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All right. Thank you. We'll call to order the meeting of the safety and licensing committee for Wednesday, January 28th. Please join me in the pledge of allegiance.

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I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of America and to the Republic for which

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it stands.

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One nation under God, individual, with liberty and justice for all.

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Okay.

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We'll start with a roll call of membership from my left.

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Denise Vinton, District 6.

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Radforkas, District 3.

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I'm Katie Banzilla, District 5.

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Sherry is hard sign District 13.

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We'll let the record show that all their person is hoping to join us via Zoom, but if

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not, he would be excused.

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I will entertain a motion to approve the minutes from our previous move.

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No, moved.

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Second.

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We have a motion and a second.

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Any discussion?

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Hearing none will vote.

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All those in favor say aye.

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Aye.

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Any opposed?

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That motion passes for zero.

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We do have two public hearings this evening.

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We'll start with number 260079, the Demerit Point Violation Appearance for the O'Night

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of BP.

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Is there anyone from the O'Night of BP here to speak on this this evening?

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I'll just ask one more time.

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Is there anyone from the O'Night of BP?

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Do I have to actually ask three times for this item?

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Okay, thank you.

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All right.

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All right, hearing none, we'll move on to the next 2-6-0-0-8-0.

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The Demarit Point violation appearance for misfits tabern.

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Is there anyone here from misfits tabern this evening?

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Anyone from misfits tabern?

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All right, doesn't appear like anyone is here.

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We'll move on to our first action item then.

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2-6-0-0-0-1, the proposed alcohol license policy revision.

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We'll have to approve.

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So we have a motion to approve in a second.

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Are there any questions or clerk monitors?

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Is there anything that you would like to add?

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Director, too.

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So in the memo, I kind of laid out the biggest changes

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that we had on the rollout of minor changes.

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But the biggest changes is that we don't do

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the special use permits anymore

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for the community development department

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and so they've changed their entire investigation procedures.

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And we wanted to make sure that was reflected in the policy.

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And then we have recently experienced some less common situations like place-to-place transfers.

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And we've had a lot of instances lately of people surrendering their alcohol licenses to us.

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And as a new clerk, for me, not being sure of the procedures, it was a lot of it lived in former clerk linches mind.

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And so even though these are procedures that we've had in the past, they're things that

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we just wanted to explicitly have written down for the future.

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So that's why we added those sections.

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Perfect.

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Any other questions from others present for the committee?

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All right.

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Hearing none, we'll go ahead and vote.

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All those in favor say aye.

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Aye.

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Any opposed?

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Emotion passes for zero.

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Next item, two six, zero one, two six.

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The schedule of deposits update.

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move to approve. Second? We have a motion to approve in a second. Are there any questions

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from committee or would anyone from staff like to offer any information on this?

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Okay.

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Go

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ahead. So this is just a periodic update revision to kind of account for new changes in the cities code

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regarding the schedule of deposits that's on file with the clerk's office. I know attorney

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I'm very glad to put a lot of time into this.

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Clark Mowler put a lot of time into this as well,

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a number of other departments put a lot of time

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into kind of hoping to get some of this stuff together.

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So it's basically housekeeping,

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but it took a fair amount of time,

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and I think it's worth mentioning that.

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Thank you.

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Other hard time?

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Thank you, Chair Mayer, direct to Attorney Browin.

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Attorney Browin, is there a reason

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or can you explain to me why the forfeiture amounts

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were essentially nonexistent prior to this?

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So now that column is added, or the fine amount,

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forfeiture amount, the total bond looked like it had always been there,

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but not this additional, this additional column.

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I believe that is just essentially a breakdown

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of what was already the case because the total amount

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that deposit is reflective of the underlying forfeiture

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with the additional court costs associated with it.

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So this is just providing basically more information of what actually is something that's imposed by the city

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And the rest of it is cost associated. Okay, I appreciate that. Thank you. Any other questions?

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All right, hearing none, we'll go ahead and vote. All those in favor say aye. Aye. Aye. Aye. Any opposed? That motion passes for zero.

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Next is 260081, the first amendment to the memorandum of understanding for automatic assistance between the fox crossing fire department and the Ableton fire department.

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Move to approve.

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Second.

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We have a motion to approve in a second.

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Chief, did you want to add any information?

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Thank you, Chair.

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The amendment to the original automatic aid agreement is pretty minor.

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When we develop the agreement, we requested Foxcrossing to come into the city of Appleton in their

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designated area for any structural fire.

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At that time, they chose not to have us respond to the village of Fox crossing.

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They have now changed their mind and request us to respond into their community as well.

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So that is the first amendment as we'll now be helping them out too.

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Okay. Any questions from other persons present or the committee hearing none will vote.

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All those in favor say aye.

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Aye.

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Any opposed?

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That motion passes 4-0.

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I would entertain a motion to move the balance of the agenda.

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So moved.

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Any discussion on doing so?

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So that would be item 2-6-008-3-260086 and 2-6-0089.

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Hearing none, we'll go ahead and vote.

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All those in favor say aye.

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Aye.

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any opposed? That motion passes for zero. We do have several information items but before we do

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that I did see some folks come in after we got started. Is there anybody here from the ONIDA BP

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or MISFITS tavern? Okay. Always good to check. So then we will start with the information item 260115, the

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A-A-S-D, truancy ordinance update,

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and that's being provided by Superintendent Harches

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if you wanted to step forward.

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Yeah, good evening.

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Thank you for giving us an opportunity to again

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to provide an update.

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When we were last year in December,

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I had given an overview of how we had communicated

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the ordinance to students, staff, and families,

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and then we also shared first quarter information.

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And what we're doing tonight is to provide an update now that the first semester is over.

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So the first semester ended the second week of January.

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Then takes us about a week and a half to put some data together.

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And that's what we're sharing with you tonight.

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So there is a handout that I put at your place and also clerk Militaire has additional paper copies

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if anybody else would like that.

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And then it also should be as part of your agenda.

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So I'll just take you through a couple of data points that we have.

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and then I'll turn it over to Stephanie Marta, who is our attendance coordinator for the high school.

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So on top of the document, you see chronic absenteeism data.

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That's the first data point that we look at.

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And just to review,

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being chronically absent means that a student misses 10% of eligible school days,

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regardless of the absences being excused or unexcused.

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So this is just simply the number of days that a student would have missed.

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and 9 days is 10% of our 91st semester school days, and you can see that this rate for our high school students was 22.3% during the first semester.

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It is a reason for optimism. As you can see, it's a little bit better than any of our last four years, much better than 21-22, but not dramatically different in terms of the absences.

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The next data point is habitually truancy data and again to review that's a student missing all are part of five or more school days in a semester without an excuse.

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So a parent can excuse their child up to 10 days during the school year.

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This means that a parent did not excuse their child, or there was not excuse.

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And 23.1% of our students were habitually true in during the first semester.

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So you can see that is our best semester even going back to pre-pandemic years.

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And then the third data point here is looking at students who are both productly absent and

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habitually true and that was 13% or 556 students.

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Just in comparison, last year that number was over.

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So again, some optimism here. We feel good about the first semester. The next thing we need to do is to look at the academic pieces. This is just simply the first step in student success and that's having students be in school and in class. The next thing we will do is we'll look at all of these 556 students to see how do they do academically and what other interventions could we provide for them. So those are the data points that I wanted to share.

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Are there any questions on those three data points before I turn it over to Stephanie Marta?

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I'll just ask looking at the percentages, it looks like an improvement, but it looks

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like a very small improvement.

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How are we sure that the improvement that we're seeing wouldn't have just naturally occurred

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or given the interventions that are in place

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versus needing to have the citation option.

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I think that more important than this number

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is going to be when we look at the number of students

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who missed 100 days or 50 days in a school year.

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And those are the students that we know

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are not going to be successful.

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So a student can be, like I said, chronically absent

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and still do okay academically.

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So, it's those numbers that we will be bringing to you later in the year as we get a better handle on those numbers.

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I think that's going to help us decide if really this has made a difference.

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And it really is very difficult for us to say, okay, a student misses 100 days versus a student who misses 90.

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It's the student who misses 90 going to be better off academically.

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really hard to say. We want to be able to look at and say we have significant improvement

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in those kids who are missing significant numbers of school days. So I would agree with

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you that really this is the day to we keep it's the day to that the state requires us to

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keep but we have to go deeper we have to look at those students who maybe missed 100 days

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last year where are they this year but about the kids who missed 50 days so at the end of

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the school year, you're going to be chronically absent if you've missed 18 school days or more.

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And if you recall last year, we shared the number of students that missed 36 days, 50 days, 100 days.

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Those are the students we're really going to want to look at.

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Okay, and I guess I would also just add that one of the things that we talked about in the amendment

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to the past resolution was that we wanted to see that kind of data broken down

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into specific groups, you know, showing people with disabilities and so forth.

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So, now that I see at the bottom that one citation has been written to a student.

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So, does that mean the next time we could expect to see that data broken down?

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Yes, right.

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The really, let me think about that a little bit.

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Even, you know, usually under five, we don't share data points because it,

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sure, you're worrying about identifying student.

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Yes, so really, anytime we get above five, that's when we start to put data points together.

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And could we see that then, when you're talking about the 100 days, 50 days students, could we see

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the demographics of those students?

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Yes, absolutely.

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And then I would just add that we did talk about in that resolution also about some follow-up on the school board side.

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Just is that something that we'll see reported on in the next meeting?

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Potentially. It's got to get it on the school board calendar.

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So the words been busy, first priority right now is a referendum, but certainly in this next semester,

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we know that we have to update the attendance policy, the board policy.

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Yes, okay.

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And all of those pieces that were in the amended resolution, they'll all be coming.

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The feedback from, okay, great.

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Any other questions?

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Alderhart's time.

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Thank you, Jeremy.

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I addressed the superintendent.

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I appreciate the data that you provided, but I know you know that more is better.

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So I would have been interested in seeing not just semester one, but additional

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semesters just to get a little bit more of a feel for how this has gone.

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I understand also there's only when you can in and date folks with the data as well.

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So I get that you have to be judicious in that regard, but I would have been looking for a little bit more data in that regard, especially the data that you provided verbally regarding the number of students that met both.

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So the thresholds, it would be nice to have this as a snapshot to show people that not just try to remember what you had said at the meeting. So in the future, if we could do that, I would really appreciate that. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Anyone else?

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All there's presence.

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All there will for you on the category that fits both.

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I would also be interested to know aren't in school anymore.

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And they went out to college or found work.

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Or if that number is from students that were here last year

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and are here this year.

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Does that make sense?

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So you're asking to take the information from last year

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and make it apples-to-apples by removing the students who know and to go to school or is that

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a possibility, Alder? I'm sorry, it's super-entend and hard just.

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Yeah, I think I understand. So, what you're interested in is what we would call co-her data,

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meaning fit in that category of being both product absent and habituately true. And you want to

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know how they're doing this year, if they haven't graduated or moved on.

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Exactly.

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Okay.

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Yep.

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Thank you.

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We don't.

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Data like that.

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We have to hand calculator.

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We'll have to put a little time into.

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These data points are ones like I said that we have to have for the state.

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So these are readily available.

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We're just finished earlier today.

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Those type of data points that you're talking about.

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And all the rights are part of what you are asking for.

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We can get to you absolutely.

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Thank you.

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I agree with the other persons that that information is helpful, it's going to help us drill down into what council can do to improve things in particular persons with questions.

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So I'm going to turn it over then to Ms. Marta.

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Go ahead. Thank you.

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Hi everyone. Stephanie Marta is social middle and high schools in the district.

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Our information superintendent Hartches shared the last time when he came about our attendance education lessons that we're holding at the high schools.

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So, beginning in November, we have been holding what we're calling attendance education lessons

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for any high school student who has met the threshold for habitual truancy.

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So, they've had five or more unexcused absences all are part of a day during first semester so far.

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So, those students are invited during a non-instructional time during what they call flex time at the high

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school. They're invited to come to this lesson to hear about the laws around attendance and

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the school board or the school policy around attendance

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and truancy information about barriers to school attendance,

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talking about what we see with students and their barriers,

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and who in the school can help them.

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So we have lots of school people there, school counselors,

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social worker, psychologists, nurse, just a variety

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of different people who come to stand in front of the students

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and introduce themselves, where can I be found,

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what can I help you with, those kinds of things.

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And then we share information about, specifically, about what happens if students continue or their

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truancy gets worse, that we can look at a county referral for truancy to provide supports

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or that a truancy citation can be issued.

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So all of that information is shared with students at these lessons.

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Since November across our three high schools, we've had 409 students participate in these

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lessons.

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Again, these are most at-risk students when it comes to attendance, so obviously there's

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a lot of students who haven't shown up for these lessons because they're not in school

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or they choose not to attend.

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Of those students, we have been tracking their attendance, so from the time they attend

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the lesson, we pull their attendance rate, so how much they've been absent, and then we've

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been tracking each month what that looks like.

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So 41.8%, so 171 out of 409 of those students have increased their attendance rate since the time of attending the lesson, which we feel is positive.

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And then as you saw at the bottom, the last bit of information we wanted to share is that we've issued one citation since this started in November.

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And this is for a student who has not attended school since first semester of last school year.

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So excuse me he has not attended in over a year and prior to that had had

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The significant truancy concerns where we had involved out of gamey county by making a truancy referral to try to provide him with suppress his attendance, which wasn't successful. When you say invite student looks like they're you just asked nicely for them to come to the gym during their free time or how does that work. So the way it works at the high schools is there's a flex period. Every day of the week. So one of the days it's home room and the rest of the days are flexed.

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And students are signed up through a program at school.

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They have to be assigned a place to go.

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So prior to students, teachers can request a student.

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And that's where they put the request in,

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and then a student can't change that request.

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So the office, for all of these students who meet the criteria for

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truancy in that time period, the office requests those students.

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And then the students receive that notification that here's where you need to go during this time.

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And is that sort of like I think they call it something with an intervention like some kind of like

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In my my son's school. I know that there is a period of time

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It's typically home room and then there are times when you can say a student needs extra help or something

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I think it's RTI and it's something with an intervention. I cannot recall what it is

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But is there any schools they have like it's not really called RTI time

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But it's exactly what you're describing where students who receive interventions typically receive it

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during this time. At the high school level, um, sometimes students might be receiving additional

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support from teachers who request them. Um, so yes, that can happen at the high school level.

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Okay. I understand. That's helpful. Thank you. Any questions? Um, Alder Fenton?

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Thank you, Chair. May I address to Ms. Morton for that information? And I understand that what I'm

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less data driven to the state. Given that the last month-ish of this semester, I'm sure that you've

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been, we all remember the flow chart, I'm sure that you're going through the whole process.

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Sure. Do you and the other attendance coordinator and is there better earlier on in the process after maybe I clearly it's good that that 40 almost 42% of people of the students have improved their attendance, but do you feel like you're reaching people earlier in the process?

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I hope so, and I think so. I mean, we hear feedback from students and parents about wanting

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to make improvements in their attendance so that, you know, they don't have to deal

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with any sort of consequence. And we're always telling kids like the last thing we want

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to do is have a consequence for anybody. We want you in school, we want you here, we want

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you learning. And so I think we've heard feedback that kids are hearing this, and they don't

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want this to be a thing for them because I think and along with all the things we asked for and

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obviously I think it's too early right now with just a month of school but I think just in terms

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of again less data driven as we move further I'd like to see again on the flow chart you know how

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like how many people were responsive at the earlier stages not that we get all the way to the very

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next thing that can happen to you as a citation, because I would be hopeful that the combination

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of the attendance lessons and then the very clear layout that we'd get people responding

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earlier.

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So, just something to keep in mind.

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Thank you.

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Yeah.

315
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No problem.

