1 00:00:01,520 --> 00:00:07,440 I'm going to go ahead and call this meeting to order. This is anformational 2 00:00:05,120 --> 00:00:11,759 evening meeting tonight only. It's like a council workshop for us. It's not an 3 00:00:09,519 --> 00:00:17,039 official meeting. We appreciate everybody coming this evening. Um Chief 4 00:00:14,719 --> 00:00:21,520 Felton is going to have a presentation about cameras and then we'll open the 5 00:00:19,279 --> 00:00:26,000 floor for questions. We would like everybody coming up to ask questions. 6 00:00:24,000 --> 00:00:30,240 Please state your name and we would like you to ask two questions at a time. two 7 00:00:28,880 --> 00:00:33,760 questions so we can get through everybody here. If they want to get up 8 00:00:31,760 --> 00:00:37,760 and ask, we want to give everybody an opportunity to get up and and ask 9 00:00:36,000 --> 00:00:42,399 questions. And if we get through everybody, then we'll 10 00:00:40,960 --> 00:00:50,480 we can get back up and ask some more questions. So, at this time, uh I would 11 00:00:46,960 --> 00:00:55,520 have introduce C, our chief of police, Cerfeld, and he'll do his presentation. 12 00:00:53,360 --> 00:00:59,920 Thank you. >> Mr. Mayor, may I have one statement 13 00:00:58,640 --> 00:01:04,239 right before we start here? >> No, you can make a statement after the 14 00:01:02,399 --> 00:01:07,479 chief's done. >> That will 15 00:01:08,080 --> 00:01:12,439 change in the base all the way around. 16 00:01:15,520 --> 00:01:20,799 » Good. >> All right. Yeah. Good. So, if everybody 17 00:01:18,240 --> 00:01:24,840 doesn't know, I'm coach SC, chief police here in the back. Um, 18 00:01:25,119 --> 00:01:33,520 presentation here. I think it's probably better if I sit for you guys over there. 19 00:01:30,479 --> 00:01:38,640 Everybody see you sit down. I'm not 20 00:01:36,320 --> 00:01:41,280 walk through this. Um, and if you have any questions and you 21 00:01:40,000 --> 00:01:44,799 can, you know, obviously it's going to be crucial for me to get through this if 22 00:01:42,640 --> 00:01:51,600 we don't stop on every slide. Remember the opportunity to ask questions that 23 00:01:46,079 --> 00:01:56,560 you have. So that'll begin. All right. So is this new is this 24 00:01:54,079 --> 00:01:59,600 technology new? Um no. This technology was actually first introduced in the 25 00:01:58,079 --> 00:02:06,320 1970s. U the technology started to be deployed 26 00:02:02,399 --> 00:02:11,239 in law enforcement in America um in the late 1990s early 2000s. 27 00:02:12,400 --> 00:02:17,599 So what is an LTR? The license plate reader is a fixed camera system designed 28 00:02:16,000 --> 00:02:23,040 to photograph vehicles traveling on public roadways. It can capture images 29 00:02:20,720 --> 00:02:27,280 primarily in the rear of the vehicle uh the time and date as well as the 30 00:02:25,120 --> 00:02:30,879 location of the camera. The important distinction here is the system is 31 00:02:29,040 --> 00:02:35,120 designed to identify vehicles and not people. The LPR system does not use 32 00:02:33,360 --> 00:02:40,560 facial recognition and does not collect biometric information or driver identity 33 00:02:37,599 --> 00:02:44,720 information. What happens to the photo that we take? 34 00:02:42,319 --> 00:02:48,160 So the photo is taken by the LPR camera. It's then uploaded into a software which 35 00:02:46,560 --> 00:02:51,519 can recognize the license plate numbers in the photo. Those numbers are then run 36 00:02:50,239 --> 00:02:56,239 against a list of plates which are entered as stolen or somehow tied to a 37 00:02:53,360 --> 00:03:00,640 criminal investigation. An LPR hit is an investigative lead, not proof of guilt. 38 00:02:58,879 --> 00:03:06,239 Officers are required to independent independently verify the information 39 00:03:03,040 --> 00:03:11,680 before taking enforcement action. Uh the software can also filter the images by 40 00:03:08,400 --> 00:03:15,760 vehicle make such as those listed there, body style, 41 00:03:13,840 --> 00:03:20,080 color, and additional characteristics such as whether a vehicle has a bumper 42 00:03:17,599 --> 00:03:24,560 sticker, rear window sticker, toolbox, top rack, or a back rack. These are 43 00:03:22,800 --> 00:03:28,959 common descriptors which are given during an investigation as people rarely 44 00:03:26,480 --> 00:03:32,720 remember or see a license plate. These filters allow for fewer results during a 45 00:03:31,040 --> 00:03:36,879 search by only including those vehicles that match the entered information in 46 00:03:34,480 --> 00:03:41,720 the results. These photos are deleted after 30 days from that cloud storage. 47 00:03:42,239 --> 00:03:48,319 Just kind of a little visual of what happens there. Uh the camera takes a 48 00:03:46,159 --> 00:03:53,360 photo of the passing car. It then is uploaded into the storage. The photo is 49 00:03:50,959 --> 00:03:58,239 assessed by the storage as discussed in the last slide. Uh then an officer 50 00:03:56,159 --> 00:04:04,439 completes a search. That photo is then pulled down to be used in an 51 00:04:01,439 --> 00:04:04,439 investigation. 52 00:04:04,560 --> 00:04:10,239 Uh things license plate readers do not do. The system does not identify a 53 00:04:08,000 --> 00:04:15,040 person's face. It does not determine who is driving the vehicle. Uh it does not 54 00:04:12,640 --> 00:04:19,280 record conversations or enter a vehicle. It does not track a person's movements 55 00:04:16,880 --> 00:04:24,160 inside buildings or record traffic violations. Does not issue any sort of 56 00:04:21,919 --> 00:04:29,240 citation or charge. The camera photographs vehicles visible from public 57 00:04:26,240 --> 00:04:29,240 locations. 58 00:04:30,080 --> 00:04:37,199 So, where are these cameras and why? Um, so we have four LPR cameras on the edges 59 00:04:35,360 --> 00:04:40,800 of Glenrock and one in Rolling Hills. The cameras are placed along the four 60 00:04:38,800 --> 00:04:44,560 main entrances based on these providing the most opportunity to capture photos 61 00:04:42,400 --> 00:04:49,479 of vehicles. These are also locations chosen to reveal nothing more than is 62 00:04:46,479 --> 00:04:49,479 necessary. 63 00:04:50,960 --> 00:04:58,479 some of the court cases associated with these where courts have ruled that block 64 00:04:54,560 --> 00:05:02,960 cameras are constitutional. Um I'll just get the key notes here guys the the 65 00:05:00,240 --> 00:05:08,639 actual court names. United States vers in 1983 66 00:05:05,040 --> 00:05:13,199 um was in regard to people's expectation of privacy regarding a license plate. 67 00:05:10,800 --> 00:05:15,919 United States versus Martin in 2024 court upheld the use of flock 68 00:05:14,560 --> 00:05:18,800 information in the circumstances presented and concluded that the 69 00:05:17,280 --> 00:05:23,759 defendant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle 70 00:05:21,120 --> 00:05:28,720 information obtained through the system. Um Smith or city of Norfolk block usage 71 00:05:26,880 --> 00:05:32,479 with limited retention periods does not track the whole of a person's movements 72 00:05:30,639 --> 00:05:39,039 nor does it provide an intimate window into where citizens drive, park, visit, 73 00:05:34,880 --> 00:05:43,440 linger, sleep or patronize. Um, and similar decisions have been made in 74 00:05:40,639 --> 00:05:48,160 other court cases. Uh, Robinson versus the Commonwealth and the Virginia Court 75 00:05:45,199 --> 00:05:51,759 of Appeals. In 2026, the Virginia Court of Appeals likewise held that the use of 76 00:05:50,000 --> 00:05:55,680 the Fox system in the circumstances before it did not constitute an 77 00:05:53,199 --> 00:05:59,600 unconstitutional search. Lastly, United States versus Porter 78 00:05:57,680 --> 00:06:02,560 2026. