1 00:00:04,750 --> 00:00:05,919 >> Welcome back to this weekly 2 00:00:05,919 --> 00:00:06,619 meeting of the Health and 3 00:00:06,619 --> 00:00:09,190 Safety Committee with Denver 4 00:00:12,259 --> 00:00:12,926 City Council. Coverage of the 5 00:00:12,926 --> 00:00:15,326 health and Safety Committee 6 00:00:15,361 --> 00:00:17,361 starts now. 7 00:00:25,839 --> 00:00:26,539 >> good morning. This is the 8 00:00:26,539 --> 00:00:27,173 MARCH 18,000 Safety Committee 9 00:00:27,173 --> 00:00:29,442 meeting on mines. Darrell 10 00:00:29,442 --> 00:00:30,743 Watson. I'm honored to serve 11 00:00:30,743 --> 00:00:32,780 as the chair of this committee 12 00:00:32,780 --> 00:00:32,946 as well as the city council 13 00:00:32,946 --> 00:00:35,946 member representing all of the 14 00:00:36,816 --> 00:00:38,618 fine district 9. We have on 15 00:00:38,618 --> 00:00:41,521 the agenda this morning. An 16 00:00:41,521 --> 00:00:43,656 action for the Axon contract 17 00:00:43,656 --> 00:00:44,657 before we roll into this 18 00:00:44,657 --> 00:00:45,358 presentation. When we start 19 00:00:45,358 --> 00:00:46,926 introductions by city council 20 00:00:46,926 --> 00:00:49,326 members starting on right. 21 00:00:50,763 --> 00:00:51,764 >> Thanks sure. Kevin Flynn 22 00:00:51,764 --> 00:00:54,164 from Southwest numbers locally 23 00:00:57,690 --> 00:00:57,771 District little. Is there any 24 00:00:57,771 --> 00:01:00,874 wonder to council is a large 25 00:01:00,874 --> 00:01:01,407 from the entire police 26 00:01:01,407 --> 00:01:02,410 Boulder, Loveland. 27 00:01:02,410 --> 00:01:02,675 >> In tourists from West 28 00:01:02,675 --> 00:01:05,750 Denver district, 3 men to 29 00:01:07,580 --> 00:01:08,114 district 5. Cashman South 100 30 00:01:08,114 --> 00:01:08,848 district. 31 00:01:08,848 --> 00:01:10,617 >> Good morning. Everyone said 32 00:01:10,617 --> 00:01:13,653 in a Gonzales, also from have 33 00:01:13,653 --> 00:01:16,653 large lovely city of Denver. 34 00:01:17,691 --> 00:01:18,658 It does like a district 7. 35 00:01:18,658 --> 00:01:20,526 >> Also, we'll turn it over to 36 00:01:20,526 --> 00:01:22,628 Tim Hoffman for the 37 00:01:22,628 --> 00:01:23,228 presentation. And you think 38 00:01:23,228 --> 00:01:25,228 announcement on oldest 39 00:01:26,532 --> 00:01:27,834 introduced myself a lot of it 40 00:01:27,834 --> 00:01:28,869 the team introduced themselves 41 00:01:28,869 --> 00:01:29,536 as well. My name is Tim 42 00:01:29,536 --> 00:01:31,738 Hoffman. I'm in the Mayor's 43 00:01:31,738 --> 00:01:32,939 services, stricter policy. And 44 00:01:32,939 --> 00:01:35,939 good morning. Cliff Barnes. I 45 00:01:36,175 --> 00:01:36,876 up commander of our side your 46 00:01:36,876 --> 00:01:39,546 >> Tears to grow depiction of 47 00:01:39,546 --> 00:01:41,546 certain knowledge services. 48 00:01:41,614 --> 00:01:43,850 >> And we're here today to 49 00:01:43,850 --> 00:01:44,551 talk about license plate or 50 00:01:44,551 --> 00:01:47,551 your contract with Axon that 51 00:01:48,254 --> 00:01:48,955 closing. Through a couple 52 00:01:48,955 --> 00:01:50,990 slides and over to come into 53 00:01:50,990 --> 00:01:53,860 Barnes, talk through some of 54 00:01:53,860 --> 00:01:55,929 the specifics the details 55 00:01:55,929 --> 00:01:58,431 before you jump in. Kind of 56 00:01:58,431 --> 00:01:59,980 jumped ahead of protocol and 57 00:01:59,980 --> 00:01:59,632 Anyone was online or their 58 00:01:59,632 --> 00:02:01,632 producers are many 59 00:02:09,842 --> 00:02:10,743 councilmembers Seeing none 60 00:02:10,743 --> 00:02:13,743 sorry staff turn a battery. 61 00:02:15,715 --> 00:02:16,983 It's okay. So the contract 62 00:02:16,983 --> 00:02:18,983 details here. It's $150,000 63 00:02:19,619 --> 00:02:22,190 one year contract. Obviously 64 00:02:24,490 --> 00:02:25,157 the $150,000 Alec is below the 65 00:02:25,157 --> 00:02:25,858 normal $500,000 threshold. 66 00:02:25,858 --> 00:02:28,858 That would trigger a council 67 00:02:29,428 --> 00:02:30,960 action. The administration, 68 00:02:30,960 --> 00:02:30,763 the mayor are bringing this 69 00:02:30,763 --> 00:02:33,163 contract through the formal 70 00:02:34,100 --> 00:02:34,934 city council process, 71 00:02:34,934 --> 00:02:37,334 including in this committee 72 00:02:38,704 --> 00:02:39,706 and the full Council based on 73 00:02:39,706 --> 00:02:40,907 the promises that the mayor 74 00:02:40,907 --> 00:02:41,608 made when we were going 75 00:02:41,608 --> 00:02:43,509 through the last 10 years, no 76 00:02:43,509 --> 00:02:45,509 cost contract extension. 77 00:02:47,246 --> 00:02:48,548 They're request today is to 78 00:02:48,548 --> 00:02:51,548 vote to delay this contract, 79 00:02:52,180 --> 00:02:52,685 which is resolution. 26 a 0, 80 00:02:52,685 --> 00:02:54,685 2, 4, 6, tweedy certain of 81 00:02:55,755 --> 00:02:57,690 MARCH 18th in the Health and 82 00:02:57,690 --> 00:02:59,859 Safety Committee. That is due 83 00:02:59,859 --> 00:03:02,595 to the fact we and our 84 00:03:02,595 --> 00:03:04,697 discussions with you all 85 00:03:04,697 --> 00:03:05,365 promised that before this item 86 00:03:05,365 --> 00:03:06,900 appeared in committee would 87 00:03:06,900 --> 00:03:07,634 get you a copy of the actual 88 00:03:07,634 --> 00:03:09,836 contract for you to review and 89 00:03:09,836 --> 00:03:12,739 to be able ask questions 90 00:03:12,739 --> 00:03:14,207 about. We getting pretty close 91 00:03:14,207 --> 00:03:15,942 to having that prepared fee, 92 00:03:15,942 --> 00:03:17,777 but it was not ready in a 93 00:03:17,777 --> 00:03:19,812 timely manner to present to 94 00:03:19,812 --> 00:03:20,881 you in advance to get even 95 00:03:20,881 --> 00:03:22,515 time to review. And so we're 96 00:03:22,515 --> 00:03:23,249 asking we're going to do the 97 00:03:23,249 --> 00:03:26,249 presentation today. We want to 98 00:03:26,385 --> 00:03:28,454 have keeping a in a discussion 99 00:03:28,454 --> 00:03:29,355 on it and get you all the 100 00:03:29,355 --> 00:03:30,230 actual contract with a little 101 00:03:30,230 --> 00:03:32,292 bit more time to review it 102 00:03:32,292 --> 00:03:33,393 before it comes back to 103 00:03:33,393 --> 00:03:34,494 committee for for further 104 00:03:34,494 --> 00:03:35,928 discussion before moving on to 105 00:03:35,928 --> 00:03:36,629 the full council. So just want 106 00:03:36,629 --> 00:03:40,829 to level. So the fact is the 107 00:03:42,736 --> 00:03:43,343 request today. It's often with 108 00:03:43,343 --> 00:03:43,970 that we here of your 109 00:03:43,970 --> 00:03:45,970 presentation questions from 110 00:03:46,539 --> 00:03:47,807 City Council members. 111 00:03:47,807 --> 00:03:48,941 >> put forward that request to 112 00:03:48,941 --> 00:03:50,710 delay action on into next 113 00:03:50,710 --> 00:03:53,713 week. One of the things I want 114 00:03:53,713 --> 00:03:54,380 insist upon is that that 115 00:03:54,380 --> 00:03:55,315 contract see by Friday. And 116 00:03:55,315 --> 00:03:58,315 can you stipulate that that 117 00:03:58,852 --> 00:03:59,786 has been the discussion, what 118 00:03:59,786 --> 00:04:00,953 acts on and with the city that 119 00:04:00,953 --> 00:04:03,353 we have, actual contract 120 00:04:04,724 --> 00:04:05,391 available by Friday. 121 00:04:05,391 --> 00:04:06,920 >> Yeah, we're we're we're 122 00:04:06,920 --> 00:04:06,793 pushing towards. We can make 123 00:04:06,793 --> 00:04:07,626 sure that you guys have ample 124 00:04:07,626 --> 00:04:08,328 time to review and understand 125 00:04:08,328 --> 00:04:10,730 that before the weekend is is 126 00:04:10,730 --> 00:04:11,397 where that needs to be in. 127 00:04:11,397 --> 00:04:14,397 Obviously we'll we'll be in 128 00:04:17,603 --> 00:04:18,303 touch as things progress. So I 129 00:04:18,303 --> 00:04:21,474 want to be clear on see they 130 00:04:21,474 --> 00:04:22,208 had contracted next week. 131 00:04:22,208 --> 00:04:22,842 >> Still will not provide time 132 00:04:22,842 --> 00:04:25,645 for us to be able to vote 133 00:04:25,645 --> 00:04:29,245 fully on that by Wednesday. So 134 00:04:29,448 --> 00:04:30,830 I want to put on the that by 135 00:04:30,830 --> 00:04:31,818 end of this week, it is 136 00:04:31,818 --> 00:04:34,218 essential. We have that 137 00:04:35,321 --> 00:04:35,921 contract. Understood. Thank 138 00:04:35,921 --> 00:04:38,321 Co-chair icu rework its 139 00:04:42,128 --> 00:04:45,131 server. It's a got so the the 140 00:04:45,131 --> 00:04:45,998 request was by Friday's sooner 141 00:04:45,998 --> 00:04:48,101 is requested. If there's 142 00:04:48,101 --> 00:04:49,680 anything that we need to do to 143 00:04:49,680 --> 00:04:50,837 help with moving that this has 144 00:04:50,837 --> 00:04:51,904 been a long process. We want 145 00:04:51,904 --> 00:04:56,104 to get to voting on this and 146 00:04:59,144 --> 00:05:00,513 we cannot without a contract. 147 00:05:00,513 --> 00:05:02,480 Good morning council members. 148 00:05:02,480 --> 00:05:02,815 I know that I'm most of you 149 00:05:02,815 --> 00:05:03,616 have seen the the presentation 150 00:05:03,616 --> 00:05:07,216 of this point and deaths. All 151 00:05:07,386 --> 00:05:08,488 try to keep the this morning. 152 00:05:08,488 --> 00:05:09,689 There's been a slight change. 153 00:05:09,689 --> 00:05:10,723 I think I can at this earlier 154 00:05:10,723 --> 00:05:13,723 in the week during the 155 00:05:13,893 --> 00:05:14,927 one-on-one briefings instead 156 00:05:14,927 --> 00:05:16,595 of having, you know, 1, 2, 157 00:05:16,595 --> 00:05:18,297 different types of cameras 158 00:05:18,297 --> 00:05:19,310 essentially in this contract. 159 00:05:19,310 --> 00:05:20,733 It's just going to be one type 160 00:05:20,733 --> 00:05:23,133 of cameras receiving 50 acts 161 00:05:27,306 --> 00:05:28,306 on outpost cameras. It for 162 00:05:28,306 --> 00:05:29,575 150,001 year contract even 163 00:05:29,575 --> 00:05:31,444 though it's a one-year 164 00:05:31,444 --> 00:05:32,412 contract. There's a multi year 165 00:05:32,412 --> 00:05:34,412 warranty maintenance agreement 166 00:05:36,416 --> 00:05:37,450 with those 50 devices. In 167 00:05:37,450 --> 00:05:39,318 addition, we also obtain 168 00:05:39,318 --> 00:05:40,320 access to the software 169 00:05:40,320 --> 00:05:41,530 application or sweet that 170 00:05:41,530 --> 00:05:44,530 allows our users to utilize 171 00:05:44,924 --> 00:05:46,580 the lpr devices. There has 172 00:05:46,580 --> 00:05:46,692 been. And I know we went 173 00:05:46,692 --> 00:05:47,293 through some of this, but 174 00:05:47,293 --> 00:05:47,994 there has been a lot of 175 00:05:47,994 --> 00:05:50,394 scrutiny during this process 176 00:05:51,130 --> 00:05:51,831 in regards to data protection 177 00:05:51,831 --> 00:05:54,231 and safeguard surrounding the 178 00:05:54,901 --> 00:05:55,701 system based on the feedback 179 00:05:55,701 --> 00:05:56,636 that we've received from 180 00:05:56,636 --> 00:05:57,336 various converse in various 181 00:05:57,336 --> 00:05:59,736 conversations. And from that 182 00:06:00,640 --> 00:06:01,306 from the community. So, for 183 00:06:01,306 --> 00:06:03,176 example, with the software 184 00:06:03,176 --> 00:06:05,576 application when users utilize 185 00:06:06,112 --> 00:06:06,779 that they are required to put 186 00:06:06,779 --> 00:06:10,820 in a case number and reason 187 00:06:10,820 --> 00:06:11,830 for each brewery as are 188 00:06:11,830 --> 00:06:11,983 utilizing the system in all of 189 00:06:11,983 --> 00:06:12,718 those. All of that, all the 190 00:06:12,718 --> 00:06:14,921 screen transactions are stored 191 00:06:14,921 --> 00:06:17,921 in an immutable for further 192 00:06:19,259 --> 00:06:20,293 auditing and We're going to 193 00:06:20,293 --> 00:06:22,195 get much more to the details 194 00:06:22,195 --> 00:06:22,862 of the protections that are 195 00:06:22,862 --> 00:06:23,529 going to be built into this 196 00:06:23,529 --> 00:06:26,529 agreement with acts on. But 197 00:06:26,532 --> 00:06:28,932 just a high level. 198 00:06:29,202 --> 00:06:29,869 >> access to the APRIL ale pr 199 00:06:29,869 --> 00:06:30,503 system with acts on can be 200 00:06:30,503 --> 00:06:32,903 limited to Denver safety 201 00:06:34,273 --> 00:06:35,775 personnel only. That includes 202 00:06:35,775 --> 00:06:36,442 a couple of arson 203 00:06:36,442 --> 00:06:37,243 investigators from the fire 204 00:06:37,243 --> 00:06:37,977 department, but by and large 205 00:06:37,977 --> 00:06:38,578 will be police officers. But a 206 00:06:38,578 --> 00:06:40,120 couple of other safety 207 00:06:40,120 --> 00:06:42,412 personnel and vehicles. Axel 208 00:06:43,850 --> 00:06:47,530 and as a company does not have 209 00:06:47,530 --> 00:06:47,720 a national database national 210 00:06:47,720 --> 00:06:50,720 lookup feature. So it's not 211 00:06:51,220 --> 00:06:51,724 something that we're going to 212 00:06:51,724 --> 00:06:53,960 be enrolled into common. Any 213 00:06:53,960 --> 00:06:54,626 or fashion of access is really 214 00:06:54,626 --> 00:06:55,328 just going to shut down to 215 00:06:55,328 --> 00:06:58,328 police officers and a couple 216 00:06:58,965 --> 00:06:59,899 of other safety personnel. 217 00:06:59,899 --> 00:07:01,934 Denver will. It's going to be 218 00:07:01,934 --> 00:07:03,836 made clear in that contract. 219 00:07:03,836 --> 00:07:05,400 It's also something that acts 220 00:07:05,400 --> 00:07:05,637 on spells out in their 221 00:07:05,637 --> 00:07:06,706 policies and procedures. 222 00:07:06,706 --> 00:07:08,474 Denver will own and control 223 00:07:08,474 --> 00:07:11,644 its own There won't be any 224 00:07:11,644 --> 00:07:12,845 sort of using our meta data to 225 00:07:12,845 --> 00:07:15,515 train ai models. There's not 226 00:07:15,515 --> 00:07:16,648 going to be selling any of 227 00:07:16,648 --> 00:07:19,648 license plate reader. GOD of 228 00:07:19,752 --> 00:07:20,486 to 3rd parties or anything 229 00:07:20,486 --> 00:07:23,486 like that, commuter van. We'll 230 00:07:23,522 --> 00:07:24,222 talk about the the level data 231 00:07:24,222 --> 00:07:27,159 security that acts on uses. I 232 00:07:27,159 --> 00:07:28,461 think of the find vendors who 233 00:07:28,461 --> 00:07:30,496 applied in this rfp process 234 00:07:30,496 --> 00:07:34,960 acts on had the highest level 235 00:07:36,302 --> 00:07:37,103 data security. We are reducing 236 00:07:37,103 --> 00:07:40,103 the retention policy in the 237 00:07:40,773 --> 00:07:41,474 city is currently license 238 00:07:41,474 --> 00:07:43,874 plate reader information. We 239 00:07:44,142 --> 00:07:44,844 retain that data for 30 days. 240 00:07:44,844 --> 00:07:47,113 We're reducing that to 21 241 00:07:47,113 --> 00:07:50,113 days. Moving forward with this 242 00:07:50,616 --> 00:07:51,284 new contract. Then commuter 243 00:07:51,284 --> 00:07:51,983 Barnes, we get into this in 244 00:07:51,983 --> 00:07:54,253 much more detail. That access 245 00:07:54,253 --> 00:07:54,921 to the system is logging on 246 00:07:54,921 --> 00:07:57,590 and the commander can talk 247 00:07:57,590 --> 00:07:58,257 about the process by which 248 00:07:58,257 --> 00:07:58,857 safety staff make sure that 249 00:07:58,857 --> 00:08:00,857 that's being regularly 250 00:08:06,399 --> 00:08:08,399 checked. 251 00:08:08,801 --> 00:08:09,602 >> So as I as Mr Hop and 252 00:08:09,602 --> 00:08:10,336 related the there were 6 total 253 00:08:10,336 --> 00:08:11,300 bidders are one. There is one 254 00:08:11,300 --> 00:08:11,671 matter that pulled out. So, 255 00:08:11,671 --> 00:08:14,273 you know, in the end, her 5 256 00:08:14,273 --> 00:08:16,673 daughters that were considered 257 00:08:17,376 --> 00:08:18,440 in this process, acts on 258 00:08:18,440 --> 00:08:20,179 vendor brought the highest 259 00:08:20,179 --> 00:08:22,140 level security to the table 260 00:08:22,140 --> 00:08:24,160 with a fed fed ramp high 261 00:08:24,160 --> 00:08:25,510 authorization. This 262 00:08:25,510 --> 00:08:27,451 essentially that the highest 263 00:08:28,854 --> 00:08:30,220 level of of federal cloud 264 00:08:30,220 --> 00:08:30,622 security standards. And really 265 00:08:30,622 --> 00:08:33,590 what that amounts to is 266 00:08:33,590 --> 00:08:34,930 there's there's over 392 267 00:08:34,930 --> 00:08:35,161 individual security standards 268 00:08:35,161 --> 00:08:35,962 or controls that the vendor 269 00:08:35,962 --> 00:08:36,662 has to comply with and show 270 00:08:36,662 --> 00:08:39,620 that they're compliant order 271 00:08:41,134 --> 00:08:44,734 to achieve that. One of the 272 00:08:45,638 --> 00:08:46,304 specific items that my was 273 00:08:46,304 --> 00:08:46,939 sure to ask each vendor is, 274 00:08:46,939 --> 00:08:47,673 you know, there are some 275 00:08:47,673 --> 00:08:50,730 concerns about other platforms 276 00:08:51,277 --> 00:08:52,143 that MAY have, you know, the 277 00:08:52,143 --> 00:08:55,143 15 it was recovered off of 278 00:08:55,381 --> 00:08:56,820 other types of the lpr 279 00:08:56,820 --> 00:08:56,782 platforms somewhere somewhere 280 00:08:56,782 --> 00:08:58,351 to be able to obtain physical 281 00:08:58,351 --> 00:08:59,218 access to the devices. So we 282 00:08:59,218 --> 00:09:00,985 have some really targeting 283 00:09:00,985 --> 00:09:03,985 questions of each vendor in 284 00:09:05,570 --> 00:09:06,192 that regard. Attacks on uses 285 00:09:06,192 --> 00:09:07,193 industry standard level of 286 00:09:07,193 --> 00:09:07,793 encryption on the device 287 00:09:07,793 --> 00:09:10,793 itself. So the data is 288 00:09:11,663 --> 00:09:14,533 encrypted at rest. And in 289 00:09:14,533 --> 00:09:16,369 addition to that, as images 290 00:09:16,369 --> 00:09:19,369 are collected and uploaded to 291 00:09:19,538 --> 00:09:20,720 the evidence dot com Cloud 292 00:09:20,720 --> 00:09:20,773 repository. They're 293 00:09:20,773 --> 00:09:23,173 immediately removed from the 294 00:09:23,342 --> 00:09:24,100 local device. What makes the 295 00:09:24,100 --> 00:09:24,677 recovery of any evidence or 296 00:09:24,677 --> 00:09:27,677 data from the device. Very 297 00:09:28,881 --> 00:09:30,649 improbable. And additionally, 298 00:09:30,649 --> 00:09:32,451 axons compliant with a lot of 299 00:09:32,451 --> 00:09:34,386 other standards. So nist 300 00:09:34,386 --> 00:09:36,222 center up. We also 301 00:09:36,222 --> 00:09:38,622 specifically asked each vendor 302 00:09:39,925 --> 00:09:40,526 if you know, perform manual 303 00:09:40,526 --> 00:09:41,594 third-party penetration 304 00:09:41,594 --> 00:09:43,362 testing, which they do when 305 00:09:43,362 --> 00:09:45,231 they provide us those results 306 00:09:45,231 --> 00:09:46,132 annually. Additionally, we 307 00:09:46,132 --> 00:09:48,634 asked if the city county of 308 00:09:48,634 --> 00:09:49,502 Denver could perform their own 309 00:09:49,502 --> 00:09:51,902 penetration testing on these 310 00:09:52,405 --> 00:09:54,573 devices to make sure you know, 311 00:09:54,573 --> 00:09:55,374 we can also check to make sure 312 00:09:55,374 --> 00:09:56,750 that they're complying with 313 00:09:56,750 --> 00:09:56,776 their security standards, for 314 00:09:56,776 --> 00:09:58,743 example, that the technology 315 00:09:58,743 --> 00:10:01,143 services security team could 316 00:10:01,180 --> 00:10:01,847 do that and day acknowledged 317 00:10:01,847 --> 00:10:02,481 and said that they would be 318 00:10:02,481 --> 00:10:06,810 willing to allow us to do 319 00:10:06,152 --> 00:10:08,552 that. Interesting testing. And 320 00:10:09,855 --> 00:10:10,523 really worth mentioning these 321 00:10:10,523 --> 00:10:12,523 devices integrate directly 322 00:10:13,859 --> 00:10:14,460 with the evidence dot com 323 00:10:14,460 --> 00:10:15,161 secure digital evidence 324 00:10:15,161 --> 00:10:16,620 repository that the city and 325 00:10:16,620 --> 00:10:16,929 county of Denver is used for 326 00:10:16,929 --> 00:10:20,529 many years. Acts on is the 327 00:10:20,733 --> 00:10:22,167 provider of that. But that is 328 00:10:22,167 --> 00:10:25,767 where all of data and evidence 329 00:10:29,642 --> 00:10:31,710 is securely managed in stores. 330 00:10:31,710 --> 00:10:32,645 I know the 2 mentioned that 331 00:10:32,645 --> 00:10:34,413 there's, you know, we're 332 00:10:34,413 --> 00:10:35,414 working on on various types of 333 00:10:35,414 --> 00:10:36,248 insurance, isn't controls that 334 00:10:36,248 --> 00:10:38,160 that we retain complete 335 00:10:38,160 --> 00:10:40,860 control and ownership over our 336 00:10:40,860 --> 00:10:41,620 data. I know that he did 337 00:10:41,620 --> 00:10:42,387 mention that are team during 338 00:10:42,387 --> 00:10:44,787 this process, asked very 339 00:10:45,223 --> 00:10:46,258 specifically targeting 340 00:10:46,258 --> 00:10:48,394 questions about will you 341 00:10:48,394 --> 00:10:50,329 resell or provider data in any 342 00:10:50,329 --> 00:10:52,164 way to any 3rd parties and 343 00:10:52,164 --> 00:10:52,932 axons response was no, it's 344 00:10:52,932 --> 00:10:53,566 fairly very clearly outlined 345 00:10:53,566 --> 00:10:55,966 in their data governance 346 00:10:56,868 --> 00:10:57,570 documents and policies. 