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Any other questions?

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All right.

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Thank you very much.

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The next information item is 2-6-0092, the Flock Safety Cameras Presentation.

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We do have some folks who have come and they have some questions to ask.

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Would you prefer Chief Olson that the public wait until after the presentation?

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Yes, I think I'm cautiously optimistic that perhaps after seeing the presentation, some

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of their questions may be answered.

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00:25:00,000 --> 00:25:13,440
Okay. So just so everyone knows who's here to speak on this item. We will have sometime after the presentation and then I'll just call you up and we'll go from there. I'll give you more instructions then. Thank you.

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How did you want to get started? I would just like to introduce, I think those that are here, reference this that are going to be speaking on it. So Captain Mike Wallace is in charge of our, is a patrol captain.

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He's got South and North Districts for those alders that are in here that have districts in the South and North District.

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He's going to be just doing an educational presentation on block safety, which is our ALPR technology that we use.

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We also have Christy McLeod. She is here remotely. She's also from block safety, so any questions that perhaps we can't answer

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or that aren't specific to Appleton, but more about the product, she's able to help out and answer those questions as well.

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Great.

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Sorry, I'm just trying to work on sharing the...

332
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No problem.

333
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Fair with me.

334
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Megan, do you think maybe you could give me a hand with trying to work through this?

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We know what's green.

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It's going to show up on if he clicks shares.

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Yep.

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Yeah.

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Yeah.

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Yeah.

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Do we have a conflict with this?

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Yes.

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I think we have to get in the wheelchair.

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There we go.

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Yeah.

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Perfect.

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Thank you, Megan.

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All right.

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So as chief said, I'm Captain Mike Wallace.

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I'm happy to be here tonight to talk about flock safety.

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And the successes our agency have had with it.

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In my 21 years of law enforcement experience, this has easily been one of the most impactful tools

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we've acquired in my career.

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There's been a lot of information out there recently, some misinformation, so I think it's

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a good time to kind of refresh our memories and go over kind of what flock cameras are.

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Thank Kristin for being here as well to answer some of the more technical questions that

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may present at the end of this presentation.

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So I'd like to explain kind of what flock cameras are, what they are not, and how they're

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used.

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I have, in this presentation, some Appleton-specific results and benefits, real things that we've seen from major incidents to relatively minor everyday occurrences, and how this makes an impact on our city.

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Address some of the privacy and civil liberties and oversight concerns that I'm sure exist.

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These cameras have become relatively commonplace across the nation now, and I know those questions are out there.

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And then, you know, considerations for future use or expansion with the program.

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So public safety challenges facing the city of Appleton, increasing mobility of crime,

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stolen vehicles, hit and run, retail theft, fraud, weapons, offenses.

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I'd like to say that criminals don't really care much about imaginary lines on a map.

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And we do deal with those things in the city of Appleton.

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Crime costs crossing city and county boundaries as a regular occurrence.

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And, you know, we're growing as a city.

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and our officers, you know, we have limited officer staffing compared to that growth at times

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and you have to balance the budget.

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Flock has been a force multiplier for our agency and provides us much faster investigative

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leads.

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One of the things that Flock in their pitch to us and it's found to be true is that 70 to

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80% of all crimes involve a vehicle in some capacity that can be, you know, to arrive at the

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scene to get away from the scene, but we find that to be accurate, and Flock has been

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very beneficial to us in holding people accountable for crimes they commit in the City of Appleton.

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The graphic you'll see there is a picture of what a Flock's traffic safety camera looks

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like. The top portion is simply the solar panel to charge the system, and then the camera

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mounted on a fixed pole. It's an automated license plate reader. It captures a vehicle license

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license plate and basic vehicle characteristics placed in the public right of way and records only what is visible to the public.

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What flocks safety cameras are not, they do not include facial recognition, they don't track people.

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There's no continuous surveillance and there's no tracking of speed or traffic violations or things like that.

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It's a snapshot of a license plate and a vehicle.

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So the system, like I said, it'll capture the vehicle image.

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Plate number and vehicle descriptors are logged, and the officers then can search back in the system using that criteria. Alerts can be created for stolen vehicles or other vehicles of interest beyond the lookout, bullows, and data auto deletes after a set retention period which for flock is 30 days unless they're saved for evidentiary purposes by us.

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So back in 2022 to 2023, we ran a pilot program. At that time we had 29 flights

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black cameras. After the pilot, we're now down to 20 cameras. It's 19 fixed cameras and one mobile camera that we can deploy throughout the city. It's mounted on a speed trailer.

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During that pilot, we had a lieutenant at the time that was tracking the success cases, basically going through the reports, pulling any incident where flock was mentioned as something that was useful in resolving that investigation.

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During that time, we encountered 183 verified successes, and that included 30 hit and run cases solved, 22 retail theft cases solved, five domestic violence arrests that were made, burglary offenses that were solved weapons complaints that it played an impact in fraud complaints and the recovery of 30 stolen vehicles just during the pilot alone.

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So

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what does it provide us, faster identification of suspect vehicles, reduced investigative time, increased case clearance rates, improved victim outcomes, as we're able to solve the offenses that they're calling us for on a more frequent basis, providing indisputable evidence that stands up in court, and a photograph of a vehicle being more reliable than witness testimony.

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20.

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Cameras work 24-7 without overtime. They run all day all night. It allows our officers

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to dedicate more time to the proactive policing that we want them to engage them, video playback

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with the traditional cameras, investigative services, lieutenant position, hours and hours

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00:32:05,340 --> 00:32:09,460
and hours are traditional cameras. Floc can dramatically reduce that time.

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00:32:10,520 --> 00:32:14,120
Supports proactive in community policing without increasing staff because we're saving

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time all over the place with them.

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Regional and interagency collaboration, and I've highlighted this in some of the examples

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that I provide.

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00:32:24,070 --> 00:32:28,310
When I was in the investigative services unit, we'd see come through the city of Appleton.

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Using flat cameras, one of the ATM hook-and-chain burglaries we experienced hook-and-chain to an

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00:32:34,750 --> 00:32:39,450
ATM rip off the face of it, we were able to track that, you know, that's a very difficult

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thing to track back without the tech bandages that flock provides us.

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individuals would go steal mail from residences and then often time

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individuals oftentimes to cash those checks give them a cut and then keep the

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rest of the physical bank we can we can get back by acquiring the license plate

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to that vehicle. Enhanced regional. Meaning meaning you're not clear. No, no, no, no.

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00:33:01,250 --> 00:33:05,730
It's the way that you said it came across. Okay. Just like that. Thank you. Enhanced

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00:33:05,730 --> 00:33:09,730
regional and public public safety. It allows we at Appleton PD share data with

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Wisconsin law enforcement agencies.

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00:33:13,810 --> 00:33:15,570
Touched on this in some of the previous slides,

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but the annual subscription, hurt and compare,

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00:33:19,290 --> 00:33:21,810
lower long to simple poll that goes up.

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Privacy protections built into the system.

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There is no facial recognition with it.

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There's no identity data other than the license plate

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of a vehicle that is gathered.

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Searches require a legitimate law enforcement purpose,

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access being limited to trained personnel

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at the police department, currently are sworn staff,

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our front desk staff and our crime analysts have access to the data. All searches are logged

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and auditable while the 30-day retention period for the images through flock and then those images

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delete, the searches remain indefinitely and we can pull those up. I'm sure everybody's aware of

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the recent arrest of an officer for misusing flock and I would highlight that that's a

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An example of the safeguards that are built into the system. Anytime you involve humans in anything, there's the potential for misuse. We as law enforcement have access to a number of systems that are, there is potential for misuse of, and that arrest is what happens when someone does abuse the authority and the rights that they have. So, APD policies and oversight, we do have written policy governing camera use, defined data retention periods, supervisory review of access.

428
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us audit logs are available for review, for review.

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If we would have had an incident involving an officer misusing, there's certainly discipline

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up to an including termination that would apply to that.

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We have launched a transparency portal on our website, that is live right now, that provides

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some additional flock data, and we maintain strict privacy and audit policies with our data.

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We were kind of on the front end of flock, but now many cities in Wisconsin have flocked

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cameras and I think every agency would have the same results that Appleton has had.

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We've had successes in rapid stolen vehicle recovery, identifying and

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locating suspects in violent crimes, locating missing persons, identifying

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00:36:13,530 --> 00:36:17,630
locating suspects in traffic offenses like hit and run and fleeing, and

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00:36:17,630 --> 00:36:20,810
identifying and locating suspects in misdemeanor and property offenses.

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00:36:23,480 --> 00:36:27,060
So takeaways, flat cameras, I believe, improve public safety outcomes.

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officers can quickly identify or eliminate individuals as a suspect of crime.

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They're a cost effective and efficient investigative tool.

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00:36:35,640 --> 00:36:41,400
They have strong privacy safeguards already in place, proven benefits that we've seen here in the city of Appleton.

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And those are cases from homicide to retail theft and I'm going to highlight some of those moving forward.

444
00:36:48,600 --> 00:36:56,280
So the first case study is a homicide investigation and on 1115 of 22 we were called to a homicide in the 700 block of West Somers Street.

445
00:36:56,280 --> 00:37:03,280
On that day, our investigators identified a possible suspect vehicle, a suspect in the vehicle

446
00:37:03,280 --> 00:37:07,920
he was believed to be operating, and flock was used to determine that that vehicle had

447
00:37:07,920 --> 00:37:11,000
hit on a camera in Green Bay, City of Green Bay also has flocked cameras.

448
00:37:11,860 --> 00:37:15,840
The vehicle was entered as stolen with caution indicators to the homicide offense.

449
00:37:16,180 --> 00:37:20,260
Had the vehicle passed any flocked cameras after that point, police would have been alerted

450
00:37:20,680 --> 00:37:23,260
to that vehicle passing that camera and where it was.

451
00:37:24,440 --> 00:37:27,540
Investigators were able to coordinate with the Green Bay Police Department who quickly

452
00:37:27,540 --> 00:37:30,600
located the vehicle in the neighborhood where it had passed the flat camera.

453
00:37:31,180 --> 00:37:36,100
The vehicle was impounded and that preserves any potential evidence and also removes an

454
00:37:36,100 --> 00:37:40,520
option for the suspect to continue to evade apprehension using that particular vehicle.

455
00:37:41,180 --> 00:37:45,200
The location of the vehicle opened up the door to other investigative leads within that

456
00:37:45,200 --> 00:37:48,940
neighborhood that led to the location of the suspect and he was taken into custody five

457
00:37:48,940 --> 00:37:51,920
days after the initial offense on 1120 of 22.

458
00:37:55,330 --> 00:38:01,150
In June of 2025, APD investigators began a sexual assault investigation involving a child

459
00:38:01,150 --> 00:38:01,570
victim.

460
00:38:02,670 --> 00:38:06,590
Investigators identified the suspect but had not been able to locate him.

461
00:38:07,490 --> 00:38:11,510
Investigators from APD Special Investigations Unit began canvassing bars and restaurants,

462
00:38:11,790 --> 00:38:15,490
contacting no associates of the suspect and were able to come up with a license plate for

463
00:38:15,490 --> 00:38:17,290
a vehicle that he was believed to be operating.

464
00:38:18,150 --> 00:38:23,750
Our crime analyst was able to enter that plate into flock, was able to use traditional

465
00:38:23,750 --> 00:38:28,910
cameras after locating the vehicle on a flock camera to track the suspect vehicle and our

466
00:38:28,910 --> 00:38:33,130
investigators were unable to provide surveillance on that vehicle. While they were surveilling

467
00:38:33,130 --> 00:38:38,850
the vehicle, the suspect entered the vehicle and was able to be taken into custody, and

468
00:38:38,850 --> 00:38:43,370
at the time of being taken into custody, he had a very large amount of cash on his person,

469
00:38:43,890 --> 00:38:47,750
and it was suggested that he was planning on fleeing the country. And so that kind of highlights

470
00:38:47,750 --> 00:38:52,670
the timeliness with which sometimes we need to operate to hold offenders accountable.

471
00:38:55,020 --> 00:38:58,760
Now, I'll kind of dip into some of the more everyday uses of this.

472
00:39:00,160 --> 00:39:05,480
On 11-5 of 25, Officer Christensen was dispatched to the Red Parking Ramp for a hit and run accident.

473
00:39:06,240 --> 00:39:08,360
Victims vehicle was unoccupied at the time of the crash.

474
00:39:08,480 --> 00:39:14,660
There was no suspect known, and it appeared as if the classic someone backed out from the

475
00:39:14,660 --> 00:39:17,200
stall across the room and hit the victim's car and then left.

476
00:39:18,180 --> 00:39:24,060
Officer Christensen was able to view CCTV footage from the parking ramp exit and noticed

477
00:39:24,060 --> 00:39:29,680
a couple of cars with rear end damage leaving the ramp around the time of the crash. Officer

478
00:39:29,680 --> 00:39:35,060
Christensen was then able to utilize flock cameras to find that those vehicles had the same

479
00:39:35,060 --> 00:39:40,220
damage prior to the crash and could have been suspects. Without that use of flock cameras,

480
00:39:40,420 --> 00:39:44,700
Officer Christensen would have had to spend valuable time tracking down the owners of each one

481
00:39:44,700 --> 00:39:48,860
of those vehicles only to find out that they weren't involved in the crash. So if they time saver

482
00:39:48,860 --> 00:39:53,240
in that capacity, the case went unsolved, but it kind of highlights eliminating people that suspects

483
00:39:53,240 --> 00:39:56,280
as well using the information that we're able to obtain.

484
00:39:59,000 --> 00:39:59,980
And then the...

485
00:40:00,000 --> 00:40:28,860
With an final case study, and I've got a number, you know, I could go on and on about flock successes, but I had to limit it for time purposes. I could keep you here all night. But on Christmas Eve, Officer Looker received a flock alert regarding a vehicle that was frequently operated by a suspect with a warrant for battery and disorderly conduct. Appleton officers had created a hot list alert as they had not had success in locating this individual. Officer Looker was able to respond quickly to the area where the flock vehicle had passed the camera and had alerted.

486
00:40:28,860 --> 00:40:33,400
locate the suspect vehicle and observe the suspect driving.

487
00:40:33,900 --> 00:40:39,620
She conducted a traffic stop on that vehicle and was able to take the suspect into custody for his warrant without any kind of incident.

488
00:40:40,160 --> 00:40:43,440
He was also cited for operating with a suspended driver's license at the time.

489
00:40:46,530 --> 00:40:47,830
So that's what I've got for my presentation.

490
00:40:48,150 --> 00:40:57,490
I would like to open it up to Kristen McLeod in case she's got any additional comments to add before we open it up to you for questions.

491
00:40:59,390 --> 00:41:07,390
Thank you so much. Good evening, committee. Thank you so much for your time this evening and opportunity to join you.

492
00:41:07,930 --> 00:41:14,830
I think Captain Wallace did an excellent job really showcasing what the system does and what it doesn't do.

493
00:41:15,170 --> 00:41:20,570
And I'm more than happy to help answer any questions that you may have. And thank you again for the opportunity.

494
00:41:23,590 --> 00:41:28,650
Let's start with committee, and then don't worry, I didn't forget about public participation.

495
00:41:28,650 --> 00:41:30,930
We'll start with the committee, though, all their hard time.

496
00:41:31,990 --> 00:41:32,390
Thank you, Chair.

497
00:41:33,150 --> 00:41:38,050
Captain Walsh, this probably sounds silly, but I don't work with these every day.

498
00:41:38,270 --> 00:41:47,070
So can you just give me an example of, like, one way that you would use flocks?

499
00:41:47,190 --> 00:41:50,710
So say, for example, you know the license plate of something that occurred.