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the 79 00:06:01,039 --> 00:06:06,160 district court's rulings. It held that the use of the LPR system to identify 80 00:06:04,240 --> 00:06:08,960 Porter's vehicle did not violate Fourth Amendment because there was no 81 00:06:07,360 --> 00:06:14,160 reasonable expectation of privacy and movement on public roads or in license 82 00:06:11,440 --> 00:06:19,319 plate information and the LPR data was not as comprehensive as cell site 83 00:06:16,319 --> 00:06:19,319 location. 84 00:06:20,080 --> 00:06:25,600 So, some of the benefits to the community with these cameras, uh, they 85 00:06:23,520 --> 00:06:28,960 allow for faster investigation time. Instead of manually reviewing hours of 86 00:06:27,199 --> 00:06:33,880 video, investigators can search vehicle information with a defined time and 87 00:06:30,880 --> 00:06:33,880 location. 88 00:06:34,080 --> 00:06:40,240 These license plate readers also allow for recovering the recovery of stolen 89 00:06:38,080 --> 00:06:46,400 property. Alerts can help officers locate stolen vehicles more quickly. 90 00:06:44,160 --> 00:06:50,720 They allow for finding missing people. Vehicle information can be provided. 91 00:06:48,319 --> 00:06:53,919 Important vehicle information can provide an important investigative lead 92 00:06:52,319 --> 00:06:58,560 when a missing or endangered person is believed to be traveling by vehicle. Uh 93 00:06:56,560 --> 00:07:01,919 these cameras can prevent and solve crime. Um knowing that vehicles 94 00:07:00,240 --> 00:07:05,039 associated with criminal activity may be identified can provide an additional 95 00:07:03,440 --> 00:07:07,840 deterrent. More efficient use of personnel. 96 00:07:06,639 --> 00:07:11,280 Automated technology can help investigators narrow a search and spend 97 00:07:09,599 --> 00:07:14,919 more time conducting traditional investigative work. 98 00:07:15,440 --> 00:07:23,840 So these are a few of the um incidents cases where in my 99 00:07:20,880 --> 00:07:30,880 time here um these could have been these flat cameras could have helped us solve 100 00:07:25,599 --> 00:07:33,440 these cases a lot sooner. Um I don't know if you want to go through 101 00:07:31,919 --> 00:07:35,199 these but May 2020 >> a few of those please sir. 102 00:07:34,479 --> 00:07:37,440 » I'm sorry. What's that? >> Could you speak on a few of those? The 103 00:07:36,560 --> 00:07:41,120 print's pretty small. >> Yeah. Absolutely. I apologize for that 104 00:07:38,880 --> 00:07:44,240 guys. In May of 2020, a juvenile female was picked up in the middle of the night 105 00:07:42,319 --> 00:07:49,759 in a blue car with out of state plates and taken out of state. Uh that young 106 00:07:46,639 --> 00:07:53,440 girl was recovered over a year later, three states away, living with a sex 107 00:07:51,520 --> 00:07:58,400 offender. Uh July 2012, a man broke into an 108 00:07:56,560 --> 00:08:03,440 elderly woman's home and raped her at gunpoint. A van believed to be related 109 00:08:00,560 --> 00:08:07,520 was seen leaving the area. That van had been borrowed by the suspect on the 110 00:08:04,960 --> 00:08:11,039 night the incident occurred. Uh, July 2016, a man's home was 111 00:08:09,759 --> 00:08:14,240 burglarized while he was in the hospital. A neighbor reported seeing a 112 00:08:12,800 --> 00:08:18,720 strange vehicle parked outside previously, but only recalled the color 113 00:08:16,240 --> 00:08:21,840 and body style. During the arrest of those individuals, the vehicle in the 114 00:08:20,400 --> 00:08:26,720 suspect's driveway match that description which you've been given. 115 00:08:24,639 --> 00:08:31,120 » So, out of all those, I see burn up in a stolen vehicle. Are all these burn up 116 00:08:28,879 --> 00:08:33,279 that you guys captured that you guys did by flock? 117 00:08:32,240 --> 00:08:36,560 » No. Is that what you're saying? These are these are previous cases that 118 00:08:34,959 --> 00:08:39,360 occurred prior to the system being in place that the flock system itself could 119 00:08:38,080 --> 00:08:42,880 have actually helped us solve through >> cuz I only see one in 120 00:08:41,440 --> 00:08:48,560 » every one of those is >> okay which is 2012 all the way back to 8 121 00:08:46,560 --> 00:08:52,080 years before >> y 10 years 122 00:08:50,080 --> 00:08:53,519 » I've been here since 2010 and so these are some from the time that I've been 123 00:08:53,279 --> 00:08:55,680 here >> and you've had these up since 2022 124 00:08:55,360 --> 00:08:57,360 correct >> 2024. 125 00:08:56,880 --> 00:09:00,880 » Oh >> yeah. So again, what I'm saying is these 126 00:08:59,120 --> 00:09:04,000 are cases that took place prior to the cameras being there that these cameras 127 00:09:02,880 --> 00:09:06,640 could have actually helped us out sooner. 128 00:09:04,560 --> 00:09:11,040 » Thank you. >> Uh March 2023, a suspicious vehicle was 129 00:09:09,120 --> 00:09:14,240 reported parked for 5 days on private property without explanation. The 130 00:09:12,480 --> 00:09:19,279 vehicle was listed as stolen by another agency. 131 00:09:16,800 --> 00:09:22,959 June 2014, a man traveling across state lines and stealing cars passed through 132 00:09:21,040 --> 00:09:26,360 Glenro in a stolen vehicle and stole another vehicle. 133 00:09:31,120 --> 00:09:36,480 used some of the recent cases that we've had in the last couple of months uh 134 00:09:34,480 --> 00:09:40,320 where the the system was actually used to help us in identifying the 135 00:09:37,920 --> 00:09:43,360 individuals involved. Um when they left here, a male individual entered a local 136 00:09:41,920 --> 00:09:46,880 gas station and engaged in an altercation with the clerk. The male 137 00:09:45,440 --> 00:09:50,080 left the station prior to officer's arrival. However, the vehicle he was 138 00:09:48,720 --> 00:09:54,399 arriving was caught on surveillance video using descriptors. A photo of the 139 00:09:52,480 --> 00:09:58,240 vehicle was located in the FPR system and using the plate number as well as 140 00:09:56,080 --> 00:10:02,080 follow-up investigation, the driver was identified and charged. The male was not 141 00:10:00,320 --> 00:10:06,160 a Gok resident and likely would not have returned to the area or been identified 142 00:10:03,839 --> 00:10:09,440 without these cameras. Uh over here on the right, a local 143 00:10:07,680 --> 00:10:12,720 resident reported an unknown female walking around their property and 144 00:10:10,880 --> 00:10:17,200 peering into the windows of their home. They stated she had caught this on their 145 00:10:14,320 --> 00:10:20,880 home surveillance system. A still shot of the unknown female was 146 00:10:19,120 --> 00:10:24,240 posted to Facebook asking for help identifying the woman. The resident said 147 00:10:22,720 --> 00:10:27,600 the responses were not helpful and included accusations that the woman had 148 00:10:25,920 --> 00:10:31,680 been doing this for a while. And another stated she was likely in 149 00:10:30,240 --> 00:10:35,839 that says anger, but it means supposed to be danger and having a mental 150 00:10:33,440 --> 00:10:40,240 episode. The resident showed the video and using descriptors of the vehicle the 151 00:10:37,519 --> 00:10:44,240 woman pulled up in, we were able to find the car and plate number. The woman was 152 00:10:42,560 --> 00:10:49,720 then contacted and explained that she was in town looking at real estate 153 00:10:45,680 --> 00:10:49,720 listings for a possible move. 154 00:10:51,279 --> 00:10:56,959 So, what about safeguards? Well, responsible use does matter. As with any 155 00:10:55,040 --> 00:11:00,720 tool, we dictate acceptable use by policy as well as regular audit. Users 156 00:10:59,360 --> 00:11:05,120 are required to possess proper credentiing. The image is deleted after 157 00:11:03,040 --> 00:11:09,440 30 days unless used as evidence in a case. When performing searches, an 158 00:11:07,519 --> 00:11:13,760 offense type, case number, and reason for the search is required. We offer a 159 00:11:11,920 --> 00:11:17,932 transparency portal where our our policies display as well as an audit log 160 00:11:16,160 --> 00:11:20,640 available for the last 30 days. [clears throat] 161 00:11:18,640 --> 00:11:26,200 As new updates or options become available, they're reviewed and if 162 00:11:22,320 --> 00:11:26,200 beneficial use. 163 00:11:27,680 --> 00:11:33,120 So this is um a look inside of the system. Actually, these are some of the 164 00:11:31,279 --> 00:11:39,839 things that we have for options as far as selecting and unselecting things. Um, 165 00:11:37,760 --> 00:11:47,120 for those of you who can't see, uh, we do have the audit assistance enabled. 