347 00:10:57,570 --> 00:10:58,270 Additionally, I know that to 348 00:10:58,270 --> 00:10:58,971 mention this as well. They do 349 00:10:58,971 --> 00:11:03,171 not use any of our data to 350 00:11:03,442 --> 00:11:05,244 train any ai models. Also that 351 00:11:05,244 --> 00:11:06,579 that language is being built 352 00:11:06,579 --> 00:11:07,213 into the contract. So there's 353 00:11:07,213 --> 00:11:07,913 going to be like I said, 354 00:11:07,913 --> 00:11:10,313 numerous levels of assurances 355 00:11:12,384 --> 00:11:13,518 of that. I know that I'm also 356 00:11:13,518 --> 00:11:14,286 mentioned that platform is 357 00:11:14,286 --> 00:11:16,488 inherently different some of 358 00:11:16,488 --> 00:11:17,890 the other competitors in the 359 00:11:17,890 --> 00:11:18,591 market and that there is no 360 00:11:18,591 --> 00:11:19,992 nationwide ensuring that work 361 00:11:19,992 --> 00:11:22,992 for the specific platform all 362 00:11:23,270 --> 00:11:24,196 in all data sharing is is like 363 00:11:24,196 --> 00:11:24,897 a one to one relationship 364 00:11:24,897 --> 00:11:26,132 between one agency to another 365 00:11:26,132 --> 00:11:29,132 agency and invite only fully 366 00:11:31,770 --> 00:11:32,904 revoke a bull. So there is no, 367 00:11:32,904 --> 00:11:35,141 there's no pathway for, you 368 00:11:35,141 --> 00:11:35,741 know, inadvertently being 369 00:11:35,741 --> 00:11:36,408 enrolled in any type of 370 00:11:36,408 --> 00:11:38,408 nationwide sharing network 371 00:11:41,780 --> 00:11:42,615 cetera. The get into a little 372 00:11:42,615 --> 00:11:43,682 bit more. But I did mention 373 00:11:43,682 --> 00:11:44,350 earlier that there is an 374 00:11:44,350 --> 00:11:46,750 immutable lock, every user 375 00:11:46,752 --> 00:11:48,870 that accesses the system, the 376 00:11:48,870 --> 00:11:50,523 way in which they access the 377 00:11:50,523 --> 00:11:51,256 system date and time with the 378 00:11:51,256 --> 00:11:51,991 reason the system for has long 379 00:11:51,991 --> 00:11:55,394 been all talk about the policy 380 00:11:55,394 --> 00:11:56,695 surrounding that here shortly. 381 00:11:56,695 --> 00:11:57,429 And then as part of our our 382 00:11:57,429 --> 00:11:59,664 Dean ownership guarantees acts 383 00:11:59,664 --> 00:12:01,400 on in their data governance 384 00:12:01,400 --> 00:12:03,400 documents explicitly outline 385 00:12:03,602 --> 00:12:04,502 they receive any type of legal 386 00:12:04,502 --> 00:12:06,902 requests of subpoenas, court 387 00:12:07,173 --> 00:12:10,173 orders, cetera, for for data, 388 00:12:10,176 --> 00:12:10,843 then they refer that directly 389 00:12:10,843 --> 00:12:11,543 to the customer's city and 390 00:12:11,543 --> 00:12:12,211 county of Denver in this case 391 00:12:12,211 --> 00:12:14,546 so that our legal teams and 392 00:12:14,546 --> 00:12:15,247 city attorney's office can 393 00:12:15,247 --> 00:12:17,216 respond accordingly to those 394 00:12:17,216 --> 00:12:19,216 to those request. 395 00:12:24,222 --> 00:12:25,290 And numerous policy safeguards 396 00:12:25,290 --> 00:12:26,192 that that are in place today 397 00:12:26,192 --> 00:12:29,792 and will remain in place. This 398 00:12:30,620 --> 00:12:30,763 is not you know, a a 399 00:12:30,763 --> 00:12:31,964 completely conclusive list of 400 00:12:31,964 --> 00:12:32,698 every policy controls in 401 00:12:32,698 --> 00:12:35,167 place. But I feel like there's 402 00:12:35,167 --> 00:12:36,335 there's a few that are There's 403 00:12:36,335 --> 00:12:37,169 a mandatory training 404 00:12:37,169 --> 00:12:39,569 requirement for every user 405 00:12:39,838 --> 00:12:41,774 that's on board the system. So 406 00:12:41,774 --> 00:12:43,809 as the the Axon platform is 407 00:12:43,809 --> 00:12:45,511 implemented, all users will 408 00:12:45,511 --> 00:12:46,445 have to go mandatory training. 409 00:12:46,445 --> 00:12:47,112 Part of that training is 410 00:12:47,112 --> 00:12:49,512 outlining acceptable use of 411 00:12:50,816 --> 00:12:52,840 the platform. These devices 412 00:12:52,840 --> 00:12:54,720 MAY only be deployed and used 413 00:12:54,720 --> 00:12:56,322 areas of the city that there 414 00:12:56,322 --> 00:12:56,989 were. There is no reasonable 415 00:12:56,989 --> 00:12:57,690 expectation of privacy. So 416 00:12:57,690 --> 00:13:00,690 public areas public right of 417 00:13:02,627 --> 00:13:03,729 way. There are numerous 418 00:13:03,729 --> 00:13:04,462 explicitly prohibit uses in 419 00:13:04,462 --> 00:13:07,266 policy. And these are just a 420 00:13:07,266 --> 00:13:10,266 handful that I think it's 421 00:13:10,369 --> 00:13:11,403 worth mentioning any type of 422 00:13:11,403 --> 00:13:13,205 First Amendment violation or 423 00:13:13,205 --> 00:13:13,906 any type of monitoring is 424 00:13:13,906 --> 00:13:15,941 expressly prohibited when it 425 00:13:15,941 --> 00:13:18,378 comes to to First Amendment 426 00:13:18,378 --> 00:13:19,511 rights to any type of 427 00:13:19,511 --> 00:13:21,511 discriminatory use, harassing 428 00:13:21,680 --> 00:13:23,782 or intimidating use. Also 429 00:13:23,782 --> 00:13:26,182 expressing put prohibited in 430 00:13:26,986 --> 00:13:28,821 policy parking enforcement, 431 00:13:28,821 --> 00:13:29,488 traffic enforcement, driver's 432 00:13:29,488 --> 00:13:30,155 license, inforcement in any 433 00:13:30,155 --> 00:13:33,755 type of personal use of the 434 00:13:35,127 --> 00:13:36,950 system are also prohibited. I 435 00:13:36,950 --> 00:13:37,830 know that there has been some 436 00:13:37,830 --> 00:13:40,230 some questions about how 437 00:13:40,599 --> 00:13:42,100 officers respond to pr alerts 438 00:13:42,100 --> 00:13:42,635 in general and to make sure 439 00:13:42,635 --> 00:13:44,635 that there's verification 440 00:13:45,170 --> 00:13:46,405 being performed on those 441 00:13:46,405 --> 00:13:48,173 alerts in policy. Officers are 442 00:13:48,173 --> 00:13:50,209 not allowed to conduct vehicle 443 00:13:50,209 --> 00:13:51,943 stops just based on an lpr 444 00:13:51,943 --> 00:13:52,578 alert alone. They must verify 445 00:13:52,578 --> 00:13:55,578 the validity of that. And 446 00:13:55,848 --> 00:13:56,882 that's typically done 447 00:13:56,882 --> 00:13:58,160 communication with dispatch, 448 00:13:58,160 --> 00:13:58,684 for example, to to clear a 449 00:13:58,684 --> 00:14:02,284 plea to make sure that's a 450 00:14:05,658 --> 00:14:07,660 valid earlier. Acts on vendors 451 00:14:07,660 --> 00:14:09,795 capable of respecting any data 452 00:14:09,795 --> 00:14:11,897 retention policy that that we 453 00:14:11,897 --> 00:14:12,598 wish I know to mention that 454 00:14:12,598 --> 00:14:16,198 that policy is going to be 21 455 00:14:16,802 --> 00:14:18,300 day retention policy. There is 456 00:14:18,300 --> 00:14:21,603 a an audit trail and mentioned 457 00:14:22,507 --> 00:14:23,909 couple times now on a monthly 458 00:14:23,909 --> 00:14:25,578 basis, the cyber bureau and 459 00:14:25,578 --> 00:14:27,846 dpd on the first of every 460 00:14:27,846 --> 00:14:28,781 month pulls the lpr usage logs 461 00:14:28,781 --> 00:14:30,215 and performs a number of 462 00:14:30,215 --> 00:14:32,615 different types of mechanisms 463 00:14:32,784 --> 00:14:34,152 on those laws, including 464 00:14:34,152 --> 00:14:34,853 keyword, searches and random 465 00:14:34,853 --> 00:14:37,890 audits to make sure that all 466 00:14:37,890 --> 00:14:39,325 of the usage looks to be above 467 00:14:39,325 --> 00:14:41,893 board. Then that date is also 468 00:14:41,893 --> 00:14:42,595 shared with some data analyst 469 00:14:42,595 --> 00:14:44,960 director Safety's Office for 470 00:14:44,960 --> 00:14:47,960 further review on a monthly 471 00:14:47,333 --> 00:14:48,330 basis in policy. Any officer 472 00:14:48,330 --> 00:14:48,901 that's under investigation, I 473 00:14:48,901 --> 00:14:51,604 will have their access to the 474 00:14:51,604 --> 00:14:52,704 system immediately. Revote and 475 00:14:52,704 --> 00:14:53,305 that will stay suspended until 476 00:14:53,305 --> 00:14:56,305 for the duration of the 477 00:14:57,710 --> 00:15:00,710 investigation. As far as as 478 00:15:00,713 --> 00:15:02,140 far as to sharing I just 479 00:15:02,140 --> 00:15:02,648 wanted to this isn't policy. I 480 00:15:02,648 --> 00:15:03,348 just wanted to outline a 481 00:15:03,348 --> 00:15:06,850 couple of of of our policies 482 00:15:06,850 --> 00:15:08,200 surrounding data sharing. We 483 00:15:08,200 --> 00:15:11,200 only share data from the 484 00:15:11,123 --> 00:15:12,124 system when there's an 485 00:15:12,124 --> 00:15:14,124 official law enforcement 486 00:15:14,993 --> 00:15:16,993 investigations of another 487 00:15:17,960 --> 00:15:17,830 agency approaches and desires 488 00:15:17,830 --> 00:15:20,230 to collaborate investigating a 489 00:15:21,133 --> 00:15:22,266 certain crime has to be an 490 00:15:22,266 --> 00:15:23,402 official investigation. That 491 00:15:23,402 --> 00:15:24,970 crime that's at the center of 492 00:15:24,970 --> 00:15:26,839 that investigation has to be a 493 00:15:26,839 --> 00:15:28,974 crime. Under Colorado state 494 00:15:28,974 --> 00:15:32,100 law. So if it's if it's a 495 00:15:32,100 --> 00:15:32,745 crime somewhere else. But 496 00:15:32,745 --> 00:15:33,312 there are specific protections 497 00:15:33,312 --> 00:15:33,846 and safeguards are in 498 00:15:33,846 --> 00:15:34,580 Colorado. In those 499 00:15:34,580 --> 00:15:37,490 circumstances, we do not share 500 00:15:37,490 --> 00:15:37,916 data. That's a policy and 501 00:15:37,916 --> 00:15:39,180 additional call out is we will 502 00:15:39,180 --> 00:15:39,685 not share data to a 503 00:15:39,685 --> 00:15:42,850 prosecution related to any 504 00:15:42,821 --> 00:15:45,821 type of reproductive care If 505 00:15:47,960 --> 00:15:48,694 that wasn't enough to tear. I 506 00:15:48,694 --> 00:15:51,230 want to add too much 200 times 507 00:15:51,230 --> 00:15:52,331 covered. Most of it. 508 00:15:52,331 --> 00:15:55,331 >> Although we did conduct a 509 00:15:55,867 --> 00:15:56,467 vendor assessment on axon, it 510 00:15:56,467 --> 00:15:57,360 was a 2 full assessment 511 00:15:57,360 --> 00:15:59,360 because our internal 512 00:16:00,720 --> 00:16:00,772 questionnaire that based and 513 00:16:00,772 --> 00:16:03,375 then we also are a provision 514 00:16:03,375 --> 00:16:05,611 access to the at SunTrust 515 00:16:05,611 --> 00:16:08,611 Center where we could access 516 00:16:09,147 --> 00:16:09,848 applicable security and 517 00:16:09,848 --> 00:16:12,248 policies and other documents 518 00:16:14,353 --> 00:16:16,121 associated to Exxon. So it 519 00:16:16,121 --> 00:16:18,521 approved from seclusion and 520 00:16:18,757 --> 00:16:20,192 technology services and 521 00:16:20,192 --> 00:16:21,860 privacy. They should also know 522 00:16:21,860 --> 00:16:25,460 our price. Your view include a 523 00:16:25,597 --> 00:16:26,298 review of the ai It standards. 524 00:16:26,298 --> 00:16:28,298 National Institute Standards 525 00:16:30,969 --> 00:16:32,537 and Technology. It also 526 00:16:32,537 --> 00:16:33,171 reviewed and approved for the 527 00:16:33,171 --> 00:16:35,171 architecture information. 528 00:16:37,376 --> 00:16:39,776 Security. Ada, compliance and 529 00:16:41,880 --> 00:16:42,614 records management. You know, 530 00:16:42,614 --> 00:16:43,348 when we're doing a vendor risk 531 00:16:43,348 --> 00:16:44,160 assessment, we're looking at 532 00:16:44,160 --> 00:16:46,416 compliance. But we're also 533 00:16:46,785 --> 00:16:47,453 looking at risk reduction and 534 00:16:47,453 --> 00:16:48,153 ensuring that we're getting 535 00:16:48,153 --> 00:16:51,753 the right vendor at the right 536 00:16:52,157 --> 00:16:55,157 type of technology for that 537 00:16:55,994 --> 00:16:56,695 business or the need city. So 538 00:16:56,695 --> 00:16:59,695 it's really important to call 539 00:16:59,864 --> 00:17:01,834 out within vendor risk 540 00:17:01,834 --> 00:17:03,834 assessment conducting the 541 00:17:04,536 --> 00:17:07,536 privacy review and the review 542 00:17:08,474 --> 00:17:12,740 the technology at offers a lot 543 00:17:12,778 --> 00:17:13,512 of operational technology. 544 00:17:13,512 --> 00:17:15,512 Modern technology capabilities 545 00:17:16,810 --> 00:17:17,716 that reduces our risk by the 546 00:17:17,716 --> 00:17:19,716 information is collecting 547 00:17:19,852 --> 00:17:22,852 being minimized and then also 548 00:17:24,222 --> 00:17:26,222 from organizational policies. 549 00:17:26,792 --> 00:17:27,425 You know, often my team will 550 00:17:27,425 --> 00:17:29,825 joke around data. Privacy 551 00:17:30,963 --> 00:17:31,663 policy is just a way for. 552 00:17:31,663 --> 00:17:34,650 Organization to tell us that 553 00:17:34,650 --> 00:17:34,766 we have no privacy because 554 00:17:34,766 --> 00:17:35,434 they're telling us all of the 555 00:17:35,434 --> 00:17:37,435 different ways the data is 556 00:17:37,435 --> 00:17:40,305 being used and shared. I would 557 00:17:40,305 --> 00:17:41,240 say that when we reviewed Axon 558 00:17:41,240 --> 00:17:41,874 and we looked at the various 559 00:17:41,874 --> 00:17:44,274 privacy practices and the 560 00:17:45,543 --> 00:17:48,543 organization as a whole. It 561 00:17:48,647 --> 00:17:49,281 allows us to have ownership 562 00:17:49,281 --> 00:17:50,150 commander, bronze and tin 563 00:17:50,150 --> 00:17:51,583 spoke about know, allows us to 564 00:17:51,583 --> 00:17:53,819 have control over data. So 565 00:17:53,819 --> 00:17:56,870 definitely worthwhile to call 566 00:17:56,870 --> 00:17:56,822 out when looking at the 567 00:17:56,822 --> 00:17:59,222 Obviously, there's always risk 568 00:17:59,458 --> 00:18:00,825 when we work with any 569 00:18:00,825 --> 00:18:02,194 technology vendor. But when we 570 00:18:02,194 --> 00:18:02,894 when we look at as a whole and 571 00:18:02,894 --> 00:18:06,494 we're trying to create a risk 572 00:18:06,532 --> 00:18:08,932 rating. Choose the right 573 00:18:09,368 --> 00:18:10,635 vendors. A lot of these 574 00:18:10,635 --> 00:18:11,337 different technology 575 00:18:11,337 --> 00:18:12,370 capabilities in the policies 576 00:18:12,370 --> 00:18:14,437 of organization really reduce 577 00:18:15,941 --> 00:18:18,777 the risk overall I will stop 578 00:18:18,777 --> 00:18:19,344 there and turned over to Tim. 579 00:18:19,344 --> 00:18:21,744 That's happy to take 580 00:18:23,516 --> 00:18:26,451 questions. Thank you so much 581 00:18:26,451 --> 00:18:27,285 for the presentation. We have 582 00:18:27,285 --> 00:18:27,920 a to that started. It started 583 00:18:27,920 --> 00:18:29,287 with councilmember parody 584 00:18:29,287 --> 00:18:30,656 accounts cash councilmember. 585 00:18:30,656 --> 00:18:32,891 >> Thank you. Thank you so 586 00:18:32,891 --> 00:18:35,127 much. And thank you for a 587 00:18:35,127 --> 00:18:37,527 time. So hopefully things 588 00:18:38,964 --> 00:18:39,664 About this, both from the city 589 00:18:39,664 --> 00:18:43,235 came in from Axon. So coming 590 00:18:43,235 --> 00:18:46,972 out of I want to sort of 591 00:18:46,972 --> 00:18:47,639 clearly identify what I we 592 00:18:47,639 --> 00:18:48,340 have learned from from the 593 00:18:48,340 --> 00:18:49,410 flock to Michael that I hear 594 00:18:49,410 --> 00:18:52,410 being addressed here and I'm 595 00:18:52,440 --> 00:18:55,440 glad he's being addressed. One 596 00:18:55,146 --> 00:18:56,715 is the Denver will have its 597 00:18:56,715 --> 00:18:58,750 data tenant on servers that 598 00:18:58,750 --> 00:19:00,985 acts on rents from Microsoft 599 00:19:00,985 --> 00:19:01,954 Azure. And that's, of course, 600 00:19:01,954 --> 00:19:03,822 you know, the fact that that 601 00:19:03,822 --> 00:19:04,556 sort segregated from other 602 00:19:04,556 --> 00:19:08,756 cities data is a good thing. I 603 00:19:09,260 --> 00:19:10,963 did want to say and one point 604 00:19:10,963 --> 00:19:13,650 someone and it was so from the 605 00:19:13,650 --> 00:19:13,799 lobbying to not anyone from 606 00:19:13,799 --> 00:19:15,670 Exxon. And you could even MISS 607 00:19:15,670 --> 00:19:16,168 Spoke about this in a briefing 608 00:19:16,168 --> 00:19:17,269 and said that the data would 609 00:19:17,269 --> 00:19:18,937 be in Denver. So many of you 610 00:19:18,937 --> 00:19:19,605 were told that just because 611 00:19:19,605 --> 00:19:20,172 it's on the cloud, but it's 612 00:19:20,172 --> 00:19:22,172 segregated, which is 613 00:19:22,674 --> 00:19:23,875 improvement from and it won't 614 00:19:23,875 --> 00:19:24,610 be used to train. Algorithms 615 00:19:24,610 --> 00:19:26,311 will be sold and they will not 616 00:19:26,311 --> 00:19:28,714 respond to subpoenas on our 617 00:19:28,714 --> 00:19:29,581 behalf because unlike flocks 618 00:19:29,581 --> 00:19:30,182 are not apparently asking to 619 00:19:30,182 --> 00:19:32,182 maintain full permanent 620 00:19:33,785 --> 00:19:35,721 license to our data. And think 621 00:19:35,721 --> 00:19:36,555 we've been assured that we see 622 00:19:36,555 --> 00:19:37,221 this contract. It will have a 623 00:19:37,221 --> 00:19:39,257 provision around not adding 624 00:19:39,257 --> 00:19:40,292 features without consent. 625 00:19:40,292 --> 00:19:40,960 That's going to be really 626 00:19:40,960 --> 00:19:41,693 important because what I've 627 00:19:41,693 --> 00:19:42,928 learned in briefings with apps 628 00:19:42,928 --> 00:19:43,695 on is that they are working 629 00:19:43,695 --> 00:19:45,397 more of the sharing features, 630 00:19:45,397 --> 00:19:47,797 like flock, have, although 631 00:19:49,201 --> 00:19:50,468 with more user control and 632 00:19:50,468 --> 00:19:52,137 they're working on really how 633 00:19:52,137 --> 00:19:54,537 they're different from flock 634 00:19:55,273 --> 00:19:57,142 is that was essentially health 635 00:19:57,142 --> 00:19:59,144 care company? Fox on, of 636 00:19:59,144 --> 00:20:00,344 course, is all various kinds 637 00:20:00,344 --> 00:20:01,279 of surveillance systems. They 638 00:20:01,279 --> 00:20:01,880 collect a lot of different 639 00:20:01,880 --> 00:20:04,883 data. We have a ton of 640 00:20:04,883 --> 00:20:06,151 different contracts with them 641 00:20:06,151 --> 00:20:09,751 and they're sort of place in 642 00:20:09,821 --> 00:20:12,290 this market. Is 2 And so it's 643 00:20:12,290 --> 00:20:12,924 it's kind of it's a different 644 00:20:12,924 --> 00:20:13,592 concern than what I think 645 00:20:13,592 --> 00:20:16,592 that's we're focused on the 646 00:20:18,960 --> 00:20:20,198 lately. With flock. And I I do 647 00:20:20,198 --> 00:20:21,466 still have questions about in 648 00:20:21,466 --> 00:20:22,201 other cities like Seattle and 649 00:20:22,201 --> 00:20:25,403 we've talked about this in the 650 00:20:25,403 --> 00:20:27,803 surveillance task force. It 651 00:20:28,240 --> 00:20:28,907 would be a council to look at 652 00:20:28,907 --> 00:20:30,209 any new features that would 653 00:20:30,209 --> 00:20:32,177 have to lead to a new 654 00:20:32,177 --> 00:20:32,878 contract. So that's one thing 655 00:20:32,878 --> 00:20:33,578 I'm really concerned about is 656 00:20:33,578 --> 00:20:34,913 that there's just been a lot 657 00:20:34,913 --> 00:20:35,580 of very careful language from 658 00:20:35,580 --> 00:20:36,214 Exxon about well, today. We 659 00:20:36,214 --> 00:20:39,214 don't have this today. We 660 00:20:39,451 --> 00:20:40,184 don't have that. Also a 661 00:20:40,184 --> 00:20:41,186 suspect, their own pr for them 662 00:20:41,186 --> 00:20:44,786 is less developed than fox but 663 00:20:45,957 --> 00:20:47,592 for them do grown know your 664 00:20:47,592 --> 00:20:48,360 time. So first question, we 665 00:20:48,360 --> 00:20:51,797 need I really want to know 666 00:20:51,797 --> 00:20:52,497 going back to flock, what 667 00:20:52,497 --> 00:20:55,400 guarantees we will have that 668 00:20:55,400 --> 00:20:56,467 those cameras will stop 669 00:20:56,467 --> 00:20:57,602 collecting images. And it's 670 00:20:57,602 --> 00:20:59,437 not enough that they not. This 671 00:20:59,437 --> 00:21:00,104 law says they're not taking 672 00:21:00,104 --> 00:21:01,873 images because other cities 673 00:21:01,873 --> 00:21:02,974 have experienced that. They 674 00:21:02,974 --> 00:21:04,609 just simply kept cameras on 675 00:21:04,609 --> 00:21:07,900 even after contracts were 676 00:21:07,179 --> 00:21:07,879 ended. We need a timeline for 677 00:21:07,879 --> 00:21:09,881 removal, potentially hoods on 678 00:21:09,881 --> 00:21:11,483 those cameras. The minute that 679 00:21:11,483 --> 00:21:12,183 contract ends. I don't think 680 00:21:12,183 --> 00:21:15,353 that contract is legal in the 681 00:21:15,353 --> 00:21:16,687 first place the Charter. 