500
00:41:50,710 --> 00:41:54,050
How is it a database that gets searched or how?

501
00:41:54,930 --> 00:42:00,650
Yeah, so oftentimes I'll just provide like a case example and we'll say you're driving

502
00:42:00,650 --> 00:42:04,970
home from this meeting tonight and your car gets re-rended and the person who re-rends

503
00:42:04,970 --> 00:42:10,210
your vehicle takes off from the scene. You call the police because that's the right thing to do.

504
00:42:10,650 --> 00:42:20,010
You've got a description of the vehicle. Say red Chevy Silverado and we can go back in

505
00:42:20,010 --> 00:42:22,390
vehicle and got the first three plate numbers, right?

506
00:42:22,750 --> 00:42:27,770
So AVW will say, we're the first three letters on that license plate.

507
00:42:28,150 --> 00:42:29,210
We can go back into flock.

508
00:42:29,390 --> 00:42:31,590
You give us a direction that the vehicle was last seen going.

509
00:42:31,890 --> 00:42:37,250
We can search that partial plate even in flock and say, okay, this vehicle hit on these cameras

510
00:42:37,250 --> 00:42:40,310
and now we'll go, okay, well, maybe does it match a Chevy Silverado?

511
00:42:40,950 --> 00:42:42,150
We've got a Silverado there.

512
00:42:42,550 --> 00:42:47,270
Maybe even if it's after the fact, maybe we'll be able to even see some damage on that vehicle

513
00:42:47,270 --> 00:42:48,710
that further supports that case.

514
00:42:48,710 --> 00:42:48,850
Thanks.

515
00:42:49,330 --> 00:42:49,750
Thank you.

516
00:42:49,830 --> 00:42:50,470
That helps a lot.

517
00:42:52,070 --> 00:42:52,850
Other Fenton.

518
00:42:53,310 --> 00:42:53,690
Thank you, Chair.

519
00:42:54,370 --> 00:43:01,930
First of all, this presentation I think was as a result of an email that I sent to the

520
00:43:01,930 --> 00:43:04,890
chief just a couple, really a couple of weeks ago.

521
00:43:05,750 --> 00:43:13,650
And at that time, because I had had questions from my constituents related to the incident in

522
00:43:13,650 --> 00:43:21,170
and Manasha, and I just asked if we could at some future safety and licensing committee

523
00:43:21,170 --> 00:43:27,070
meeting have a presentation about Appleton's use of the plot cameras, and Chief Olson

524
00:43:27,070 --> 00:43:32,450
answered me, I think the very next day and said, yes, we could do this at the next meeting.

525
00:43:32,890 --> 00:43:39,390
And so I wanted to thank the chief and the department for putting all this information together,

526
00:43:39,390 --> 00:44:01,270
and also for just immediate answers to questions that Alder, Van Zeland, and I have sent after we saw the presentation, so grateful for that, grateful for directing me to where some of the policies are found in public facing websites, but I do have a question.

527
00:44:01,810 --> 00:44:11,570
So, we're talking about the authorization and the, could you Captain Wallace elaborate

528
00:44:12,190 --> 00:44:13,110
on the procedure?

529
00:44:13,390 --> 00:44:17,310
So, let's go with Alder Hardt's time example of the hit-and-run accident.

530
00:44:17,490 --> 00:44:18,670
Let's not have my car hit.

531
00:44:19,070 --> 00:44:19,310
Okay.

532
00:44:20,670 --> 00:44:22,570
So, you can let it be mine.

533
00:44:22,570 --> 00:44:33,410
Okay, so what are the requirements for either, you said the sworn officer or somebody?

534
00:44:33,790 --> 00:44:35,270
And so what are the requirements?

535
00:44:35,850 --> 00:44:37,710
Does there have to be a case number?

536
00:44:38,070 --> 00:44:41,410
Does there have to be an incident number of some kind?

537
00:44:41,870 --> 00:44:47,450
What information is required to initiate a search of the data?

538
00:44:47,450 --> 00:44:49,230
We do require a case number.

539
00:44:49,430 --> 00:44:50,470
Also, flock requires.

540
00:44:50,590 --> 00:44:51,870
It's a niverse number.

541
00:44:52,010 --> 00:44:57,950
It's a reporting thing that essentially designates what type of case we are investigating.

542
00:44:58,890 --> 00:44:59,870
And we use it for

543
00:45:00,000 --> 00:45:27,820
There are a lot of different cases, and I highlighted that in the examples, but we do require a case number to be entered when we audit as we can track it back and find the why behind the search. If we're using it similarly for retail theft, you could go back. There'll be a case number that's associated with that search that would then correspond to our CAD screen for that retail theft, which then corresponds with the subsequent report that the officer would make for that investigation. May I follow up?

544
00:45:27,820 --> 00:45:41,700
So, sure, but I do just after this I just want to remind us we're going to focus on questions hopefully for the FLAQ representative so that we can also have the public provide their input but please go ahead and finish.

545
00:45:41,700 --> 00:45:54,260
I promise. So the case numbers required does the officer is what identification is the officer

546
00:45:54,260 --> 00:46:00,900
or the crime analyst required to enter a badge number or anything to show who is doing

547
00:46:00,900 --> 00:46:01,420
the request?

548
00:46:01,880 --> 00:46:06,440
Okay, so yeah, that comes with, so when I log into flock, it requires two factor authentication

549
00:46:06,440 --> 00:46:11,580
to prove it's me. So I have a unique username password and then it sends the file

550
00:46:11,580 --> 00:46:15,520
follow-up text to my phone so that it verifies that yes, it's me that's using the system.

551
00:46:16,620 --> 00:46:21,540
And then when I do a search in that, that information is logged under my name as I conducted

552
00:46:21,540 --> 00:46:23,160
the search for that information.

553
00:46:23,700 --> 00:46:23,880
Okay.

554
00:46:24,240 --> 00:46:24,360
All right.

555
00:46:24,740 --> 00:46:27,640
I will yield so that we can take care of that.

556
00:46:27,800 --> 00:46:28,140
Thank you, Chair.

557
00:46:28,180 --> 00:46:32,620
I actually did have a question for the FLAQ representative and then I do see you, Alder Smith.

558
00:46:33,720 --> 00:46:39,200
In the information on the FLAQ website, it says FLAQ never shares data on its own.

559
00:46:39,200 --> 00:46:44,400
All data sharing relationships are explicitly configured and visible to the customer.

560
00:46:44,760 --> 00:46:47,920
The customer may limit, revoke, or deny data access.

561
00:46:49,160 --> 00:46:59,220
But then later, it does say something that made me a little confused that Flock can provide certain data.

562
00:46:59,460 --> 00:47:06,620
So could the representative from Flock address what information, what do you mean by data, first of all?

563
00:47:06,620 --> 00:47:11,080
And what information resides with the police department,

564
00:47:11,260 --> 00:47:13,520
and is there any information that does reside with Flock?

565
00:47:14,240 --> 00:47:17,020
Yes, thank you so much for that question.

566
00:47:17,340 --> 00:47:19,020
Happy to provide clarification there.

567
00:47:19,660 --> 00:47:23,940
So all of the data we're referring to is all of the images

568
00:47:23,940 --> 00:47:26,320
and associated metadata that are collected

569
00:47:27,140 --> 00:47:29,060
by your camera network.

570
00:47:29,360 --> 00:47:33,300
So cameras that are located within your community.

571
00:47:33,800 --> 00:47:35,960
And all of that data that is collected

572
00:47:35,960 --> 00:47:48,300
is owned by the city of Appleton and that means that the city and through the police department and their administration of the system, you all have the sharing controls.

573
00:47:48,960 --> 00:47:57,660
Flock will never share your data without your express consent unless we are legally required to do so.

574
00:47:57,660 --> 00:48:06,040
So if we receive a valid subpoena for that information, what we would do in that instance would

575
00:48:06,040 --> 00:48:13,220
be to notify you first because that is your data. And then we would work with you and your city legal

576
00:48:13,220 --> 00:48:19,740
team to address that response. But flock does not have a general right of access to your data.

577
00:48:19,740 --> 00:48:27,960
In your contract, it specifies very specific instances where we would be legally compelled

578
00:48:27,960 --> 00:48:34,540
to release your information, but you all have full control of those data sharing settings.

579
00:48:34,760 --> 00:48:40,400
There are no default data sharing settings, so you all are able to determine which other

580
00:48:40,400 --> 00:48:45,420
law enforcement agencies, if any, you would like to share your camera network data with.

581
00:48:45,420 --> 00:48:50,700
and you can adjust those sharing settings as needed.

582
00:48:51,000 --> 00:48:52,680
Those can be revoked at any time.

583
00:48:52,980 --> 00:48:55,260
Again, that is fully within the control

584
00:48:55,260 --> 00:48:57,900
of the city via the police department.

585
00:48:58,700 --> 00:48:59,500
And thank you.

586
00:48:59,660 --> 00:49:03,380
What are some of the examples of what it has

587
00:49:03,380 --> 00:49:05,920
in the contract, regard to sharing,

588
00:49:06,120 --> 00:49:07,780
where Flockwood would get involved?

589
00:49:08,240 --> 00:49:11,000
Would it always be initiated by the judiciary?

590
00:49:13,560 --> 00:49:20,200
That would be that we go by them trying to pull up the terms and conditions to get the exact

591
00:49:20,920 --> 00:49:26,440
verbiage, but it's the the court's definition of reasonably necessary.

592
00:49:29,810 --> 00:49:31,870
Thank you. All there Smith, did you want to go ahead?

593
00:49:32,630 --> 00:49:34,270
Is that number 12? Yes.

594
00:49:34,570 --> 00:49:34,690
Okay.

595
00:49:35,410 --> 00:49:37,350
Thank you, Officer Wallace, for the presentation.

596
00:49:37,570 --> 00:49:42,930
I think my question will also probably be to Christian McLeod.

597
00:49:42,930 --> 00:49:50,690
But my question is about we have the flock safety cameras and they are license plate readers.

598
00:49:51,190 --> 00:49:56,210
But is that something and that it's specifically not facial recognition or tracking of people?

599
00:49:56,570 --> 00:49:59,970
Is that something that could at some point be turned on, that we have-

600
00:50:00,000 --> 00:50:29,960
That we are only doing the license plate readers or is that just kind of a natural limitation of the system? Sure. Yes. The great question. So we do not utilize facial recognition with any of our products. And if that were to ever come about, that would be something that really goes beyond the scope of the product that you use in the contract for. So we would, that would be something that

601
00:50:29,960 --> 00:50:38,220
But we would take to the customer first and that would be a decision that the city would have to make to implement that technology.

602
00:50:40,670 --> 00:50:54,250
Okay, so at this point, this is, but that isn't something that flock offers now or it is something the flock offers on, on you, in no do not offer a facial recognition, okay, so ever.

603
00:50:54,510 --> 00:51:00,790
Okay, thank you. And then just follow up, there's other cities and there's more and more cities that are using this technology.

604
00:51:00,790 --> 00:51:03,390
And those have substantially the same system.

605
00:51:03,690 --> 00:51:06,110
There's our license plate reading systems as well.

606
00:51:07,930 --> 00:51:12,410
There's not vastly different powers or anything like that that is,

607
00:51:13,790 --> 00:51:15,970
that different cities are using or purchasing.

608
00:51:17,450 --> 00:51:22,410
We have different, so we do have different offerings,

609
00:51:22,670 --> 00:51:27,470
so in some enhancements with the software that support investigative functions.

610
00:51:27,470 --> 00:51:33,470
but the license plate readers do essentially function the same in each city.

611
00:51:33,970 --> 00:51:37,010
Okay, that's the core product, is that license plate side?

612
00:51:37,590 --> 00:51:37,790
Yes.

613
00:51:38,130 --> 00:51:38,510
Okay, yes.

614
00:51:38,970 --> 00:51:39,430
Thank you.

615
00:51:40,210 --> 00:51:44,330
I have just one final question for Ms. McLeod.

616
00:51:44,630 --> 00:51:55,450
So we have had a situation, are you familiar with the situation with the officer in Manasha who accessed the flock cameras for a personal reason?

617
00:51:55,450 --> 00:52:01,550
Yes. Okay. So in reading out a little bit more on the

618
00:52:01,550 --> 00:52:06,650
FOX system, it doesn't appear that this is the first time that something like that has occurred.

619
00:52:07,210 --> 00:52:15,010
So what steps are FOX taking to ensure that these types of things can't happen in the future?

620
00:52:15,790 --> 00:52:20,710
Yes, and so glad you asked that. So we are very committed to supporting

621
00:52:20,710 --> 00:52:28,910
departments with compliance and accountability efforts. With the auditing functions in place,

622
00:52:29,330 --> 00:52:35,010
we do encourage every single city to implement consistent recurring auditing practices.

623
00:52:35,750 --> 00:52:40,750
In addition to that, I believe it's either at the end of this quarter or next quarter,

624
00:52:41,210 --> 00:52:48,850
we are coming out with an alert feature. So any anomaly of a search within the system,

625
00:52:48,850 --> 00:53:02,550
That will trigger an alert to the administrators of the flock system to say these search or searches are out of the norm and you may want to look into this further.

626
00:53:03,210 --> 00:53:12,990
So again, being able to provide a proactive approach to those auditing features is we're very happy to support that.

627
00:53:13,490 --> 00:53:16,690
Can you give me an example of what an anomaly would look like?

628
00:53:17,490 --> 00:53:32,570
Yeah so one of them it would be if a search is performed by a user say after after hours beyond that that person's typical shift that would that would trigger an alert or

629
00:53:32,570 --> 00:53:41,830
and that's from a learned pattern you learn the pattern of that officer using flack and then you can tell that they were using it outside of that timeframe.

630
00:53:42,850 --> 00:53:47,610
That I'm not sure on the specifics on how we're configuring that, but I can certainly

631
00:53:47,610 --> 00:53:50,490
get more information and get back to you on that.

632
00:53:51,590 --> 00:53:56,870
And another example would be repeated searches for the same vehicle.

633
00:53:57,710 --> 00:53:58,070
Okay.

634
00:53:58,630 --> 00:53:59,430
That's helpful.

635
00:53:59,810 --> 00:54:00,230
Thank you.

636
00:54:01,250 --> 00:54:04,330
Alder, Schultz is your question for Ms. McCawd?

637
00:54:08,040 --> 00:54:08,260
Okay.

638
00:54:08,500 --> 00:54:12,740
And just make sure you speak into the microphone so they can hear you on Zoom.

639
00:54:14,460 --> 00:54:21,680
Okay. Thank you, Chair. I think the incident in Monash is certain to have some of us questioning

640
00:54:22,200 --> 00:54:27,720
the accountability side of this. And I've had some exchanges with police chief and trying

641
00:54:27,720 --> 00:54:35,000
to get my head wrapped around this a little bit too, about the sort of log in, capture of log in data,

642
00:54:35,240 --> 00:54:40,160
and essentially the reasons for those searches. And I pulled up the Uptown Police Department,

643
00:54:40,160 --> 00:54:59,740
The government pulled up the Uptown Police Department policy manual for ALPR and 424.3 sub B, which is ALPR operations, as an ALPR may be used in conjunction with any patrol operation or official department investigation, and then it says reasonable suspicion or probable causes.

644
00:55:00,000 --> 00:55:29,140
Not necessary before using any LPR. And I'll come back to that as I think I want to ask chief if there are many incidents is where there hasn't been reasonable suspicion of probable cause, but the system's been used by police as an investigative tool. And the second one, data collection retention, data may be gathered, maintained by the part, maybe used and shared with prosecutors or others only as permitted by law. Well, that's kind of a, that's a rather wide

645
00:55:30,020 --> 00:55:36,040
allowance, I think there are a lot of tolerable uses that could fall within that definition.