166 00:11:43,200 --> 00:11:53,160 Um, as far as being able to receive requests from federal agencies for 167 00:11:49,040 --> 00:11:53,160 sharing, that is disabled. 168 00:11:55,839 --> 00:12:00,000 So, when we go into the system, this is what you actually see when you're about 169 00:11:58,480 --> 00:12:05,279 to perform a search. Well, you can't all see, but there are 170 00:12:02,399 --> 00:12:10,560 little red hyphens here in the required fields. 171 00:12:08,320 --> 00:12:14,480 Those fields are offense type, case number, and reason. 172 00:12:13,120 --> 00:12:18,639 When you're going to perform the search, what you would do is obviously complete 173 00:12:16,160 --> 00:12:21,279 those three fields. Then down below, if you have a license plate, you could 174 00:12:19,839 --> 00:12:25,040 enter it there. If you know the state, you could enter it there. U or you come 175 00:12:23,680 --> 00:12:30,399 down here and you enter the things that you do have like body, make, those sorts 176 00:12:28,079 --> 00:12:35,279 of things. You can then select the time frame and you hit search. This is what 177 00:12:32,880 --> 00:12:39,399 you would get from that search. Assuming you were searching a black SUV, 178 00:12:43,120 --> 00:12:50,160 responsible employment. Uh five principles. Number one, legality operate 179 00:12:48,079 --> 00:12:54,160 with we operate within federal and state constitutional requirements. Two, 180 00:12:52,240 --> 00:12:58,639 purpose limitation. The use of the system is for legitimate purposes, 181 00:12:56,480 --> 00:13:04,079 public safety and investigative purposes only. Number three, accountability. 182 00:13:01,200 --> 00:13:08,560 Audit searches and investigate misuse. Number four, data minimization. We only 183 00:13:06,399 --> 00:13:12,560 keep information as long as reasonably necessary and legally permitted. Number 184 00:13:10,720 --> 00:13:16,560 five, transparency. Give the community clear information about how the 185 00:13:13,920 --> 00:13:23,694 technology is deployed and go. >> On on three there, who audits the 186 00:13:19,200 --> 00:13:27,360 searches and investigative misuse? Hi. [clears throat] 187 00:13:25,040 --> 00:13:31,920 » Um, and on on number four, what how long do you consider reasonably 188 00:13:29,760 --> 00:13:36,160 uh reasonably necessary >> as far as retention goes? 189 00:13:33,760 --> 00:13:41,279 » Yeah, it seems kind of >> So 30 days is what they're retained for. 190 00:13:38,399 --> 00:13:45,440 » Okay. >> So guys, if you let me complete that, it 191 00:13:43,519 --> 00:13:49,120 actually does say 30 days earlier in the system. It also says that on our 192 00:13:47,440 --> 00:13:52,639 transparency portal as well as other things that is included in the software 193 00:13:51,120 --> 00:13:57,079 and the software is what actually automatically deletes that from the 194 00:13:54,079 --> 00:13:57,079 cloud. 195 00:14:01,360 --> 00:14:07,399 Um our transparency portal punch that link real quick. 196 00:14:11,600 --> 00:14:16,440 It's going to come up for me. 197 00:14:34,560 --> 00:14:39,040 You probably open the file outside of the presentation. See if you should be 198 00:14:38,079 --> 00:14:42,040 able to see it. >> Yeah. 199 00:14:51,040 --> 00:14:56,639 All right. So, this is our transparency portal. This is located on the town's 200 00:14:54,720 --> 00:15:01,240 web page under the police department for anybody who wants to go to it at any 201 00:14:58,240 --> 00:15:01,240 time. 202 00:15:01,279 --> 00:15:06,800 » How long has this been in place? >> This So, they actually just came out 203 00:15:05,040 --> 00:15:08,160 with transparency portal, I believe, in July. 204 00:15:07,519 --> 00:15:11,440 » Oh, >> to my knowledge. 205 00:15:10,000 --> 00:15:14,839 So, we've been working on getting it up and running since. 206 00:15:17,680 --> 00:15:25,680 So, some of the things on here, um, it does include some of the news articles 207 00:15:22,079 --> 00:15:29,680 and such, um, locally regarding the LPR systems, things that they have helped in 208 00:15:27,600 --> 00:15:35,440 solving. Um, obviously these update as they 209 00:15:32,079 --> 00:15:40,320 become available. So, you can see the data usage summary. 210 00:15:37,440 --> 00:15:46,240 Uh data retention is 30 days. Total number of cameras five. 211 00:15:43,600 --> 00:15:51,199 Um the unique vehicles detected is meaning vehicles that have never passed 212 00:15:48,399 --> 00:15:54,880 the the uh cameras in that prior 30 days. 213 00:15:53,680 --> 00:16:02,120 So the number of searches that were completed in the last 30 days was six. 214 00:15:59,120 --> 00:16:02,120 Um 215 00:16:02,480 --> 00:16:07,519 hot list alerted on uh national statewide hot list sources. It's just 216 00:16:06,320 --> 00:16:12,240 showing you the sources. There wasn't actually any hot listed, which is what 217 00:16:09,279 --> 00:16:15,680 it shows over here. >> Does it look for all offense types or 218 00:16:14,240 --> 00:16:18,160 just a few >> offense types when you search or just 219 00:16:17,680 --> 00:16:20,399 right now? >> Because it says top. 220 00:16:19,199 --> 00:16:23,040 » So, these are the ones that were searched. It's just showing you the 221 00:16:22,320 --> 00:16:27,040 three different search. >> If if somebody's sex offender someplace 222 00:16:25,440 --> 00:16:29,680 and they end up here even though they're not supposed to be. 223 00:16:28,079 --> 00:16:33,759 » So, that is actually an option. We did use that at one point. We've since 224 00:16:31,279 --> 00:16:38,480 deactivated it. Um because the in the beginning 225 00:16:35,519 --> 00:16:44,959 uh a number of these things the software right since 2024 they've both added and 226 00:16:41,920 --> 00:16:48,160 uh changed a number of things. Um in the beginning it was kind of an all or 227 00:16:46,240 --> 00:16:51,279 nothing thing and since then they've allowed for that other page you know 228 00:16:49,680 --> 00:16:53,600 which is options you can turn on and off. 229 00:16:52,160 --> 00:16:56,480 » Now would that include if there was an Amber? 230 00:16:54,800 --> 00:16:59,600 » Yep. That would include that option. Yep. If one of those vehicles had passed 231 00:16:58,240 --> 00:17:03,199 our stuff, that would actually change. >> Yep. 232 00:17:00,720 --> 00:17:08,720 » One one quick question on this with the uh the list of searches when you you 233 00:17:05,919 --> 00:17:12,480 scroll up back to the six searches or whatnot. Now, I understand that you guys 234 00:17:10,880 --> 00:17:17,679 might have to do some investigation and not potentially show this information 235 00:17:15,360 --> 00:17:20,799 until an investigation has been active. So, what triggers that number to go up? 236 00:17:20,240 --> 00:17:25,439 » Six. >> Yeah. anytime it's searched that number 237 00:17:22,880 --> 00:17:28,960 goes up >> in the last 30 days. 238 00:17:27,120 --> 00:17:32,000 » In the last 30 days. Yeah. And it'll it automatically does that in the system. 239 00:17:30,400 --> 00:17:35,600 So it's not like I'm going in and uploading, you know, tomorrow for the 240 00:17:33,760 --> 00:17:41,520 last 30 days. It actually automatically will change to include what's today? 