682 00:21:16,687 --> 00:21:18,657 Regardless what it ends, those 683 00:21:18,657 --> 00:21:19,591 things need to be off. And the 684 00:21:19,591 --> 00:21:21,460 ceo when he was in my office 685 00:21:21,460 --> 00:21:22,594 told me that they cannot be 686 00:21:22,594 --> 00:21:23,361 black box. And so essentially 687 00:21:23,361 --> 00:21:24,963 they can't be manually turned 688 00:21:24,963 --> 00:21:28,330 off. You can't stop them from 689 00:21:28,330 --> 00:21:28,733 transmitting. So I think 690 00:21:28,733 --> 00:21:30,135 probably a good is engine or 691 00:21:30,135 --> 00:21:30,769 removal is the only way to do 692 00:21:30,769 --> 00:21:31,369 that. So that's my first 693 00:21:31,369 --> 00:21:33,769 question is what's the 694 00:21:35,340 --> 00:21:36,875 timeline for the cancer that 695 00:21:36,875 --> 00:21:37,809 counselor and my team has been 696 00:21:37,809 --> 00:21:40,712 tracking that down with flock 697 00:21:40,712 --> 00:21:41,379 to actually diligently this 698 00:21:41,379 --> 00:21:42,113 weekend. This MAY be new. I 699 00:21:42,113 --> 00:21:43,882 don't new this feature is, but 700 00:21:43,882 --> 00:21:45,350 they do have a decommissioned 701 00:21:45,350 --> 00:21:46,651 mode. 702 00:21:46,651 --> 00:21:48,153 >> And so fox is sure does 703 00:21:48,153 --> 00:21:48,886 that at the date of contract 704 00:21:48,886 --> 00:21:50,550 termination, every camera will 705 00:21:50,550 --> 00:21:52,858 be moved in to decommission 706 00:21:52,858 --> 00:21:53,525 mode and then we are seeking a 707 00:21:53,525 --> 00:21:54,826 certificate of destruction 708 00:21:54,826 --> 00:21:57,280 effective to of termination as 709 00:21:57,280 --> 00:21:59,197 well. And then my team will be 710 00:21:59,197 --> 00:22:00,532 working flock in order to 711 00:22:00,532 --> 00:22:01,733 schedule the actual removal of 712 00:22:01,733 --> 00:22:04,733 the devices as soon as 713 00:22:04,736 --> 00:22:05,470 possible. Contract 714 00:22:05,470 --> 00:22:06,104 termination. Thank you very 715 00:22:06,104 --> 00:22:06,805 Concerned because that is 716 00:22:06,805 --> 00:22:09,106 progress since we last talked 717 00:22:09,106 --> 00:22:10,408 about a week ago. 718 00:22:10,408 --> 00:22:11,309 >> From the tax services point 719 00:22:11,309 --> 00:22:12,100 of view and how how can verify 720 00:22:12,100 --> 00:22:15,100 the decommission mode is a 721 00:22:16,381 --> 00:22:18,350 real thing. Where can we and 722 00:22:18,350 --> 00:22:19,384 screenshots sent his son to 723 00:22:19,384 --> 00:22:20,619 screenshots. So I can I can 724 00:22:20,619 --> 00:22:23,619 share that. On their devices 725 00:22:24,188 --> 00:22:24,856 themselves, they do this is 726 00:22:24,856 --> 00:22:25,390 the calm the center screen 727 00:22:25,390 --> 00:22:27,390 shots, pictures of 728 00:22:28,930 --> 00:22:28,960 >> Ok, thank you. 729 00:22:28,960 --> 00:22:32,531 >> I will want to more about 730 00:22:32,531 --> 00:22:33,565 that, but that's great 731 00:22:33,565 --> 00:22:35,333 information. Next thing, the 732 00:22:35,333 --> 00:22:38,770 sides that we've say that we 733 00:22:38,770 --> 00:22:39,571 have that our policy is only 734 00:22:39,571 --> 00:22:43,771 to share in response to a law 735 00:22:44,141 --> 00:22:45,210 enforcement investigation. 736 00:22:45,210 --> 00:22:46,143 When oxen described the data 737 00:22:46,143 --> 00:22:46,812 sharing that they're 738 00:22:46,812 --> 00:22:47,479 developing, which is not in 739 00:22:47,479 --> 00:22:48,213 place yet. So it's a little 740 00:22:48,213 --> 00:22:51,316 hard for us to assess how it's 741 00:22:51,316 --> 00:22:54,185 gonna work, which does give me 742 00:22:54,185 --> 00:22:55,354 some pause again after fans 743 00:22:55,354 --> 00:22:57,220 will flock. They are saying 744 00:22:57,220 --> 00:22:58,323 that they're developing 745 00:22:58,323 --> 00:22:59,157 developing it to one-on-one 746 00:22:59,157 --> 00:23:00,725 where it would actually be 747 00:23:00,725 --> 00:23:01,426 that you get access to another 748 00:23:01,426 --> 00:23:04,196 jurisdiction as a user. Same 749 00:23:04,196 --> 00:23:04,930 is with flock, not 750 00:23:04,930 --> 00:23:05,563 case-by-case. So I think there 751 00:23:05,563 --> 00:23:08,563 MAY be a disconnect there 752 00:23:08,834 --> 00:23:09,801 about. What dpd says its 753 00:23:09,801 --> 00:23:11,436 policy would be about sharing 754 00:23:11,436 --> 00:23:12,337 versus how they are developing 755 00:23:12,337 --> 00:23:15,937 the technology. And I think we 756 00:23:16,174 --> 00:23:17,275 probably need to had that off 757 00:23:17,275 --> 00:23:18,310 before we enter into this 758 00:23:18,310 --> 00:23:19,411 contractual relationship 759 00:23:19,411 --> 00:23:20,111 because that's just, you know, 760 00:23:20,111 --> 00:23:23,111 if they're building the tech 761 00:23:23,848 --> 00:23:24,882 to jurisdictional sharing did 762 00:23:24,882 --> 00:23:25,550 rather case-by-case, then 763 00:23:25,550 --> 00:23:27,919 we're sort of cruising for 764 00:23:27,919 --> 00:23:31,519 that to the conflict with our 765 00:23:31,590 --> 00:23:32,491 policies. So that's that's I 766 00:23:32,491 --> 00:23:33,158 guess I'm curious if you have 767 00:23:33,158 --> 00:23:35,250 any talked about that with 768 00:23:35,250 --> 00:23:35,961 have thoughts about that. 769 00:23:35,961 --> 00:23:38,361 Given that they're developing 770 00:23:38,830 --> 00:23:39,898 that jurisdiction based 771 00:23:39,898 --> 00:23:40,532 sharing feature. 772 00:23:40,532 --> 00:23:41,233 >> can see that that the 773 00:23:41,233 --> 00:23:44,690 intent and I haven't reviewed 774 00:23:44,690 --> 00:23:45,700 the final contract yet, and 775 00:23:45,700 --> 00:23:47,470 feel free. But yeah, 776 00:23:47,606 --> 00:23:49,741 absolutely. There's an opt out 777 00:23:49,741 --> 00:23:50,442 by default built into the into 778 00:23:50,442 --> 00:23:51,109 the contract. So any new type 779 00:23:51,109 --> 00:23:53,509 of sharing technology that 780 00:23:54,246 --> 00:23:54,980 they're bringing to the table, 781 00:23:54,980 --> 00:23:55,613 it blocking out. We would have 782 00:23:55,613 --> 00:23:58,130 to explicitly popped into 783 00:24:00,518 --> 00:24:02,821 that. And in the mind, a big 784 00:24:02,821 --> 00:24:03,555 question mark for me is who 785 00:24:03,555 --> 00:24:04,222 makes the decision to opt into 786 00:24:04,222 --> 00:24:07,222 new technology and how now 787 00:24:08,626 --> 00:24:09,327 within the city I think that's 788 00:24:09,327 --> 00:24:10,929 still the conversation that, 789 00:24:10,929 --> 00:24:11,896 you know, that is actively 790 00:24:11,896 --> 00:24:12,530 unfolding between Council 791 00:24:12,530 --> 00:24:14,530 surveillance task force, 792 00:24:15,330 --> 00:24:16,368 mayor's office cetera. So, 793 00:24:16,368 --> 00:24:17,102 right, okay. And I would be 794 00:24:17,102 --> 00:24:18,302 really hasn't done for us to 795 00:24:18,302 --> 00:24:19,337 enter into this contract 796 00:24:19,337 --> 00:24:21,139 without that being sort of 797 00:24:21,139 --> 00:24:21,906 because I think I mean, again, 798 00:24:21,906 --> 00:24:23,208 we messed up by not knowing 799 00:24:23,208 --> 00:24:26,808 the on national network and we 800 00:24:27,279 --> 00:24:28,780 can do that So another 801 00:24:28,780 --> 00:24:31,780 question about is auditing. So 802 00:24:32,750 --> 00:24:33,384 as of now, our internal policy 803 00:24:33,384 --> 00:24:36,384 says that we will require 804 00:24:37,555 --> 00:24:40,555 officers to enter a case 805 00:24:40,959 --> 00:24:41,860 number a a parent. And what 806 00:24:41,860 --> 00:24:44,296 I've been told is that with 807 00:24:44,296 --> 00:24:44,996 tax on online with flock, the 808 00:24:44,996 --> 00:24:45,730 formatting will have to sort 809 00:24:45,730 --> 00:24:48,366 of be similar to a case number 810 00:24:48,366 --> 00:24:49,501 to be accepted. But it's not 811 00:24:49,501 --> 00:24:50,201 like it links to our records 812 00:24:50,201 --> 00:24:51,636 management system. So there's 813 00:24:51,636 --> 00:24:52,804 no way to be sure that it's a 814 00:24:52,804 --> 00:24:53,504 real case number rather than 815 00:24:53,504 --> 00:24:55,904 just letter letter. Whenever 816 00:24:56,975 --> 00:24:58,243 for like us and then when we 817 00:24:58,243 --> 00:25:01,446 asked when we talk about this 818 00:25:01,446 --> 00:25:03,347 before, I think the team told 819 00:25:03,347 --> 00:25:05,830 me that our auditing of the 820 00:25:05,830 --> 00:25:05,783 flock logs was focused on key 821 00:25:05,783 --> 00:25:08,783 word searches and spot checks 822 00:25:10,689 --> 00:25:12,357 and sensitive terms I want to 823 00:25:12,357 --> 00:25:14,259 know if tbd will be checking 824 00:25:14,259 --> 00:25:17,228 in a more meaningful way to 825 00:25:17,228 --> 00:25:18,696 see that no one's putting 826 00:25:18,696 --> 00:25:21,696 think case In other words, 827 00:25:22,434 --> 00:25:23,969 doing more than spot chance it 828 00:25:23,969 --> 00:25:25,403 does not seem that the systems 829 00:25:25,403 --> 00:25:26,738 have been you so much that it 830 00:25:26,738 --> 00:25:27,839 would be impractical to review 831 00:25:27,839 --> 00:25:29,707 all searches periodically. I 832 00:25:29,707 --> 00:25:30,742 think that would probably need 833 00:25:30,742 --> 00:25:33,511 to be ndp's and tell policy. 834 00:25:33,511 --> 00:25:34,179 So I'm curious what the intent 835 00:25:34,179 --> 00:25:34,846 is there because that seems 836 00:25:34,846 --> 00:25:37,846 like something we need to 837 00:25:38,450 --> 00:25:40,850 enforced by actually looking 838 00:25:41,385 --> 00:25:42,870 at that search absolutely and 839 00:25:42,870 --> 00:25:42,786 Councilmember United Capital 840 00:25:42,786 --> 00:25:45,223 yesterday. And I'm very open 841 00:25:45,223 --> 00:25:45,924 to any suggestions on how to 842 00:25:45,924 --> 00:25:48,660 increase, you know, the level 843 00:25:48,660 --> 00:25:49,361 of transparency you know, say 844 00:25:49,361 --> 00:25:51,830 MISTER And says so if there's 845 00:25:51,830 --> 00:25:54,230 something reasonable that we 846 00:25:55,800 --> 00:25:57,200 can do to increase the amount 847 00:25:57,200 --> 00:25:57,735 of And I'm totally open to 848 00:25:57,735 --> 00:25:59,971 discussing that. I think we're 849 00:25:59,971 --> 00:26:00,905 trying to strike a balance, 850 00:26:00,905 --> 00:26:02,640 though. Obviously, you know, 851 00:26:02,640 --> 00:26:04,409 we want to to do our due 852 00:26:04,409 --> 00:26:05,644 diligence, but we also want to 853 00:26:05,644 --> 00:26:08,279 make sure that we're engaging 854 00:26:08,279 --> 00:26:10,679 too much administrative burden 855 00:26:11,816 --> 00:26:14,953 a month on a monthly basis. 856 00:26:14,953 --> 00:26:15,620 Happy to additional 857 00:26:15,620 --> 00:26:16,253 conversations with anybody 858 00:26:16,253 --> 00:26:17,155 who's interested. Yeah, I 859 00:26:17,155 --> 00:26:17,856 mean, the knowing the number 860 00:26:17,856 --> 00:26:18,490 of searches that have been 861 00:26:18,490 --> 00:26:19,357 performing Flock would be 862 00:26:19,357 --> 00:26:21,757 helpful to understand what's 863 00:26:23,695 --> 00:26:25,430 realistic there. So I don't 864 00:26:25,430 --> 00:26:26,598 mean the question of whether 865 00:26:26,598 --> 00:26:27,732 dpd season need to rewrite its 866 00:26:27,732 --> 00:26:28,800 internal lpr policy to address 867 00:26:28,800 --> 00:26:32,700 some of these things because I 868 00:26:32,700 --> 00:26:32,737 think the way Axon works. What 869 00:26:32,737 --> 00:26:34,306 the policy said was always 870 00:26:34,306 --> 00:26:35,673 different from how flock 871 00:26:35,673 --> 00:26:38,673 actually worked. And we need 872 00:26:38,742 --> 00:26:39,911 with pauses to match how Axon 873 00:26:39,911 --> 00:26:41,780 actually works. And if so, I 874 00:26:41,780 --> 00:26:42,581 just want to fly that the 875 00:26:42,581 --> 00:26:43,281 Independent Monitor Austin 876 00:26:43,281 --> 00:26:44,549 last task force meeting. She 877 00:26:44,549 --> 00:26:45,550 could be given time to review 878 00:26:45,550 --> 00:26:46,284 that policy. So I'm wondering 879 00:26:46,284 --> 00:26:49,884 if there's an intent to revise 880 00:26:50,355 --> 00:26:52,857 it all. Clarify question here. 881 00:26:52,857 --> 00:26:54,392 So what aspects in regards to 882 00:26:54,392 --> 00:26:55,126 specifically how acts on 883 00:26:55,126 --> 00:26:58,126 platform works to addressed in 884 00:26:58,229 --> 00:26:59,431 the current policy? Well, I 885 00:26:59,431 --> 00:27:03,310 think I should say, I think 886 00:27:03,134 --> 00:27:04,669 the policy, for example, isn't 887 00:27:04,669 --> 00:27:05,436 specific enough about what 888 00:27:05,436 --> 00:27:08,873 we're based on the terms our 889 00:27:08,873 --> 00:27:09,607 input into the system. Lays 890 00:27:09,607 --> 00:27:10,341 out what the rules are, but it 891 00:27:10,341 --> 00:27:13,678 doesn't lay out kind of how we 892 00:27:13,678 --> 00:27:14,612 check for the rainfall. And 893 00:27:14,612 --> 00:27:15,546 then in addition, some of 894 00:27:15,546 --> 00:27:16,648 these sharing aspects, right 895 00:27:16,648 --> 00:27:18,516 probably need to be in the 896 00:27:18,516 --> 00:27:20,916 policy. Will share with 897 00:27:20,919 --> 00:27:22,353 another jurisdiction a way 898 00:27:22,353 --> 00:27:23,220 that not just with the 899 00:27:23,220 --> 00:27:25,620 technology does. I'm always 900 00:27:26,724 --> 00:27:27,424 happy to put, you know. We're 901 00:27:27,424 --> 00:27:28,927 always have to be flexible on 902 00:27:28,927 --> 00:27:31,610 the policy. I think the reason 903 00:27:31,610 --> 00:27:31,930 why, for example, a keyword 904 00:27:31,930 --> 00:27:33,798 terms are not explicitly laid 905 00:27:33,798 --> 00:27:34,632 out in policies were trying to 906 00:27:34,632 --> 00:27:36,101 stays flexible in as a nimble 907 00:27:36,101 --> 00:27:38,702 as possible. So that MAY be an 908 00:27:38,702 --> 00:27:41,702 stop. There's a procedure, for 909 00:27:41,739 --> 00:27:42,741 example. But if there's a new 910 00:27:42,741 --> 00:27:43,975 key word that that is 911 00:27:43,975 --> 00:27:45,810 presented this week that we 912 00:27:45,810 --> 00:27:46,778 need to start auditing for, 913 00:27:46,778 --> 00:27:47,846 you know, to me that makes 914 00:27:47,846 --> 00:27:49,881 more sense to put it in 915 00:27:49,881 --> 00:27:51,716 procedure and then indicated 916 00:27:51,716 --> 00:27:52,383 policy that we are following 917 00:27:52,383 --> 00:27:55,383 these monthly types of pot. 918 00:27:55,854 --> 00:27:56,521 Audit cadences doesn't sense. 919 00:27:56,521 --> 00:27:57,255 >> And because policy isn't 920 00:27:57,255 --> 00:28:00,391 updated a weekly basis, we try 921 00:28:00,391 --> 00:28:01,240 to stay nimble with it. But I 922 00:28:01,240 --> 00:28:04,240 can easily have my teams 923 00:28:04,429 --> 00:28:06,429 update. Written procedure 924 00:28:07,131 --> 00:28:08,660 known as quickly as often as 925 00:28:08,660 --> 00:28:09,100 needed. 926 00:28:09,100 --> 00:28:10,201 >> yeah, and I hear all I hear 927 00:28:10,201 --> 00:28:13,338 the openness to do this. And I 928 00:28:13,338 --> 00:28:14,304 just continue to concerned 929 00:28:14,304 --> 00:28:17,904 that we've been through a lot 930 00:28:18,309 --> 00:28:19,444 on this task force and made 931 00:28:19,444 --> 00:28:20,111 province. But we're not all 932 00:28:20,111 --> 00:28:20,812 the way through all of the 933 00:28:20,812 --> 00:28:23,815 things that need to be done. 934 00:28:23,815 --> 00:28:24,449 And so I worry about putting a 935 00:28:24,449 --> 00:28:25,490 contract through without 936 00:28:25,490 --> 00:28:27,185 having dpd policies and 937 00:28:27,185 --> 00:28:28,953 procedures in place without 938 00:28:28,953 --> 00:28:29,654 having it's an ordinance in 939 00:28:29,654 --> 00:28:30,821 place and those other things. 940 00:28:30,821 --> 00:28:31,723 And that's not for lack of 941 00:28:31,723 --> 00:28:31,999 everybody working very h# 942 00:28:31,999 --> 00:28:32,277 # 943 00:28:32,277 --> 00:28:32,553 # 944 00:28:32,553 --> 00:28:33,324 o# 945 00:28:33,324 --> 00:28:36,227 this is because you certainly 946 00:28:36,227 --> 00:28:38,162 haven't a lot of others have 947 00:28:38,162 --> 00:28:39,797 been. Another question is that 948 00:28:39,797 --> 00:28:40,464 I my understanding is that 949 00:28:40,464 --> 00:28:42,864 originally we were talking 950 00:28:43,368 --> 00:28:44,802 about 45 cameras on posts and 951 00:28:44,802 --> 00:28:46,437 then finds cameras that had 952 00:28:46,437 --> 00:28:48,540 greater capacity. And it's 953 00:28:48,540 --> 00:28:50,675 something that changed to 50 954 00:28:50,675 --> 00:28:51,376 cameras on post. Is that right 955 00:28:51,376 --> 00:28:53,278 is and is that still what the 956 00:28:53,278 --> 00:28:55,280 cap of the contractor fox 957 00:28:55,280 --> 00:28:57,482 okay. Those cameras I 958 00:28:57,482 --> 00:28:59,250 understand can do some live 959 00:28:59,250 --> 00:29:00,651 streaming. Can you describe 960 00:29:00,651 --> 00:29:01,385 church? So they are battery 961 00:29:01,385 --> 00:29:04,385 power cameras the Dodgers are. 962 00:29:04,622 --> 00:29:05,256 Then we charged by solar. 963 00:29:05,256 --> 00:29:06,230 >> So the live streaming 964 00:29:06,230 --> 00:29:07,625 capabilities in these cameras 965 00:29:07,625 --> 00:29:08,659 are very limited. Great so 966 00:29:08,659 --> 00:29:11,590 they can't live stream. 24 7 967 00:29:11,763 --> 00:29:13,131 has to be a very overt action 968 00:29:13,131 --> 00:29:13,999 on the part the user live 969 00:29:13,999 --> 00:29:16,999 stream from that camera. The 970 00:29:17,202 --> 00:29:17,869 footage is also not retained 971 00:29:17,869 --> 00:29:18,536 great. So inappropriate use 972 00:29:18,536 --> 00:29:21,536 would be, for example, the 973 00:29:21,773 --> 00:29:23,841 real time crime Center 974 00:29:23,841 --> 00:29:24,576 responding to an unfolding 975 00:29:24,576 --> 00:29:25,309 incident in progress and needs 976 00:29:25,309 --> 00:29:27,309 additional intelligence about, 977 00:29:27,879 --> 00:29:29,814 you know, that specific area. 978 00:29:29,814 --> 00:29:31,416 But like I said, they're 979 00:29:31,416 --> 00:29:32,450 battery devices. They're not 980 00:29:32,450 --> 00:29:36,500 designed to to operate in type 981 00:29:37,322 --> 00:29:39,390 live streaming mode. 24 7. So 982 00:29:39,390 --> 00:29:40,910 as soon as that operator 983 00:29:40,910 --> 00:29:40,792 stopped a live stream that it 984 00:29:40,792 --> 00:29:41,492 would return to its. That's 985 00:29:41,492 --> 00:29:43,695 the motive. Just capturing 986 00:29:43,695 --> 00:29:46,950 license plate images that's 987 00:29:48,333 --> 00:29:50,168 different So this is something 988 00:29:50,168 --> 00:29:51,836 I I've asked a few questions 989 00:29:51,836 --> 00:29:52,537 just trying to understand but 990 00:29:52,537 --> 00:29:54,606 it's fairly new is a concept 991 00:29:54,606 --> 00:29:57,809 to me of how I would even 992 00:29:57,809 --> 00:29:58,509 work. And does concern me that 993 00:29:58,509 --> 00:29:59,210 the idea someone in the real 994 00:29:59,210 --> 00:30:01,412 time crime center could open 995 00:30:01,412 --> 00:30:01,980 up a live stream and watch. 996 00:30:01,980 --> 00:30:03,140 >> Everything that's 997 00:30:03,140 --> 00:30:05,182 unfolding. That's new and 998 00:30:05,182 --> 00:30:05,983 different. And it's not 999 00:30:05,983 --> 00:30:06,718 something we've it's not about 1000 00:30:06,718 --> 00:30:08,486 a lot in the task force from a 1001 00:30:08,486 --> 00:30:11,486 policy point of either every 1002 00:30:11,889 --> 00:30:12,623 you MAY be aware that the real 1003 00:30:12,623 --> 00:30:15,560 time Crime Center does monitor 1004 00:30:15,560 --> 00:30:18,560 a number of cameras throughout 1005 00:30:18,662 --> 00:30:20,198 the city in order you provide 1006 00:30:20,198 --> 00:30:22,598 better response and resource 1007 00:30:23,868 --> 00:30:25,868 allocation to unfolding 1008 00:30:26,137 --> 00:30:28,720 criminal incidents. To because 1009 00:30:28,720 --> 00:30:30,641 of this conversation, I didn't 1010 00:30:30,641 --> 00:30:31,242 know that And so it's sort of 1011 00:30:31,242 --> 00:30:31,876 a fun. I mean, I'm not 1012 00:30:31,876 --> 00:30:34,111 concerned about all those 1013 00:30:34,111 --> 00:30:35,346 cameras to, unfortunately, I 1014 00:30:35,346 --> 00:30:37,215 was not aware that that was 1015 00:30:37,215 --> 00:30:38,116 something that law enforcement 1016 00:30:38,116 --> 00:30:41,716 have the capacity to do. And 1017 00:30:42,253 --> 00:30:44,321 that is a pretty intense form 1018 00:30:44,321 --> 00:30:46,658 You know, COUNCILMAN I wasn't 1019 00:30:46,658 --> 00:30:48,226 limited to question limit, but 1020 00:30:48,226 --> 00:30:50,761 I'm gonna see at the record 1021 00:30:50,761 --> 00:30:51,461 reflect that. I asked I'm very 1022 00:30:51,461 --> 00:30:52,130 happy isn't an item. One more 1023 00:30:52,130 --> 00:30:52,563 question and then we'll get 1024 00:30:52,563 --> 00:30:54,563 you back you. 1025 00:30:55,465 --> 00:30:58,465 >> Okay. That sounds good. So 1026 00:30:58,536 --> 00:30:59,503 >> last question, then can 1027 00:30:59,503 --> 00:31:00,237 tell us all of the different 1028 00:31:00,237 --> 00:31:03,837 acts on products that the city 1029 00:31:03,941 --> 00:31:05,420 uses. The I think it's such 1030 00:31:05,420 --> 00:31:06,911 comprehensive list yesterday. 1031 00:31:06,911 --> 00:31:07,879 Don't want really MISS 1032 00:31:07,879 --> 00:31:09,879 Anything, generally speaking, 1033 00:31:10,915 --> 00:31:11,649 I'm not trying to trip you 1034 00:31:11,649 --> 00:31:13,150 body-worn cameras evidence dot 1035 00:31:13,150 --> 00:31:15,550 com which are digital. 