646
00:55:36,240 --> 00:55:42,560
But I guess I want to drill down a little bit deeper into sort of the login process

647
00:55:42,560 --> 00:55:50,340
in the searches, because according to this policy, this is sub-C of the safeguards.

648
00:55:51,160 --> 00:55:56,640
All ALPR searches shall have an associated incident number or unique search reason, entered

649
00:55:56,640 --> 00:55:58,320
in the search reason or look-up reason.

650
00:55:58,480 --> 00:56:02,100
It doesn't specify that there is actually a field

651
00:56:02,100 --> 00:56:06,600
where you're answering an incident number or a case number.

652
00:56:06,800 --> 00:56:11,640
To me, it sounds like, and this is potentially why it has seen some abuses

653
00:56:11,640 --> 00:56:17,620
by officers over time, that the only field required is something to input

654
00:56:17,620 --> 00:56:20,200
into a search reason or look-up reason reason.

655
00:56:21,060 --> 00:56:25,380
There have been incidents, or at least reported incidents of, in one case,

656
00:56:25,380 --> 00:56:31,580
up to a thousand uses of the system with just investigation as the reason, which is a rather broad

657
00:56:33,300 --> 00:56:39,200
reason to be looking to that many cases, developing really specific. So I just want to

658
00:56:39,200 --> 00:56:45,080
be certain that, and I'm hearing that it is, but I want to be certain that anybody uses this

659
00:56:45,080 --> 00:56:52,180
system in Appleton is clearly using it with an incident number, which it sounds like we are,

660
00:56:52,180 --> 00:56:55,400
And that the reasons are being reviewed.

661
00:56:56,820 --> 00:57:17,100
If I could just, I think what I'll do is I'll take you have a two-part question, so there will be a question for Chief Olson that we'll get to in a second, but what I also heard from you was you wondering about the field that somebody needs to enter in order to access information.

662
00:57:17,100 --> 00:57:27,060
and if you could speak to that Ms. McLeod, what type of information can it be set that a certain

663
00:57:27,820 --> 00:57:33,280
type of character needs to be put into that or can they just simply type investigation?

664
00:57:33,940 --> 00:57:39,340
It sounds like some places have been set that way. Are there ways to restrict that further?

665
00:57:40,460 --> 00:57:46,120
Yes, so I'm glad you asked that question as well. A couple months ago, FLOC implemented.

666
00:57:46,120 --> 00:57:52,960
So previously, a search reason was always required, but like you said, there were many communities

667
00:57:52,960 --> 00:58:00,640
and agencies recognized that with an open text search field and some vague search reasons

668
00:58:00,640 --> 00:58:07,480
were provided. There was a need for more clarity as far as use of the system. And so,

669
00:58:07,480 --> 00:58:15,120
we walk as implemented, there is a required which sort of takes the place of that open text field.

670
00:58:15,120 --> 00:58:30,940
Now, when a user logs on and is conducting a search of the system, they must select from a drop-down menu a list of offense types that is based on neighbors and with feedback from our customers.

671
00:58:30,940 --> 00:58:53,420
So, the user would have to select a specific offense type from this drop-down menu, and then agencies may also choose to require an incident or case number, as well as they have the option to provide additional context via a text box.

672
00:58:53,420 --> 00:59:05,620
So, our intention with requiring this offense type drop down was to eliminate those that vagueness in those searches that you had mentioned.

673
00:59:06,480 --> 00:59:09,840
Thank you. Did that answer the first part of your question?

674
00:59:09,860 --> 00:59:18,600
That answer the first one makes me feel a little bit better about at least that problematic situation, which sounds like it's being remedied.

675
00:59:18,600 --> 00:59:21,480
And certainly, at least from what I'm hearing from APD,

676
00:59:21,620 --> 00:59:22,780
they're on top of it.

677
00:59:24,760 --> 00:59:27,340
Any other questions for Ms. McClub before I open

678
00:59:27,700 --> 00:59:30,260
this up to public participation, other Fenden?

679
00:59:30,620 --> 00:59:32,040
Thank you, and I promise it'll be short.

680
00:59:33,400 --> 00:59:36,900
First, thank you, Ms. McClub, for being with us

681
00:59:36,900 --> 00:59:38,180
and helping us out with this.

682
00:59:38,360 --> 00:59:40,340
I know it's the complicated technology,

683
00:59:40,660 --> 00:59:44,800
so your input is greatly appreciated.

684
00:59:44,800 --> 00:59:50,320
My question is, these cameras are marketed to private entities as well.

685
00:59:50,700 --> 00:59:55,300
I understand that they're sold to homeowners associations, private businesses.

686
00:59:56,160 --> 00:59:59,900
Clearly, those entities can share with law enforcement.

687
01:00:18,020 --> 01:00:29,960
Thank you for that question as well. So, the, that it is one way sharing and meaning private entities, commercial businesses, and H.O.A.s,

688
01:00:29,960 --> 01:00:37,740
It may choose to share their camera network data with law enforcement, however, it cannot

689
01:00:38,120 --> 01:00:39,180
work in reverse.

690
01:00:40,020 --> 01:00:45,840
No government or city camera network data is shared with any private entity.

691
01:00:46,520 --> 01:00:52,040
No hot list information, no sensitive information can be shared with private entities.

692
01:00:52,260 --> 01:00:55,780
There is a very distinct separation within the system.

693
01:00:56,380 --> 01:00:56,920
Thank you.

694
01:00:56,920 --> 01:01:06,140
And they can share with law enforcement, is there any sort of restriction on them?

695
01:01:06,920 --> 01:01:15,940
The local private group can share with, I mean, can they share with any police department?

696
01:01:17,220 --> 01:01:25,320
So each customer owns their network, their camera network, typically the commercial businesses

697
01:01:25,320 --> 01:01:29,460
is share with their local law enforcement in regional,

698
01:01:29,980 --> 01:01:31,500
but because it is their data,

699
01:01:31,660 --> 01:01:34,760
they own to share with enforcement agencies

700
01:01:34,760 --> 01:01:36,500
that are flocked customers.

701
01:01:37,000 --> 01:01:39,900
Or they potentially could share

702
01:01:39,900 --> 01:01:42,340
with non- flocked customers as well,

703
01:01:42,520 --> 01:01:45,820
but because each customer owns their data 100%,

704
01:01:45,820 --> 01:01:48,040
that is up to each customer.

705
01:01:48,820 --> 01:01:49,760
Okay, thank you.

706
01:01:50,340 --> 01:01:52,100
All their mouth, sir?

707
01:01:53,080 --> 01:01:53,460
Thank you.

708
01:01:53,940 --> 01:01:54,580
District two.

709
01:01:55,320 --> 01:02:04,540
Thank you. So, at one point, I was told by someone during a demonstration that flock

710
01:02:04,540 --> 01:02:09,240
cameras can write in this, even though they don't have facial recognition in the same

711
01:02:09,240 --> 01:02:14,560
way that they can track bumper stickers and damage on vehicles, they can also track

712
01:02:14,560 --> 01:02:21,340
unique characteristics of individuals in the vehicles. So, I would just like to hear from

713
01:02:21,340 --> 01:02:25,380
Kristen, as someone misunderstood why was I told that?

714
01:02:26,080 --> 01:02:29,000
System only focuses on vehicle details.

715
01:02:29,400 --> 01:02:36,020
There is no way to search the floccale pair system for a person or any personal character.

716
01:02:36,680 --> 01:02:37,180
Thank you.

717
01:02:39,380 --> 01:02:41,260
I do have a couple more questions.

718
01:02:41,280 --> 01:02:44,140
I'm just going to try to filter out the ones that are for the police chief.

719
01:02:44,300 --> 01:02:45,040
It's my understanding.

720
01:02:45,040 --> 01:02:47,240
We'll be asking those later.

721
01:02:47,240 --> 01:02:54,520
Or like a demonstration mode or something like that where someone who has access to the

722
01:02:54,520 --> 01:03:01,340
flock system could turn off the need to enter a case number, turn off the need to provide

723
01:03:01,340 --> 01:03:07,840
a search reason, is that something that the system permits?

724
01:03:09,620 --> 01:03:22,020
So your flock, the police department, your flock administrators can require a case number be entered or they can not require that a case number be entered.

725
01:03:22,460 --> 01:03:28,040
But there is no way to turn off the requirement for that offense type link to that.

726
01:03:28,040 --> 01:03:40,160
Thank you, then if we have a policy to only retain data for 30 days, would other cities

727
01:03:40,160 --> 01:03:45,180
perhaps have access to our data who have a different policy, let's say 90 days or something

728
01:03:45,180 --> 01:03:52,160
like that, would our data that we own and then delete after 30 days would they be able to

729
01:03:52,160 --> 01:04:01,420
access it and then retain it for some indefinite period where we don't actually know how long they're retaining it for.

730
01:04:02,000 --> 01:04:12,920
Great question. So they would have to download the image, the data prior to the 30-day mark and retain that.

731
01:04:12,920 --> 01:04:22,940
That event of that download is logged and your agency can see if that information was downloaded.

732
01:04:24,920 --> 01:04:25,240
Okay.

733
01:04:25,240 --> 01:04:31,780
And then is data sharing among

734
01:05:00,000 --> 01:05:29,760
Is that all mutual? Like, we can only see their data if we're also sharing it with them, or how exactly is that set up? Yes, another great question. So it is all at your discretion. There are some agencies that choose to not share their camera network data externally, but they do have, you know, neighboring law enforcement or within the state or even nationally that will share their

735
01:05:29,760 --> 01:05:38,240
camera network with that agency, so it's completely customizable. But it doesn't mean if you are

736
01:05:38,240 --> 01:05:48,700
sharing, it's not automatically reciprocal unless, and Captain Wallace, you can help me out. And

737
01:05:48,700 --> 01:05:56,280
if I remember correctly, if you're, if you all are participating in the Wisconsin state lookup tool.

738
01:05:58,120 --> 01:06:00,000
I can speak to that a little bit.

739
01:06:00,720 --> 01:06:06,100
Appleton shares our data with state of Wisconsin law enforcement agencies.

740
01:06:06,560 --> 01:06:07,680
We do have access.

741
01:06:08,160 --> 01:06:12,120
We have been granted permission by other agencies throughout the country, and they vary

742
01:06:12,120 --> 01:06:16,960
from state to state, but other agencies have given us access to their cameras from out of

743
01:06:16,960 --> 01:06:17,560
state as well.

744
01:06:19,630 --> 01:06:20,170
Thank you.

745
01:06:20,970 --> 01:06:29,990
And that's through a request, similar to how we ask people to request data, or is it just open-ended?

746
01:06:30,410 --> 01:06:37,310
So, it goes kind of both ways. We can request from an agency, or occasionally I'll get an email, I believe this says,

747
01:06:37,770 --> 01:06:45,330
this agency wants to share information with you. And if we click OK, well then we can access their data as well.

748
01:06:45,330 --> 01:06:50,430
But you're still following what processes are you following to request that data?

749
01:06:50,770 --> 01:06:54,770
Are you entering an offense for a specific?

750
01:06:55,430 --> 01:06:55,550
Yeah.

751
01:06:55,710 --> 01:07:00,930
Any search that we conduct throughout the system has the same, we fall under our policy all

752
01:07:00,930 --> 01:07:01,310
the time.

753
01:07:01,470 --> 01:07:06,190
So we fall under the case number, the neighbors code, that's the policy that we fall under

754
01:07:06,190 --> 01:07:06,990
to conduct a search.

755
01:07:07,050 --> 01:07:13,310
Whether we're searching camera system that's in Missouri or a camera system here, we're accessing

756
01:07:13,310 --> 01:07:17,390
seen flock under our set of prescribed rules and regulations.

757
01:07:17,830 --> 01:07:18,770
And vice versa.

758
01:07:19,590 --> 01:07:24,790
So if one of those outside entities wants to access it, they're typing in the same information

759
01:07:24,790 --> 01:07:26,470
that we require of our officers.

760
01:07:27,090 --> 01:07:29,990
I wouldn't be able to speak on the other agencies.

761
01:07:30,210 --> 01:07:32,950
They'd be under their agency's policy for help or use.

762
01:07:33,690 --> 01:07:38,630
But if I could add at minimum, they would have to select the offense type.

763
01:07:39,670 --> 01:07:40,250
Okay.

764
01:07:40,630 --> 01:07:40,990
Thank you.

765
01:07:42,610 --> 01:07:46,650
I saw, did you have any other questions, Alder Meltzer?

766
01:07:47,110 --> 01:07:47,750
No, thank you.

767
01:07:48,010 --> 01:07:48,170
Okay.

768
01:07:48,810 --> 01:07:49,950
Alder, Schultz, I saw.

769
01:07:50,450 --> 01:07:53,330
Was there anybody else that I missed who hasn't gone yet?

770
01:07:54,270 --> 01:07:54,510
Okay.

771
01:07:54,910 --> 01:07:59,810
And then if you wanted to go ahead and then I'd like to turn this over to the folks who are weight patient.

772
01:07:59,910 --> 01:08:00,190
Sure.

773
01:08:00,670 --> 01:08:02,230
Yep. No, that's totally fine.

774
01:08:02,470 --> 01:08:09,530
I guess just following that conversation there and trying to understand how many times

775
01:08:09,530 --> 01:08:15,190
data is accessed from outside of the agency versus within, so if we have 20

776
01:08:15,190 --> 01:08:21,270
cameras and we're capturing data, and our APD uses it to track stuff locally.

777
01:08:22,710 --> 01:08:27,070
Can you give me a sense, Kristen, about how often that same data is being

778
01:08:27,070 --> 01:08:33,190
accessed by requests from outside of Appleton? Someone in Kentucky, license plate was

779
01:08:33,190 --> 01:08:37,130
reported to go to Appleton, so we're going to check to see if that license plate

780
01:08:37,130 --> 01:08:42,810
showed up in Appleton. I guess I'm trying to get a sense of how often it's used locally

781
01:08:42,810 --> 01:08:47,550
and then sort of non-locally that same access data is accessed.

782
01:08:48,230 --> 01:08:53,330
I'll just put it like this, I think this might be helpful. So I saw that there is a transparency

783
01:08:53,330 --> 01:09:01,690
site that shows which outside locations have asked or shared data with the Appleton Police

784
01:09:01,690 --> 01:09:13,090
department and if I understand what Aldersholtz is trying to ask, he's trying to ask if how we are tracking their requests.

785
01:09:13,410 --> 01:09:24,510
How often they're requesting, is that information that that flock provides, are there alerts, are there notifications to the Appleton Police Department?

786
01:09:24,690 --> 01:09:26,710
Is that along the lines of what you're asking?

787
01:09:26,710 --> 01:09:31,630
Yeah, similar, I mean, I can give you a little bit more to go on.

788
01:09:31,630 --> 01:09:46,550
We have this transparency site which, because here's the numbers unique vehicles detected in the last 30 days is 295,000 hot list hits in the last 30 days is 5,682 and then searches in the last 30 days is 385.

789
01:09:46,550 --> 01:09:52,530
I can't imagine that that's all searches, hotness hits, things that are happening in our community.

790
01:09:52,690 --> 01:09:58,670
That's obviously numbers generated from the entire system, but access to the Appleton data.

791
01:09:59,030 --> 01:09:59,750
Yes, so could you?

792
01:10:00,000 --> 01:10:29,980
Talk about the information that's on that transparency site and where those numbers and that data comes from, please. Yes, yes. And to add, um, each query of the Appleton's camera network. So whether that's conducted by internally by your officers, by your police department staff, or externally by users that Appleton PD has granted.