241 00:17:38,480 --> 00:17:45,679 25th. So we go back to the 25th of July. So tomorrow it's going to bump from July 242 00:17:43,679 --> 00:17:48,240 26 to 26. >> What's test mean? 243 00:17:47,200 --> 00:17:51,760 » What does test mean? >> Yeah. When you do a search, you need to 244 00:17:49,760 --> 00:17:54,880 put test. I would actually rather just get through this if that's all right and 245 00:17:53,360 --> 00:17:57,880 then I'll answer those questions question. 246 00:18:02,240 --> 00:18:07,679 » All right. So down here go down a little further. It talks about some of the 247 00:18:05,520 --> 00:18:10,960 policy and trust things. Uh what's detected license plates vehicles. Just 248 00:18:09,520 --> 00:18:14,400 goes over some information here guys. And honestly I'm not going to waste too 249 00:18:12,799 --> 00:18:18,080 much time going through all of this with you because this is completely available 250 00:18:16,160 --> 00:18:21,520 to everybody to review when you get home and the rest of it. Um down here on the 251 00:18:20,000 --> 00:18:26,960 bottom you can actually download the last 30 days worth of searches. Um again 252 00:18:25,520 --> 00:18:29,200 that's completely available to you. >> What does that mean? Just tell me what 253 00:18:28,480 --> 00:18:32,799 that means. >> What? 254 00:18:29,520 --> 00:18:35,919 » So um you can download the last 30 days of searches. So if I went home and 255 00:18:34,480 --> 00:18:38,880 downloaded that it would show the six searches that were made. Yep. 256 00:18:37,200 --> 00:18:42,240 » And it would show what you were looking for case number was and would show the 257 00:18:40,720 --> 00:18:45,919 picture of the vehicle. So it it does withhold some information because as was 258 00:18:44,240 --> 00:18:50,240 brought up by the gentleman over here u some of the cases are obviously current 259 00:18:47,440 --> 00:18:52,720 in the last 30 days. So case numbers aren't going to be in there, license 260 00:18:51,760 --> 00:18:58,000 plate numbers aren't going to be in there, but it would show you the search 261 00:18:54,799 --> 00:19:03,039 parameters if you why it was undertaken. >> Yeah. 262 00:19:00,000 --> 00:19:06,160 » But how does that lead to >> Would you guys let him finish the 263 00:19:04,480 --> 00:19:10,200 presentation and you can get up and come to the podium and ask questions? 264 00:19:11,200 --> 00:19:16,960 So also included here guys some myths versus facts with some information for 265 00:19:14,720 --> 00:19:23,039 you down at the bottom. Our policy is actually attached as well as some 266 00:19:20,240 --> 00:19:28,720 additional information on another. So 267 00:19:24,880 --> 00:19:31,720 with that said we can move on to questions. 268 00:19:32,000 --> 00:19:39,799 If you have questions for Chief Felner, please come to the podium and state your 269 00:19:36,080 --> 00:19:39,799 name and ask the questions. 270 00:19:47,600 --> 00:19:55,600 Hi, my name is Mark Manel. I got involved with this talking to the 271 00:19:53,039 --> 00:20:00,960 mayor in the town park. I guess I'm not playing jeopardy right 272 00:19:57,360 --> 00:20:05,280 and stating a question, am I? But the reason I got involved with this was the 273 00:20:02,880 --> 00:20:08,559 mayor lied to me about these flop cameras. How did I lie to you about the 274 00:20:07,280 --> 00:20:13,200 flot camera? >> That you didn't know anything about it. 275 00:20:10,640 --> 00:20:17,520 That the chief did it by himself and by >> I told you they were bought they were 276 00:20:14,640 --> 00:20:20,640 brought in and put in during the budget session and I knew where they were at. 277 00:20:19,520 --> 00:20:25,440 So go ahead and make your false statement 278 00:20:21,039 --> 00:20:31,960 » and you all lied at the last same thing that you didn't know about 279 00:20:28,400 --> 00:20:31,960 » until he 280 00:20:32,320 --> 00:20:40,400 » you had I don't know about him. That was not our advisor session. We can do that. 281 00:20:36,400 --> 00:20:47,280 But then again to my brought to my attention here as we came 282 00:20:42,799 --> 00:20:53,440 in to hear the January or the July 27th meeting you were on Mike 283 00:20:51,600 --> 00:20:57,440 for giggling about that these things have been here for four years already 284 00:20:55,200 --> 00:21:02,080 and we're just now figuring it out. And you ran it through the budget 285 00:21:00,000 --> 00:21:09,039 through like a snake so nobody knew about it. You're on mike for that sir. 286 00:21:05,600 --> 00:21:14,880 Everything we do is your honest is open. You are probably my church and we do our 287 00:21:12,240 --> 00:21:20,840 budget. Thank you. >> Just so you know, our flag system 288 00:21:16,559 --> 00:21:20,840 cameras have been in for 4 years. 289 00:21:27,360 --> 00:21:34,080 and let him speak. >> So, I know we have four years ago. 290 00:21:32,400 --> 00:21:38,880 » Please sit down and let him finish. >> No, that's we'll get to everybody. Let 291 00:21:36,799 --> 00:21:41,919 them do their questions, but you've lied to us on this the whole time here. 292 00:21:40,559 --> 00:21:44,799 » No, we haven't. So, go ahead. >> And this we said we had them four years 293 00:21:44,400 --> 00:21:48,799 ago. >> Well, I was mistaken. You you you never 294 00:21:47,600 --> 00:21:52,000 made a mistake in your life. >> You snaked it through. 295 00:21:50,000 --> 00:21:58,679 » No, we didn't snake it anywhere. >> It's your voice, Mr. Mayor. It's your 296 00:21:55,039 --> 00:21:58,679 comments, not mine. 297 00:21:59,039 --> 00:22:03,760 » I've got about two minutes of context with my question. So, if you bear with 298 00:22:02,559 --> 00:22:07,360 me, please let me know if I'm talking your ears off. Uh, a couple of years 299 00:22:05,679 --> 00:22:11,520 ago, I spoke of my concerns with the flock cameras in Rolling Hills. Um, 300 00:22:10,000 --> 00:22:14,480 since then, I've discussed the issue with many people. In these 301 00:22:13,039 --> 00:22:18,799 conversations, I've said the same thing again and again. These are good people 302 00:22:16,559 --> 00:22:21,440 with an evil tool in their hands. >> Pardon me, sir. Would you please give us 303 00:22:20,960 --> 00:22:24,799 your name? >> I'd be happy to. I reside in Rolling 304 00:22:23,120 --> 00:22:28,480 Hills. My name is Alex Smith. >> Thank you. 305 00:22:25,919 --> 00:22:32,640 » I'm sorry. I was just telling you you're good people. 306 00:22:29,520 --> 00:22:36,559 » Um, as best I understand, our police see the lost child quickly found, the 307 00:22:34,480 --> 00:22:40,799 tragedy averted. They see a safer and happier community. But in these 308 00:22:38,960 --> 00:22:45,280 conversations, time and again, I hear people expressing anger and frustration. 309 00:22:43,280 --> 00:22:49,600 I hear people concerned their community is being subjected to unamerican 310 00:22:47,520 --> 00:22:53,760 warrantless surveillance. I hear concerns that evidence gathered without 311 00:22:51,360 --> 00:22:58,240 a warrant gets thrown out and that genuine dangers to our community would 312 00:22:55,520 --> 00:23:01,919 persist. I hear fears of the potential loss of funds from our community from 313 00:23:00,240 --> 00:23:06,159 lawsuits. I hear people talking about freedom of 314 00:23:03,840 --> 00:23:10,720 information requests for data related to the day-to-day activities our 315 00:23:07,520 --> 00:23:15,840 representatives or publication. I hear fear of abuse of these systems, concern 316 00:23:13,360 --> 00:23:22,000 that someone who should not have access could get into these systems could see 317 00:23:17,919 --> 00:23:26,480 you leave your house and rob you. And I also hear people say, "Well, I'm 318 00:23:24,400 --> 00:23:30,480 not doing anything wrong. What's wrong with this?" To that, I say you need to 319 00:23:28,880 --> 00:23:34,480 spend some time and talk with some defense lawyers. As I understand it, 320 00:23:32,880 --> 00:23:38,960 there are people in this country that are serving 8 years in prison for moving 321 00:23:36,880 --> 00:23:43,760 lobsters from one place to another. They use plastic bags instead of cardboard. 