1036 00:31:16,821 --> 00:31:17,555 >> Evidence storage repository 1037 00:31:17,555 --> 00:31:21,125 few sis which is the real time 1038 00:31:21,125 --> 00:31:24,125 Crime Center on platform. And 1039 00:31:27,980 --> 00:31:27,832 then lpr. Can think of what 1040 00:31:27,832 --> 00:31:28,866 also MAY be missing in a rerun 1041 00:31:28,866 --> 00:31:30,866 cameras, which probably 1042 00:31:31,902 --> 00:31:34,500 interview room Deo drones. 1043 00:31:34,500 --> 00:31:35,106 Scotty was not part of the 1044 00:31:35,106 --> 00:31:36,174 acts on coffee. I think just 1045 00:31:36,174 --> 00:31:37,107 acquired them. And I don't I 1046 00:31:37,107 --> 00:31:37,775 think they just told us that 1047 00:31:37,775 --> 00:31:40,175 they told office everything 1048 00:31:40,178 --> 00:31:41,946 yesterday. So I think they are 1049 00:31:41,946 --> 00:31:42,580 now part of get an honest to 1050 00:31:42,580 --> 00:31:44,415 is not a gotcha. I'm just 1051 00:31:44,415 --> 00:31:47,415 giving the full list. So 1052 00:31:47,518 --> 00:31:49,786 Taylor's evidence a comp uses, 1053 00:31:49,786 --> 00:31:50,455 which I don't think we've ever 1054 00:31:50,455 --> 00:31:54,550 been briefed on our have a 1055 00:31:54,459 --> 00:31:55,593 great understanding But in the 1056 00:31:55,593 --> 00:31:57,695 body warns and then the sky, 1057 00:31:57,695 --> 00:32:01,295 And that's where I just think 1058 00:32:01,499 --> 00:32:02,233 that all of us need to kind of 1059 00:32:02,233 --> 00:32:04,268 spend our time because this is 1060 00:32:04,268 --> 00:32:05,570 really different from fox and 1061 00:32:05,570 --> 00:32:07,505 the way that all these 1062 00:32:07,505 --> 00:32:08,172 different, you know, images 1063 00:32:08,172 --> 00:32:10,274 and types of data it's just 1064 00:32:10,274 --> 00:32:12,310 going be learning her Thank 1065 00:32:12,310 --> 00:32:14,746 you, MR. Thank you. Counselor 1066 00:32:14,746 --> 00:32:15,179 Perry counts cash then 1067 00:32:15,179 --> 00:32:17,179 councilmember 1068 00:32:20,318 --> 00:32:21,180 >> Thank Committee chair. 1069 00:32:21,180 --> 00:32:23,180 Presentation troops. That's 1070 00:32:24,856 --> 00:32:25,590 one piece of information You 1071 00:32:25,590 --> 00:32:29,190 have big question from come in 1072 00:32:29,427 --> 00:32:30,461 and Houston. It would be 1073 00:32:30,461 --> 00:32:33,998 forthcoming is as far as the 1074 00:32:33,998 --> 00:32:36,998 flock cameras go. Which crimes 1075 00:32:41,472 --> 00:32:42,106 how many of Which crimes do 1076 00:32:42,106 --> 00:32:44,506 the flock participate in 1077 00:32:45,209 --> 00:32:47,609 solving? Someone will looking 1078 00:32:49,280 --> 00:32:50,848 forward that. And sure 1079 00:32:50,848 --> 00:32:52,848 COUNCILMAN's questions on. 1080 00:32:57,989 --> 00:32:58,723 We'll live streaming and where 1081 00:32:58,723 --> 00:33:01,723 talk comes from tyranny. Makes 1082 00:33:02,560 --> 00:33:04,829 a little bit sharing only in 1083 00:33:04,829 --> 00:33:05,530 response. 2 official 1084 00:33:05,530 --> 00:33:07,930 investigation. Could tell me 1085 00:33:09,166 --> 00:33:11,301 more about What you that 1086 00:33:11,301 --> 00:33:13,301 investigation with 2? How 1087 00:33:15,106 --> 00:33:18,106 would that work? And then 1088 00:33:19,444 --> 00:33:20,378 sharing with another agency 1089 00:33:20,378 --> 00:33:23,815 who then nation are with where 1090 00:33:23,815 --> 00:33:25,749 the guardrails there. 1091 00:33:25,749 --> 00:33:27,749 >> great question. Questions 1092 00:33:28,720 --> 00:33:29,954 council member as far as the 1093 00:33:29,954 --> 00:33:30,788 data goes, we have done some 1094 00:33:30,788 --> 00:33:31,856 annual review. Some of our I 1095 00:33:31,856 --> 00:33:33,925 didn't Teams have done some 1096 00:33:33,925 --> 00:33:35,226 annual review of of the the 1097 00:33:35,226 --> 00:33:38,226 flock data from the duration 1098 00:33:38,963 --> 00:33:40,264 of the program up to about the 1099 00:33:40,264 --> 00:33:43,835 11th of last month. And can we 1100 00:33:43,835 --> 00:33:46,871 do have some of that data. 1101 00:33:46,871 --> 00:33:48,390 There's been over that that 1102 00:33:48,390 --> 00:33:50,439 platform has helped contribute 1103 00:33:50,575 --> 00:33:51,275 to over 500 arrests over 400 1104 00:33:51,275 --> 00:33:53,675 recovered motor vehicles and 1105 00:33:54,144 --> 00:33:55,379 over 60 firearms that have 1106 00:33:55,379 --> 00:33:57,515 been recovered. So obviously 1107 00:33:57,515 --> 00:34:00,515 quite a successful program in 1108 00:34:03,654 --> 00:34:06,157 my view, as far as And as far 1109 00:34:06,157 --> 00:34:08,959 as the sharing goes as related 1110 00:34:08,959 --> 00:34:10,260 to an official criminal 1111 00:34:10,260 --> 00:34:11,395 investigation. So what I what 1112 00:34:11,395 --> 00:34:12,290 I told many people is that, 1113 00:34:12,290 --> 00:34:14,429 you know, criminals often 1114 00:34:15,133 --> 00:34:16,100 don't really respect borders. 1115 00:34:16,100 --> 00:34:17,902 So so it's important that we 1116 00:34:17,902 --> 00:34:18,603 collaborate with our 1117 00:34:18,603 --> 00:34:19,303 neighboring jurisdictions and 1118 00:34:19,303 --> 00:34:21,472 in solving crimes, specially 1119 00:34:21,472 --> 00:34:24,472 patterned crimes and what not 1120 00:34:25,643 --> 00:34:26,210 so oftentimes we approach 1121 00:34:26,210 --> 00:34:26,878 agencies to thaw for 1122 00:34:26,878 --> 00:34:28,878 assistance in investigating 1123 00:34:29,313 --> 00:34:30,382 crimes. And sometimes we are 1124 00:34:30,382 --> 00:34:31,480 approached and there's all 1125 00:34:31,480 --> 00:34:34,480 sorts of different types of 1126 00:34:34,850 --> 00:34:35,353 crimes. You know, for example, 1127 00:34:35,353 --> 00:34:37,488 narcotics trafficking or human 1128 00:34:37,488 --> 00:34:38,189 trafficking or robberies. You 1129 00:34:38,189 --> 00:34:38,889 know, the Magic Metropolitan 1130 00:34:38,889 --> 00:34:41,526 Area, auto theft, I think has 1131 00:34:41,526 --> 00:34:42,193 has been, you know, a major 1132 00:34:42,193 --> 00:34:45,562 one for our state over the 1133 00:34:45,562 --> 00:34:46,364 last few years, right? So when 1134 00:34:46,364 --> 00:34:49,364 we are approached by an 1135 00:34:49,500 --> 00:34:50,301 external agency for help 1136 00:34:50,301 --> 00:34:51,869 investigating an incident, 1137 00:34:51,869 --> 00:34:52,470 typically that's referred 1138 00:34:52,470 --> 00:34:54,171 either a supervisor or 1139 00:34:54,171 --> 00:34:55,973 investigator in an 1140 00:34:55,973 --> 00:34:56,908 investigative team and obtain 1141 00:34:56,908 --> 00:34:57,575 additional information about 1142 00:34:57,575 --> 00:34:59,760 what type of crime is being 1143 00:34:59,760 --> 00:35:01,760 investigated. But that's 1144 00:35:01,112 --> 00:35:04,112 really what the necessity What 1145 00:35:05,490 --> 00:35:06,500 is the crime that's being 1146 00:35:06,500 --> 00:35:06,651 investigated I as the 1147 00:35:06,651 --> 00:35:08,651 presentation, you know, 1148 00:35:08,786 --> 00:35:10,221 elaborate a little bit. It has 1149 00:35:10,221 --> 00:35:11,188 to be something that's illegal 1150 00:35:11,188 --> 00:35:12,857 in the state of Colorado. In 1151 00:35:12,857 --> 00:35:15,857 order for us collaborate and 1152 00:35:16,560 --> 00:35:18,960 share information with that 1153 00:35:19,300 --> 00:35:19,397 agency. Show. Go back initial 1154 00:35:19,397 --> 00:35:21,397 comment. 1155 00:35:24,350 --> 00:35:25,436 >> aware of the overall number 1156 00:35:25,436 --> 00:35:26,103 cases have been involved. But 1157 00:35:26,103 --> 00:35:27,805 it's really relevant. What 1158 00:35:27,805 --> 00:35:29,706 were the actual crimes that 1159 00:35:29,706 --> 00:35:32,706 would that were solved? You 1160 00:35:33,911 --> 00:35:36,911 know how meaningful? In the 1161 00:35:39,830 --> 00:35:43,283 House we? More we open up the 1162 00:35:43,854 --> 00:35:46,924 door to sharing the more it 1163 00:35:46,924 --> 00:35:48,593 becomes flock. Other words, 1164 00:35:48,593 --> 00:35:52,193 they might not be an actual 1165 00:35:54,632 --> 00:35:55,232 nationwide system like, door, 1166 00:35:55,232 --> 00:35:57,632 you open increases the 1167 00:36:00,171 --> 00:36:03,771 opportunity for the. I I'm not 1168 00:36:04,308 --> 00:36:06,708 comfortable I need more 1169 00:36:09,747 --> 00:36:11,315 comfort around guardrails. To 1170 00:36:11,315 --> 00:36:14,315 that sharing couple other I 1171 00:36:19,256 --> 00:36:22,256 would hope. Contract or any 1172 00:36:22,593 --> 00:36:24,261 contract in ballpark. It moves 1173 00:36:24,261 --> 00:36:27,261 forward that we would have 1174 00:36:31,335 --> 00:36:33,735 regular reports. To committee 1175 00:36:33,771 --> 00:36:37,371 How it was unfolding. The last 1176 00:36:45,480 --> 00:36:47,551 thing I wanted to say fact. 1177 00:36:47,551 --> 00:36:49,553 Flock screams says d-conn 1178 00:36:49,553 --> 00:36:52,553 gives me no confidence in 1179 00:36:53,290 --> 00:36:56,290 time. GOD is not being 1180 00:37:01,132 --> 00:37:04,132 reporting sure I very least. 1181 00:37:06,637 --> 00:37:08,637 Recognizing cameras, whatever. 1182 00:37:08,773 --> 00:37:10,908 Would should be what are taken 1183 00:37:10,908 --> 00:37:15,108 The more I talk to who really 1184 00:37:17,915 --> 00:37:18,816 understand world. We're down 1185 00:37:18,816 --> 00:37:21,816 is is being collected from 1186 00:37:22,586 --> 00:37:24,586 multiple sources constantly. 1187 00:37:28,726 --> 00:37:30,394 Like what economy? So I just 1188 00:37:30,394 --> 00:37:32,620 want for that. I thank Thank 1189 00:37:32,620 --> 00:37:34,331 cast count Arkansas tears and 1190 00:37:34,331 --> 00:37:37,331 comes from Thank you. MISTER 1191 00:37:37,401 --> 00:37:38,335 >> Thank you for you know, 1192 00:37:38,335 --> 00:37:40,271 providing us the briefings 1193 00:37:40,271 --> 00:37:41,438 ahead of time for the 1194 00:37:41,438 --> 00:37:43,700 conversations that we continue 1195 00:37:43,700 --> 00:37:44,275 to have. The surveillance task 1196 00:37:44,275 --> 00:37:46,900 also been having conversations 1197 00:37:46,900 --> 00:37:47,978 out community and asked to 1198 00:37:47,978 --> 00:37:50,347 attend different arno's to 1199 00:37:50,347 --> 00:37:50,881 talk about specifically plot, 1200 00:37:50,881 --> 00:37:51,549 but also about just 1201 00:37:51,549 --> 00:37:53,117 surveillance tech and where 1202 00:37:53,117 --> 00:37:55,119 things are with the task force 1203 00:37:55,119 --> 00:37:55,919 and a lot of the questions 1204 00:37:55,919 --> 00:37:56,620 I've received tons of 1205 00:37:56,620 --> 00:37:59,620 questions from some of these 1206 00:38:00,424 --> 00:38:01,759 artisan. They've submitted. Up 1207 00:38:01,759 --> 00:38:02,426 to like 15 questions, some of 1208 00:38:02,426 --> 00:38:03,694 them. And so there is some 1209 00:38:03,694 --> 00:38:07,294 fall of only to have provide 1210 00:38:07,431 --> 00:38:08,799 that I won't asked all the 15 1211 00:38:08,799 --> 00:38:09,466 questions here, all of the 1212 00:38:09,466 --> 00:38:10,167 various questions that you 1213 00:38:10,167 --> 00:38:11,669 receive But I do want to get 1214 00:38:11,669 --> 00:38:13,604 at some of these things to 1215 00:38:13,604 --> 00:38:14,572 make sure that the public is 1216 00:38:14,572 --> 00:38:17,942 is aware that we're all on the 1217 00:38:17,942 --> 00:38:20,511 same page so can you tell us 1218 00:38:20,511 --> 00:38:21,450 about the privately owned? I 1219 00:38:21,450 --> 00:38:23,445 know that you can't 1220 00:38:25,820 --> 00:38:25,982 necessarily. You're I want to 1221 00:38:25,982 --> 00:38:27,284 make sure that everyone is 1222 00:38:27,284 --> 00:38:29,684 aware that privately owned 1223 00:38:31,322 --> 00:38:31,889 flock cameras will remain 1224 00:38:31,889 --> 00:38:33,220 because they are not 1225 00:38:33,220 --> 00:38:33,724 contracted by the city. Right? 1226 00:38:33,724 --> 00:38:36,927 And so one of the questions I 1227 00:38:36,927 --> 00:38:38,696 know I asked was will dpd have 1228 00:38:38,696 --> 00:38:41,696 access to those cameras and 1229 00:38:42,332 --> 00:38:44,732 data for investigations. I 1230 00:38:44,935 --> 00:38:45,702 think ultimately the answer 1231 00:38:45,702 --> 00:38:48,702 questions is yes. What it 1232 00:38:48,906 --> 00:38:50,775 comes down 1233 00:38:50,775 --> 00:38:52,509 >> Investigating any type of 1234 00:38:52,509 --> 00:38:53,210 crime occurred, right? And if 1235 00:38:53,210 --> 00:38:53,911 there is a private entity to 1236 00:38:53,911 --> 00:38:56,911 capture some sort of evidence 1237 00:38:57,515 --> 00:38:59,483 of that crime it's our duty to 1238 00:38:59,483 --> 00:39:00,451 to obtain that evidence to 1239 00:39:00,451 --> 00:39:02,986 make it part of our 1240 00:39:02,986 --> 00:39:05,322 investigation and provided to 1241 00:39:05,322 --> 00:39:06,156 prosecution. So the question 1242 00:39:06,156 --> 00:39:07,624 marks that my team is still 1243 00:39:07,624 --> 00:39:09,593 actively trying to chase down 1244 00:39:09,593 --> 00:39:12,662 is is what that that access 1245 00:39:12,662 --> 00:39:13,597 looks like. But I would 1246 00:39:13,597 --> 00:39:14,398 related to any depth, other 1247 00:39:14,398 --> 00:39:16,367 type of business that that has 1248 00:39:16,367 --> 00:39:18,767 a private surveillance camera 1249 00:39:18,769 --> 00:39:19,470 network. Great. Typically when 1250 00:39:19,470 --> 00:39:21,739 you respond to that location 1251 00:39:21,739 --> 00:39:24,410 and investigate a crime, if 1252 00:39:24,410 --> 00:39:25,509 they have of that crime, we 1253 00:39:25,509 --> 00:39:28,790 ask them to provide it to us 1254 00:39:28,790 --> 00:39:28,946 of the people. Want thank you 1255 00:39:28,946 --> 00:39:30,114 for that. 1256 00:39:30,114 --> 00:39:31,281 >> With that said, I'm one of 1257 00:39:31,281 --> 00:39:32,216 the things I didn't get to ask 1258 00:39:32,216 --> 00:39:35,352 him because I forgot about it 1259 00:39:35,352 --> 00:39:38,289 was drones that we were 1260 00:39:38,289 --> 00:39:41,192 utilizing from plot that we 1261 00:39:41,192 --> 00:39:42,393 had access to in a contract 1262 00:39:42,393 --> 00:39:43,560 that we actually were paying 1263 00:39:43,560 --> 00:39:47,160 for. It was they were being 1264 00:39:47,230 --> 00:39:48,332 provided to us free of cost. 1265 00:39:48,332 --> 00:39:48,933 Are exact contract still 1266 00:39:48,933 --> 00:39:51,933 exist? Are we going to 1267 00:39:51,968 --> 00:39:52,670 continue that contract? 1268 00:39:52,670 --> 00:39:53,771 >> contract still exists, but 1269 00:39:53,771 --> 00:39:54,772 that program has not gotten 1270 00:39:54,772 --> 00:39:58,972 off the ground were So we have 1271 00:39:59,243 --> 00:40:01,245 not flown in flat rate. Okay. 1272 00:40:01,245 --> 00:40:02,479 >> And then how having me come 1273 00:40:02,479 --> 00:40:03,480 due to the 21 day data 1274 00:40:03,480 --> 00:40:05,516 retention. Where did that 1275 00:40:05,516 --> 00:40:06,117 number come from? Because I 1276 00:40:06,117 --> 00:40:06,750 know there's been a of 1277 00:40:06,750 --> 00:40:08,750 conversation around data 1278 00:40:11,621 --> 00:40:14,621 retention. How can we utilize 1279 00:40:14,725 --> 00:40:16,930 to determine data retention 1280 00:40:16,930 --> 00:40:16,794 and what we know and why 1281 00:40:16,794 --> 00:40:19,296 because every day was kind of 1282 00:40:19,296 --> 00:40:21,198 the standard with flock. Now 1283 00:40:21,198 --> 00:40:22,366 we have a 21 day, which is 1284 00:40:22,366 --> 00:40:23,660 less and I see it as a way 1285 00:40:23,660 --> 00:40:26,660 like, okay, we're moving the 1286 00:40:26,236 --> 00:40:26,937 needle a little bit. But is 1287 00:40:26,937 --> 00:40:29,206 there a rhyme or reason as to 1288 00:40:29,206 --> 00:40:30,274 why is 21 1289 00:40:30,274 --> 00:40:32,141 >> I'm happy to take this 1290 00:40:32,141 --> 00:40:33,343 Thanks for time. The question, 1291 00:40:33,343 --> 00:40:34,378 COUNCILMAN, as you said, I 1292 00:40:34,378 --> 00:40:36,778 think most jurisdictions have 1293 00:40:37,181 --> 00:40:38,315 a 30 day retention policy. 1294 00:40:38,315 --> 00:40:39,349 There's some that 14 days. 1295 00:40:39,349 --> 00:40:40,684 There's a couple of examples 1296 00:40:40,684 --> 00:40:41,385 where it's less than that 3 or 1297 00:40:41,385 --> 00:40:44,655 4 days. But by and large, the 1298 00:40:44,655 --> 00:40:45,789 standard is 30 days. I think 1299 00:40:45,789 --> 00:40:46,823 in discussions that we had and 1300 00:40:46,823 --> 00:40:49,760 the task that we've heard 1301 00:40:49,760 --> 00:40:50,927 community members as well, it 1302 00:40:50,927 --> 00:40:51,728 wasn't something that we 1303 00:40:51,728 --> 00:40:54,728 wanted to be proactive about. 1304 00:40:55,333 --> 00:40:58,933 And it's a treat testing out. 1305 00:40:58,936 --> 00:41:01,936 Is there big loss evidence 1306 00:41:02,906 --> 00:41:05,306 between days? 22 to going 1307 00:41:06,142 --> 00:41:06,844 below something like 14. Know 1308 00:41:06,844 --> 00:41:07,543 the Denver Police Department 1309 00:41:07,543 --> 00:41:11,143 to look some of the homicide 1310 00:41:12,160 --> 00:41:14,551 cases where license role in 1311 00:41:14,551 --> 00:41:18,151 2025. Look to when in the kind 1312 00:41:18,522 --> 00:41:19,657 timeline of the case that 1313 00:41:19,657 --> 00:41:22,570 evidence became relevant. I 1314 00:41:22,326 --> 00:41:25,261 mean, it was pretty spread you 1315 00:41:25,261 --> 00:41:27,261 know, immediately within 1316 00:41:27,364 --> 00:41:30,301 minutes up to and including 1317 00:41:30,301 --> 00:41:31,802 ending 2020 or 30 days with 1318 00:41:31,802 --> 00:41:32,536 the lion share of the evidence 1319 00:41:32,536 --> 00:41:36,136 found that it was between like 1320 00:41:36,206 --> 00:41:37,774 3 in 20 days. And so I think 1321 00:41:37,774 --> 00:41:39,900 it was kind of clustered in 1322 00:41:39,900 --> 00:41:40,811 that period. We want to still 1323 00:41:40,811 --> 00:41:42,646 make sure that we were being 1324 00:41:42,646 --> 00:41:44,140 responsive in reducing it by 1325 00:41:44,140 --> 00:41:48,214 some but not by going too this 1326 00:41:52,790 --> 00:41:53,490 point. Okay. I 1327 00:41:53,490 --> 00:41:54,424 >> vast a couple of times for 1328 00:41:54,424 --> 00:41:55,359 just like the data on that. I 1329 00:41:55,359 --> 00:41:58,359 think so. My colleagues have 1330 00:41:59,960 --> 00:42:01,131 also asked for wanting to just 1331 00:42:01,131 --> 00:42:02,332 better understand everything 1332 00:42:02,332 --> 00:42:03,566 that you just said. Don't know 1333 00:42:03,566 --> 00:42:06,103 that her a level of that 1334 00:42:06,103 --> 00:42:09,103 detail before this meeting and 1335 00:42:09,573 --> 00:42:12,476 I would still love to see it. 1336 00:42:12,476 --> 00:42:13,844 Eyes to see like how that been 1337 00:42:13,844 --> 00:42:17,414 caused by the other piece that 1338 00:42:17,414 --> 00:42:19,830 I have is on has released 1339 00:42:19,830 --> 00:42:21,452 data. So when the evidence dot 1340 00:42:21,452 --> 00:42:23,852 com, readings it's happening 1341 00:42:25,289 --> 00:42:28,240 right of Has there ever been 1342 00:42:28,240 --> 00:42:31,240 any leaks from evidence dot 1343 00:42:31,495 --> 00:42:33,697 com we're aware Not to my 1344 00:42:33,697 --> 00:42:34,231 knowledge, okay has so our 1345 00:42:34,231 --> 00:42:35,933 data has never been 1346 00:42:35,933 --> 00:42:39,533 compromised in any way in the 1347 00:42:40,371 --> 00:42:41,171 past it's okay. Then the last 1348 00:42:41,171 --> 00:42:43,674 couple questions that I have 1349 00:42:43,674 --> 00:42:44,308 is around access to the who 1350 00:42:44,308 --> 00:42:47,308 will have access to those 1351 00:42:47,378 --> 00:42:49,378 audit. The platform, 1352 00:42:50,647 --> 00:42:50,982 administrators in command 1353 00:42:50,982 --> 00:42:52,982 staff. 1354 00:42:54,652 --> 00:42:55,385 >> And myself, obviously 1355 00:42:55,385 --> 00:42:56,200 access. We also provide that 1356 00:42:56,200 --> 00:42:59,200 data to data analyst and 1357 00:42:59,456 --> 00:43:00,190 director safety's office. 1358 00:43:00,190 --> 00:43:02,590 There are sensitivities around 1359 00:43:02,859 --> 00:43:03,527 that data because typically a 1360 00:43:03,527 --> 00:43:06,527 can contain Pei and receive 1361 00:43:09,100 --> 00:43:10,167 just enough. It's It does 1362 00:43:10,167 --> 00:43:12,167 personally identifiable 1363 00:43:12,970 --> 00:43:13,570 information and just this 1364 00:43:13,570 --> 00:43:14,237 information. 1365 00:43:14,237 --> 00:43:16,637 >> When it all continuing. 