793
01:10:29,980 --> 01:10:38,060
sharing access to, all of those searches are logged and recorded. And Captain Wallace,

794
01:10:38,300 --> 01:10:44,980
he can show the network audit and the organization audit will show that

795
01:10:44,980 --> 01:10:49,460
information as far as, you know, when you started sharing with a certain

796
01:10:49,980 --> 01:10:58,320
external agency and search information related to any external searches conducted

797
01:10:58,320 --> 01:11:01,580
conducted that included the Appleton camera network.

798
01:11:02,860 --> 01:11:05,820
And then as far as the transparency portal,

799
01:11:06,080 --> 01:11:10,540
so yep, it's a public-facing, block-generated web page,

800
01:11:10,720 --> 01:11:13,340
the organizations that has a full listing

801
01:11:13,340 --> 01:11:19,980
of all of the external agencies that your department has

802
01:11:19,980 --> 01:11:22,740
granted sharing access to.

803
01:11:23,680 --> 01:11:28,140
And the searches conducted in the last 30 days

804
01:11:28,140 --> 01:11:38,820
that I believe and I will confirm this, those include external searches as well, but I will

805
01:11:39,500 --> 01:11:44,720
confirm that because they, for some reason, I just want to make sure that I'm giving you the

806
01:11:44,720 --> 01:11:50,620
correct information that the searches conducted in the last 30 days does include external agencies

807
01:11:50,620 --> 01:11:55,920
and not just internal, but I can certainly show that that follow up with chief.

808
01:11:55,920 --> 01:12:09,280
That would be great if you're able to provide something that gives more information on the different types of data that are listed on this site that would be great.

809
01:12:09,680 --> 01:12:14,220
So the hot list hits searches, for example, that would be appreciated.

810
01:12:15,080 --> 01:12:15,680
Absolutely.

811
01:12:15,680 --> 01:12:15,880
Absolutely.

812
01:12:17,240 --> 01:12:17,440
All right.

813
01:12:17,680 --> 01:12:21,240
Anybody else before we hear from the public?

814
01:12:22,200 --> 01:12:22,440
All right.

815
01:12:23,320 --> 01:12:23,880
Folks.

816
01:12:24,180 --> 01:12:29,540
So anyone who is here to speak today, I just to let you know you'll step up to the podium.

817
01:12:29,840 --> 01:12:32,140
You'll state your name and address for the record.

818
01:12:32,920 --> 01:12:34,600
It's not a back and forth.

819
01:12:34,960 --> 01:12:38,400
So if you have questions, feel free to state those questions.

820
01:12:38,400 --> 01:12:42,640
And then as a committee, we'll take up those questions with staff.

821
01:12:43,300 --> 01:12:51,220
And I just ask, I give everybody five minutes maximum and just keep in mind the comments

822
01:12:51,220 --> 01:12:55,600
that were made before, try to make them concise, I'd appreciate it.

823
01:12:55,780 --> 01:12:58,400
So who would like to step forward first?

824
01:13:03,780 --> 01:13:06,580
I'm Kathy Flores, I'm the city of Appleton resident.

825
01:13:07,780 --> 01:13:11,140
I've also been working in domestic violence for over 35 years.

826
01:13:11,380 --> 01:13:15,540
So my question, and I've worked with marginalized communities, so I have two questions and they're

827
01:13:15,540 --> 01:13:18,160
related to domestic violence and marginalized communities.

828
01:13:19,060 --> 01:13:23,800
So, you know, as you're, anybody that's aware about domestic violence knows that there's

829
01:13:23,800 --> 01:13:27,740
several studies around police officers and domestic violence stating anywhere from

830
01:13:27,740 --> 01:13:32,320
28 to 40% of police officers are active domestic abusers.

831
01:13:32,760 --> 01:13:36,700
28% is more like the local national average.

832
01:13:37,140 --> 01:13:42,540
40% is hired and there's lots of reasons in the studies for that about stress and different

833
01:13:42,540 --> 01:13:49,820
things in control. But my question is related to the officer that we heard about recently.

834
01:13:50,700 --> 01:13:58,120
I'm more concerned about prevention than accountability afterward. So I want to ask what specifically

835
01:13:58,120 --> 01:14:05,220
the question is to staff in the Apple to Police Department domestic violence policy, what specifically

836
01:14:05,220 --> 01:14:14,460
Are you doing to prevent an officer stalking a survivor or their ex-partner, current partner?

837
01:14:15,000 --> 01:14:17,860
And what those parameters look like, so that's my question for staff.

838
01:14:18,440 --> 01:14:24,160
The other question I have is, does Appleton Police have a written binding policy that prohibits

839
01:14:24,160 --> 01:14:31,240
flock data from being used for civil immigration enforcement, including indirect access through

840
01:14:31,240 --> 01:14:33,740
other agencies that do not share with ICE?

841
01:14:33,740 --> 01:14:41,540
case. So what does that look like? And just concerned about that whole, like Lucy Goosey

842
01:14:41,540 --> 01:14:48,180
around domestic violence, what do we know about, let's just say Wapaka. Wapaka might have

843
01:14:48,180 --> 01:14:55,720
somebody using FLOC for purposes of domestic violence through Appleton Police Department.

844
01:14:55,720 --> 01:14:58,940
And what are the prevention, preventative things?

845
01:14:59,160 --> 01:14:59,980
I know the

846
01:15:00,000 --> 01:15:28,780
But there's accountability around this, but what's the prevention? Thank you. Thank you. Chief, did you want to take those questions right away? Or did you want to wait until after public participation? Let me try. Okay. So the question was, what are we doing to prevent misuse, especially in the case of domestic violence? And then if you could address the policies that we have about sharing with federal agencies or agencies that share with federal agencies?

847
01:15:31,740 --> 01:15:40,780
So, as far as the domestic policy is concerned in prevention, I mean like everything, we try

848
01:15:40,780 --> 01:15:45,720
to do everything we can do to prevent certainly those types of crimes from happening, we take

849
01:15:45,720 --> 01:15:46,700
them very seriously.

850
01:15:47,260 --> 01:15:54,620
I also understand your perspective that handling it after it already happens is one part

851
01:15:54,620 --> 01:15:57,380
of it and prevention is certainly another part of it.

852
01:15:58,460 --> 01:16:06,000
I can only speak to what we do in Appleton to prevent things from happening, including

853
01:16:06,000 --> 01:16:13,760
a very robust set of rules and regulations that our officers are expected to abide by,

854
01:16:14,180 --> 01:16:21,500
as well as swift consequences and accountability if they don't abide by those rules and regulations.

855
01:16:21,500 --> 01:16:32,360
We also spend probably more time than most of our other partner agencies when it comes

856
01:16:32,360 --> 01:16:34,260
to doing background investigations.

857
01:16:35,000 --> 01:16:38,100
We polygraph all of our candidates before they're hired.

858
01:16:38,740 --> 01:16:44,120
They all go through a psychological evaluation before they're hired.

859
01:16:44,120 --> 01:16:53,140
And we take our hiring practices very, very seriously, ensuring that we do the best that

860
01:16:53,140 --> 01:17:01,000
we can to try to, again, find people that embrace our core values and that don't engage

861
01:17:01,000 --> 01:17:04,060
in that type of violence.

862
01:17:05,940 --> 01:17:09,220
Of course, once they're hired things can change.

863
01:17:09,360 --> 01:17:10,740
We all understand that.

864
01:17:11,480 --> 01:17:16,520
However, I think that by putting all of those types of things in place on the front end,

865
01:17:16,860 --> 01:17:23,200
at least gives us kind of a leg up on ensuring that the people that we hire are good people

866
01:17:23,200 --> 01:17:29,840
that hopefully will make good choices and if they don't, again, there's swift accountability

867
01:17:30,380 --> 01:17:31,320
that happens.

868
01:17:31,780 --> 01:17:40,640
Now, as far as the use of the FOX system in prevention, as far as what other agencies

869
01:17:40,640 --> 01:17:45,640
do in their policies, I don't have any control over that.

870
01:17:46,600 --> 01:17:50,840
Those are risks that are going to be involved in any time you have any kind of data, whether

871
01:17:50,840 --> 01:17:54,720
it's FOC or other types of programs that we have out there.

872
01:17:54,720 --> 01:18:02,780
What I can say that is we have put in our policy and practices in place now that

873
01:18:02,780 --> 01:18:07,640
flock has also tightened up their practices, that there has to be an incident number that

874
01:18:07,640 --> 01:18:15,460
goes into that search capability, without getting into specifics on the case that kind of generated

875
01:18:15,460 --> 01:18:17,920
all of this interest, that wasn't the case.

876
01:18:17,920 --> 01:18:31,300
And so, you could just put in there, say, welfare check or investigative purposes, drugs, that type of thing without an incident number and you could do a search.

877
01:18:32,120 --> 01:18:39,540
So, it is possible to, again, some of those practices have since been tightened up.

878
01:18:39,540 --> 01:18:48,440
And I think that that is going to take a huge step towards preventing this type of thing from happening again.

879
01:18:48,940 --> 01:18:51,960
Could you just speak a little bit further on that?

880
01:18:52,300 --> 01:18:56,600
So if someone puts in an incident number, let's say I put in one, two, three, four, five, six, seven,

881
01:18:56,680 --> 01:19:00,280
I put it in and what an incident number looks like for the police department.

882
01:19:00,980 --> 01:19:05,920
Is there anybody checking that information against an actual incident number

883
01:19:05,920 --> 01:19:10,600
to ensure that there is actually an incident number that exists.

884
01:19:11,700 --> 01:19:20,220
Correct. There's no way from a resource management perspective that we would go down and be able to check every single incident number consistently.

885
01:19:20,880 --> 01:19:28,800
However, like we do when we audit many of the programs that we have supervisors do, for example, our axon body cameras.

886
01:19:29,480 --> 01:19:34,520
We have auditing features in there to ensure that officers are turning those on every time

887
01:19:34,520 --> 01:19:38,580
they have interactions with the public and that they are following our policy.

888
01:19:39,120 --> 01:19:43,720
They also periodically review video to see how our interactions in the public are going

889
01:19:43,720 --> 01:19:47,960
and how, you know, that they're appropriate and what we expect from our officers on our

890
01:19:47,960 --> 01:19:48,160
staff.

891
01:19:48,880 --> 01:19:56,100
So along the same lines, they go through and we randomly pick those incidents and then

892
01:19:56,100 --> 01:19:59,860
and we can research those to ensure that it was

893
01:20:06,960 --> 01:20:15,420
Okay, I think I see an opportunity there, especially with AI, checking just numbers. If that's something

894
01:20:15,420 --> 01:20:23,000
that the department would be open to, I think that would eliminate a lot of concern that our

895
01:20:23,000 --> 01:20:29,560
constituents are having as well as the folks who are here. I can just add to that.

896
01:20:29,560 --> 01:20:35,120
But we are very much open to tightening up any practices we have.

897
01:20:35,580 --> 01:20:41,180
If it means adding of language into our policy, if that helps people feel better about

898
01:20:41,180 --> 01:20:45,340
what's happening, we are more than happy to address some of those concerns.

899
01:20:46,460 --> 01:20:53,120
And certainly, we continue to explore AI and looking for opportunities to again utilize that

900
01:20:53,120 --> 01:21:02,300
tool in there are a lot of different resources out there that we would be happy to again purchase

901
01:21:02,300 --> 01:21:05,820
but all of that does come with a cost. So thank you.

902
01:21:08,900 --> 01:21:10,520
Maybe because you have somebody else

903
01:21:10,520 --> 01:21:16,140
ask it because if you heard your time or go off. Well I know that one of the additional questions

904
01:21:16,140 --> 01:21:24,640
that was asked was around basically our sharing with federal authorities and we only share with

905
01:21:24,640 --> 01:21:26,920
with any agencies outside the state.

906
01:21:27,700 --> 01:21:30,760
The transparency portal does show every agency

907
01:21:30,760 --> 01:21:32,100
that we share our data with.

908
01:21:32,760 --> 01:21:34,700
Now, to your question, is there a chance

909
01:21:34,700 --> 01:21:37,400
that, you know, just same-aggression authorities

910
01:21:37,400 --> 01:21:40,380
access as somebody else's,

911
01:21:40,580 --> 01:21:42,500
are our data through another department,

912
01:21:42,640 --> 01:21:45,020
or I think that was one of the questions that was asked?

913
01:21:45,980 --> 01:21:48,200
I'm not exactly sure how they would do that,

914
01:21:48,260 --> 01:21:49,720
or what benefit it would serve them.

915
01:21:49,720 --> 01:21:58,720
I mean, this is an isolated license plate at an intersection at a point in time.

916
01:21:59,460 --> 01:22:00,920
It doesn't involve any people.

917
01:22:01,160 --> 01:22:03,280
It doesn't, it's not searchable in that way.

918
01:22:03,600 --> 01:22:08,560
So even if that is a possibility, I guess I'm not really sure how useful it would be

919
01:22:08,560 --> 01:22:08,920
to them.

920
01:22:09,240 --> 01:22:14,600
If I could just give you an example, let's just say that the license plate reader is capturing

921
01:22:14,600 --> 01:22:19,220
people coming and going from Houdini Plaza the other day.

922
01:22:19,220 --> 01:22:23,480
So there are folks who are protesting something like that.

923
01:22:23,920 --> 01:22:28,720
So I think that is, that's what I'm hearing from my constituents that the concern is

924
01:22:28,720 --> 01:22:35,660
about, you know, sensitive activities that they don't want that information shared with

925
01:22:35,660 --> 01:22:37,020
other agencies.

926
01:22:38,960 --> 01:22:45,820
So if I understood you correctly, though, so I guess maybe I don't understand the process

927
01:22:45,820 --> 01:22:55,480
very well of let's just say that we'll call this other police agency wants to access information

928
01:22:55,480 --> 01:23:04,380
from our cameras, our readers. Do they have to say, you know, between this time and this time,

929
01:23:04,960 --> 01:23:11,000
like what does a search look like? I think I'm having trouble really understanding what it is they can

930
01:23:11,000 --> 01:23:15,840
and ask you for, but you seem very confident that they wouldn't need it.

931
01:23:15,960 --> 01:23:20,680
So maybe if you could just give us more information about what a search looks like.

932
01:23:20,840 --> 01:23:22,840
What are they asking you for specifically?

933
01:23:23,660 --> 01:23:26,760
I'm actually going to let Captain Wallace answer that question.

934
01:23:26,960 --> 01:23:27,320
Thank you.

935
01:23:31,200 --> 01:23:31,440
All right.

936
01:23:31,540 --> 01:23:33,300
I'll try and answer your question as best as I can.

937
01:23:33,720 --> 01:23:40,940
So the search criteria, you can look for, and to put it in perspective from the camera's

938
01:23:40,940 --> 01:23:41,220
view.

939
01:23:41,220 --> 01:23:49,460
We literally capture a, in order to capture a vehicle license plate, the picture is fairly zoomed in to enable it to be legible.

940
01:23:50,520 --> 01:23:56,440
So like your Houdini Plaza example isn't really plausible because it's not this wide angle view of people and all these things.

941
01:23:57,160 --> 01:23:59,980
So it captures an image of the license plate.

942
01:23:59,980 --> 01:24:02,840
We can also search by certain vehicle characteristics,

943
01:24:03,280 --> 01:24:08,740
and I would put that like, if a vehicle had a large sticker

944
01:24:08,740 --> 01:24:13,300
on the right rear fender area, like we could search

945
01:24:13,300 --> 01:24:16,820
that criteria for vehicles fitting that criteria.

946
01:24:17,260 --> 01:24:19,560
But the image isn't similar to what you'd see

947
01:24:19,560 --> 01:24:21,220
from a traffic camera perspective,

948
01:24:21,740 --> 01:24:23,940
where it's this broad zoomed-out image.