322 00:23:41,520 --> 00:23:48,240 There are quotes out there that some attorneys suspect that every average 323 00:23:46,400 --> 00:23:53,039 American is committing about three felonies a day. They don't even know we 324 00:23:50,640 --> 00:23:56,400 have that many laws. We have treaties where we honor the laws of other 325 00:23:54,480 --> 00:23:59,120 countries. Even like no person could know everything that they're doing and 326 00:23:57,679 --> 00:24:04,880 what might be considered wrong under the eyes of the law. This technology in this 327 00:24:02,320 --> 00:24:08,640 legal landscape threatens everyone because everyone is technically guilty 328 00:24:06,960 --> 00:24:14,000 of something. And I'm not talking about immorality or anything here. So again, 329 00:24:12,320 --> 00:24:17,840 you're good people. You have an evil tool in your toolbox. I would really 330 00:24:16,000 --> 00:24:23,600 appreciate it if you would consider putting on the um agenda for next 331 00:24:20,559 --> 00:24:27,679 meeting to terminate this contract, ban flock drones, and take down the cameras. 332 00:24:26,400 --> 00:24:30,919 I appreciate your time. >> Thank you. 333 00:24:39,840 --> 00:24:46,559 Hello council and chief. Thank you everyone who made this meeting possible 334 00:24:44,640 --> 00:24:52,000 and I would like to speak along the lines as our last speaker just about the 335 00:24:50,159 --> 00:24:58,240 » tell us your name. Oh, my name is Tim Kane and I write I reside in Ring Hills 336 00:24:55,279 --> 00:25:03,120 in the the back side of Ring Hills. And um lastly, I'd like to just speak about 337 00:25:00,559 --> 00:25:06,960 the national conversation that's going on about these cameras and the use of 338 00:25:04,960 --> 00:25:11,760 these types of systems, not just lock, but there are multiple types of these 339 00:25:09,039 --> 00:25:15,600 systems. And so there's a national debate going on right now, not not just 340 00:25:14,159 --> 00:25:20,080 but the whole country, and has been downplayed by some license plate 341 00:25:17,679 --> 00:25:24,480 readers. But that's only a small part of this conversation. The real heart of 342 00:25:22,159 --> 00:25:29,279 this conversation and debate is about the individual and his right or her 343 00:25:26,880 --> 00:25:33,200 right to be responsible for their own safety and make their own decisions 344 00:25:30,720 --> 00:25:37,360 about how to be safe and secure in their daily lives. And right now this is under 345 00:25:35,919 --> 00:25:42,640 attack by people who have good intentions but they are good intentions 346 00:25:39,600 --> 00:25:47,440 by force. also not to be under surveillance everywhere they go so that 347 00:25:44,799 --> 00:25:52,880 they feel a sense of freedom and a a sense of space that we all crave. The 348 00:25:50,240 --> 00:25:57,200 real debate is whether or not government will allow the individual to make these 349 00:25:55,039 --> 00:26:01,279 choices or will it be decided for them by those who know better and have only 350 00:25:59,440 --> 00:26:04,480 the best intentions. The very designed purpose of our 351 00:26:02,799 --> 00:26:10,000 national constitution and the constitution in all 50 states is to 352 00:26:07,120 --> 00:26:14,159 recognize the individual and to protect and defend and promote the rights of the 353 00:26:11,919 --> 00:26:19,120 individual specifically protect from government and 100% from the majority 354 00:26:17,039 --> 00:26:22,559 rule. The way that the rights of the 355 00:26:20,799 --> 00:26:26,640 individual are protected is by confirming that individual rights come 356 00:26:24,080 --> 00:26:31,120 from God and are not privileges that are granted by government that the people 357 00:26:28,720 --> 00:26:36,799 have created. A well-meaning government, even 358 00:26:34,320 --> 00:26:40,480 supported by the majority, whatever the public at large, cannot infringe upon 359 00:26:38,640 --> 00:26:47,600 the rights of the individuals. All of our constitutions state this and demand 360 00:26:43,520 --> 00:26:51,440 that our public officials abide by this. The individual is guided and held to 361 00:26:49,600 --> 00:26:55,840 account by a moral code of conduct conduct in society and society is given 362 00:26:54,159 --> 00:27:00,080 the job of considering and bringing to bear punishment and accountability for 363 00:26:57,760 --> 00:27:04,679 breaking the moral code handed down from Almighty God and given to Moses. 364 00:27:05,440 --> 00:27:11,840 We all know that security cameras are everywhere and nearly everywhere and and 365 00:27:10,400 --> 00:27:16,640 everyone says, "So why is this different? What's the big deal?" Well, 366 00:27:14,000 --> 00:27:22,559 for most people of the liberty mindset, 99% of all these other cameras are 367 00:27:20,080 --> 00:27:25,919 either belong to private individuals or private companies. 368 00:27:24,400 --> 00:27:29,200 It's different when any part of the government decides to make your 369 00:27:27,279 --> 00:27:33,600 day-to-day comeings and goings a part of a surveillance program. That is nothing 370 00:27:31,840 --> 00:27:38,480 more than a crime looking for a person or a suspicious overseer waiting to make 371 00:27:36,080 --> 00:27:44,080 an accusation. At least this is the perception and the the the question is 372 00:27:41,760 --> 00:27:48,320 going around the country. All available information currently shows that this is 373 00:27:45,840 --> 00:27:51,440 to be is the case and across the country it has been shown that any amount of 374 00:27:49,840 --> 00:27:56,320 good that has come from these types of systems surveillance that they're 375 00:27:54,000 --> 00:28:03,600 overshadowed by corruption and misuse of these systems. Sometimes these these 376 00:28:00,559 --> 00:28:07,840 these misuses are still also well-meaning, but they're misuses and 377 00:28:05,120 --> 00:28:12,000 and they certain times they people go outside of the parameters that which 378 00:28:09,360 --> 00:28:15,520 they have been told to they told the community that they're not going to. And 379 00:28:13,919 --> 00:28:20,720 to be clear, I am not in any way suggesting that any member of our town 380 00:28:17,600 --> 00:28:26,880 government or our law enforcement here um is planning to or to misuse this 381 00:28:24,799 --> 00:28:31,679 program. that evidence shows that the potential for harm across the country is 382 00:28:29,600 --> 00:28:35,840 is shown that the potential for harm outweighs the potential for good. 383 00:28:34,080 --> 00:28:39,840 There's been studies shown that in large metropolitan areas where these cameras 384 00:28:37,279 --> 00:28:46,000 have been used for 10 years plus that the the actual the lowering of crime 385 00:28:44,000 --> 00:28:51,200 rates in those in those areas and the actual meaningful arrest had had not 386 00:28:48,159 --> 00:28:55,279 increased even a single percent. But yet the cost of these things are enormous to 387 00:28:53,120 --> 00:28:58,640 the people and that's another thing the government is supposed to protect is to 388 00:28:56,960 --> 00:29:03,679 look at what they're spending the money that's belongs to the people on. And so 389 00:29:01,520 --> 00:29:09,600 I'm asking on behalf of myself and other members of the community to remove and 390 00:29:06,240 --> 00:29:14,080 ban forever these types of destroyers of freedom and liberty and uphold and 391 00:29:12,159 --> 00:29:18,880 defend the rights of the individuals as requested and required by our national 392 00:29:16,960 --> 00:29:24,320 and state constitutions which are the highest laws of the land. 393 00:29:21,679 --> 00:29:30,080 And