1366 00:43:17,574 --> 00:43:18,509 Yeah, I because personal 1367 00:43:18,509 --> 00:43:19,176 identifying information 1368 00:43:19,176 --> 00:43:19,876 because license plates have 1369 00:43:19,876 --> 00:43:22,876 been identified by the state 1370 00:43:23,414 --> 00:43:24,515 by state law. Those are 1371 00:43:24,515 --> 00:43:25,482 identified as person 1372 00:43:25,482 --> 00:43:26,550 identifying from just like 1373 00:43:26,550 --> 00:43:27,183 when we treated with with due 1374 00:43:27,183 --> 00:43:29,583 regard because of the 1375 00:43:31,355 --> 00:43:34,355 sensitivity of of the rent. 1376 00:43:34,357 --> 00:43:35,659 City Council or the public be 1377 00:43:35,659 --> 00:43:38,428 able to have any access at any 1378 00:43:38,428 --> 00:43:41,298 form of level of the results 1379 00:43:41,298 --> 00:43:41,899 of the audience we have 1380 00:43:41,899 --> 00:43:43,534 provided in response to 1381 00:43:43,534 --> 00:43:44,635 requests redacted data sets 1382 00:43:44,635 --> 00:43:46,369 that show various usage sign I 1383 00:43:46,369 --> 00:43:47,700 don't have any objections to 1384 00:43:47,700 --> 00:43:47,671 that. But just understanding 1385 00:43:47,671 --> 00:43:48,405 that we have we have an 1386 00:43:48,405 --> 00:43:50,805 obligation to redact sensitive 1387 00:43:52,276 --> 00:43:55,446 data from okay that's all I 1388 00:43:55,446 --> 00:43:56,113 have for Thank you, Thank you. 1389 00:43:56,113 --> 00:43:58,513 Cause Gonzales from thing's 1390 00:43:58,715 --> 00:44:00,715 for sure. 1391 00:44:02,186 --> 00:44:03,720 >> Thank you for intentionally 1392 00:44:03,720 --> 00:44:06,120 going about designers contract 1393 00:44:06,924 --> 00:44:07,857 to address most of them a 1394 00:44:07,857 --> 00:44:08,592 year. Concerns about the way 1395 00:44:08,592 --> 00:44:11,592 the system has been configured 1396 00:44:12,930 --> 00:44:14,930 before. Closed system 1397 00:44:17,134 --> 00:44:18,680 accessible only by We're going 1398 00:44:18,680 --> 00:44:21,680 to take only which initiated 1399 00:44:25,108 --> 00:44:28,708 by no, they are training. No 1400 00:44:31,448 --> 00:44:32,750 National Network. Like that 1401 00:44:32,750 --> 00:44:35,150 terrifying the question that 1402 00:44:38,122 --> 00:44:38,755 council just ask other private 1403 00:44:38,755 --> 00:44:39,489 flock cameras its to its 1404 00:44:39,489 --> 00:44:41,391 systems for the icrc. A lot of 1405 00:44:41,391 --> 00:44:42,920 them in my district after 1406 00:44:42,920 --> 00:44:42,793 shopping centers, one in the 1407 00:44:42,793 --> 00:44:44,194 shopping center where council 1408 00:44:44,194 --> 00:44:47,194 offices. There's a couple of 1409 00:44:51,670 --> 00:44:51,768 them actually. We will have no 1410 00:44:51,768 --> 00:44:52,469 self initiated. That's matter 1411 00:44:52,469 --> 00:44:53,136 is we won't be able log into 1412 00:44:53,136 --> 00:44:55,439 the flock system. See those 1413 00:44:55,439 --> 00:44:58,439 prior cameras. When relied on 1414 00:45:00,770 --> 00:45:02,770 moves. Shopping center 1415 00:45:03,313 --> 00:45:05,849 management that the access to 1416 00:45:05,849 --> 00:45:07,351 provide photo ultimately it is 1417 00:45:07,351 --> 00:45:09,751 the private entity that 1418 00:45:11,388 --> 00:45:12,523 controls that have our ability 1419 00:45:12,523 --> 00:45:13,757 to what that sharing mechanism 1420 00:45:13,757 --> 00:45:15,359 looks like. My team is still 1421 00:45:15,359 --> 00:45:15,993 trying to figure that out for 1422 00:45:15,993 --> 00:45:18,950 one stuck on our current 1423 00:45:18,950 --> 00:45:19,429 contract lapses. I don't know. 1424 00:45:19,429 --> 00:45:20,164 >> Have specific answers in 1425 00:45:20,164 --> 00:45:20,863 that regard. But I'm happy to 1426 00:45:20,863 --> 00:45:24,463 share with looks like this we 1427 00:45:26,169 --> 00:45:28,338 have information we have 1428 00:45:28,338 --> 00:45:29,600 tasers and body cameras 1429 00:45:29,600 --> 00:45:31,975 provided by accident in the 1430 00:45:31,975 --> 00:45:32,676 most recent contract. One of 1431 00:45:32,676 --> 00:45:35,760 the significant upgrades was 1432 00:45:35,946 --> 00:45:37,946 when an officer. 1433 00:45:38,549 --> 00:45:39,550 >> removes the Taser from that 1434 00:45:39,550 --> 00:45:41,550 holder automatically activates 1435 00:45:44,188 --> 00:45:46,723 the body cam. So doesn't have 1436 00:45:46,723 --> 00:45:48,725 to do 2 things body cams not 1437 00:45:48,725 --> 00:45:51,125 already activated for one 1438 00:45:51,695 --> 00:45:54,695 reason or another. Is there 1439 00:45:56,700 --> 00:45:59,360 any interactivity? Between the 1440 00:45:59,360 --> 00:45:59,702 flock between the Axon cameras 1441 00:45:59,702 --> 00:46:03,302 and then the other acts on 1442 00:46:05,576 --> 00:46:07,477 device. Solis stand alone. 1443 00:46:07,477 --> 00:46:08,744 Internal. It doesn't go 1444 00:46:08,744 --> 00:46:09,379 anywhere else. Among other 1445 00:46:09,379 --> 00:46:11,615 devices, halo cameras or 1446 00:46:11,615 --> 00:46:13,615 anything like 1447 00:46:13,784 --> 00:46:14,584 >> Right now it is 1448 00:46:14,584 --> 00:46:15,819 stand-alone. There is so 1449 00:46:15,819 --> 00:46:17,654 there's obviously an evidence 1450 00:46:17,654 --> 00:46:18,989 dot com integration. That's 1451 00:46:18,989 --> 00:46:21,825 where the gators essential for 1452 00:46:21,825 --> 00:46:22,459 was gone. And there's a few 1453 00:46:22,459 --> 00:46:23,193 says integration to that 1454 00:46:23,193 --> 00:46:24,995 allows the camera locations to 1455 00:46:24,995 --> 00:46:26,129 be viewed the few says map. 1456 00:46:26,129 --> 00:46:26,730 And then in those cases in the 1457 00:46:26,730 --> 00:46:29,130 real time crime centers 1458 00:46:29,567 --> 00:46:31,967 responding to an active 1459 00:46:32,690 --> 00:46:32,803 incident, they could act to be 1460 00:46:32,803 --> 00:46:35,272 live streamed uses strike. And 1461 00:46:35,272 --> 00:46:35,939 Bernard Live streaming we 1462 00:46:35,939 --> 00:46:39,539 asked the same thing in the 1463 00:46:40,410 --> 00:46:41,143 task force meeting last week a 1464 00:46:41,143 --> 00:46:41,812 chair when the real time Crime 1465 00:46:41,812 --> 00:46:43,413 Center says we need to see 1466 00:46:43,413 --> 00:46:44,114 what's happening there right 1467 00:46:44,114 --> 00:46:44,715 now. 1468 00:46:44,715 --> 00:46:47,251 >> We don't have a halo 1469 00:46:47,251 --> 00:46:49,553 camera, but there's a match on 1470 00:46:49,553 --> 00:46:51,388 camera the are stream from 1471 00:46:51,388 --> 00:46:52,890 that camera. That cameras no 1472 00:46:52,890 --> 00:46:54,258 longer taking photographs of 1473 00:46:54,258 --> 00:46:55,192 vehicles passing by. It is 1474 00:46:55,192 --> 00:46:58,161 being used on a large tree 1475 00:46:58,161 --> 00:46:58,528 moment taking photos. Is 1476 00:46:58,528 --> 00:46:59,363 correct? 1477 00:46:59,363 --> 00:47:01,365 >> I don't know that those 2 1478 00:47:01,365 --> 00:47:02,232 modes are mutually exclusive. 1479 00:47:02,232 --> 00:47:05,832 I My team is still trying 1480 00:47:06,690 --> 00:47:07,303 to figure that But happy to 1481 00:47:07,303 --> 00:47:09,703 provide that information says 1482 00:47:09,973 --> 00:47:13,243 we to know that and we do have 1483 00:47:13,243 --> 00:47:15,979 someone from acts online. I 1484 00:47:15,979 --> 00:47:17,580 have all and much in show. We 1485 00:47:17,580 --> 00:47:18,448 for that person answer that 1486 00:47:18,448 --> 00:47:21,448 question. Joe has promoted. So 1487 00:47:24,454 --> 00:47:25,188 to preserve you don't mind. 1488 00:47:25,188 --> 00:47:27,557 >> I'm only human while you're 1489 00:47:27,557 --> 00:47:29,493 doing Want to can council 1490 00:47:29,493 --> 00:47:30,160 PRESIDENT Pro Tempore Mayor 1491 00:47:30,160 --> 00:47:31,395 Council PRESIDENT Putin. If 1492 00:47:31,395 --> 00:47:32,610 you want to join the queue, 1493 00:47:32,610 --> 00:47:34,610 please communicate through 1494 00:47:34,598 --> 00:47:36,598 instant message. 1495 00:47:38,735 --> 00:47:42,935 We produce a lot of snow and 1496 00:47:43,172 --> 00:47:45,750 generally it's been promoted. 1497 00:47:45,750 --> 00:47:46,430 >> Part going here I introduce 1498 00:47:46,430 --> 00:47:48,812 yourself your title and that 1499 00:47:48,812 --> 00:47:49,913 customer Flynn has a question 1500 00:47:49,913 --> 00:47:51,481 for 1501 00:47:51,481 --> 00:47:54,484 >> It's my name is Joe. I am a 1502 00:47:54,484 --> 00:47:55,118 vice PRESIDENT Of sales tax 1503 00:47:55,118 --> 00:47:56,620 on. If you wouldn't mind 1504 00:47:56,620 --> 00:47:58,620 repeating a question. 1505 00:48:01,358 --> 00:48:02,590 >> Sure, when Cameron 1506 00:48:02,590 --> 00:48:04,459 activated for live streaming 1507 00:48:05,361 --> 00:48:05,995 for one reason or another. 1508 00:48:05,995 --> 00:48:06,696 Does it continue to take 1509 00:48:06,696 --> 00:48:07,363 photographs as well as large 1510 00:48:07,363 --> 00:48:09,763 streaming through that same 1511 00:48:10,834 --> 00:48:11,568 device? 1512 00:48:11,568 --> 00:48:13,470 >> Yes, it does. So the device 1513 00:48:13,470 --> 00:48:15,672 itself actually has 2 centers 1514 00:48:15,672 --> 00:48:16,473 on it. What is dedicated to 1515 00:48:16,473 --> 00:48:17,106 the alpr portion. The other 1516 00:48:17,106 --> 00:48:20,106 one is dedicated to live 1517 00:48:20,877 --> 00:48:22,877 stream. 1518 00:48:25,415 --> 00:48:26,116 >> Ok, thank doesn't provide. 1519 00:48:26,116 --> 00:48:29,116 Words through the live stream 1520 00:48:30,530 --> 00:48:30,754 of any vehicle or does that 1521 00:48:30,754 --> 00:48:33,154 function resigned? Only with 1522 00:48:35,559 --> 00:48:37,559 the photographs. 1523 00:48:38,695 --> 00:48:40,664 >> Well, all in terms all the 1524 00:48:40,664 --> 00:48:41,365 learning back into Arkansas 1525 00:48:41,365 --> 00:48:42,320 system to protect fails. The 1526 00:48:42,320 --> 00:48:45,320 are that the license plate 1527 00:48:47,671 --> 00:48:49,673 this. The the alerts come from 1528 00:48:49,673 --> 00:48:52,730 the photographs, not the 1529 00:48:53,542 --> 00:48:54,210 video. 1530 00:48:54,210 --> 00:48:54,911 >> Thank a couple questions 1531 00:48:54,911 --> 00:48:58,511 that have come to me answers 1532 00:48:59,316 --> 00:48:59,982 for these devices are do not 1533 00:48:59,982 --> 00:49:02,382 use facial recognition. Is 1534 00:49:04,354 --> 00:49:07,354 that correct? Okay. Was asked 1535 00:49:07,423 --> 00:49:08,125 that question. Constituents. 1536 00:49:08,125 --> 00:49:11,125 Putting pictures on the backs 1537 00:49:11,461 --> 00:49:12,562 cars. I don't workspaces with 1538 00:49:12,562 --> 00:49:15,562 being involved America. I have 1539 00:49:21,538 --> 00:49:22,233 to ask. Alert for him learn. 1540 00:49:22,233 --> 00:49:22,906 Versus a search of the 1541 00:49:22,906 --> 00:49:25,306 databases are 2 different uses 1542 00:49:28,144 --> 00:49:31,144 of the system. Wear them. 1543 00:49:32,249 --> 00:49:33,884 Camper trailers. There is 1544 00:49:33,884 --> 00:49:34,551 child abduction and number of 1545 00:49:34,551 --> 00:49:36,951 vehicle that's involved in 1546 00:49:37,421 --> 00:49:40,724 passes by a camera alert is 1547 00:49:40,724 --> 00:49:41,391 sent its verified by some 1548 00:49:41,391 --> 00:49:43,791 other method before vehicle 1549 00:49:45,962 --> 00:49:48,362 stops authorized. Does that 1550 00:49:48,966 --> 00:49:49,599 automatically generate case 1551 00:49:49,599 --> 00:49:52,599 number with your does it 1552 00:49:55,338 --> 00:49:56,730 simply a cad number? The 1553 00:49:56,730 --> 00:49:56,807 officer investigator responded 1554 00:49:56,807 --> 00:49:57,607 to that incident would have to 1555 00:49:57,607 --> 00:49:58,308 generate a cad number that 1556 00:49:58,308 --> 00:49:59,900 eventually become the report 1557 00:49:59,900 --> 00:50:01,900 number for that. 1558 00:50:03,113 --> 00:50:04,214 >> that's automatic. So the 1559 00:50:04,214 --> 00:50:06,315 hot list so that the platform 1560 00:50:06,315 --> 00:50:07,500 is capable of maintaining a 1561 00:50:07,500 --> 00:50:07,718 hot list of vehicles that, you 1562 00:50:07,718 --> 00:50:10,320 know, for example, a stolen 1563 00:50:10,320 --> 00:50:13,920 motor vehicle or it's just the 1564 00:50:14,900 --> 00:50:15,910 example to you straight. But 1565 00:50:15,910 --> 00:50:17,294 when a littler has received an 1566 00:50:17,294 --> 00:50:19,262 officer to take action on that 1567 00:50:19,262 --> 00:50:21,131 and create a system they would 1568 00:50:21,131 --> 00:50:23,330 there have to create a cad 1569 00:50:23,330 --> 00:50:25,335 number and put in record 1570 00:50:25,335 --> 00:50:26,102 number officer generate is the 1571 00:50:26,102 --> 00:50:27,337 system automatically generate 1572 00:50:27,337 --> 00:50:29,337 doesn't automatically generate 1573 00:50:29,539 --> 00:50:30,407 some of use. More immediate 1574 00:50:30,407 --> 00:50:31,740 example that a child abduction 1575 00:50:31,740 --> 00:50:33,474 because obviously there be 1576 00:50:34,244 --> 00:50:37,244 earlier report already I hit 1577 00:50:38,148 --> 00:50:42,948 and run and you got a call. It 1578 00:50:44,200 --> 00:50:46,890 was a white Ford Bronco with 1579 00:50:46,890 --> 00:50:47,190 but what I want for front it 1580 00:50:47,190 --> 00:50:49,192 had a partial plate number, 1581 00:50:49,192 --> 00:50:51,940 some signage. And hard to 1582 00:50:51,940 --> 00:50:51,828 watch camera hits on that. And 1583 00:50:51,828 --> 00:50:53,290 that's an alert. So that would 1584 00:50:53,290 --> 00:50:53,897 be that would just generate a 1585 00:50:53,897 --> 00:50:55,897 cad number. 1586 00:50:56,133 --> 00:50:57,400 >> As soon as there's no case 1587 00:50:57,400 --> 00:50:58,268 number, as soon as that's 1588 00:50:58,268 --> 00:51:00,670 reported to Denver, 9-1-1, can 1589 00:51:00,670 --> 00:51:02,670 generated right then. 1590 00:51:03,540 --> 00:51:04,740 >> All of the investigative 1591 00:51:04,740 --> 00:51:07,140 work and data collection 1592 00:51:07,210 --> 00:51:08,780 evidence collection can 1593 00:51:08,780 --> 00:51:10,478 centralize around cold water 1594 00:51:10,947 --> 00:51:14,551 to pull its ok? Can you just 1595 00:51:14,551 --> 00:51:15,485 describe what to catch them? 1596 00:51:15,485 --> 00:51:17,387 It's a computer aided dispatch 1597 00:51:17,387 --> 00:51:18,540 and it's just it's an 1598 00:51:18,540 --> 00:51:19,856 electronic system that that 1599 00:51:19,856 --> 00:51:20,457 Denver, 9, one uses track 1600 00:51:20,457 --> 00:51:22,826 incidents and to deploy 1601 00:51:22,826 --> 00:51:24,940 resources to those incidents. 1602 00:51:24,940 --> 00:51:24,928 And whenever there's an 1603 00:51:24,928 --> 00:51:26,290 incident that's received in 1604 00:51:26,290 --> 00:51:29,290 the system that generates that 1605 00:51:30,534 --> 00:51:31,268 unique number that then 1606 00:51:31,268 --> 00:51:32,168 essentially precipitate all of 1607 00:51:32,168 --> 00:51:35,168 that, all the data collection 1608 00:51:36,473 --> 00:51:38,508 and responses. 4 for so that 1609 00:51:38,508 --> 00:51:40,908 that creates portable trail. 1610 00:51:41,378 --> 00:51:44,378 With full searches that are 1611 00:51:45,615 --> 00:51:47,484 connected to that one 1612 00:51:47,484 --> 00:51:48,752 incident. Yes, an officer gets 1613 00:51:48,752 --> 00:51:49,486 a lead a month same number 12 1614 00:51:49,486 --> 00:51:52,821 20 days later, they be able to 1615 00:51:52,821 --> 00:51:54,557 search system. 1616 00:51:54,557 --> 00:51:56,260 >> are your final question? 1617 00:51:56,260 --> 00:51:58,895 Because we're sliding one more 1618 00:51:58,895 --> 00:51:59,563 and thank you asking happens. 1619 00:51:59,563 --> 00:52:01,963 Separate case numbers while 1620 00:52:02,320 --> 00:52:05,632 playing out for him do monthly 1621 00:52:05,701 --> 00:52:06,436 audits under this contract. 1622 00:52:06,436 --> 00:52:08,872 Yes, sir, will it be available 1623 00:52:08,872 --> 00:52:10,640 to You mentioned that you 1624 00:52:10,640 --> 00:52:11,507 would have access your data 1625 00:52:11,507 --> 00:52:13,743 analyst where City Council be 1626 00:52:13,743 --> 00:52:16,743 able to request seeing just 1627 00:52:17,647 --> 00:52:18,381 want to logs. What I want to 1628 00:52:18,381 --> 00:52:20,917 see license plate numbers. I 1629 00:52:20,917 --> 00:52:23,886 don't any need to look at But 1630 00:52:23,886 --> 00:52:25,550 the crimes, the cabs, senator. 1631 00:52:25,550 --> 00:52:27,857 >> They do have to be rejected 1632 00:52:27,857 --> 00:52:29,960 because of the sensitive 1633 00:52:29,960 --> 00:52:30,659 nature of the certainty that 1634 00:52:30,659 --> 00:52:32,796 know personally fine-tune the 1635 00:52:32,796 --> 00:52:34,898 nation. I don't want to 1636 00:52:34,898 --> 00:52:35,732 compromise. And then typically 1637 00:52:35,732 --> 00:52:38,602 that's why we that's one of 1638 00:52:38,602 --> 00:52:39,235 the reasons why provide that 1639 00:52:39,235 --> 00:52:39,869 data is sent the director 1640 00:52:39,869 --> 00:52:41,805 safety's office, the data 1641 00:52:41,805 --> 00:52:42,872 analyst there. So although I 1642 00:52:42,872 --> 00:52:44,740 have no issues with it, I 1643 00:52:44,740 --> 00:52:44,740 would need to to discuss with 1644 00:52:44,740 --> 00:52:48,100 the team. I don't know what 1645 00:52:48,100 --> 00:52:52,210 kind of a lift that is for 1646 00:52:53,750 --> 00:52:54,484 them to do that on suspect, 1647 00:52:54,484 --> 00:52:57,484 there will be interest because 1648 00:52:57,620 --> 00:52:58,188 going be theirs. And 1649 00:52:58,188 --> 00:52:58,855 councilmember Taurus. 1650 00:52:58,855 --> 00:53:01,157 >> you chair, thank you for 1651 00:53:01,157 --> 00:53:02,391 coming forward with this. 1652 00:53:02,391 --> 00:53:05,391 Despite that, we'll need for 1653 00:53:06,429 --> 00:53:08,664 council. But I really 1654 00:53:08,664 --> 00:53:09,265 appreciate attempt to have a 1655 00:53:09,265 --> 00:53:10,000 better transparency and 1656 00:53:10,000 --> 00:53:13,000 relationship when it comes to 1657 00:53:14,971 --> 00:53:16,807 this as far as their attention 1658 00:53:16,807 --> 00:53:17,507 period going back to council 1659 00:53:17,507 --> 00:53:20,507 Putin and his question around 1660 00:53:21,511 --> 00:53:22,780 the 21 days and data behind 1661 00:53:22,780 --> 00:53:25,780 that I still and not 1662 00:53:25,816 --> 00:53:26,716 understanding. How we got to 1663 00:53:26,716 --> 00:53:28,218 21 days and what is the 1664 00:53:28,218 --> 00:53:30,618 difference between a vehicle 1665 00:53:31,254 --> 00:53:31,988 that has actually been flagged 1666 00:53:31,988 --> 00:53:34,988 and just anyone that's driving 1667 00:53:35,358 --> 00:53:37,358 around the city. 1668 00:53:37,961 --> 00:53:38,594 >> So happy work dpd team to 1669 00:53:38,594 --> 00:53:41,594 provide a little bit more 1670 00:53:42,532 --> 00:53:44,633 context on. We arrived at the 1671 00:53:44,633 --> 00:53:47,603 21 day. Number. We looked at a 1672 00:53:47,603 --> 00:53:50,603 pretty small sample size cases 1673 00:53:52,800 --> 00:53:52,676 in 2025 and then look when in 1674 00:53:52,676 --> 00:53:53,376 the process, license plate 1675 00:53:53,376 --> 00:53:55,776 reader system became involved 1676 00:53:56,245 --> 00:53:58,214 are providing relevant and 1677 00:53:58,214 --> 00:54:00,316 we're to balance not 1678 00:54:00,316 --> 00:54:00,983 losing a bunch of cases where 1679 00:54:00,983 --> 00:54:02,983 provided relative relevant 1680 00:54:04,721 --> 00:54:05,655 evidence. We'll also be 1681 00:54:05,655 --> 00:54:06,221 responsive to the concerns 1682 00:54:06,221 --> 00:54:07,791 that we've heard from 1683 00:54:07,791 --> 00:54:09,159 councilmembers community 1684 00:54:09,159 --> 00:54:12,610 around. The longer you hold 1685 00:54:12,610 --> 00:54:13,163 that the longer it's possible 1686 00:54:13,163 --> 00:54:13,830 that someone gains access to 1687 00:54:13,830 --> 00:54:14,431 the system and use it. So 1688 00:54:14,431 --> 00:54:17,431 those are the 2 kind of 1689 00:54:17,500 --> 00:54:19,402 bouncing factors that we're 1690 00:54:19,402 --> 00:54:22,402 trying to strikes here in 21 1691 00:54:22,572 --> 00:54:24,374 days felt least first attempt 1692 00:54:24,374 --> 00:54:25,175 to strike to strike. And but 1693 00:54:25,175 --> 00:54:25,909 think it's an ongoing 1694 00:54:25,909 --> 00:54:27,911 conversation. Happened at dove 1695 00:54:27,911 --> 00:54:28,912 into a little bit more detail 1696 00:54:28,912 --> 00:54:30,912 there. 1697 00:54:32,115 --> 00:54:32,782 >> And how about when we are 1698 00:54:32,782 --> 00:54:33,416 searching for a particular 1699 00:54:33,416 --> 00:54:34,170 vehicle? How long are we 1700 00:54:34,170 --> 00:54:37,170 holding on to that data 1701 00:54:38,454 --> 00:54:39,622 investigations open? Is it 1702 00:54:39,622 --> 00:54:41,622 past that? 1703 00:54:41,623 --> 00:54:42,292 >> that already obtained 1704 00:54:42,292 --> 00:54:43,250 evidence for specific case, 1705 00:54:43,250 --> 00:54:45,729 typically what would happen is 1706 00:54:45,729 --> 00:54:46,296 we will take those images and 1707 00:54:46,296 --> 00:54:46,996 we would attack them 1708 00:54:46,996 --> 00:54:47,697 specifically. So the system's 1709 00:54:47,697 --> 00:54:49,866 a little bit different. Just 1710 00:54:49,866 --> 00:54:50,967 40 resides in dot com. So 1711 00:54:50,967 --> 00:54:51,801 socially would have to 1712 00:54:51,801 --> 00:54:52,402 preserve it for that case 1713 00:54:52,402 --> 00:54:54,802 because then it becomes 1714 00:54:55,472 --> 00:54:56,139 evidence for that case that 1715 00:54:56,139 --> 00:54:56,773 evidence was be retained as 1716 00:54:56,773 --> 00:54:59,773 long as necessary for the 1717 00:55:01,911 --> 00:55:03,313 disposition of case. Outside 1718 00:55:03,313 --> 00:55:04,130 of specific specific evidence 1719 00:55:04,130 --> 00:55:06,483 collected for a case that 20 1720 00:55:06,483 --> 00:55:08,883 one-day retention period. But 1721 00:55:09,850 --> 00:55:09,365 on a medic, the purge and he 1722 00:55:09,365 --> 00:55:10,753 did 1723 00:55:10,753 --> 00:55:13,753 >> And that something we will 1724 00:55:13,890 --> 00:55:15,580 see specified in the contract 1725 00:55:15,580 --> 00:55:17,580 with Axon? 1726 00:55:17,860 --> 00:55:19,596 >> The 21 day or the All of 1727 00:55:19,596 --> 00:55:22,464 Yeah. So the purging will 1728 00:55:22,464 --> 00:55:24,601 absolutely part of the 1729 00:55:24,601 --> 00:55:26,502 contract there will discussion 1730 00:55:26,502 --> 00:55:27,203 of the retention policy. I 1731 00:55:27,203 --> 00:55:27,904 don't know if it'll it's a 21 1732 00:55:27,904 --> 00:55:31,307 days in the contract, but it 1733 00:55:31,307 --> 00:55:33,176 will make clear. But it says 1734 00:55:33,176 --> 00:55:34,210 the city who are the ones who 1735 00:55:34,210 --> 00:55:35,780 set whatever that number is. 1736 00:55:35,780 --> 00:55:35,944 And so it's within our 1737 00:55:35,944 --> 00:55:38,344 discretion to that 21 days 1738 00:55:39,150 --> 00:55:40,183 higher or lower. 