949
01:24:23,940 --> 01:24:26,580
It's literally like the back of a car in a piece of roadway.

950
01:24:26,620 --> 01:24:27,280
That's all we see.

951
01:24:28,820 --> 01:24:34,940
We can also search by full license plate, partial license plate, and so when you search by

952
01:24:34,940 --> 01:24:39,540
partial license plate, obviously there's a lot of cars out there that have the same characteristics

953
01:24:39,540 --> 01:24:42,860
within their same license plate. So you get a bunch of matches and that's where the witness

954
01:24:42,860 --> 01:24:47,620
information, as I brought up in the hit and run example, that's where the witness information becomes

955
01:24:47,620 --> 01:24:52,780
valuable to us of, well now I have a picture of a Nissan and I'm looking for a Chevy. That one clearly

956
01:24:52,780 --> 01:24:56,300
isn't my vehicle. Does that explain it a little bit?

957
01:24:56,660 --> 01:24:59,980
So you have to have like a plate number and you'd have

958
01:25:07,340 --> 01:25:29,980
So when we conduct a search, you can set parameters based on, do I want to search all the cameras I have access to, which for us, we have a large number throughout the nation that we have access to. You can narrow that to our local network of cameras. You can further narrow that I believe to just an individual camera. If I knew that the suspect vehicle went through

959
01:25:29,980 --> 01:25:35,040
college enrichment as an example, I could think I could specifically narrow down that I just want

960
01:25:35,040 --> 01:25:41,040
to see college enrichment between this time and this time and search for this vehicle plate.

961
01:25:41,660 --> 01:25:45,600
So you have to have a you have to have a plate to get started. You're not like looking at

962
01:25:45,600 --> 01:25:50,260
the intersection at a certain time and then it's returning to you a number of plates.

963
01:25:50,700 --> 01:25:56,640
You have to have some type of characteristic that you're searching for. Like I could probably search

964
01:25:56,640 --> 01:25:58,660
by vehicle type, I believe.

965
01:26:00,080 --> 01:26:05,940
So you could say I want all of the Jeep Cherokees or something like that, but it wouldn't return

966
01:26:05,940 --> 01:26:12,480
to you every vehicle plate that was in the vicinity of that camera.

967
01:26:13,160 --> 01:26:13,500
Correct.

968
01:26:13,960 --> 01:26:14,140
Okay.

969
01:26:14,260 --> 01:26:18,620
That's more helpful, I think, as we go further in this discussion, thank you.

970
01:26:18,620 --> 01:26:28,240
So I'm going to let the public continue so whoever else would like to step up, yeah, we'll

971
01:26:28,240 --> 01:26:31,220
come back. Let's let everybody speak, please.

972
01:26:33,440 --> 01:26:35,260
So state your name and address for the

973
01:26:35,260 --> 01:26:35,800
record, please.

974
01:26:35,920 --> 01:26:40,960
Good evening, Carla Hayles, City of Appleton resident. I have a follow up question in regards to

975
01:26:40,960 --> 01:26:49,420
Kathy Flores' question. And what we would like to know is if there is anything in place or

976
01:26:49,420 --> 01:26:55,800
how is there not something in place that we don't have the ability to cross-check a real

977
01:26:55,800 --> 01:27:02,900
case number versus a fake case number in real time as it would be entered into a flock.

978
01:27:04,400 --> 01:27:10,820
And personally, I'm very concerned when it comes to regional and interagency collaboration

979
01:27:11,220 --> 01:27:17,160
and that APD would not be able to hold other law enforcement agencies to the same standards

980
01:27:17,160 --> 01:27:33,360
As our own police department, there are many departments that are very problematic around civil rights, and it's very concerning to me that there is no way for you to supervise that those civil rights aren't being violated in another department.

981
01:27:34,080 --> 01:27:34,560
Thank you.

982
01:27:36,000 --> 01:27:36,740
Thank you.

983
01:27:36,900 --> 01:27:39,780
Did you want to add anything there?

984
01:27:39,960 --> 01:27:44,780
I mean, I know that we just talked about you being open to looking at other ways to

985
01:27:44,780 --> 01:27:45,040
check.

986
01:27:46,820 --> 01:27:50,900
I guess a regional and injury agency collaboration.

987
01:27:51,220 --> 01:27:52,500
Did you have anything to add?

988
01:27:54,000 --> 01:27:54,840
Director Wanigan.

989
01:27:56,020 --> 01:28:03,160
I think the only thing I want to add just to reiterate, again, what Captain Wallace just

990
01:28:03,160 --> 01:28:09,440
explained that somebody is limited to license plate information.

991
01:28:11,460 --> 01:28:18,920
So when you talk about civil liberties and violating civil liberties and things along

992
01:28:18,920 --> 01:28:24,160
those lines, I just want to keep things in perspective for the group that's in here.

993
01:28:26,240 --> 01:28:30,500
We're not sharing personal information through this system.

994
01:28:30,500 --> 01:28:35,640
So somebody can't put in my name and look for license plates or cars belonging specifically

995
01:28:35,640 --> 01:28:36,500
to me.

996
01:28:36,980 --> 01:28:38,800
That's not how this system works.

997
01:28:40,660 --> 01:28:43,480
So I don't have the same concerns.

998
01:28:43,820 --> 01:28:44,900
I think that others do.

999
01:28:45,000 --> 01:28:50,220
I respect that they have those concerns, but I don't know that there's anything that we

1000
01:28:50,220 --> 01:28:57,440
can do here at the applicant police department to tighten up again how other agencies use the

1001
01:28:57,440 --> 01:29:06,600
license plate data that they might get if they do a search of a car with license plate ATZ and it

1002
01:29:06,600 --> 01:29:11,260
happens to come back that it went through one of our license plate readers 15 days ago.

1003
01:29:12,620 --> 01:29:23,480
Okay, I think what may possibly be helpful because as an older person who is hearing from their

1004
01:29:23,480 --> 01:29:29,140
constituents. I hear your example and that's very helpful. I think it would be helpful for

1005
01:29:29,140 --> 01:29:37,780
us to be able to see what this process looks like and that will better help us decide what

1006
01:29:38,600 --> 01:29:44,360
that information could be useful for and how it could be misused because I think there's a real

1007
01:29:44,360 --> 01:29:52,680
misunderstanding amongst the non-users here of what kind of data can be used and the more you talk,

1008
01:29:52,680 --> 01:29:59,880
the more it sounds to me, like, those are not concerns I need to have, but I'm still quite unsure so

1009
01:30:00,000 --> 01:30:29,760
I think that that might be something that would be helpful. Thank you. And just so everyone is aware, the chief has been very open in my questions to really having this be the opening of a conversation. So I don't think anything that happens here is final tonight that I think hearing from you is really important. So who else would like to speak go ahead and approach the podium please. And then name and address for

1010
01:30:29,760 --> 01:30:36,180
the record, please. Karen Iverson-Riggers, 1919 North Appleton Street. So in the presentation,

1011
01:30:36,180 --> 01:30:42,000
it was cited that there are strong privacy safeguards, but the more I'm listening, the more

1012
01:30:42,000 --> 01:30:47,780
I'm concerned, I was already concerned about privacy safeguards of data concerned about

1013
01:30:47,780 --> 01:30:55,040
balancing, right, due process, constitutional rights with data and data being shared that

1014
01:30:55,040 --> 01:31:00,180
you don't have control over. And so I'm just really concerned about the data sharing.

1015
01:31:00,420 --> 01:31:06,560
I'm concerned about, you know, how that's shared with flock and flock stated. They will share

1016
01:31:06,560 --> 01:31:16,880
their data if there is a legal request. And so we're seeing concern around those rights right now.

1017
01:31:17,140 --> 01:31:23,900
So I don't have a lot of confidence around saying privacy and safety. So I feel this tension

1018
01:31:23,900 --> 01:31:26,740
in between balancing privacy and safety,

1019
01:31:26,940 --> 01:31:30,520
but really concerned about the data sharing

1020
01:31:30,520 --> 01:31:31,980
and privacy protection.

1021
01:31:32,600 --> 01:31:33,140
Thank you.

1022
01:31:33,380 --> 01:31:35,080
We can look into that further.

1023
01:31:35,280 --> 01:31:36,100
Can I make a comment?

1024
01:31:36,400 --> 01:31:36,760
Oh, sure.

1025
01:31:36,900 --> 01:31:37,620
Go ahead, thank you.

1026
01:31:39,640 --> 01:31:42,020
Anybody in this room that owns a cell phone

1027
01:31:42,700 --> 01:31:44,760
also is subjected to the same

1028
01:31:44,760 --> 01:31:47,980
probably much more involved tracking

1029
01:31:48,300 --> 01:31:50,600
if you wanna call it that, or sharing of data,

1030
01:31:51,140 --> 01:31:53,200
then the flag system.

1031
01:31:53,200 --> 01:31:58,980
The reason I say that is your cell phones track wherever you go, the calls you make.

1032
01:32:00,340 --> 01:32:07,340
Verizon, if you have Verizon, and they receive a subpoena for records that's signed by a judge,

1033
01:32:07,660 --> 01:32:11,200
they're compelled to turn over those records, including your location data.

1034
01:32:11,900 --> 01:32:16,200
And that's what I understood, right, is that the things that were flocked

1035
01:32:16,960 --> 01:32:20,100
is being asked to comply is with a judicial subpoena.

1036
01:32:20,100 --> 01:32:26,100
correct. Okay. It's it's a court order that they have to comply with. Issued by a judge.

1037
01:32:28,280 --> 01:32:33,640
Who else would like to speak? Go ahead and thank you. Sorry, thank you Chief. Go ahead.

1038
01:32:33,800 --> 01:32:39,500
State your name and address for the record please. Hi everyone. My name is Frankie Gilboa. I'm a

1039
01:32:39,500 --> 01:32:47,140
brother of Appleton. I was born in Appleton. Live in Appleton. I work in Appleton. I have a few

1040
01:32:47,140 --> 01:32:53,760
questions. Thank you for sharing the presentation prior, and I was very helpful. I was able to review it.

1041
01:32:54,720 --> 01:33:00,640
So the APD presentation on the role of flock camera states that the cameras do not track people.

1042
01:33:01,180 --> 01:33:06,840
How do you define tracking given that officers can search a vehicle's movement across time and location

1043
01:33:07,460 --> 01:33:12,440
using plate, color, or vehicle characteristics? And how is it possible that there is no personal

1044
01:33:12,440 --> 01:33:19,040
identity shared and personal identity information shared in the flock system. When a license plate is

1045
01:33:19,040 --> 01:33:26,600
connected to a car title, which is connected to a person's name, is that the last question that you have?

1046
01:33:26,820 --> 01:33:32,920
Yeah, sorry. I have one more question. Okay, go ahead. No, I'm sorry. I was, it's not a back and forth.

1047
01:33:33,460 --> 01:33:39,640
Yeah, sorry. I answered the question. Nope, that's okay. My next question, I've heard a lot of

1048
01:33:39,640 --> 01:33:48,340
of mentions about the MNASHA incident, but I kind of wanted to quickly speak to the details

1049
01:33:48,340 --> 01:33:55,680
of it because I think that it's an open investigation and it's not appropriate for an open meeting.

1050
01:33:56,500 --> 01:33:56,720
Okay.

1051
01:33:57,180 --> 01:34:01,240
I was only going to read a WBA article that I saw online.

1052
01:34:01,840 --> 01:34:06,560
Could you maybe just distill it down to what your specific concern is?

1053
01:34:06,700 --> 01:34:06,840
Yes.

1054
01:34:06,840 --> 01:34:08,060
Yes, I'd be happy to do that.

1055
01:34:10,440 --> 01:34:17,620
So this month, a menacea police officer was arrested for allegedly using the flock

1056
01:34:17,620 --> 01:34:19,880
system to track his ex-girlfriend.

1057
01:34:20,340 --> 01:34:21,500
He lived in Appleton.

1058
01:34:22,840 --> 01:34:27,340
His ex-girlfriend made a criminal complaint to the Appleton police that he had used the

1059
01:34:27,340 --> 01:34:29,760
flock system to monitor her location.

1060
01:34:30,260 --> 01:34:33,780
A review of the police officer's activities showed that he tried to use it five different

1061
01:34:33,780 --> 01:34:35,500
times to search for her vehicle.

1062
01:34:35,500 --> 01:34:41,660
and he indicated that desperation bad judgment combined with a lack of sleep contributed to his decision to use Flock.

1063
01:34:43,480 --> 01:34:49,040
Based on this article, we know that the victim of this incident reported it directly to the Appleton Police.

1064
01:34:49,640 --> 01:34:56,740
The PowerPoint claims that this incident was a form of accountability and I want to ask all of you how that can really be so.

1065
01:34:56,740 --> 01:34:59,980
When the victim was the one who brought that information to the victim,

1066
01:35:00,000 --> 01:35:06,140
To your attention, and the police department did not flag it internally. It was not flagged

1067
01:35:06,140 --> 01:35:14,180
by your internal auditing features they spoke of earlier. How can you ensure that Appleton

1068
01:35:14,180 --> 01:35:22,880
police officers and other agencies do not misuse flag for personal reasons to stock civilians

1069
01:35:22,880 --> 01:35:27,420
and their partners, and that this incident is not an isolated issue.

1070
01:35:28,780 --> 01:35:29,760
Thank you.

1071
01:35:30,900 --> 01:35:37,040
Chief, I know that this is an open investigation, so is there anything that you can add to the

1072
01:35:37,040 --> 01:35:40,580
concerns that the citizen provided?

1073
01:35:42,750 --> 01:35:49,870
Yes, so I can just add or reiterate that when this search was conducted by the City of

1074
01:35:49,870 --> 01:35:56,290
National Police Officer, while he lives in Appleton, which is why it was Appleton's jurisdiction,

1075
01:35:57,690 --> 01:36:04,130
that the requirement to put an incident number was not mandated by his department at that time,

1076
01:36:04,510 --> 01:36:12,090
and that you could use some of those loose search parameters in the system.

1077
01:36:13,050 --> 01:36:20,510
So the updated incident and then perhaps whatever as we work together we decide could possibly

1078
01:36:20,510 --> 01:36:29,990
be you're open to looking for other ways that we can be preventative with the system.

1079
01:36:30,530 --> 01:36:33,910
It's just that that wasn't in that wasn't in place at the time.

1080
01:36:35,150 --> 01:36:36,070
That's my understanding.

1081
01:36:36,070 --> 01:36:45,610
Okay. And then the other question was about if someone's looking for a license plate,

1082
01:36:46,010 --> 01:36:54,590
you know, the DMV says, my license plate belongs to me. How do we address concerns about

1083
01:36:55,890 --> 01:37:02,570
that kind of data being tied to a person when we're saying we're really only looking at license plates?

1084
01:37:02,570 --> 01:37:16,970
So the license plates that we're looking at are obviously tied to like to your point registered owners of vehicles doesn't point us to whose operating vehicle at the time that the vehicle Michael through or pass that camera.

1085
01:37:17,550 --> 01:37:29,350
So it still requires us to do an investigation to determine who would be operating a vehicle at the time that it went through whatever camera system that we're referring to in this case.

1086
01:37:32,650 --> 01:37:41,230
Okay. And so those were the two questions that I had is anybody else want to speak or ask any questions if you could just approach the podium.

1087
01:37:41,330 --> 01:37:50,970
We are running while over time this evening. And again, this is just an opening discussion. But if you could go ahead and state your name and address for the record, please.

1088
01:37:50,970 --> 01:37:54,450
Karin Stoltenberg. I live in Appleton.