it and at first and they're also the first grant of power entrusted to all of 394 00:29:26,799 --> 00:29:34,480 you who have chosen to serve the people that you must abide by these 395 00:29:32,240 --> 00:29:39,760 constitutions which are the highest law of the land. And they they say as our 396 00:29:38,000 --> 00:29:44,159 founders have that these things should not be. 397 00:29:41,679 --> 00:29:48,799 I'm going to quote really quick. Daniel Webster, one of our founders, is hardly 398 00:29:46,480 --> 00:29:52,960 too strong to say that the Constitution was made to guard the people against the 399 00:29:50,720 --> 00:29:58,000 dangers of good intentions. There are men in all ages who mean to govern well, 400 00:29:55,600 --> 00:30:03,840 but they mean to govern. They promise to be good masters, but they mean to be 401 00:30:00,320 --> 00:30:09,039 masters. And Thomas Jefferson remarked in questions of power then let no more 402 00:30:06,399 --> 00:30:13,679 be heard of confidence in man but bind him down for mischief which is what has 403 00:30:11,600 --> 00:30:18,480 been happening across the country by the change of the constitutions. It is your 404 00:30:15,840 --> 00:30:23,120 duty. It is it is all of our duty to follow the constitutions and to make it 405 00:30:20,320 --> 00:30:27,960 our our primary law. I thank you for your time and and thank you everyone for 406 00:30:24,720 --> 00:30:27,960 coming tonight. 407 00:30:31,760 --> 00:30:35,679 Please give the people a chance to come up and ask their questions before you 408 00:30:34,880 --> 00:30:38,960 get up and wait. >> Sorry, I don't have a couple questions. 409 00:30:38,159 --> 00:30:43,679 » Thank you. >> Hi. Um, I'm Amy Smith. I live in Rolling 410 00:30:41,279 --> 00:30:48,960 Hills. I just have like five questions for the chief. Um, 411 00:30:46,640 --> 00:30:52,640 okay. So, we were talking about that 30-day 412 00:30:50,720 --> 00:30:57,919 um data retention and that's like the license plate, right? 413 00:30:55,279 --> 00:31:01,840 » Okay. So, cuz Flock is a software company and so I'm assuming that like 414 00:31:00,480 --> 00:31:06,960 all the other software companies that we're interacting with, they're 415 00:31:03,039 --> 00:31:12,159 collecting user data, metadata, etc. location data that can maybe on the 416 00:31:09,760 --> 00:31:16,640 individual level not be so valuable, but on the aggregate level, maybe not even 417 00:31:14,320 --> 00:31:22,080 that we see at all, but that flock could see, they can make a lot of money um 418 00:31:19,440 --> 00:31:24,880 making that data anonymous and selling it on the exchange. Do you know anything 419 00:31:23,760 --> 00:31:28,320 about that? Have they told you anything about that from the flock side of things 420 00:31:26,559 --> 00:31:30,720 » about whether they do that or >> Yeah. If they're selling um the user 421 00:31:30,080 --> 00:31:34,080 data at all >> in the contract it states that they're 422 00:31:32,320 --> 00:31:38,159 not allowed to sell the data. >> They're not allowed to sell but like 423 00:31:36,480 --> 00:31:41,440 just the license plate data or they can anonymize it 424 00:31:39,679 --> 00:31:43,679 » so what they use is I think you're talking about another portion of the 425 00:31:42,399 --> 00:31:46,320 contract that talks about them having the ability to anonymize the data. 426 00:31:45,600 --> 00:31:52,799 » Sure. >> Then use it to train their own software. 427 00:31:48,960 --> 00:31:58,080 Oh, well, they can use it to group a lot of those data pieces together and 428 00:31:54,960 --> 00:32:02,080 strategically sell them. Um, plenty of companies buy and sell each other's 429 00:31:59,600 --> 00:32:06,640 data. So, I'm assuming Fluck does this in some way, but it might just be a 430 00:32:04,240 --> 00:32:10,080 couple steps removed from just the actual in town. So, you you 431 00:32:08,880 --> 00:32:12,559 » if they're selling it, it would be in violation of the agreement, 432 00:32:11,519 --> 00:32:16,799 » right? I'm not saying it's like there's only my license plate, but like maybe 433 00:32:14,159 --> 00:32:21,039 just like the entire, you know, pattern of movements of the state of Wyoming can 434 00:32:19,200 --> 00:32:24,480 get condensed and sold or maybe the whole front range cuz, you know, it's 435 00:32:22,960 --> 00:32:28,559 really detractive to some advertisers. I'm I'm just guessing. Okay. Well, just 436 00:32:26,000 --> 00:32:33,279 look at that. Um, just another tech question. Sorry. 437 00:32:31,039 --> 00:32:37,760 Okay. I don't know a ton about encryption, but I keep hearing about how 438 00:32:35,440 --> 00:32:42,000 end to end the encryption of all this data kind of lies within the Flock 439 00:32:39,679 --> 00:32:48,080 system. Is that correct? >> As far as you know. Okay. 440 00:32:45,039 --> 00:32:52,720 So, basically it's kind of a lot of this is out of like the Glenrock PD's hands 441 00:32:50,399 --> 00:32:57,440 like once the information is collected by flock like there's that period of 30 442 00:32:55,279 --> 00:33:01,360 days and in that period of 30 days or seven if it gets reduced technically 443 00:32:59,840 --> 00:33:05,279 they can do whatever they want with the data right because I haven't seen the 444 00:33:02,799 --> 00:33:09,039 terms of the the contract with the PD contract in front of me. I know that uh 445 00:33:07,600 --> 00:33:13,360 I mean it's out there but I have read it. So technically there's a number of 446 00:33:11,120 --> 00:33:15,200 things that they in that contract they are not 447 00:33:14,080 --> 00:33:18,640 » right because like I don't think they're going to try and sell that like I went 448 00:33:17,039 --> 00:33:21,679 to grocery store or anything like that like the one time but the aggregate 449 00:33:20,240 --> 00:33:23,519 tends to have a lot of value >> if you're implying that they're lying to 450 00:33:22,960 --> 00:33:28,320 me. >> Oh it would be like 451 00:33:26,480 --> 00:33:30,399 » well okay so do you know how long has been around? 452 00:33:29,039 --> 00:33:33,600 » Do I I I don't know. >> Okay. So apparently they were found out 453 00:33:31,760 --> 00:33:35,760 in 2017 and how long they've I'm so sorry. How 454 00:33:35,360 --> 00:33:40,399 long? >> 24. We our cameras went up in 2020. 455 00:33:38,640 --> 00:33:42,159 » Okay. How long have you been with the police department? 456 00:33:41,279 --> 00:33:46,640 » 2010. >> Okay. Wow. So longer the Flock has been 457 00:33:44,000 --> 00:33:51,279 around. That's kind of cool. So I mean that's neat. Okay. Um are there any 458 00:33:49,440 --> 00:33:55,919 other companies that you know of that do what Flock does? Like does Flock have 459 00:33:53,039 --> 00:34:01,120 any competitors? >> Axon one that also sells systems. Yes. 460 00:33:59,200 --> 00:34:05,440 » Okay. >> If Flock scares you, Axon will 461 00:34:03,440 --> 00:34:08,480 terrorize. I I've never heard of them. Okay, 462 00:34:06,880 --> 00:34:11,520 » guys. Let her speak. >> No, it's fine. It's fine. I appreciate I 463 00:34:10,159 --> 00:34:14,399 appreciate that. I just never knew if they had any competitors or not. And 464 00:34:12,879 --> 00:34:18,159 lately, I feel like all I've been hearing about is them. And so, good to 465 00:34:16,639 --> 00:34:23,119 know that there are others out there. Um, so just just really quickly just to 466 00:34:21,280 --> 00:34:26,639 kind of go back to it for those 30 days that Flock has the aggregated user data 467 00:34:25,280 --> 00:34:30,639 of the comingings and goings of the people of this town, they could 468 00:34:29,359 --> 00:34:35,280 technically do whatever they want with it, even though it's more like not 469 00:34:33,440 --> 00:34:37,359 asking for permission, but asking for, you know, forgiveness later on. Is that 470 00:34:36,720 --> 00:34:41,119 correct? >> I can't answer that question. You're 471 00:34:39,599 --> 00:34:43,119 assuming that they're lying to me. >> No, it's not even lying. It's just I 472 00:34:42,720 --> 00:34:46,079 mean, >> they certainly haven't told me that 473 00:34:44,159 --> 00:34:48,480 they're doing that. Another way the data is in their control, right? They own the 474 00:34:48,079 --> 00:34:53,440 data. >> It is inside of a storage system. 