1739 00:55:40,183 --> 00:55:41,684 >> I guess my concern there is 1740 00:55:41,684 --> 00:55:42,352 that we can change that any 1741 00:55:42,352 --> 00:55:45,352 time without council and we 1742 00:55:45,388 --> 00:55:48,158 want him be necessarily need 1743 00:55:48,158 --> 00:55:51,758 to be informed. And so I'm 1744 00:55:52,600 --> 00:55:53,896 just curious what that process 1745 00:55:53,896 --> 00:55:55,264 also curious about that. And 1746 00:55:55,264 --> 00:55:56,933 who is going to be approving 1747 00:55:56,933 --> 00:55:59,933 that invitation. And will that 1748 00:56:00,360 --> 00:56:00,837 be? 1749 00:56:00,837 --> 00:56:03,720 >> There's no intention right 1750 00:56:03,720 --> 00:56:05,909 now to move forward with any 1751 00:56:05,909 --> 00:56:06,743 of those directly to sharing 1752 00:56:06,743 --> 00:56:07,510 relationships. I know you 1753 00:56:07,510 --> 00:56:08,770 know, I mentioned earlier, 1754 00:56:08,770 --> 00:56:09,245 there's some of these 1755 00:56:09,245 --> 00:56:11,245 conversations are still 1756 00:56:12,115 --> 00:56:13,984 evolving. And so I think, you 1757 00:56:13,984 --> 00:56:15,118 know, that conversation have 1758 00:56:15,118 --> 00:56:17,787 to be had with council with 1759 00:56:17,787 --> 00:56:18,487 mayor's office and dpd 1760 00:56:18,487 --> 00:56:20,887 collectively to forward. That 1761 00:56:22,258 --> 00:56:22,992 were something that we wanted 1762 00:56:22,992 --> 00:56:25,270 to do just Just to reiterate 1763 00:56:25,270 --> 00:56:28,310 on that at this point, it will 1764 00:56:28,310 --> 00:56:30,200 be only Denver police a couple 1765 00:56:30,200 --> 00:56:31,000 of other person news. Another 1766 00:56:31,000 --> 00:56:33,400 safety personnel access to. 1767 00:56:34,700 --> 00:56:35,205 This the city of Denver, 1768 00:56:35,205 --> 00:56:35,872 >> And then what is the 1769 00:56:35,872 --> 00:56:38,872 hickory and accuracy of the 1770 00:56:39,409 --> 00:56:40,476 systems? 1771 00:56:40,476 --> 00:56:42,612 >> I have a specific number 1772 00:56:42,612 --> 00:56:44,581 the axe on representative on 1773 00:56:44,581 --> 00:56:45,248 the call can speak to that You 1774 00:56:45,248 --> 00:56:48,618 know, do you buy step back 1775 00:56:48,618 --> 00:56:50,618 for? 1776 00:56:51,654 --> 00:56:52,856 >> also in terms the accuracy 1777 00:56:52,856 --> 00:56:55,358 of the system. All of that 1778 00:56:55,358 --> 00:56:56,240 depends on real world weather 1779 00:56:56,240 --> 00:56:58,127 conditions. But what we've 1780 00:56:58,127 --> 00:56:59,290 seen in kind of all weather 1781 00:56:59,290 --> 00:57:02,290 conditions is were upwards of 1782 00:57:02,732 --> 00:57:03,666 about 98% accuracy in terms of 1783 00:57:03,666 --> 00:57:05,335 the capture 8 and then 1784 00:57:05,335 --> 00:57:07,303 accuracy of that capture, 1785 00:57:07,303 --> 00:57:08,710 meaning they're 2 metrics that 1786 00:57:08,710 --> 00:57:10,106 you look at when a car goes by 1787 00:57:10,106 --> 00:57:11,273 how many times do capture car. 1788 00:57:11,273 --> 00:57:13,476 And then when you do capture 1789 00:57:13,476 --> 00:57:14,543 it, the accuracy of that read, 1790 00:57:14,543 --> 00:57:18,143 were both and that kind of 1791 00:57:21,551 --> 00:57:22,252 area. 1792 00:57:22,252 --> 00:57:22,885 >> the with the foxes staff, 1793 00:57:22,885 --> 00:57:23,620 you can also search for a 1794 00:57:23,620 --> 00:57:27,220 vehicle with a scratch. On the 1795 00:57:27,256 --> 00:57:29,425 phone for and other details 1796 00:57:29,425 --> 00:57:30,226 using ai. Will the system be 1797 00:57:30,226 --> 00:57:30,826 doing that as well? Or is it 1798 00:57:30,826 --> 00:57:32,826 strictly license plate 1799 00:57:35,198 --> 00:57:36,499 information? 1800 00:57:36,499 --> 00:57:38,434 >> That system our system does 1801 00:57:38,434 --> 00:57:39,135 have the ability to search for 1802 00:57:39,135 --> 00:57:41,535 things to characteristics of 1803 00:57:42,639 --> 00:57:43,339 the vehicle. 1804 00:57:43,339 --> 00:57:45,941 >> And will he having that is 1805 00:57:45,941 --> 00:57:49,541 part of our system with the 1806 00:57:49,912 --> 00:57:52,248 city of acts have is my last 1807 00:57:52,248 --> 00:57:53,490 question. Provides just public 1808 00:57:53,490 --> 00:57:54,951 transparency portal. What does 1809 00:57:54,951 --> 00:57:57,530 that mean? Where does that 1810 00:57:57,530 --> 00:57:58,620 look like? And how will we 1811 00:57:58,620 --> 00:57:59,289 provide transparency to the 1812 00:57:59,289 --> 00:58:01,289 public without jeopardizing 1813 00:58:03,590 --> 00:58:05,459 sensitive information? Was for 1814 00:58:10,633 --> 00:58:11,267 you. As a w. 1815 00:58:11,267 --> 00:58:13,603 >> If absolutely sure the 1816 00:58:13,603 --> 00:58:16,300 trial transparency portal that 1817 00:58:17,607 --> 00:58:19,776 we have allows agencies 1818 00:58:19,776 --> 00:58:21,744 publish how they're using any 1819 00:58:21,744 --> 00:58:22,879 of axons technology to the 1820 00:58:22,879 --> 00:58:23,946 public. It is a tool that we 1821 00:58:23,946 --> 00:58:24,579 provide through the few says 1822 00:58:24,579 --> 00:58:27,579 platform and so allows it 1823 00:58:27,850 --> 00:58:28,517 allows you to say what are the 1824 00:58:28,517 --> 00:58:29,252 technologies that you have, 1825 00:58:29,252 --> 00:58:29,919 any sharing agreements that 1826 00:58:29,919 --> 00:58:31,687 you have with other police 1827 00:58:31,687 --> 00:58:34,687 agencies or entities and then 1828 00:58:34,691 --> 00:58:37,691 also an ability for community 1829 00:58:37,860 --> 00:58:40,860 members to there, cameras or 1830 00:58:41,630 --> 00:58:43,463 register any cameras too. 1831 00:58:43,566 --> 00:58:44,467 Existing kind of use its 1832 00:58:44,467 --> 00:58:45,100 network, meaning called a 1833 00:58:45,100 --> 00:58:46,336 private cameras that you 1834 00:58:46,336 --> 00:58:48,271 previously talked about on the 1835 00:58:48,271 --> 00:58:48,938 fox Network. You can also do 1836 00:58:48,938 --> 00:58:51,338 similar things issues that 1837 00:58:53,643 --> 00:58:54,310 work as a private individual. 1838 00:58:54,310 --> 00:58:55,211 >> Thank. Thank Thank you. 1839 00:58:55,211 --> 00:58:55,778 Committee chair. Thank you. 1840 00:58:55,778 --> 00:58:56,446 Council Roby, there's 1841 00:58:56,446 --> 00:58:58,446 Councilmember Torres. Thank 1842 00:58:59,148 --> 00:59:00,983 you. MISTER Chair I want to go 1843 00:59:00,983 --> 00:59:03,383 back to COUNCILMAN Parodies 1844 00:59:03,519 --> 00:59:04,153 question about the ops manual 1845 00:59:04,153 --> 00:59:05,220 because there are several 1846 00:59:05,220 --> 00:59:06,155 references to flock in the 1847 00:59:06,155 --> 00:59:09,155 Alps manual. So assuming you 1848 00:59:10,460 --> 00:59:13,960 have to change that 2. We 1849 00:59:13,960 --> 00:59:15,496 references and replace with. 1850 00:59:16,933 --> 00:59:17,600 The name. This system meant 1851 00:59:17,600 --> 00:59:19,600 your potential? Absolutely. 1852 00:59:21,710 --> 00:59:23,173 Yes. And the policy itself I I 1853 00:59:23,173 --> 00:59:23,773 review routinely. I think they 1854 00:59:23,773 --> 00:59:24,474 biweekly with the city 1855 00:59:24,474 --> 00:59:26,900 attorney's office cannot far 1856 00:59:26,900 --> 00:59:29,609 from the truth. But is pretty 1857 00:59:30,246 --> 00:59:32,115 robust generalizing lpr 1858 00:59:32,115 --> 00:59:33,316 systems. You know, just 1859 00:59:33,316 --> 00:59:35,485 generally speaking. So yes, we 1860 00:59:35,485 --> 00:59:38,721 do intend to go through and do 1861 00:59:38,721 --> 00:59:39,555 some slight amendments because 1862 00:59:39,555 --> 00:59:41,555 explicitly it doesn't 1863 00:59:42,125 --> 00:59:44,525 reference live streaming and 1864 00:59:45,328 --> 00:59:47,196 any regulations around that 1865 00:59:47,196 --> 00:59:49,320 when then rely the guidance 1866 00:59:49,320 --> 00:59:51,401 under Halo. And we do have 1867 00:59:51,401 --> 00:59:52,368 some robust policy controls 1868 00:59:52,368 --> 00:59:53,403 Rican regards to all of 1869 00:59:53,403 --> 00:59:54,360 technologies that are used 1870 00:59:54,360 --> 00:59:56,272 utilized by the real time 1871 00:59:56,272 --> 00:59:58,774 crime center as well. So yes, 1872 00:59:58,774 --> 00:59:59,575 it would because it is a 1873 00:59:59,575 --> 01:00:02,575 camera device. Well, would say 1874 01:00:02,979 --> 01:00:05,379 that, though. And updated 1875 01:00:06,215 --> 01:00:08,615 policy language. If that's 1876 01:00:09,180 --> 01:00:09,619 tool absent provides. That 1877 01:00:09,619 --> 01:00:12,619 there would be even the 1878 01:00:12,655 --> 01:00:15,655 reference to the sections or 1879 01:00:16,326 --> 01:00:17,250 something else. Because that 1880 01:00:17,250 --> 01:00:19,862 just learned about that that 1881 01:00:19,862 --> 01:00:20,530 side of that technology here. 1882 01:00:20,530 --> 01:00:23,530 So just wanted something to 1883 01:00:24,867 --> 01:00:27,170 speak to that. I think that's 1884 01:00:27,170 --> 01:00:27,803 absolutely did call out. I All 1885 01:00:27,803 --> 01:00:29,339 of you that with the city 1886 01:00:29,339 --> 01:00:30,600 attorney's office was once 1887 01:00:30,600 --> 01:00:31,307 more to just make sure that 1888 01:00:31,307 --> 01:00:32,941 that if it's not in there 1889 01:00:32,941 --> 01:00:33,576 already, that we could 1890 01:00:33,576 --> 01:00:35,576 something that explicitly 1891 01:00:36,646 --> 01:00:39,460 addresses that concern the 1892 01:00:39,515 --> 01:00:42,515 real time crime center how 1893 01:00:43,419 --> 01:00:44,860 long does that then? Like a 1894 01:00:44,860 --> 01:00:47,860 dedicated team and how many 1895 01:00:48,458 --> 01:00:50,293 people make it up? So it's 1896 01:00:50,293 --> 01:00:52,495 quite a few years now. I think 1897 01:00:52,495 --> 01:00:53,662 I think the halo cameras go 1898 01:00:53,662 --> 01:00:57,262 back to the dnc that we 1899 01:00:57,333 --> 01:00:58,670 previously hosted. So 1900 01:00:58,670 --> 01:00:58,768 >> doing that math in my head. 1901 01:00:58,768 --> 01:01:01,768 It's been it's 20 years been 1902 01:01:02,571 --> 01:01:03,206 quite long time. The author, a 1903 01:01:03,206 --> 01:01:05,374 strength real time. Crime 1904 01:01:05,374 --> 01:01:08,374 centers is 12. Far below that 1905 01:01:13,816 --> 01:01:15,840 currently. But yeah, okay. I 1906 01:01:15,840 --> 01:01:17,619 don't think I have additional 1907 01:01:17,619 --> 01:01:20,190 questions. Only interest that 1908 01:01:22,591 --> 01:01:23,259 I have as as we just utilize 1909 01:01:23,259 --> 01:01:25,895 more frequently, do want to 1910 01:01:25,895 --> 01:01:28,295 better understand what impact 1911 01:01:29,665 --> 01:01:32,665 that has on redistribution of 1912 01:01:33,869 --> 01:01:35,400 officers and budget 1913 01:01:35,400 --> 01:01:37,339 consequences. I feel like we 1914 01:01:37,339 --> 01:01:38,700 should be creating more 1915 01:01:38,700 --> 01:01:40,407 efficient systems where we 1916 01:01:40,476 --> 01:01:42,876 need fewer people interacting 1917 01:01:44,130 --> 01:01:46,982 or we're trying to address 1918 01:01:46,982 --> 01:01:47,683 some of gap that we experience 1919 01:01:47,683 --> 01:01:50,520 with either response times or 1920 01:01:50,520 --> 01:01:53,520 something like that and this 1921 01:01:53,856 --> 01:01:54,590 is just the sense that I feel 1922 01:01:54,590 --> 01:01:58,270 it MAY not be real in terms of 1923 01:01:58,270 --> 01:02:01,627 numbers or data. We things to 1924 01:02:03,499 --> 01:02:04,333 the side of budget and 1925 01:02:04,333 --> 01:02:06,235 technology. I'm concerned that 1926 01:02:06,235 --> 01:02:06,969 we're not being very judicious 1927 01:02:06,969 --> 01:02:09,304 about. Where does that then 1928 01:02:09,304 --> 01:02:12,304 relieve us of publication to 1929 01:02:14,760 --> 01:02:14,811 keep putting money in our 1930 01:02:14,811 --> 01:02:17,811 personnel and when we continue 1931 01:02:18,347 --> 01:02:20,160 to both tolls and money to the 1932 01:02:20,160 --> 01:02:21,116 side of the budget. But I can 1933 01:02:21,116 --> 01:02:24,116 bring that up another time. 1934 01:02:25,588 --> 01:02:27,988 Thank you. Thank you. 1935 01:02:30,492 --> 01:02:32,562 Councilmember I have a second 1936 01:02:32,562 --> 01:02:35,562 that beef before we jump 2 1937 01:02:35,631 --> 01:02:38,310 quick First on year. 1938 01:02:38,734 --> 01:02:39,702 >> Policy and procedures 1939 01:02:39,702 --> 01:02:41,370 manual. Is there a reason why 1940 01:02:41,370 --> 01:02:44,970 we're not think not stick to 1941 01:02:46,209 --> 01:02:46,943 carriers, wiser name of that 1942 01:02:46,943 --> 01:02:49,943 carrier. Less than an We're 1943 01:02:51,514 --> 01:02:53,416 going to be going think that's 1944 01:02:53,416 --> 01:02:55,183 a good I was actually thinking 1945 01:02:55,183 --> 01:02:56,180 about that as we were just 1946 01:02:56,180 --> 01:02:56,686 discussing, removing flock and 1947 01:02:56,686 --> 01:02:58,487 then putting in an Exxon. I 1948 01:02:58,487 --> 01:02:59,488 think the reason that it's in 1949 01:02:59,488 --> 01:03:00,756 there now 1950 01:03:00,756 --> 01:03:01,457 >> is to differentiate the 1951 01:03:01,457 --> 01:03:03,857 unique characteristics of the 1952 01:03:05,940 --> 01:03:05,762 various platforms that we use. 1953 01:03:05,762 --> 01:03:06,329 So I will definitely bring 1954 01:03:06,329 --> 01:03:08,531 that up with the city 1955 01:03:08,531 --> 01:03:09,232 attorney's office and see if 1956 01:03:09,232 --> 01:03:11,533 we can. You just make a pass 1957 01:03:11,533 --> 01:03:13,533 from 1958 01:03:15,137 --> 01:03:15,872 >> One of 13 council members, 1959 01:03:15,872 --> 01:03:16,539 my strong recommendations that 1960 01:03:16,539 --> 01:03:19,539 were not flipping names an 1961 01:03:19,909 --> 01:03:23,509 opera Miles that we are having 1962 01:03:24,613 --> 01:03:25,214 procedures specific 2 systems 1963 01:03:25,214 --> 01:03:27,614 and abilities And means 1964 01:03:27,683 --> 01:03:29,885 because then you're going 1965 01:03:29,885 --> 01:03:30,486 continue updating whatever 1966 01:03:30,486 --> 01:03:31,187 basis. That is just my 1967 01:03:31,187 --> 01:03:33,587 recommendation. So would love 1968 01:03:33,889 --> 01:03:35,157 to hear city attorney's 1969 01:03:35,157 --> 01:03:37,157 perspective. 1970 01:03:38,962 --> 01:03:39,428 >> I have I have continued 1971 01:03:39,428 --> 01:03:40,129 concerns. West. 1972 01:03:40,129 --> 01:03:42,980 >> Surveillance cameras near 1973 01:03:42,980 --> 01:03:44,980 predict reproductive all 1974 01:03:44,990 --> 01:03:45,134 centers. And I would like you 1975 01:03:45,134 --> 01:03:48,134 to describe once what controls 1976 01:03:48,971 --> 01:03:51,600 that we have as we commission 1977 01:03:51,600 --> 01:03:51,940 on cameras from the last 1978 01:03:51,940 --> 01:03:54,940 carrier to now this carrier. 1979 01:03:55,711 --> 01:03:58,711 What? Controls that? We have 1980 01:03:59,448 --> 01:04:02,384 to ensure that new cameras, 1981 01:04:02,384 --> 01:04:03,319 our place places that provide 1982 01:04:03,319 --> 01:04:06,919 details folks going in and out 1983 01:04:07,256 --> 01:04:08,423 really ensuring that they have 1984 01:04:08,423 --> 01:04:10,823 safety, security and privacy 1985 01:04:11,226 --> 01:04:12,295 with going to reproductive 1986 01:04:12,295 --> 01:04:12,828 health centers. 1987 01:04:12,828 --> 01:04:14,396 >> Yeah, thank you, 1988 01:04:14,396 --> 01:04:15,230 COUNCILMAN. I we've had this 1989 01:04:15,230 --> 01:04:15,931 conversation a couple times. 1990 01:04:15,931 --> 01:04:16,632 We've also been talking with 1991 01:04:16,632 --> 01:04:19,632 some of the organizations in 1992 01:04:20,603 --> 01:04:21,837 that space I know dpd is 1993 01:04:21,837 --> 01:04:23,606 currently working on kind of 1994 01:04:23,606 --> 01:04:25,508 the list of criteria that 1995 01:04:25,508 --> 01:04:27,576 they're going to use for 1996 01:04:27,576 --> 01:04:28,277 determining where these camera 1997 01:04:28,277 --> 01:04:30,212 placements we're happy to sit 1998 01:04:30,212 --> 01:04:30,913 down with any councilmember 1999 01:04:30,913 --> 01:04:31,580 and have discussions about 2000 01:04:31,580 --> 01:04:34,580 either in your district or 2001 01:04:34,917 --> 01:04:35,618 city at large where camera 2002 01:04:35,618 --> 01:04:38,618 placements going kind of the 2003 01:04:39,489 --> 01:04:40,222 feedback there in a couple of 2004 01:04:40,222 --> 01:04:43,222 things that we've talked about 2005 01:04:44,560 --> 01:04:46,461 as it relates to putting that 2006 01:04:46,461 --> 01:04:47,196 certain sensitive locations, 2007 01:04:47,196 --> 01:04:49,565 right? As we've already talked 2008 01:04:49,565 --> 01:04:50,699 about, these are facing the 2009 01:04:50,699 --> 01:04:51,500 public right of way right 2010 01:04:51,500 --> 01:04:52,401 there facing public streets to 2011 01:04:52,401 --> 01:04:53,602 face in the parking lot. It's 2012 01:04:53,602 --> 01:04:55,103 not facing a specific 2013 01:04:55,103 --> 01:04:55,771 building. It's getting the 2014 01:04:55,771 --> 01:04:57,730 image is going through and 2015 01:04:57,730 --> 01:05:00,730 down the public street. So 2016 01:05:00,910 --> 01:05:01,610 that's part of it. The 2017 01:05:01,610 --> 01:05:04,610 reduction in the retention of 2018 01:05:06,150 --> 01:05:06,682 the number of days policy is 2019 01:05:06,682 --> 01:05:07,416 son, Parker, reflection of 2020 01:05:07,416 --> 01:05:10,786 some of the concerns have been 2021 01:05:10,786 --> 01:05:12,655 raised about the potential for 2022 01:05:12,655 --> 01:05:14,890 improper uses around 2023 01:05:14,890 --> 01:05:14,757 reproductive healthcare 2024 01:05:14,757 --> 01:05:15,957 investigations and there's 2025 01:05:15,957 --> 01:05:16,926 going to be there's already 2026 01:05:16,926 --> 01:05:19,926 policies and exist with be 2027 01:05:19,995 --> 01:05:21,964 explicit language in the 2028 01:05:21,964 --> 01:05:23,320 contract about the fact that 2029 01:05:23,320 --> 01:05:24,266 we have shield laws in the 2030 01:05:24,266 --> 01:05:25,568 state and that none of this 2031 01:05:25,568 --> 01:05:26,769 can be used for the purposes 2032 01:05:26,769 --> 01:05:29,169 of those types of 2033 01:05:29,572 --> 01:05:30,272 investigations. So it's the 2034 01:05:30,272 --> 01:05:33,272 balance of the concerns that 2035 01:05:33,742 --> 01:05:34,577 have been raised. Also 2036 01:05:34,577 --> 01:05:35,578 recognizing that a lot of the 2037 01:05:35,578 --> 01:05:36,278 sensitive locations, those 2038 01:05:36,278 --> 01:05:38,678 type of facilities, hospitals 2039 01:05:40,490 --> 01:05:40,683 and places, those are also 2040 01:05:40,683 --> 01:05:43,830 places that targeted for 2041 01:05:44,219 --> 01:05:45,721 attack other. Criminal 2042 01:05:45,721 --> 01:05:46,489 conduct. And so weighing those 2043 01:05:46,489 --> 01:05:48,423 factors as part of what we've 2044 01:05:48,423 --> 01:05:50,823 been discussing. But I'm 2045 01:05:50,893 --> 01:05:51,594 certainly chat about the 2046 01:05:51,594 --> 01:05:52,261 camera placement that you any 2047 01:05:52,261 --> 01:05:55,261 other member who would like 2048 01:05:59,268 --> 01:06:00,369 to. Thank you so much. In the 2049 01:06:00,369 --> 01:06:01,700 second round councilmember 2050 01:06:01,700 --> 01:06:01,737 parity visas tears comes from 2051 01:06:01,737 --> 01:06:04,137 Cashman and Council member 2052 01:06:04,807 --> 01:06:05,708 Fletcher. 2053 01:06:05,708 --> 01:06:09,308 >> and I apologize. I just our 2054 01:06:11,881 --> 01:06:12,948 council member Amanda Sawyer, 2055 01:06:12,948 --> 01:06:14,150 and you didn't go first round. 2056 01:06:14,150 --> 01:06:14,983 So if you don't mind jumping 2057 01:06:14,983 --> 01:06:16,419 in and don't go to second. 2058 01:06:16,419 --> 01:06:18,870 Great. Thank you so much. 2059 01:06:18,870 --> 01:06:18,754 MISTER Chair. Really person 2060 01:06:18,754 --> 01:06:21,857 and I want to say thank you 2061 01:06:21,857 --> 01:06:22,892 for hearing the council's 2062 01:06:22,892 --> 01:06:24,293 concerns about. 