1089
01:37:58,450 --> 01:38:02,350
I'm also trying to process all of the

1090
01:38:02,350 --> 01:38:08,830
information that's been given today, but I guess I just want to know how

1091
01:38:10,130 --> 01:38:20,050
information could be used to benefit ice, just plainly simply through

1092
01:38:20,050 --> 01:38:21,890
Is that through subpoena?

1093
01:38:24,510 --> 01:38:34,470
And do we have any safeguards in place for that? Like when I hear the word drop down, do we know what those categories are?

1094
01:38:37,090 --> 01:38:47,010
And also who, if anyone independently audits these searches, or is that something that can be done independently?

1095
01:38:47,970 --> 01:38:59,430
and will statistics about that misuse be reported publicly, who would that be reported to?

1096
01:39:00,210 --> 01:39:01,190
Thank you.

1097
01:39:02,630 --> 01:39:07,570
Chief, sure I can try to remember to answer all the questions here.

1098
01:39:07,930 --> 01:39:16,330
So as far as the misuse is concerned, if there's misuse of the system, that would be a significant

1099
01:39:16,330 --> 01:39:21,730
can policy violation that's handled like all policy violations with an internal investigation.

1100
01:39:22,270 --> 01:39:28,970
Those internal investigations are subject to open records and people, a person could make

1101
01:39:28,970 --> 01:39:35,590
a request. At times, the media does make occasional requests and we turn over all of our records

1102
01:39:35,590 --> 01:39:39,030
as it relates to any internal investigations that we conduct.

1103
01:39:40,150 --> 01:39:49,130
Again, if somebody violates this particular policy, the consequences would be significant.

1104
01:39:51,540 --> 01:39:57,270
I can't say for certain what would happen, but likely that person would be facing termination

1105
01:39:57,270 --> 01:39:59,830
or something, you know, very significant, like such a-

1106
01:40:01,000 --> 01:40:29,460
As far as, how could ICE use our data? I myself have spent a lot of time certainly trying to think through different scenarios on how our data could be used. And essentially what it comes down to, that if, say ICE, because I know that's why specifically people are asking, they would have to have information about a vehicle.

1107
01:40:29,460 --> 01:40:35,500
license play obviously that somebody is either has that vehicle registered to them or perhaps

1108
01:40:35,500 --> 01:40:41,720
if they believe somebody was in a particular vehicle and then they would have to do a search

1109
01:40:41,720 --> 01:40:50,300
of cameras based on that. However, they don't have access to our system, so I don't know if even

1110
01:40:50,300 --> 01:40:56,380
Kristen can comment on that but they would have to somehow, I'm not exactly sure how they would

1111
01:40:56,380 --> 01:40:57,400
get our data.

1112
01:40:58,240 --> 01:41:00,340
Happy to jump in their chief.

1113
01:41:00,640 --> 01:41:03,540
So ICE does not have access to the flock system.

1114
01:41:03,800 --> 01:41:06,800
We do not have a contract with the Department of Homeland

1115
01:41:06,800 --> 01:41:10,220
Security or any of their sub agencies.

1116
01:41:11,040 --> 01:41:14,680
I would also like to flag, I think the question was

1117
01:41:14,680 --> 01:41:17,840
with the drop down menu, those offense types.

1118
01:41:18,040 --> 01:41:21,240
It does include one of those selections

1119
01:41:21,240 --> 01:41:23,100
is immigration enforcement.

1120
01:41:23,380 --> 01:41:26,120
Civil and one of them is immigration enforcement.

1121
01:41:26,120 --> 01:41:33,360
criminal related. And Appleton has, we have a search flock has a search filter feature

1122
01:41:33,900 --> 01:41:41,220
and any city, any community that is a flock customer can enable this filter and what the

1123
01:41:41,220 --> 01:41:50,180
filter does is prevent any search whether internal by an internal department user or an external

1124
01:41:50,180 --> 01:41:53,200
user whom Appleton has agreed to share

1125
01:41:53,200 --> 01:41:55,880
camera network data with, it prevents

1126
01:41:55,880 --> 01:41:58,380
any search related to immigration

1127
01:41:58,380 --> 01:41:59,260
enforcement.

1128
01:42:01,570 --> 01:42:02,390
Thank you.

1129
01:42:04,170 --> 01:42:05,690
So, is this any of the questions?

1130
01:42:06,110 --> 01:42:07,790
Is that something that we have?

1131
01:42:08,350 --> 01:42:11,250
Do we have filters enabled for such

1132
01:42:11,250 --> 01:42:11,570
things?

1133
01:42:11,870 --> 01:42:14,890
Is that something that we have set up in our system?

1134
01:42:16,330 --> 01:42:17,130
That's correct.

1135
01:42:17,310 --> 01:42:20,650
I think it shows that on our transparency

1136
01:42:20,650 --> 01:42:25,690
and support all that those searches would not, would be filtered out.

1137
01:42:27,150 --> 01:42:27,670
Excellent.

1138
01:42:28,490 --> 01:42:35,710
Is there anybody else in the public who wants to ask any questions or make any statements this evening?

1139
01:42:37,290 --> 01:42:42,390
Okay, with that I'll close public participation and I saw that Alder Wolf has a question.

1140
01:42:47,400 --> 01:42:48,320
Did I turn you off?

1141
01:42:48,580 --> 01:42:49,040
It was on.

1142
01:42:49,240 --> 01:42:49,800
Sorry about that.

1143
01:42:49,980 --> 01:42:50,280
Thank you.

1144
01:42:50,540 --> 01:42:51,080
Thank you chair.

1145
01:42:51,660 --> 01:42:52,760
I just have a couple questions.

1146
01:42:52,760 --> 01:43:00,100
And just one kind of simple point, but maybe Kristen or Chief Olsen can answer as well.

1147
01:43:00,820 --> 01:43:10,940
An example I was thinking of how immigration and border or ICE could potentially manipulate

1148
01:43:10,940 --> 01:43:18,480
the system. For an example, the Brown County Sheriff came out as a big proponent of ICE so they could

1149
01:43:18,480 --> 01:43:22,440
And simply go to the Brown County Sheriff's Department, ask them to do a search.

1150
01:43:23,080 --> 01:43:27,920
Brown County Sheriff's Department would come back to ICE with those results.

1151
01:43:29,180 --> 01:43:36,780
But also as far as the drop down menu, that data could still be manipulated if, say, an

1152
01:43:36,780 --> 01:43:44,320
officer just lied about the official reason for the case, rather than saying its immigration

1153
01:43:45,020 --> 01:43:45,420
control.

1154
01:43:45,420 --> 01:43:51,260
they could just say that it's a drug smuggler or something else like that.

1155
01:43:52,000 --> 01:44:00,380
Is there a prevention capability inside of lock system that prevents officers from falsifying reports?

1156
01:44:02,690 --> 01:44:02,970
Chief,

1157
01:44:05,980 --> 01:44:16,020
there isn't a system of product, there's not anything there other than an officer's integrity that prevents them from lying.

1158
01:44:16,020 --> 01:44:20,840
or somehow misusing information or misusing their authority.

1159
01:44:21,620 --> 01:44:24,260
And understanding that, again, if those things happen,

1160
01:44:24,640 --> 01:44:29,900
that they will, there'll be swift and significant repercussions,

1161
01:44:30,420 --> 01:44:34,390
including likely not ever getting hired by another police agency

1162
01:44:34,560 --> 01:44:40,400
as an officer, again, if they're caught lying on the job.

1163
01:44:41,360 --> 01:44:42,320
What's that?

1164
01:44:42,960 --> 01:44:44,220
I'll just to follow up.

1165
01:44:45,160 --> 01:44:50,000
First, I know that I trust the applicant

1166
01:44:50,000 --> 01:44:52,300
pleased to partner with the Fox system.

1167
01:44:52,500 --> 01:44:54,460
I know that we have standards and integrity.

1168
01:44:55,120 --> 01:44:56,400
And I trust our officers training.

1169
01:44:57,160 --> 01:44:59,980
And I do appreciate you and the work that our department does.

1170
01:45:00,860 --> 01:45:29,980
I just wanted to make that clear. I know that it could be difficult sitting there, defending your own record when it's a good record as far as integrity goes. There are a lot of people concerned about ICE because it is clear, based on videos, and things that they've seen that their standards are much lower than what we've seen before. And that gives them a lot of concern.

1171
01:45:29,980 --> 01:45:59,800
When I asked about Flock on Facebook and with people, they're very scared about it and I think that if we want to continue to use it in the city, we need to do a very thorough education process with our community and with the people who are in fact paying for the system to ensure them that it's safe in our hands and that they don't have to be afraid of that.

1172
01:45:59,800 --> 01:46:00,520
system in place.

1173
01:46:04,160 --> 01:46:12,100
But I guess I don't have a question there or just a point because I can see

1174
01:46:12,100 --> 01:46:17,280
how it could be frustrating from your perspective. Well, if I can just make a quick comment on that,

1175
01:46:17,380 --> 01:46:23,500
I appreciate your comments and I very much know that this community is very supportive of our police

1176
01:46:23,500 --> 01:46:30,460
department. So I view this as being just good solid discussion about a tool that we have available to

1177
01:46:30,460 --> 01:46:38,980
us. On the same note, I think we're straining a little bit too far from the purpose of why

1178
01:46:39,420 --> 01:46:45,780
the council trusted us with this product three years ago when they did, and that is because

1179
01:46:46,300 --> 01:46:56,240
it's a force multiplier in leading us to leads that allow us to self-crime and hold people

1180
01:46:56,240 --> 01:47:01,200
accountable for what happens in this community. I haven't yet had a chance to report out

1181
01:47:01,200 --> 01:47:08,860
on our stats from last year, but I can tell you that our part one crimes are violent crimes

1182
01:47:08,860 --> 01:47:14,780
in the city are significantly reduced and have significantly declined over the last three

1183
01:47:14,780 --> 01:47:20,800
years since we've had these cameras, you know, be put in place. And I think we're very short-sighted

1184
01:47:20,800 --> 01:47:29,260
if we lose sight of that or get distracted by what ifing, a million things that likely will

1185
01:47:29,260 --> 01:47:38,340
never happen. And that if one of us has a family member that becomes a victim of a horrible crime,

1186
01:47:38,500 --> 01:47:45,320
I just hope that we have this kind of technology available to be able to give you the closure that

1187
01:47:45,320 --> 01:47:49,720
that you deserve if something like that were to happen.

1188
01:47:50,480 --> 01:47:51,380
And that's my fear.

1189
01:47:51,620 --> 01:47:54,820
My fear is that again, because we're so worried

1190
01:47:54,820 --> 01:47:57,940
about what could happen that we're losing sight

1191
01:47:57,940 --> 01:48:02,460
of how it's currently being used in a lawful, helpful,

1192
01:48:02,940 --> 01:48:04,080
very beneficial way.

1193
01:48:06,350 --> 01:48:06,810
Thank you.

1194
01:48:07,470 --> 01:48:10,710
Yeah, I think that we all recognize the value

1195
01:48:10,710 --> 01:48:15,810
as the tool, but we're all operating in a situation right now

1196
01:48:15,810 --> 01:48:20,490
where there's very low trust for public institutions.

1197
01:48:21,410 --> 01:48:25,630
And that's where we find ourselves as all their persons saying,

1198
01:48:25,930 --> 01:48:32,690
how can we continue to use the tool in a way that helps keep us safe.

1199
01:48:33,230 --> 01:48:37,130
But how can we also make sure that we're showing the community

1200
01:48:37,130 --> 01:48:40,990
that we're worthy of that trust? So, other hard time?

1201
01:48:42,130 --> 01:48:43,650
Thank you, Chair. A question was asked.

1202
01:48:43,650 --> 01:48:44,890
I mean, I directed Chief Olson.

1203
01:48:45,570 --> 01:48:50,090
A question was asked earlier about someone falsifying a case number in order to use this.

1204
01:48:50,910 --> 01:48:55,250
I assume that there's an internal audit section that is disallowing that.

1205
01:48:55,370 --> 01:48:55,790
Is that correct?

1206
01:48:56,430 --> 01:48:57,110
That's correct.

1207
01:48:57,390 --> 01:49:02,090
I mean, again, we would have to go through and check every single incident number.

1208
01:49:02,890 --> 01:49:08,890
And depending on how many searches we have, that might be what we have to do if that means

1209
01:49:08,890 --> 01:49:13,190
that it allows us to continue to have the trust of the public.

1210
01:49:13,770 --> 01:49:17,070
I would also put it in line with our evidence unit,

1211
01:49:17,250 --> 01:49:20,990
and we do announced and unannounced audience

1212
01:49:20,990 --> 01:49:22,930
and our evidence unit regularly,

1213
01:49:23,530 --> 01:49:26,130
where a supervisor goes down and just randomly pulls

1214
01:49:26,130 --> 01:49:27,970
pieces of evidence from the shelves,

1215
01:49:28,410 --> 01:49:31,170
and ensures, again, that we don't have drugs missing,

1216
01:49:31,490 --> 01:49:32,910
that we don't have evidence missing.

1217
01:49:33,470 --> 01:49:36,850
This falls in the same, I guess, category as that,

1218
01:49:36,850 --> 01:49:41,570
that, and that we have these internal auditing processes in place because it's important

1219
01:49:41,570 --> 01:49:46,730
to us to make sure that we continue to have the trust of the community.

1220
01:49:47,410 --> 01:49:47,950
Thank you.

1221
01:49:48,010 --> 01:49:48,810
I'm trusting in that.

1222
01:49:48,890 --> 01:49:50,630
I just wanted to ask that question as a follow-up.

1223
01:49:50,810 --> 01:49:50,890
Thank you.

1224
01:49:50,890 --> 01:49:51,450
Other Fenton?

1225
01:49:51,690 --> 01:49:52,150
Super quick.

1226
01:49:52,410 --> 01:49:54,810
And this one probably goes to Ms. McLeod as well.

1227
01:49:55,350 --> 01:49:57,950
And thank you for staying with us for so long.

1228
01:49:58,170 --> 01:49:59,690
I'm sure that's not what you expected.

1229
01:50:00,000 --> 01:50:29,980
But of course, so in terms of we share data, and I will use Alder Wolf's Brown County example, so they perhaps have their drop down set more loosely for what's a valid search than the city of Appleton would, because our transparency portal clearly lays out what is not allowed as a search. If an entity with whom we share data is searching the city of Appleton

1230
01:50:29,980 --> 01:50:39,160
will they be limited to the parameters we select as opposed to theirs which might be looser?

1231
01:50:41,930 --> 01:50:48,930
So with regard to immigration enforcement specifically, you have the search filter enabled.

1232
01:50:50,170 --> 01:50:58,310
Brown County, if they do not, if they have removed that search,

1233
01:50:59,250 --> 01:51:09,150
that offense type from their drop down menu, then they are testing to that the search is going to be conducted for the offense type that is selected.

1234
01:51:12,800 --> 01:51:20,400
And you will have record of that external agency's search.

1235
01:51:21,580 --> 01:51:29,520
If I can just clarify, what I heard Alder-Fundin asking was we have certain parameters set up,

1236
01:51:29,520 --> 01:51:32,700
you have to put in an incident number for example.

1237
01:51:33,560 --> 01:51:40,500
So if an outside entity that shares that we share data with is looking up information,

1238
01:51:41,020 --> 01:51:43,540
do they have to provide an incident number?

1239
01:51:43,540 --> 01:51:50,240
They are beholden to the way that Appleton has set up their system.

1240
01:51:50,460 --> 01:51:51,140
Is that correct?

1241
01:51:51,420 --> 01:51:55,840
Or are they able to access it under the way their system is set up?

1242
01:51:55,900 --> 01:51:57,900
Is that what you were asking, Father Fenton?

1243
01:51:58,120 --> 01:52:04,000
In a way, but I was specifically saying, and either we have prohibited uses on our portal,

1244
01:52:04,380 --> 01:52:07,560
immigration enforcement, traffic, harassment, intimidation, etc.