475 00:34:51,280 --> 00:34:56,440 » There you 476 00:34:56,639 --> 00:34:59,639 go. 477 00:35:00,800 --> 00:35:07,359 » All right. Hi. Uh my name is James Kane. I live here in Glenrock. 478 00:35:05,520 --> 00:35:11,520 My main issue with the with the fly cameras is not necessarily like you guys 479 00:35:09,200 --> 00:35:14,880 being able to find, you know, a kidnapper or something like that along 480 00:35:13,359 --> 00:35:21,040 those lines. I think that that's a that's a good thing that can be used. 481 00:35:16,880 --> 00:35:25,040 there is the problem with uh misuse. Um like I said pointed out in your 482 00:35:22,640 --> 00:35:30,079 presentation that you were the only one that does the in you know investigations 483 00:35:27,440 --> 00:35:35,520 and audits and things like that. And the the primary problem with this is that 484 00:35:33,200 --> 00:35:38,960 all of this stuff it's not like a closed camera system. I'd be happier with a 485 00:35:37,200 --> 00:35:44,079 closed camera system that you guys just had here at the police station. But then 486 00:35:41,359 --> 00:35:47,119 it goes out all over the web. All right. Now, we can talk about securities and 487 00:35:45,760 --> 00:35:51,119 this and that that nobody will understand in this room and all this 488 00:35:48,480 --> 00:35:57,040 stuff for hours. The problem is things like FBI uh databases, uh Pentagon 489 00:35:54,880 --> 00:36:01,440 databases, all this stuff has been breached by hackers throughout the 490 00:35:58,960 --> 00:36:06,400 world. There's already the reason why these things have been around for such a 491 00:36:03,599 --> 00:36:12,160 time and they're only now be gaining traction and people coming against them 492 00:36:08,800 --> 00:36:16,480 is because there has been issues, right? We can't change the law until there's an 493 00:36:14,000 --> 00:36:20,720 issue with the law, right? Or things that are going on in the public. 494 00:36:19,119 --> 00:36:24,960 So, basically, 495 00:36:22,960 --> 00:36:31,440 how could is there any way that we can make this system a Glenrock system, not 496 00:36:28,960 --> 00:36:34,560 a flock system that goes around the world for whatever to see because 497 00:36:33,040 --> 00:36:39,200 there's already >> uh there's already breaches of uh stuff 498 00:36:37,040 --> 00:36:44,079 elsewhere. I don't know. It was Poland to tell with VPNs and how they bounce it 499 00:36:41,599 --> 00:36:50,400 around because if you guys could track where it was leaked to all, excuse me, 500 00:36:47,119 --> 00:36:54,320 all of the uh all of the scammers and everybody in the world would already be 501 00:36:51,920 --> 00:36:59,119 caught. You know what I mean? Cuz there's too many things for it to go 502 00:36:55,920 --> 00:37:05,440 around. Um that's my that's my point. I just wanted to know instead of the flock 503 00:37:02,000 --> 00:37:09,599 cameras, we have a maybe our own system or something like that that's not 504 00:37:07,200 --> 00:37:14,720 broadcast around the world to parts unknown data brokers. We don't know. 505 00:37:12,800 --> 00:37:17,599 Once it's out there, we don't have access to it, but somebody does. 506 00:37:16,850 --> 00:37:21,640 [snorts] Thank you. Thank you. 507 00:37:26,079 --> 00:37:33,680 » Hi, I'm Sherin Kovatch. Uh, I grew up here in Glenrock and I have a whole list 508 00:37:31,200 --> 00:37:41,440 of questions, but and I will save my opposition for the city council meeting 509 00:37:35,599 --> 00:37:48,800 on the 14th. Um, I also second the motion to not renew the contract uh for 510 00:37:46,320 --> 00:37:56,240 many reasons that have been stated. So, I will limit my questions starting with 511 00:37:53,359 --> 00:38:05,040 uh this one. The order from page rock 0002 512 00:38:00,960 --> 00:38:10,240 say initial term of 24 and uh a 24 months and a renewal a renewal term of 513 00:38:07,839 --> 00:38:14,640 24 months not one year. The agreement says that the term begins with the 514 00:38:12,160 --> 00:38:21,119 cameras are installed and validated and the log shows the system life by 515 00:38:17,119 --> 00:38:25,520 midocctober 2024. What is the exact date uh this contract auto renews? What is 516 00:38:23,440 --> 00:38:31,119 the exact deadline for the town's 30 days written notice of nonrenewal and 517 00:38:28,800 --> 00:38:34,599 will we have a chance to speak on it is my first question. 518 00:38:35,280 --> 00:38:48,320 » Um the renewal date is October 14th. The 30-day window would be September. 519 00:38:41,599 --> 00:38:55,280 » Okay. Okay. And then the next question, Chief Felton, on December 8th, 2025, you 520 00:38:52,079 --> 00:39:00,079 ran two searches logged uh to a real hit and run case for a white ram pickup 521 00:38:57,280 --> 00:39:05,359 truck. 2 hours later, you ran roughly 40 more uh searches logged only as test. No 522 00:39:03,119 --> 00:39:12,160 case number. six of them filtering for RAM uh using the same time window and 523 00:39:08,960 --> 00:39:17,520 the extend uh and then extending it for 4 days further back. What are those uh 524 00:39:15,040 --> 00:39:25,119 40 searches actually looking for considering their tests and why the 525 00:39:21,200 --> 00:39:32,640 test? And maybe explain what test means because there is an awful lot of tests 526 00:39:30,320 --> 00:39:38,480 in the 375 different logs that were audited since 527 00:39:35,359 --> 00:39:40,800 the start of this. >> Yeah, 528 00:39:39,359 --> 00:39:48,240 » for now. >> All right, we'll try and get all those 529 00:39:42,880 --> 00:39:54,720 questions. Um, so December 2025. >> Yeah, it was December 8th, 2025. 530 00:39:51,520 --> 00:39:57,920 » I I apologize. I That's a year ago. I can't remember exactly what that was. I 531 00:39:56,480 --> 00:40:01,599 can tell you that when something like test is entered in there, it's either 532 00:39:59,760 --> 00:40:05,520 for training or we're training a new person on the system or some sort of an 533 00:40:04,240 --> 00:40:10,160 update. >> Can I answer her question first? Sure. 534 00:40:08,079 --> 00:40:16,000 You're welcome afterwards to ask her. >> Okay. So um either training of a new 535 00:40:13,280 --> 00:40:19,760 person or some sort of a new feature is added to the system. So we go in and 536 00:40:18,000 --> 00:40:26,240 then we have to retrain on that system for the new features. 537 00:40:22,000 --> 00:40:28,880 » So that is 40 searches within hours of that 538 00:40:26,720 --> 00:40:31,880 » without being able to go back. I apologize. 