2063 01:06:24,293 --> 01:06:24,927 >> You a lot of the different 2064 01:06:24,927 --> 01:06:27,163 things that we've already 2065 01:06:27,163 --> 01:06:27,862 talked about here and being 2066 01:06:27,862 --> 01:06:30,862 responsive to them. I really 2067 01:06:31,660 --> 01:06:31,734 appreciate it. We have been in 2068 01:06:31,734 --> 01:06:33,690 situations previously where 2069 01:06:33,690 --> 01:06:33,769 we've had concerns like this 2070 01:06:33,769 --> 01:06:36,504 and haven't been responded to 2071 01:06:36,504 --> 01:06:37,173 with such thorough and 2072 01:06:37,173 --> 01:06:39,173 extensive conversation and 2073 01:06:39,941 --> 01:06:42,341 research and discussions. So 2074 01:06:43,144 --> 01:06:45,544 thank really appreciate Wanted 2075 01:06:46,282 --> 01:06:47,149 to ask about the 55 cameras 2076 01:06:47,149 --> 01:06:48,718 that are coming in in this 2077 01:06:48,718 --> 01:06:52,318 contract. So right now we have 2078 01:06:52,955 --> 01:06:55,355 111 flock cameras. This more 2079 01:06:56,892 --> 01:06:58,928 than cuts that in half. What 2080 01:06:58,928 --> 01:06:59,561 does that mean for kind of 2081 01:06:59,561 --> 01:07:02,561 system in general and the 2082 01:07:03,499 --> 01:07:05,500 impacts that I have? I think 2083 01:07:05,500 --> 01:07:07,469 we're going to have to and we 2084 01:07:07,469 --> 01:07:08,703 fully anticipate to drain into 2085 01:07:08,703 --> 01:07:09,438 the collection phase as we 2086 01:07:09,438 --> 01:07:11,307 roll out this platform to kind 2087 01:07:11,307 --> 01:07:11,974 of see where. 2088 01:07:11,974 --> 01:07:13,209 >> That plans to on. If you 2089 01:07:13,209 --> 01:07:15,277 want to see details in that 2090 01:07:15,277 --> 01:07:16,312 regard. But essentially, we do 2091 01:07:16,312 --> 01:07:17,113 know that they're, you know, 2092 01:07:17,113 --> 01:07:19,148 reducing the number of lpr 2093 01:07:19,148 --> 01:07:20,181 devices will have some sort of 2094 01:07:20,181 --> 01:07:21,951 impact. We're not exactly sure 2095 01:07:21,951 --> 01:07:23,886 where that impactful will 2096 01:07:23,886 --> 01:07:24,553 land, but we're definitely be 2097 01:07:24,553 --> 01:07:27,222 collecting data as much as 2098 01:07:27,222 --> 01:07:28,524 possible in that regard. Is 2099 01:07:28,524 --> 01:07:29,391 that does that make sense? I 2100 01:07:29,391 --> 01:07:32,795 think so. I mean, I guess I'm 2101 01:07:32,795 --> 01:07:34,795 I'm asking 2102 01:07:35,464 --> 01:07:36,499 >> this we have seen 2103 01:07:36,499 --> 01:07:38,499 significant success with 111 2104 01:07:40,836 --> 01:07:42,438 cameras are we going to be 2105 01:07:42,438 --> 01:07:45,641 able to have that same level 2106 01:07:45,641 --> 01:07:46,609 of success with less cameras? 2107 01:07:46,609 --> 01:07:47,376 I think there will be an 2108 01:07:47,376 --> 01:07:48,177 impact. And I just I just 2109 01:07:48,177 --> 01:07:48,844 don't I can't quantify what 2110 01:07:48,844 --> 01:07:52,444 that impact will be at this 2111 01:07:53,682 --> 01:07:54,490 plane. 2112 01:07:54,490 --> 01:07:55,551 >> think 2113 01:07:55,551 --> 01:07:56,218 >> that that's goes back to 2114 01:07:56,218 --> 01:07:56,852 their earlier discussion of 2115 01:07:56,852 --> 01:08:00,452 why tpd is coming up with 2116 01:08:00,456 --> 01:08:02,157 this. This kind of list of 2117 01:08:02,157 --> 01:08:03,359 parameters for determining 2118 01:08:03,359 --> 01:08:03,993 where cameras are most needed 2119 01:08:03,993 --> 01:08:06,993 across the city and then 2120 01:08:07,329 --> 01:08:08,297 obviously working with council 2121 01:08:08,297 --> 01:08:11,297 members to have that further 2122 01:08:11,967 --> 01:08:12,700 discussion around the 2123 01:08:12,700 --> 01:08:14,770 placement. But it's it'll be a 2124 01:08:14,770 --> 01:08:15,503 little bit of an iterative 2125 01:08:15,503 --> 01:08:18,503 process along with the 21 day. 2126 01:08:19,441 --> 01:08:21,443 Retention period rate is to 2127 01:08:21,443 --> 01:08:23,379 How much of a loss evidence 2128 01:08:23,379 --> 01:08:24,914 does that create? Because it's 2129 01:08:24,914 --> 01:08:25,580 significant not similar with 2130 01:08:25,580 --> 01:08:27,716 the reduction cameras. It's 2131 01:08:27,716 --> 01:08:28,817 something that will be 2132 01:08:28,817 --> 01:08:30,753 tracking certainly. 2133 01:08:30,753 --> 01:08:31,387 >> Ok, so are you kind of 2134 01:08:31,387 --> 01:08:34,987 looking at this that as a 2135 01:08:37,226 --> 01:08:40,226 pilot to see what that? 2136 01:08:40,429 --> 01:08:41,697 >> loss what that impact will 2137 01:08:41,697 --> 01:08:42,364 be, what all of the different 2138 01:08:42,364 --> 01:08:43,320 things that we just talked 2139 01:08:43,320 --> 01:08:46,602 about like is that are you 2140 01:08:46,602 --> 01:08:47,302 sort of? From a management 2141 01:08:47,302 --> 01:08:49,702 perspective? Are you looking 2142 01:08:50,873 --> 01:08:52,700 at this as a as an opportunity 2143 01:08:52,700 --> 01:08:54,407 to pilot a different 2144 01:08:55,978 --> 01:08:56,812 technology that works better 2145 01:08:56,812 --> 01:08:57,546 given all of our concerns. And 2146 01:08:57,546 --> 01:08:59,815 given the community's concerns 2147 01:08:59,815 --> 01:09:02,215 about data, retention, cetera, 2148 01:09:03,919 --> 01:09:05,870 that vision here. 2149 01:09:05,870 --> 01:09:07,870 >> Absolutely. That's 2150 01:09:07,890 --> 01:09:07,990 different aspect because this 2151 01:09:07,990 --> 01:09:09,758 is a different platform Levy's 2152 01:09:09,758 --> 01:09:11,293 previously. For example, the 2153 01:09:11,293 --> 01:09:12,361 retention period is, as Tim 2154 01:09:12,361 --> 01:09:12,928 said, is being reduced. So I 2155 01:09:12,928 --> 01:09:13,629 think there's there's 2156 01:09:13,629 --> 01:09:16,290 definitely different types of 2157 01:09:16,980 --> 01:09:16,832 metrics that we're going to be 2158 01:09:16,832 --> 01:09:19,201 monitoring and capturing to to 2159 01:09:19,201 --> 01:09:20,350 kind of judge the efficacy. 2160 01:09:20,350 --> 01:09:20,836 And I think, you know, as this 2161 01:09:20,836 --> 01:09:23,836 new platform rules out, that's 2162 01:09:24,600 --> 01:09:24,673 going take some time. This is 2163 01:09:24,673 --> 01:09:27,673 new platform rules out. You 2164 01:09:27,676 --> 01:09:28,344 know, we can start comparing 2165 01:09:28,344 --> 01:09:28,978 what that what the numbers 2166 01:09:28,978 --> 01:09:31,978 look like to the previous 2167 01:09:34,150 --> 01:09:36,150 platform. Really appreciate 2168 01:09:37,119 --> 01:09:37,786 that. I I will just follow 2169 01:09:37,786 --> 01:09:38,487 Councilmember Cashman's 2170 01:09:38,487 --> 01:09:40,356 requests that U.S. Keep us 2171 01:09:40,356 --> 01:09:41,256 updated on what this looks 2172 01:09:41,256 --> 01:09:42,591 like after. 2173 01:09:42,591 --> 01:09:43,626 >> You know, assuming the 2174 01:09:43,626 --> 01:09:44,560 contract goes through after 2175 01:09:44,560 --> 01:09:46,528 certain number of months, 2176 01:09:46,528 --> 01:09:49,528 maybe quarterly kind of go 2177 01:09:51,967 --> 01:09:53,269 over what that looks like 2178 01:09:53,269 --> 01:09:55,437 really appreciate that. I will 2179 01:09:55,437 --> 01:09:56,171 say thank you for delaying 2180 01:09:56,171 --> 01:09:56,805 this to a date certain because 2181 01:09:56,805 --> 01:09:59,205 I don't feel comfortable 2182 01:10:00,408 --> 01:10:01,577 voting on this contract and 2183 01:10:01,577 --> 01:10:04,346 tell they see the contract 2184 01:10:04,346 --> 01:10:06,682 itself. And the reason for 2185 01:10:06,682 --> 01:10:10,282 that is because task force has 2186 01:10:10,919 --> 01:10:11,587 been talking. Lyle about 2187 01:10:11,587 --> 01:10:13,987 creating an ordinance that 2188 01:10:15,124 --> 01:10:17,559 would manage data sharing and 2189 01:10:17,559 --> 01:10:18,193 privacy are across all 2190 01:10:18,193 --> 01:10:20,280 technology platforms that 2191 01:10:20,280 --> 01:10:23,280 doesn't exist at this moment. 2192 01:10:26,135 --> 01:10:28,337 I hope it does But what that 2193 01:10:28,337 --> 01:10:28,903 means for real world 2194 01:10:28,903 --> 01:10:30,903 implications is that 2195 01:10:31,740 --> 01:10:32,841 guardrails have to exist in 2196 01:10:32,841 --> 01:10:35,911 the contract. And that's why I 2197 01:10:35,911 --> 01:10:36,611 feel like I cam vote to move 2198 01:10:36,611 --> 01:10:38,247 this out of committee until I 2199 01:10:38,247 --> 01:10:39,148 see the contract because the 2200 01:10:39,148 --> 01:10:41,548 only place these guardrails 2201 01:10:44,386 --> 01:10:45,454 exist the contract. So really 2202 01:10:45,454 --> 01:10:47,422 appreciate you getting that. 2203 01:10:47,422 --> 01:10:48,123 That to us soon as possible. 2204 01:10:48,123 --> 01:10:50,959 And thanks again for hearing 2205 01:10:50,959 --> 01:10:54,163 us and for doing only work on 2206 01:10:54,163 --> 01:10:54,830 Thank you. 2207 01:10:54,830 --> 01:10:55,497 >> Thank you. Councilmember 2208 01:10:55,497 --> 01:10:57,897 And then Councilmember gets 2209 01:10:59,300 --> 01:11:02,710 off terrorists and let's start 2210 01:11:02,710 --> 01:11:03,572 there thank you, MISTER Do we 2211 01:11:03,572 --> 01:11:04,306 have an axon representative 2212 01:11:04,306 --> 01:11:06,941 available to be promoted or is 2213 01:11:06,941 --> 01:11:08,143 he he great. Thank you. 2214 01:11:08,143 --> 01:11:09,478 >> So something I didn't get a 2215 01:11:09,478 --> 01:11:10,979 chance to ask. And to 2216 01:11:10,979 --> 01:11:12,800 Beijing's, I've had with you 2217 01:11:12,800 --> 01:11:15,800 all that. I appreciate all 2218 01:11:15,851 --> 01:11:19,488 that time spent how a tax on 2219 01:11:19,488 --> 01:11:20,621 handle executive order or a 2220 01:11:20,621 --> 01:11:22,591 situation where the federal 2221 01:11:22,591 --> 01:11:23,292 government sent you a 2222 01:11:23,292 --> 01:11:23,992 subpoena. You sent it to the 2223 01:11:23,992 --> 01:11:25,327 role. The jurisdiction is the 2224 01:11:25,327 --> 01:11:27,329 owner of the data. But the 2225 01:11:27,329 --> 01:11:28,163 federal government then took 2226 01:11:28,163 --> 01:11:31,763 Exxon to court trying to get 2227 01:11:33,202 --> 01:11:34,169 essentially all of your data. 2228 01:11:34,169 --> 01:11:35,838 >> In in a scenario like that 2229 01:11:35,838 --> 01:11:36,472 is something that we have a 2230 01:11:36,472 --> 01:11:38,640 legal team where we would 2231 01:11:38,640 --> 01:11:41,640 fight against That's kind of 2232 01:11:42,444 --> 01:11:43,144 as far as I. And able to 2233 01:11:43,144 --> 01:11:44,513 probably speak to that. But I 2234 01:11:44,513 --> 01:11:45,247 get more specifics in terms of 2235 01:11:45,247 --> 01:11:46,715 like what we would actually do 2236 01:11:46,715 --> 01:11:50,315 in a matter like that. But 2237 01:11:50,686 --> 01:11:51,419 Lilly under contract, we send 2238 01:11:51,419 --> 01:11:52,121 the did send the foi request a 2239 01:11:52,121 --> 01:11:55,457 review because we do not have 2240 01:11:55,457 --> 01:11:56,157 access and it is not our data. 2241 01:11:56,157 --> 01:11:57,826 >> Something that we talked a 2242 01:11:57,826 --> 01:11:59,270 little bit everything in our 2243 01:11:59,270 --> 01:11:59,695 second briefing yesterday was 2244 01:11:59,695 --> 01:12:02,998 that also impacts on has an 2245 01:12:02,998 --> 01:12:04,266 ethics board around ai looking 2246 01:12:04,266 --> 01:12:05,667 into a little more actually 2247 01:12:05,667 --> 01:12:06,468 saw that entire board resigned 2248 01:12:06,468 --> 01:12:08,737 in 2022. So I We're talking 2249 01:12:08,737 --> 01:12:09,605 about a new word. It was 2250 01:12:09,605 --> 01:12:11,506 replaced. That resignation was 2251 01:12:11,506 --> 01:12:14,506 pretty concerning to me. Can 2252 01:12:15,176 --> 01:12:15,844 you talk about whether Axon 2253 01:12:15,844 --> 01:12:16,545 did anything to address the 2254 01:12:16,545 --> 01:12:19,545 concerns that led the entire 2255 01:12:20,149 --> 01:12:23,149 board resign due to the 2256 01:12:23,252 --> 01:12:26,252 announcement some time not his 2257 01:12:27,122 --> 01:12:27,923 quick to and then also use 2258 01:12:27,923 --> 01:12:29,923 surveillance cameras with 2259 01:12:30,125 --> 01:12:31,226 real-time streaming, which is 2260 01:12:31,226 --> 01:12:32,394 exactly what we're talking to 2261 01:12:32,394 --> 01:12:35,497 me what it acts. In response 2262 01:12:35,497 --> 01:12:36,365 to that words as a nation of 2263 01:12:36,365 --> 01:12:37,990 2022. 2264 01:12:37,990 --> 01:12:38,133 >> That's one of probably have 2265 01:12:38,133 --> 01:12:38,700 to follow up on to get more 2266 01:12:38,700 --> 01:12:39,435 specifics about that 2267 01:12:39,435 --> 01:12:42,137 particular piece. But all fall 2268 01:12:42,137 --> 01:12:42,805 on that. 2269 01:12:42,805 --> 01:12:43,539 >> Okay. I would appreciate 2270 01:12:43,539 --> 01:12:47,139 that because I wasn't aware of 2271 01:12:49,111 --> 01:12:50,344 it is concerning for dvd. Is 2272 01:12:50,344 --> 01:12:51,113 there any other software of 2273 01:12:51,113 --> 01:12:51,847 all the different tools that 2274 01:12:51,847 --> 01:12:54,782 you have available in the real 2275 01:12:54,782 --> 01:12:55,818 time crime center? 2276 01:12:55,818 --> 01:12:56,552 >> That has facial recognition 2277 01:12:56,552 --> 01:12:59,552 capability. Even if you're not 2278 01:13:03,910 --> 01:13:04,259 necessarily using No, to my 2279 01:13:04,259 --> 01:13:06,659 knowledge. I'm I'm concerned 2280 01:13:07,229 --> 01:13:09,970 that even if the even of axons 2281 01:13:09,970 --> 01:13:11,400 over them is not building in 2282 01:13:11,400 --> 01:13:12,401 facial recognition, that live 2283 01:13:12,401 --> 01:13:13,168 streaming capability leads to 2284 01:13:13,168 --> 01:13:14,690 the possibility of fake 2285 01:13:14,690 --> 01:13:15,270 official recognition by 2286 01:13:15,270 --> 01:13:16,405 wearing it with another And 2287 01:13:16,405 --> 01:13:17,139 it's just one of these things 2288 01:13:17,139 --> 01:13:18,474 where there's so much we don't 2289 01:13:18,474 --> 01:13:21,209 know about what happens in our 2290 01:13:21,209 --> 01:13:21,910 gcc that I have to raise a 2291 01:13:21,910 --> 01:13:25,113 concern. It's a member and I 2292 01:13:25,113 --> 01:13:25,780 know I just want to 2293 01:13:25,780 --> 01:13:27,683 >> a flag for you like, you 2294 01:13:27,683 --> 01:13:30,850 know, we're we're very aware 2295 01:13:30,850 --> 01:13:31,920 that recognition legislatively 2296 01:13:31,920 --> 01:13:34,222 regulated in the state of 2297 01:13:34,222 --> 01:13:34,956 Colorado. And so that's, you 2298 01:13:34,956 --> 01:13:36,624 know, you have to be something 2299 01:13:36,624 --> 01:13:37,559 almost all of our vendors that 2300 01:13:37,559 --> 01:13:39,959 dead even have anything 2301 01:13:39,995 --> 01:13:40,696 related to facial recognition 2302 01:13:40,696 --> 01:13:43,980 understand that we would have 2303 01:13:43,980 --> 01:13:43,765 to explicitly opt in and 2304 01:13:43,765 --> 01:13:46,765 typically we would have to 2305 01:13:47,200 --> 01:13:48,837 provide evidence that, you 2306 01:13:48,837 --> 01:13:50,472 know, we collaborated with 2307 01:13:50,472 --> 01:13:51,874 city council as required by 2308 01:13:51,874 --> 01:13:55,474 law in order to bring that 2309 01:13:55,977 --> 01:13:56,978 technology and to use That's a 2310 01:13:56,978 --> 01:13:58,980 lot. And our compliance with 2311 01:13:58,980 --> 01:13:59,648 is another side topic. That's 2312 01:13:59,648 --> 01:14:00,382 a reasonable course of this 2313 01:14:00,382 --> 01:14:01,830 task force. And I just haven't 2314 01:14:01,830 --> 01:14:02,617 had time to sort of fully ask 2315 01:14:02,617 --> 01:14:05,170 questions about. And so 2316 01:14:06,621 --> 01:14:07,889 >> I would like to do that as 2317 01:14:07,889 --> 01:14:09,958 well because just it's only as 2318 01:14:09,958 --> 01:14:10,959 good as our kind of enforce 2319 01:14:10,959 --> 01:14:11,593 mechanisms. You know, that 2320 01:14:11,593 --> 01:14:12,127 down flock was developed 2321 01:14:12,127 --> 01:14:13,896 initial actions and 2322 01:14:13,896 --> 01:14:15,130 technology. So again, we have 2323 01:14:15,130 --> 01:14:16,765 an example where all these 2324 01:14:16,765 --> 01:14:17,466 things on the on paper just 2325 01:14:17,466 --> 01:14:18,200 into the tracks. All I have a 2326 01:14:18,200 --> 01:14:19,935 question about that, but thank 2327 01:14:19,935 --> 01:14:22,905 you for that. Has the 2328 01:14:22,905 --> 01:14:24,905 administration probably hurt 2329 01:14:25,240 --> 01:14:25,940 him. Doesn't sort of diligence 2330 01:14:25,940 --> 01:14:28,340 on axons business immigration 2331 01:14:30,112 --> 01:14:31,313 enforcement? 2332 01:14:31,313 --> 01:14:32,681 >> Yes, mean, I know that they 2333 01:14:32,681 --> 01:14:34,516 have contracts with dhs with 2334 01:14:34,516 --> 01:14:36,451 ice to provide teachers and 2335 01:14:36,451 --> 01:14:37,218 body-worn camera. I believe 2336 01:14:37,218 --> 01:14:38,530 this was probably a top 2337 01:14:38,530 --> 01:14:38,720 discussion when the body-worn 2338 01:14:38,720 --> 01:14:40,221 camera Taser contract came 2339 01:14:40,221 --> 01:14:43,821 through this body a couple of 2340 01:14:44,760 --> 01:14:46,528 months ago. So it's certainly 2341 01:14:46,528 --> 01:14:47,229 a factor. This obviously a 2342 01:14:47,229 --> 01:14:49,629 separate program from those. 2343 01:14:51,466 --> 01:14:52,700 To my knowledge, the federal 2344 01:14:52,700 --> 01:14:53,468 there, there is not an example 2345 01:14:53,468 --> 01:14:56,468 the federal getting access to 2346 01:14:57,390 --> 01:14:57,773 that scenario. Lpr system. 2347 01:14:57,773 --> 01:15:00,208 >> And I guess I'm curious 2348 01:15:00,208 --> 01:15:01,610 whether after Mets executive 2349 01:15:01,610 --> 01:15:03,610 order recently, whether 2350 01:15:04,713 --> 01:15:05,414 there's any thought from the 2351 01:15:05,414 --> 01:15:05,947 administration about kind of 2352 01:15:05,947 --> 01:15:07,947 from like unethical 2353 01:15:09,251 --> 01:15:10,686 contracting point of view 2354 01:15:10,686 --> 01:15:11,519 considering those sorts of 2355 01:15:11,519 --> 01:15:12,154 times before we agree get a 2356 01:15:12,154 --> 01:15:12,854 lot of money to a company 2357 01:15:12,854 --> 01:15:14,289 because that's something the 2358 01:15:14,289 --> 01:15:16,689 mayor isn't interested. Happy 2359 01:15:16,825 --> 01:15:17,526 have a conversation. Will this 2360 01:15:17,526 --> 01:15:20,395 the time? Because we're about 2361 01:15:20,395 --> 01:15:21,296 to vote on this and we would 2362 01:15:21,296 --> 01:15:23,431 be, you know, paying money to 2363 01:15:23,431 --> 01:15:24,232 this coming. We have a We 2364 01:15:24,232 --> 01:15:25,299 hundreds company already, but 2365 01:15:25,299 --> 01:15:27,202 this would be a new one that 2366 01:15:27,202 --> 01:15:27,903 we don't have already. So I 2367 01:15:27,903 --> 01:15:30,903 just wondered about that from 2368 01:15:32,674 --> 01:15:33,375 the Executive branch Last 2369 01:15:33,375 --> 01:15:36,544 question here. I just want to 2370 01:15:36,544 --> 01:15:37,279 say correcting one thing to 2371 01:15:37,279 --> 01:15:37,979 heart. We are adding new ones. 2372 01:15:37,979 --> 01:15:40,415 I what can enter her and told 2373 01:15:40,415 --> 01:15:44,150 the task force is that average 2374 01:15:45,687 --> 01:15:46,354 range of time for what tpd 2375 01:15:46,354 --> 01:15:48,754 defines as useful evidence 2376 01:15:50,525 --> 01:15:52,427 from a flock cameras was up to 2377 01:15:52,427 --> 01:15:53,610 14 days, not 20. So I just not 2378 01:15:53,610 --> 01:15:56,661 to her split, but I again 2379 01:15:57,320 --> 01:15:58,934 wonder why 21 days and I also 2380 01:15:58,934 --> 01:16:00,135 carry us about ledgers to 2381 01:16:00,135 --> 01:16:00,701 actions have those 3, 4, a 2382 01:16:00,701 --> 01:16:03,101 time frames that you 2383 01:16:05,106 --> 01:16:07,709 referenced. Do know that tough 2384 01:16:07,709 --> 01:16:09,677 I don't happy have a 2385 01:16:09,677 --> 01:16:10,778 spreadsheet that I share with 2386 01:16:10,778 --> 01:16:13,649 all council members of a range 2387 01:16:13,649 --> 01:16:14,782 25 or 30 cities and their 2388 01:16:14,782 --> 01:16:16,180 retention policies. 2389 01:16:16,180 --> 01:16:17,819 >> then since I know that you 2390 01:16:17,819 --> 01:16:18,587 as long, just the idea that 2391 01:16:18,587 --> 01:16:19,121 we're not going cameras near 2392 01:16:19,121 --> 01:16:20,589 reproductive health 2393 01:16:20,589 --> 01:16:22,589 facilities. That's obviously 2394 01:16:25,426 --> 01:16:27,262 important. But that also. To 2395 01:16:27,262 --> 01:16:28,563 me is sort banking the 2396 01:16:28,563 --> 01:16:29,197 question. We know that don't 2397 01:16:29,197 --> 01:16:30,264 Cameras have been used in 2398 01:16:30,264 --> 01:16:32,264 other jurisdictions, for 2399 01:16:32,701 --> 01:16:33,435 example, to monitor protest 2400 01:16:33,435 --> 01:16:34,169 activity in the live streaming 2401 01:16:34,169 --> 01:16:37,169 capability makes that far more 2402 01:16:38,173 --> 01:16:38,706 concerning to me. That's 2403 01:16:38,706 --> 01:16:39,374 another exercise of 2404 01:16:39,374 --> 01:16:40,750 constitutional rights and 2405 01:16:40,750 --> 01:16:40,909 concert tours that are still 2406 01:16:40,909 --> 01:16:41,610 protected on like reproductive 2407 01:16:41,610 --> 01:16:43,745 rights, which no longer are. 2408 01:16:43,745 --> 01:16:46,745 But federal government. And so 2409 01:16:48,650 --> 01:16:51,720 it just sort of To me. I feel 2410 01:16:51,720 --> 01:16:52,620 like carving out particularly 2411 01:16:52,620 --> 01:16:53,288 well organized kind of 2412 01:16:53,288 --> 01:16:54,220 constituency in the voting 2413 01:16:54,220 --> 01:16:56,824 rights groups who I appreciate 2414 01:16:56,824 --> 01:16:57,858 and agree with. But then we're 2415 01:16:57,858 --> 01:16:59,561 leaving unprotected. A lot of 2416 01:16:59,561 --> 01:17:00,696 other people who might be 2417 01:17:00,696 --> 01:17:01,363 engaging in other kinds of 2418 01:17:01,363 --> 01:17:02,300 protected activity such as 2419 01:17:02,300 --> 01:17:02,697 first met. Right? So I just 2420 01:17:02,697 --> 01:17:06,297 want put that out there for 2421 01:17:06,367 --> 01:17:08,367 conversation. A consideration. 