1245
01:52:07,560 --> 01:52:21,860
and using immigration as an example, that is not allowed as a drop down for an Appleton personnel who still has to have an incident number, a case number.

1246
01:52:22,600 --> 01:52:31,160
But if another entity still has a case number but they could select that from the drop down,

1247
01:52:31,160 --> 01:52:38,340
would Appleton's data filter under the wider filter allowed by that agency?

1248
01:52:39,800 --> 01:52:43,240
Let me see if I can address this clearly.

1249
01:52:43,980 --> 01:52:52,200
So in the FOX system, when an agency, so let's call them agency B,

1250
01:52:53,460 --> 01:52:59,280
that you have granted sharing permissions to and they are conducting a search.

1251
01:52:59,280 --> 01:53:08,680
When they are conducting a search on their end, at minimum, they will have to select from the offense type drop down.

1252
01:53:12,250 --> 01:53:19,730
Up to that agency, agency B, whether or not they want to require a case number,

1253
01:53:22,320 --> 01:53:25,600
but at minimum, they will have to select the offense type.

1254
01:53:25,600 --> 01:53:46,860
So, let's say for example, agency B does not require an incident number, when they are searching for the suspect vehicle, the wanted vehicle, they would have to, they would select the offense type and then they could select I want to include Appleton's camera network because they've granted us permission.

1255
01:53:47,200 --> 01:53:51,160
I want to include that search of their camera network.

1256
01:53:51,160 --> 01:54:06,060
Now, if the offense type selected is immigration enforcement, for example, that search would not hit the Appleton cameras because the search filter for that is enabled.

1257
01:54:07,700 --> 01:54:10,780
I believe that answered my question.

1258
01:54:11,140 --> 01:54:20,640
So the bottom line is, Appleton controls the access to our data by other agencies based

1259
01:54:20,640 --> 01:54:22,920
on the parameters that we select.

1260
01:54:23,960 --> 01:54:25,260
Is that a true statement?

1261
01:54:28,120 --> 01:54:31,500
With regard to immigration enforcement.

1262
01:54:34,430 --> 01:54:35,910
Any other questions?

1263
01:54:36,670 --> 01:54:37,610
All their mouths are.

1264
01:54:37,810 --> 01:54:38,310
Number two?

1265
01:54:38,790 --> 01:54:39,790
Yes, thank you.

1266
01:54:42,330 --> 01:54:49,890
So, I'm not sure if these are necessarily questions, more comments, but we're talking

1267
01:54:49,890 --> 01:54:58,070
about flock as a tool, a tool that certainly, as this force multiplier, has great advantages

1268
01:54:58,070 --> 01:54:59,230
for our police force.

1269
01:55:00,000 --> 01:55:29,860
But I think just to kind of contextualize where some of our concerns are coming from, we've had lots of very valuable tools in the past that we learned were actually very harmful. So asbestos, for example, was a force multiplier in keeping auditoriums from bursting into flames. We have since then learned that asbestos is not worth the harms that it does on the side. So I think one of my big concerns

1270
01:55:29,860 --> 01:55:38,160
returns with the flock camera technology with the system is that it holds those kinds of risks.

1271
01:55:38,900 --> 01:55:46,400
So if we have good policies, but we share our data with other entities who don't have good policies,

1272
01:55:46,920 --> 01:55:54,080
that concerns me with the exposure of our residents to a level of risk of abuse.

1273
01:55:54,080 --> 01:56:01,280
I think even things as going as far as to factor authentication can still be abused.

1274
01:56:01,500 --> 01:56:06,640
You can have someone, you know, log you in to the system and then you as the bad actor

1275
01:56:06,640 --> 01:56:11,240
under their credentials to what they have given you access to too.

1276
01:56:11,760 --> 01:56:23,440
I think that one question I have is if we were notified that our data was downloaded by another

1277
01:56:23,440 --> 01:56:29,280
agency who could then potentially retain that data and do what they want with it, what would

1278
01:56:29,280 --> 01:56:37,340
we do in response? Do we have any ability to say no, we own that data. You downloaded a copy

1279
01:56:37,340 --> 01:56:44,980
of it, but we demand it back, we demand that you delete it, or something like that. The degree

1280
01:56:44,980 --> 01:56:52,640
to which we don't have control over what everyone else is doing with this data is my primary concern.

1281
01:56:52,640 --> 01:57:13,760
So if we make sure that our ship is tight and that we're not abusing this data at all, what do we do, what recourse do we have, how do we respond to the harm being done if we become aware that other entities that we're sharing data with are not operating with the same integrity that we have?

1282
01:57:13,760 --> 01:57:14,700
Did

1283
01:57:17,000 --> 01:57:18,820
you want to add anything, Chief?

1284
01:57:19,900 --> 01:57:21,920
I don't have anything to add at this point.

1285
01:57:22,280 --> 01:57:22,560
Thank you.

1286
01:57:24,360 --> 01:57:25,400
Other forkists?

1287
01:57:25,600 --> 01:57:26,040
Thank you, Chair.

1288
01:57:27,200 --> 01:57:28,640
Thank you for the presentation.

1289
01:57:29,820 --> 01:57:36,960
I definitely do agree the benefits of this system definitely well away some of these other

1290
01:57:36,960 --> 01:57:39,340
concerns and potential issues.

1291
01:57:40,240 --> 01:57:45,840
I think any tool that makes the job easier and more efficient, no matter what that tool is,

1292
01:57:45,840 --> 01:57:50,540
This is always going to have the ability to be misused and that's where the accountability

1293
01:57:50,540 --> 01:57:51,880
mechanisms come in.

1294
01:57:54,320 --> 01:58:00,280
I think ultimately we want to be able to have the tools in place that allow our department

1295
01:58:00,280 --> 01:58:03,480
our city to enforce its laws the most effective and most efficiently.

1296
01:58:04,480 --> 01:58:08,900
I think if you aren't doing what you can to be effective and efficient you are opening the

1297
01:58:08,900 --> 01:58:12,680
door for people who maybe aren't going to be as responsible and responsive to accountability.

1298
01:58:14,900 --> 01:58:20,500
But taking in some of these concerns of how systems could be misused or abused, I am

1299
01:58:20,500 --> 01:58:27,700
wondering whether or not these are a functionality within block or be things that can be somewhat

1300
01:58:27,700 --> 01:58:31,460
accomplished through department internal audits.

1301
01:58:32,600 --> 01:58:38,920
One option maybe would be a red flag type of situation where say you know you have a member,

1302
01:58:39,400 --> 01:58:43,700
A department has a member of the force where they know they're going through some stuff

1303
01:58:43,700 --> 01:58:44,960
in their life at that moment.

1304
01:58:45,960 --> 01:58:51,360
And just as a safe part, they can say, hey, if this person looks for specific things like

1305
01:58:51,360 --> 01:58:58,000
say an ex-spouses license plate number, that would be a red flag that would say, hey, somebody's

1306
01:58:58,000 --> 01:58:59,220
doing something they've shown right now.

1307
01:59:00,160 --> 01:59:05,960
Another one would maybe be a blacklisting, so kind of using the example of another department

1308
01:59:05,960 --> 01:59:09,980
is accessing our data by their agreement with another department.

1309
01:59:10,880 --> 01:59:20,300
Let's say we start to notice a pattern of, hey, this other department isn't very good at safeguarding their searches,

1310
01:59:20,820 --> 01:59:22,540
and we feel like they're abusing them.

1311
01:59:23,100 --> 01:59:27,540
While we still want to continue to share our data with the primary department,

1312
01:59:27,800 --> 01:59:33,060
we want a blacklist, that secondary department, if we feel like they are not using standards that,

1313
01:59:33,660 --> 01:59:38,460
Again, these are maybe not going to be things that are going to happen all the time, but

1314
01:59:38,460 --> 01:59:42,520
maybe these are features that whether or not they exist today, or whether or not they

1315
01:59:42,520 --> 01:59:46,560
can be effectively duplicated through some sort of internal audits.

1316
01:59:47,020 --> 01:59:51,560
Maybe those are enhancements that could go a little bit further towards safeguarding to

1317
01:59:51,560 --> 01:59:59,000
make sure that, well, yes, there is risk either way, we can maybe tighten that up a little

1318
01:59:59,000 --> 01:59:59,360
a little bit more.

1319
02:00:00,000 --> 02:00:01,000
Those are just some thoughts.

1320
02:00:03,350 --> 02:00:31,230
And I think I'm going to have this be the last comment because it's 730. So go ahead, alder, shalt, number two, right? Thank you. I'll try and make it brief here. I first off, echo the sentiments of all their wolf concerning the appletan place department and integrity of the individuals that serve this community. I will hardly agree. It's not so much that my concern is about our appletan place misusing the system, but the data that's out there being collected by our system.

1321
02:00:31,230 --> 02:00:34,950
and that might be misused by other departments outside of Appleton.

1322
02:00:35,710 --> 02:00:40,670
I feel a little bit better coming out of this, number one, knowing that we're only sharing

1323
02:00:40,670 --> 02:00:44,710
with mostly police departments within this data Wisconsin, that's at least what's showed

1324
02:00:44,710 --> 02:00:45,250
on the portal.

1325
02:00:45,830 --> 02:00:52,130
It's a little interesting that the police departments around the entity sharing with us from outside

1326
02:00:52,130 --> 02:00:56,910
is a much larger collection of people in the middle, departments in the Midwest, Maya, one,

1327
02:00:56,990 --> 02:00:59,810
Illinois, and Minnesota, so that's, I find that kind of interesting.

1328
02:01:01,590 --> 02:01:08,550
I do think that, you know, I want to recognize the comments by the public here that, you know,

1329
02:01:08,830 --> 02:01:15,570
there has been abuse of the system, and in particular, from some segments society that there

1330
02:01:15,570 --> 02:01:20,630
is concern, particularly when it comes to spousal or sexual abuse, or things in that nature,

1331
02:01:21,330 --> 02:01:23,270
that could be accomplished with this system.

1332
02:01:23,270 --> 02:01:31,970
But I have heard now from Kristen and APD that we're tightening the accessibility accountability

1333
02:01:31,970 --> 02:01:39,650
by making sure that we have numbers associated with inquiries into the system that there

1334
02:01:39,650 --> 02:01:47,270
will be coming forth a system to flag sort of odd searches that say, okay, maybe you need

1335
02:01:47,270 --> 02:01:48,850
to look in, this doesn't seem right.

1336
02:01:48,850 --> 02:01:56,670
So, if that system, that process gets employed by our FOX system, I think that is helpful as well.

1337
02:01:57,910 --> 02:02:11,550
I still think there are some improvements in that maybe we could be made maybe on the data retention, maybe shrinking the window of how long we keep that data from 30 days to a smaller window of time.

1338
02:02:12,010 --> 02:02:25,230
I do sort of recognize that, you know, it doesn't track people, but if you put a query in of a license plate, maybe you're conducting investigation and there's a bystander who is a witness and says, well, I saw a person drive away.

1339
02:02:25,390 --> 02:02:27,330
This is the vehicle and I wrote down the license plate.

1340
02:02:27,930 --> 02:02:38,450
Part of the investigation as well. Let's take a look at this license plate. It's a valid investigative query that gets put in the system. Maybe it's not the right license place for person, but suddenly you have a collection.

1341
02:02:39,850 --> 02:02:45,150
that license plate being captured by a system of 20 cameras for, let's say, it's a period of 15 days.

1342
02:02:45,590 --> 02:02:53,530
That's tracking activity of a singular vehicle in the community for a large amount of time.

1343
02:02:53,830 --> 02:02:58,450
So, you know, I get that it's a single shot and a single license plate.

1344
02:02:58,630 --> 02:03:03,470
But the way the system works, you can collect a lot more data from a single plate in a 30-80 window

1345
02:03:03,470 --> 02:03:07,810
and tell what a person has been doing for the last 30 days down to the hour.

1346
02:03:09,470 --> 02:03:14,190
So those are the concerns that I just want to recognize some of the concerns that the constituents had.

1347
02:03:14,690 --> 02:03:15,550
Again, I feel comfortable.

1348
02:03:16,310 --> 02:03:26,250
I like that Chief Olson is open to looking at the policy and maybe addressing a couple things that might make us all feel a little bit better about the way it's being used.

1349
02:03:26,890 --> 02:03:31,030
And I do believe that it is a valuable tool for our police department.

1350
02:03:31,210 --> 02:03:40,990
And it's obvious by the cases that this thing has helped us resolve with a lot of manpower that it's the tool we need to use.

1351
02:03:41,210 --> 02:03:45,190
But just want to make sure we're using it in a way that everybody feels good about.

1352
02:03:45,450 --> 02:03:46,390
So thank you.

1353
02:03:47,130 --> 02:03:54,070
Thank you. And I'll just wrap this up by saying thank you to everyone who participated today and for your information.

1354
02:03:55,330 --> 02:04:01,430
Again, reminding everyone that when I spoke with Chief today, I actually highlighted what Chief said,

1355
02:04:01,610 --> 02:04:06,770
which was, I'm always open to improving how we provide service to the community and

1356
02:04:06,770 --> 02:04:13,630
while we view ours, meaning the policies and procedures, to see if we can modify to address any concerns you may have.

1357
02:04:13,910 --> 02:04:23,810
So this is just the jumping off point and I think we have a group of active older persons who are willing to work with the department to see what we can do.

1358
02:04:23,810 --> 02:04:25,710
to strengthen public trust.

1359
02:04:26,170 --> 02:04:29,430
So we'll move on then to the next information item,

1360
02:04:30,990 --> 02:04:35,910
260093, the Alcohol License Violations and Convictions.

1361
02:04:38,110 --> 02:04:40,230
Clerk Molleter, did you have anything to add

1362
02:04:40,230 --> 02:04:41,390
or should we just note these?

1363
02:04:45,500 --> 02:04:47,500
Nothing to add except that these will be the ones

1364
02:04:47,500 --> 02:04:49,360
that will be appearing at the next safety and licensing.

1365
02:04:49,720 --> 02:04:50,940
Great, thank you very much.

1366
02:04:51,100 --> 02:04:53,760
And then that brings us to our director's report.

1367
02:04:53,760 --> 02:04:59,560
We only have one with some information and that's for our police.

1368
02:05:00,000 --> 02:05:03,340
Chief, so Chief Olson on focus traffic enforcement violations?

1369
02:05:05,860 --> 02:05:11,960
Yes, thank you, Chair. So as a discussion

1370
02:05:11,960 --> 02:05:18,600
point coming out of last year and specifically around the noise related violations, we've

1371
02:05:18,600 --> 02:05:26,080
got an auto-generated report that's going to generate this report on the 15th of every month,

1372
02:05:26,080 --> 02:05:32,540
which contains those violations that, if you recall, the mayor did a presentation on back in October.

1373
02:05:34,020 --> 02:05:40,980
And so, this is the first such report, and I plan on attaching it to the agenda for

1374
02:05:40,980 --> 02:05:46,680
whatever meeting could be done after that, if the committee finds value in seeing this report.

1375
02:05:47,680 --> 02:05:53,640
I think that it's valuable and just looking at the rest of the committee, it appears they do as well.

1376
02:05:53,640 --> 02:05:55,600
So we would appreciate that. Thank you.

1377
02:05:57,000 --> 02:05:59,700
So then I didn't have anything from the chief

1378
02:06:00,460 --> 02:06:07,720
Fire Chief or the clerk. So with that all entertained in motion to adjourn move to adjourn second all those in favor say aye

1379
02:06:07,720 --> 02:06:08,340
I

1380
02:06:08,340 --> 02:06:09,920
We're adjourned. Thank you