2422 01:17:08,369 --> 01:17:09,437 And I I want to add took a 2423 01:17:09,437 --> 01:17:10,138 very long time to get this 2424 01:17:10,138 --> 01:17:12,538 level of responsiveness. I'm 2425 01:17:13,175 --> 01:17:13,941 glad that we're getting it, 2426 01:17:13,941 --> 01:17:16,712 but I'm not feeling like like 2427 01:17:16,712 --> 01:17:19,447 any of this would have 2428 01:17:19,447 --> 01:17:20,148 happened. We have not had huge 2429 01:17:20,148 --> 01:17:20,816 amount of accountability from 2430 01:17:20,816 --> 01:17:21,650 the public about what went 2431 01:17:21,650 --> 01:17:23,784 incredibly wrong with flock 2432 01:17:23,784 --> 01:17:25,153 and should never have gone 2433 01:17:25,153 --> 01:17:27,188 wrong. Should have been put a 2434 01:17:27,188 --> 01:17:29,291 stop to a year sooner than it 2435 01:17:29,291 --> 01:17:30,125 was and so on. So I just have 2436 01:17:30,125 --> 01:17:32,260 to say that and that's not 2437 01:17:32,260 --> 01:17:34,162 uncommon for dpd. Those are 2438 01:17:34,162 --> 01:17:35,463 political decisions, but I can 2439 01:17:35,463 --> 01:17:36,965 sort of I'm not going to give 2440 01:17:36,965 --> 01:17:37,599 a lot of credit for for this 2441 01:17:37,599 --> 01:17:38,299 process because this is a 2442 01:17:38,299 --> 01:17:40,699 process that's been demanded 2443 01:17:41,670 --> 01:17:43,205 from the public every step of 2444 01:17:43,205 --> 01:17:43,872 the way. And it's been a lot 2445 01:17:43,872 --> 01:17:46,272 of pulling together. Thank 2446 01:17:47,242 --> 01:17:47,909 you. MISTER Chair. Thank 2447 01:17:47,909 --> 01:17:49,909 Councilmember Gonzalez get 2448 01:17:50,445 --> 01:17:51,479 discount cash money accounts 2449 01:17:51,479 --> 01:17:52,580 for Flint. 2450 01:17:52,580 --> 01:17:53,648 >> Yes, my question is for is 2451 01:17:53,648 --> 01:17:56,584 it Joe with Axon? Yes. Is he 2452 01:17:56,584 --> 01:17:58,520 any still available? Is the 2453 01:17:58,520 --> 01:18:01,389 main office. Okay. Thank you. 2454 01:18:01,389 --> 01:18:02,390 Thank you. So I have question 2455 01:18:02,390 --> 01:18:03,458 about the trigger which 2456 01:18:03,458 --> 01:18:05,160 triggers the cameras to 2457 01:18:05,160 --> 01:18:07,429 activity and actually captured 2458 01:18:07,429 --> 01:18:09,998 images. When I met with the 2459 01:18:09,998 --> 01:18:10,665 fox it was explained to me 2460 01:18:10,665 --> 01:18:11,299 that there was cameras were 2461 01:18:11,299 --> 01:18:14,269 triggered by any sort of 2462 01:18:14,269 --> 01:18:15,637 movement, including someone 2463 01:18:15,637 --> 01:18:16,638 walking through a crosswalk. 2464 01:18:16,638 --> 01:18:20,509 So was it just a on a mobile 2465 01:18:20,509 --> 01:18:21,209 movement? It was unjust, 2466 01:18:21,209 --> 01:18:23,609 capturing license plate data. 2467 01:18:24,779 --> 01:18:25,814 It was also also capturing 2468 01:18:25,814 --> 01:18:28,550 people because of that trigger 2469 01:18:28,550 --> 01:18:29,451 and motion detection. Can you 2470 01:18:29,451 --> 01:18:33,510 tell me how these cameras are 2471 01:18:34,156 --> 01:18:35,900 triggered to capture? 2472 01:18:35,900 --> 01:18:35,791 >> The way that our camera 2473 01:18:35,791 --> 01:18:39,391 works is we have both active 2474 01:18:39,594 --> 01:18:42,594 and passive infrared. The idea 2475 01:18:42,764 --> 01:18:44,533 is basically a vehicle creates 2476 01:18:44,533 --> 01:18:45,433 a large amount of heat. And so 2477 01:18:45,433 --> 01:18:49,330 we have a heat signatures that 2478 01:18:49,700 --> 01:18:50,171 basically send turns on the 2479 01:18:50,171 --> 01:18:51,606 image sensor. That takes a 2480 01:18:51,606 --> 01:18:53,441 photo of the vehicle and then 2481 01:18:53,441 --> 01:18:56,411 we do analysis to pull out the 2482 01:18:56,411 --> 01:18:58,947 license. We're also working on 2483 01:18:58,947 --> 01:19:00,115 a motion based but that is 2484 01:19:00,115 --> 01:19:00,816 vehicle specifically are not 2485 01:19:00,816 --> 01:19:03,816 using these cameras to track 2486 01:19:05,320 --> 01:19:06,788 motion of individuals. 2487 01:19:06,788 --> 01:19:07,522 >> Thank you for for answering 2488 01:19:07,522 --> 01:19:11,722 that. I think that just puts a 2489 01:19:11,893 --> 01:19:13,361 finer point Lake making sure 2490 01:19:13,361 --> 01:19:14,950 that whatever, however, that 2491 01:19:14,950 --> 01:19:15,830 technology is being developed, 2492 01:19:15,830 --> 01:19:18,830 that there is clear indication 2493 01:19:18,934 --> 01:19:19,601 around that. Again, like not 2494 01:19:19,601 --> 01:19:22,601 going into the like facial 2495 01:19:23,805 --> 01:19:25,841 recognition piece rate of 2496 01:19:25,841 --> 01:19:27,942 identify simple in the use of 2497 01:19:27,942 --> 01:19:30,942 these cameras there was one 2498 01:19:31,479 --> 01:19:34,479 other question I had forward. 2499 01:19:35,500 --> 01:19:38,650 This is also for you, Joe. 2500 01:19:39,955 --> 01:19:42,257 Wasn't around. How information 2501 01:19:42,257 --> 01:19:43,959 is shared with other 2502 01:19:43,959 --> 01:19:44,759 jurisdictions. And I know that 2503 01:19:44,759 --> 01:19:45,560 dpd is saying that if there's 2504 01:19:45,560 --> 01:19:47,461 not going to be to my 2505 01:19:47,461 --> 01:19:49,564 understanding and open door 2506 01:19:49,564 --> 01:19:51,320 kind of policy or even 2507 01:19:51,320 --> 01:19:51,733 agreements with other 2508 01:19:51,733 --> 01:19:53,733 jurisdictions that everything 2509 01:19:53,835 --> 01:19:55,770 would stay in-house as opposed 2510 01:19:55,770 --> 01:19:57,772 to how things were being 2511 01:19:57,772 --> 01:19:58,507 shared before. But I just want 2512 01:19:58,507 --> 01:20:01,750 to, I guess, put a finer point 2513 01:20:01,750 --> 01:20:04,675 and and confirm if this is 2514 01:20:05,814 --> 01:20:08,814 actually true, is that We'll 2515 01:20:09,851 --> 01:20:14,510 see I have my here and forgot 2516 01:20:14,689 --> 01:20:15,356 it. 2517 01:20:15,356 --> 01:20:18,859 >> Is this so if there are 2518 01:20:18,859 --> 01:20:20,528 protect our Times when data 2519 01:20:20,528 --> 01:20:23,528 would be shared with other 2520 01:20:25,600 --> 01:20:27,680 jurisdictions. The Axon 2521 01:20:27,680 --> 01:20:27,769 different jurisdictions 2522 01:20:27,769 --> 01:20:29,703 because this is something we 2523 01:20:29,703 --> 01:20:31,640 talked about kind of artists 2524 01:20:31,640 --> 01:20:34,900 that we know that if a crime 2525 01:20:34,900 --> 01:20:36,311 occurs you know, the border of 2526 01:20:36,311 --> 01:20:38,113 Denver and Lakewood and that 2527 01:20:38,113 --> 01:20:39,347 person that goes into 2528 01:20:39,347 --> 01:20:40,150 Lakewood, that there is some 2529 01:20:40,150 --> 01:20:42,117 kind of collaboration that 2530 01:20:42,117 --> 01:20:44,418 would be happening. And so 2531 01:20:44,418 --> 01:20:45,190 just curious, like, where is 2532 01:20:45,190 --> 01:20:47,419 everyone's part in that 2533 01:20:48,356 --> 01:20:49,223 sharing of that information 2534 01:20:49,223 --> 01:20:50,392 across jurisdictions? 2535 01:20:50,392 --> 01:20:52,327 >> So on the opposite side 2536 01:20:52,327 --> 01:20:53,228 all, what we're doing is 2537 01:20:53,228 --> 01:20:55,628 creating a software that 2538 01:20:56,164 --> 01:20:56,731 facilitates that sharing and 2539 01:20:56,731 --> 01:20:57,399 then the facilitation 2540 01:20:57,399 --> 01:20:58,980 overtime. We're developing 2541 01:20:58,980 --> 01:21:01,350 more and more granular levels 2542 01:21:01,350 --> 01:21:01,770 of that sharing peace. 2543 01:21:01,770 --> 01:21:03,380 Councilmember parity asked the 2544 01:21:03,380 --> 01:21:05,438 question earlier related to 2545 01:21:06,410 --> 01:21:06,775 can you do it based off of 2546 01:21:06,775 --> 01:21:07,442 just case? And the answer is, 2547 01:21:07,442 --> 01:21:08,142 yes, we are developing. So 2548 01:21:08,142 --> 01:21:10,745 that will be available by the 2549 01:21:10,745 --> 01:21:11,813 end of this year where you 2550 01:21:11,813 --> 01:21:13,448 could actually have a sharing 2551 01:21:13,448 --> 01:21:14,181 protocol set up with Lakewood 2552 01:21:14,181 --> 01:21:17,752 or any any agency that you set 2553 01:21:17,752 --> 01:21:19,154 up the sharing principal with 2554 01:21:19,154 --> 01:21:21,560 and it can a space to come. 2555 01:21:21,560 --> 01:21:21,856 The reason based number of 2556 01:21:21,856 --> 01:21:22,757 different characteristics, you 2557 01:21:22,757 --> 01:21:26,294 also can have it set up where 2558 01:21:26,294 --> 01:21:27,629 it's the full global access of 2559 01:21:27,629 --> 01:21:31,229 of those lpr reads, but it's 2560 01:21:31,733 --> 01:21:33,401 completely on your and 2561 01:21:33,401 --> 01:21:35,570 discretion in terms how you 2562 01:21:35,570 --> 01:21:36,871 create that sharing principle 2563 01:21:36,871 --> 01:21:38,240 between agencies. There also 2564 01:21:38,240 --> 01:21:40,640 is no syndication of 2565 01:21:41,109 --> 01:21:42,310 information, meaning we are 2566 01:21:42,310 --> 01:21:44,345 not rewriting that your pale 2567 01:21:44,345 --> 01:21:46,180 pr reads into another 2568 01:21:46,180 --> 01:21:47,115 database, but other agencies 2569 01:21:47,115 --> 01:21:48,516 database, they are getting 2570 01:21:48,516 --> 01:21:52,420 access to look at the data. So 2571 01:21:52,420 --> 01:21:54,556 if you have your 14 day 2572 01:21:54,556 --> 01:21:56,524 retention policy or 21 day 2573 01:21:56,524 --> 01:21:57,959 retention policy. Those reader 2574 01:21:57,959 --> 01:21:58,727 delete it and no other agency 2575 01:21:58,727 --> 01:21:59,394 can be those because they're 2576 01:21:59,394 --> 01:22:02,297 delete it. And they're only 2577 01:22:02,297 --> 01:22:04,697 looking at your information. 2578 01:22:07,335 --> 01:22:07,969 >> That's on the Thank you. 2579 01:22:07,969 --> 01:22:10,369 Cards guns off terrorist 2580 01:22:10,505 --> 01:22:13,505 Cashman think you MR. Chair 2581 01:22:17,312 --> 01:22:20,912 bills from us to you know. 2582 01:22:21,516 --> 01:22:22,417 Talks still 2583 01:22:22,417 --> 01:22:24,686 >> Currently you're doing this 2584 01:22:24,686 --> 01:22:25,190 more than license plate 2585 01:22:25,190 --> 01:22:27,190 reader. 2586 01:22:29,391 --> 01:22:32,227 >> Because you said can also 2587 01:22:32,227 --> 01:22:34,162 look for body damage and Saint 2588 01:22:34,162 --> 01:22:37,762 truck on a vehicle. Trying to 2589 01:22:37,766 --> 01:22:38,433 find out exactly what. When 2590 01:22:38,433 --> 01:22:40,833 you're taking pictures and 2591 01:22:41,200 --> 01:22:41,836 just the back of the car. Can 2592 01:22:41,836 --> 01:22:43,671 you capture the dent on the 2593 01:22:43,671 --> 01:22:47,809 hood of a car in the roof? 2594 01:22:47,809 --> 01:22:48,476 What is being done? 2595 01:22:48,476 --> 01:22:49,311 >> Absolutely. So all do it 2596 01:22:49,311 --> 01:22:51,312 all is based on the 2597 01:22:51,312 --> 01:22:53,248 orientation of the camera to 2598 01:22:53,248 --> 01:22:53,881 the road. And so we're 2599 01:22:53,881 --> 01:22:55,116 capturing an image of the 2600 01:22:55,116 --> 01:22:57,217 vehicle as it passes the 2601 01:22:57,217 --> 01:22:57,819 camera. And so any 2602 01:22:57,819 --> 01:22:59,819 characteristic of that 2603 01:23:00,188 --> 01:23:00,856 vehicle, we would be able to 2604 01:23:00,856 --> 01:23:03,691 capture. And then over time 2605 01:23:03,691 --> 01:23:05,360 you be able to search off with 2606 01:23:05,360 --> 01:23:08,229 policy Right now. It is an 2607 01:23:08,229 --> 01:23:09,130 image of that. The back of 2608 01:23:09,130 --> 01:23:10,365 that vehicle. 2609 01:23:10,365 --> 01:23:11,498 >> It just shows that one 2610 01:23:11,498 --> 01:23:14,436 image as the car passes you 2611 01:23:14,436 --> 01:23:16,436 shooting multiple images. 2612 01:23:16,438 --> 01:23:17,872 >> It is. It a shooting, 2613 01:23:17,872 --> 01:23:18,540 multiple images and then 2614 01:23:18,540 --> 01:23:22,140 taking the one has the best 2615 01:23:23,944 --> 01:23:24,612 overall view. 2616 01:23:24,612 --> 01:23:27,120 >> Thank marcher. And just 2617 01:23:29,116 --> 01:23:31,516 customer fun. Temperatures I 2618 01:23:33,354 --> 01:23:33,988 just be commander. Of all 2619 01:23:33,988 --> 01:23:36,388 hundreds of thousands of 2620 01:23:36,991 --> 01:23:38,580 photos might be in the 2621 01:23:38,580 --> 01:23:40,458 database are rolling. 21 day 2622 01:23:43,998 --> 01:23:47,735 basis. I just want for you so 2623 01:23:47,735 --> 01:23:50,735 you can affirm that. Images 2624 01:23:51,840 --> 01:23:55,777 are looked at. Are based on. A 2625 01:23:55,777 --> 01:23:56,444 lurch. For information 2626 01:23:56,444 --> 01:23:58,844 developed after a criminal 2627 01:24:01,181 --> 01:24:02,817 complaint. But individual 2628 01:24:02,817 --> 01:24:05,817 beagles are search only south. 2629 01:24:06,454 --> 01:24:08,156 If I'm in there 5 times read 2630 01:24:08,156 --> 01:24:10,592 camera hard times in 21 days. 2631 01:24:10,592 --> 01:24:14,192 No one's working on my car. 2632 01:24:15,620 --> 01:24:15,696 Former car stolen. So we still 2633 01:24:15,696 --> 01:24:17,640 my plate robbed a 7.11 or 2634 01:24:17,640 --> 01:24:20,640 something like that. And then 2635 01:24:20,201 --> 01:24:24,401 on the other hand. If an image 2636 01:24:26,674 --> 01:24:27,341 is useful crime. In 2637 01:24:27,341 --> 01:24:29,341 investigation after the 21 2638 01:24:33,470 --> 01:24:33,681 days. How is that preserved in 2639 01:24:33,681 --> 01:24:34,349 evidence starcom and not 2640 01:24:34,349 --> 01:24:36,749 pursue because we're gonna 2641 01:24:37,886 --> 01:24:39,254 need a going forward for case 2642 01:24:39,254 --> 01:24:40,722 firing. So how do that set up 2643 01:24:40,722 --> 01:24:41,289 more medically as an automatic 2644 01:24:41,289 --> 01:24:43,689 Lee? Same those? The 2645 01:24:45,193 --> 01:24:45,994 detective. Drag and drop it 2646 01:24:45,994 --> 01:24:48,429 into the case file so that 2647 01:24:48,429 --> 01:24:49,620 available 21 days. Absolutely. 2648 01:24:49,620 --> 01:24:52,620 So to address your first 2649 01:24:52,534 --> 01:24:54,701 question. The majority of data 2650 01:24:54,701 --> 01:24:55,770 will be automatically courage. 2651 01:24:55,770 --> 01:24:56,571 There has to be there has to 2652 01:24:56,571 --> 01:24:58,406 be nexus to a crime that was 2653 01:24:58,406 --> 01:24:59,700 committed that we're 2654 01:24:59,700 --> 01:24:59,707 investigating. 2655 01:24:59,707 --> 01:25:02,142 >> In order for us to even go 2656 01:25:02,142 --> 01:25:05,613 look at that image and that 2657 01:25:05,613 --> 01:25:06,247 would be, you a fraction of 2658 01:25:06,247 --> 01:25:09,183 the total amount of data 2659 01:25:09,183 --> 01:25:10,510 that's captured in that 2660 01:25:10,510 --> 01:25:10,652 automatically perched. There 2661 01:25:10,652 --> 01:25:13,154 has to an official law 2662 01:25:13,154 --> 01:25:16,154 enforcement reason to do that. 2663 01:25:17,792 --> 01:25:18,493 And then as far as retaining 2664 01:25:18,493 --> 01:25:20,528 images, if there is an image 2665 01:25:20,528 --> 01:25:22,564 that is evidence in a crime, 2666 01:25:22,564 --> 01:25:23,998 then I know that the platform 2667 01:25:23,998 --> 01:25:24,698 has a specific way to retain 2668 01:25:24,698 --> 01:25:26,334 that, according you know, and 2669 01:25:26,334 --> 01:25:28,436 then tag it with the case. 2670 01:25:28,436 --> 01:25:29,103 Number. I can't I can't think 2671 01:25:29,103 --> 01:25:31,600 of off time. I had exactly 2672 01:25:31,600 --> 01:25:32,473 what the mechanism is. A new 2673 01:25:32,473 --> 01:25:33,740 platform. I'm sure some 2674 01:25:33,740 --> 01:25:34,275 members of my team know 2675 01:25:34,275 --> 01:25:37,275 exactly how to do that 2676 01:25:37,312 --> 01:25:38,120 already. But there is a way to 2677 01:25:38,120 --> 01:25:41,120 preserve evidence dot com as 2678 01:25:42,160 --> 01:25:43,218 evidence for couple. 2679 01:25:43,218 --> 01:25:46,218 >> In front starting just in 2680 01:25:49,423 --> 01:25:50,857 terms of that worked out. Just 2681 01:25:50,857 --> 01:25:51,492 be it called the lpr read. You 2682 01:25:51,492 --> 01:25:53,270 can actually just click a 2683 01:25:53,270 --> 01:25:54,620 button that says send evidence 2684 01:25:54,620 --> 01:25:56,620 case. 2685 01:25:58,399 --> 01:25:59,500 >> Thank you. That soldier. 2686 01:25:59,500 --> 01:26:00,735 >> Thank you. Councilmember We 2687 01:26:00,735 --> 01:26:04,335 have 5 more minutes to see if 2688 01:26:04,372 --> 01:26:06,507 there's any final questions. I 2689 01:26:06,507 --> 01:26:07,675 comes PRESIDENT Pro did not 2690 01:26:07,675 --> 01:26:08,309 have an additional question. 2691 01:26:08,309 --> 01:26:09,100 Councilmember Torres I to 2692 01:26:09,100 --> 01:26:12,100 myself into queue for timing. 2693 01:26:12,547 --> 01:26:13,180 But if it got. 2694 01:26:13,180 --> 01:26:15,490 >> a couple of the camera 2695 01:26:15,490 --> 01:26:18,490 placements for Flock had to 2696 01:26:20,822 --> 01:26:21,389 put up with tier 3. Permits 2697 01:26:21,389 --> 01:26:23,789 once we're no longer 2698 01:26:24,759 --> 01:26:26,561 contracting with them. Does 2699 01:26:26,561 --> 01:26:28,763 permit expired for them or 2700 01:26:28,763 --> 01:26:29,597 what happens with that? Know 2701 01:26:29,597 --> 01:26:32,597 you mentioned a new cameras 2702 01:26:33,768 --> 01:26:35,570 would be utilizing the same 2703 01:26:35,570 --> 01:26:36,571 encroachment kind of platforms 2704 01:26:36,571 --> 01:26:40,171 coming. Just tell me a little 2705 01:26:41,109 --> 01:26:41,809 bit had swapped takes place. 2706 01:26:41,809 --> 01:26:42,577 Committed. Please jump in as 2707 01:26:42,577 --> 01:26:45,577 well. The permits for those 2708 01:26:46,247 --> 01:26:48,247 rate of weight. 2709 01:26:48,383 --> 01:26:49,317 >> We're 4, 1, plate readers. 2710 01:26:49,317 --> 01:26:52,253 Generically, I think to the 2711 01:26:52,253 --> 01:26:53,988 earlier point, have term is 2712 01:26:53,988 --> 01:26:54,555 better than specific. Those 2713 01:26:54,555 --> 01:26:56,555 locations where there 2714 01:26:57,658 --> 01:26:58,360 currently are flock cameras, 2715 01:26:58,360 --> 01:26:59,930 her permitted and they would 2716 01:26:59,930 --> 01:27:02,693 remain to be permitted for the 2717 01:27:03,231 --> 01:27:04,198 permanent to flock No. It has 2718 01:27:04,198 --> 01:27:05,867 in close communication with 2719 01:27:05,867 --> 01:27:06,968 Donny and our understanding 2720 01:27:06,968 --> 01:27:10,171 right now is no, they were not 2721 01:27:10,171 --> 01:27:10,872 commit specifically to flock. 2722 01:27:10,872 --> 01:27:11,606 >> And the swapping of 2723 01:27:11,606 --> 01:27:14,208 hardware on those Poles should 2724 01:27:14,208 --> 01:27:14,875 no problem. Okay. So what's 2725 01:27:14,875 --> 01:27:18,475 the timing for this to come 2726 01:27:20,548 --> 01:27:21,282 down? As soon as contract 2727 01:27:21,282 --> 01:27:24,217 breaches term, our data spurs, 2728 01:27:24,217 --> 01:27:24,953 those moved to become status. 2729 01:27:24,953 --> 01:27:28,523 My team is working to schedule 2730 01:27:28,523 --> 01:27:29,457 the with flock, to schedule 2731 01:27:29,457 --> 01:27:30,191 the removal of those. I don't 2732 01:27:30,191 --> 01:27:32,660 know what rate yet. They'll be 2733 01:27:32,660 --> 01:27:33,628 able to remove them. But 2734 01:27:33,628 --> 01:27:36,628 obviously we're going to move 2735 01:27:36,631 --> 01:27:37,332 as as quickly as possible 2736 01:27:37,332 --> 01:27:37,999 because the existing hardware 2737 01:27:37,999 --> 01:27:41,599 has to come down. New thank 2738 01:27:43,237 --> 01:27:43,937 you. Thanks. Thank you. 2739 01:27:43,937 --> 01:27:44,639 Councilmember Torres song see 2740 01:27:44,639 --> 01:27:47,639 no further questions on based 2741 01:27:49,210 --> 01:27:51,446 on administration is request. 2742 01:27:51,446 --> 01:27:54,181 >> I will put forward a motion 2743 01:27:54,181 --> 01:27:57,840 to postpone this item to take 2744 01:27:57,840 --> 01:27:57,785 certain 3/18/2026, I need a 2745 01:27:57,785 --> 01:27:59,721 second second do we need vote 2746 01:27:59,721 --> 01:28:02,220 or up and down anyone that 2747 01:28:02,220 --> 01:28:05,220 it's on the committee that 2748 01:28:06,460 --> 01:28:09,460 comes up. Perfect. Thank you 2749 01:28:10,631 --> 01:28:11,331 so much for the presentation. 2750 01:28:11,331 --> 01:28:14,931 We have second final many on 2751 01:28:16,471 --> 01:28:17,204 week. We have one item on 2752 01:28:17,204 --> 01:28:17,772 consent on that has not pulled 2753 01:28:17,772 --> 01:28:20,172 off. So the meeting's 2754 01:28:32,186 --> 01:28:34,186 adjourned. Thanks, everyone.