539 00:40:37,599 --> 00:40:45,839 » Okay. And then back to my first question, will the community have a 540 00:40:43,440 --> 00:40:51,760 chance to speak on it? And will the city council actually take the community's 541 00:40:48,480 --> 00:40:56,240 opinion into consideration? >> We will take items from the floor and 542 00:40:53,520 --> 00:41:00,000 yes, in a in a in a legal council meeting where we can make a vote, we 543 00:40:57,920 --> 00:41:03,240 will discuss that. >> Thank you. 544 00:41:06,400 --> 00:41:12,079 Hi. Uh, my name is Brett Kenway. I live here in Glenrock. Um, I'm going to be 545 00:41:10,560 --> 00:41:18,240 pretty quick and just be kind of matter of fact. Um, so since 546 00:41:16,000 --> 00:41:21,520 2024, I guess we've had these cameras for 2 years now. Since since those 547 00:41:20,160 --> 00:41:28,160 cameras went up, how many times have they actually actively led to some sort 548 00:41:24,160 --> 00:41:35,040 of arrest or some sort of I guess result would be uh the word I'm looking for in 549 00:41:31,119 --> 00:41:38,480 in an active investigation um that's been used to like you know close a case 550 00:41:36,720 --> 00:41:42,319 or something like that. >> I would estimate that it could be about 551 00:41:40,079 --> 00:41:46,000 10 to 12 times that we've used that system that would 552 00:41:44,000 --> 00:41:49,359 » and are you able to speak on like what kinds of cases those were? Is it is that 553 00:41:48,400 --> 00:41:53,040 something that you're allowed to talk about or um 554 00:41:50,960 --> 00:41:56,800 » I mean visually I can't talk about but a lot of them are usually uh missing 555 00:41:54,720 --> 00:42:02,560 people checks that kind of thing. >> Okay. Okay. I just I I bring it up just 556 00:42:00,640 --> 00:42:06,240 because of there's kind of a heavy emphasis on like the Amber Alert things 557 00:42:05,040 --> 00:42:10,720 and stuff that you guys brought up earlier and for for two years it just 558 00:42:08,560 --> 00:42:14,319 you know in a town of 2400 people how many how many people can possibly go 559 00:42:12,240 --> 00:42:18,760 missing? And I guess the answer is about five a year or six a year. 560 00:42:19,359 --> 00:42:26,079 job. So the actual idea and the the reason for no network versus closed 561 00:42:24,800 --> 00:42:29,680 network does that make sense with the sharing of other cameras and such is 562 00:42:27,760 --> 00:42:34,079 because it's not just our amber alerts that we right alert would be those 563 00:42:32,319 --> 00:42:36,480 entered by other agencies >> right 564 00:42:34,640 --> 00:42:40,640 » from anywhere >> and and and I totally get that 565 00:42:38,400 --> 00:42:45,520 understand um >> but the question kind of stands like of 566 00:42:42,800 --> 00:42:52,560 those 10 to 12 cases how many of those were like interstate or inter county or 567 00:42:48,640 --> 00:42:59,200 inner you know, larger than the town. >> Um, 568 00:42:54,480 --> 00:43:03,760 » just just thank you. Um, yeah, just just that seems like and remind me, I'm 569 00:43:02,160 --> 00:43:09,040 sorry, I'm not 100% clear. I've seen different figures. What was the total 570 00:43:05,280 --> 00:43:13,040 cost to the town of Glenrock? Like to us for those cameras to this point. 571 00:43:11,280 --> 00:43:16,640 » So, for the first year of the contract, I believe was roughly 19,000. It might 572 00:43:15,040 --> 00:43:21,599 have been just over that. Um, that included installation costs. The second 573 00:43:18,880 --> 00:43:24,079 year of that contract was 15,000. It's $3,000 per camera per year. 574 00:43:23,760 --> 00:43:27,680 » Okay. >> Multiply that by the five cameras that 575 00:43:25,440 --> 00:43:31,280 we use, 15 for the year. The first one did include more just because of the um 576 00:43:30,240 --> 00:43:34,599 installation cost. >> Right. Okay. 577 00:43:35,200 --> 00:43:41,040 And again, I I want to be clear, but just by saying like my main concern 578 00:43:39,520 --> 00:43:46,000 isn't, you know, how much of this is coming out of my paycheck, but um more 579 00:43:43,839 --> 00:43:50,640 so the privacy aspect. It just doesn't seem like, you know, 10 or 12 people 580 00:43:48,480 --> 00:43:56,240 over two years. I not that we should not look for people. Um I don't want to get 581 00:43:53,760 --> 00:44:00,319 conflated or twisted there, but um it just it just doesn't seem like the the 582 00:43:58,000 --> 00:44:07,920 amount of what I would consider invasion of privacy um to kind of be congruent 583 00:44:04,240 --> 00:44:11,200 with those results. Um so that that was kind of all the 584 00:44:09,599 --> 00:44:15,640 questions I had. So thanks for your time. 585 00:44:11,440 --> 00:44:15,640 » Thank you. Thank you. APPRECIATE IT. 586 00:44:16,480 --> 00:44:24,560 UH TO ADD TO HER question though, how many officers Jack Street, I'm a 587 00:44:21,599 --> 00:44:27,520 resident going out here. Uh in the last year, how many new cops have you had 588 00:44:26,560 --> 00:44:30,520 » in the last year? >> Yeah, 589 00:44:30,800 --> 00:44:36,560 » I would estimate three or four. >> Which ones? 590 00:44:34,640 --> 00:44:39,359 » Which new officers last year? Two of them were in the academy right now. 591 00:44:38,000 --> 00:44:43,119 » Oh, they're still in the academy. >> On the street. 592 00:44:40,160 --> 00:44:47,839 » Okay. Okay. So I was just wondering when you say training in the last year, how 593 00:44:45,359 --> 00:44:51,760 many officers are you training for the 40 searches that she said on 594 00:44:50,160 --> 00:44:55,599 » who's here has to train and then like I said software updates occur, changes are 595 00:44:53,839 --> 00:44:59,440 made in the system and new things have to be looked up. 596 00:44:56,800 --> 00:45:03,200 » All right. So here's some data for you for national average tracks 597 00:45:01,200 --> 00:45:08,079 ex-girlfriends and her teenage daughter 600 times. This is you like you started 598 00:45:06,400 --> 00:45:12,800 tracks ex-girlfriend and her new boyfriend 200 times plus. Track 599 00:45:10,480 --> 00:45:17,920 estranged wife multiple track ex-girlfriend and her parents 100 times. 600 00:45:15,440 --> 00:45:24,000 Tracked ex-girlfriends multiple track a woman who met with working security on 601 00:45:20,240 --> 00:45:28,960 TV set then pulled her over multiple. So that has a real concern to me with 602 00:45:26,800 --> 00:45:36,480 all the women around here as how these are getting abused. I got here some more 603 00:45:32,560 --> 00:45:40,079 for you. Um, my question is the department on the policy requires every 604 00:45:38,319 --> 00:45:43,520 flock search to have a relevant case number and [music] legitimate law 605 00:45:42,000 --> 00:45:47,040 enforcement. Right. And that goes for the law as well 606 00:45:45,599 --> 00:45:52,400 in Wyoming. >> It goes for the law 607 00:45:48,160 --> 00:45:54,880 » as the law set in Wyoming on cameras. Where does the law stand? 608 00:45:53,599 --> 00:45:57,599 » I'm not aware of the law. >> Oh, they don't have any laws for flock 609 00:45:56,800 --> 00:46:01,680 safety? >> No, sir. 610 00:45:59,520 --> 00:46:07,680 just policy and procedures by the town of Waro that you must follow. Okay. So 611 00:46:04,560 --> 00:46:14,480 the auto log show that requirements was ignored on 370 out of 375 searches in 612 00:46:11,520 --> 00:46:19,520 the last 2 years. What did they put instead on the audit logs? 613 00:46:17,440 --> 00:46:23,040 » So when a test or a training was occurring, obviously there's not a case 614 00:46:20,880 --> 00:46:29,440 number associated with that. >> Okay, I would kind of fall into that. Um 615 00:46:25,680 --> 00:46:31,839 under the policy that would be regarding any searches that occur there just 616 00:46:31,280 --> 00:46:39,200 searches. >> Yeah. If you was doing a policy of your 617 00:46:35,040 --> 00:46:46,400 own policy, right, of being a case number and justification, right? 618 00:46:42,079 --> 00:46:52,400 » Okay. 370 out of 375 searches didn't have that. So I think that you're 619 00:46:49,200 --> 00:46:56,560 referring to um the logs that were public public information requests 620 00:46:54,160 --> 00:46:59,280 turned over that. So in those logs the case numbers were actually removed. 621 00:46:58,240 --> 00:47:05,040 » Okay. >> As well as the license plates is a 622 00:47:01,680 --> 00:47:09,119 couple of those were missed. That was a redaction error. 623 00:47:06,319 --> 00:47:15,040 » Huh. Always an errors. God, I hate errors. Uh all right. So on November 624 00:47:12,319 --> 00:47:21,599 27th of 2025, there was a search with the filter out 625 00:47:17,839 --> 00:47:26,480 of all Wyoming plates in Grock. So and what you wanted to do is you filtered 626 00:47:23,599 --> 00:47:32,800 out everybody in town of Wyoming and went out and tracked every other license 627 00:47:28,720 --> 00:47:37,280 plate with 6,000 some odd networks of 49 other states of that didn't have Wyoming 628 00:47:35,440 --> 00:47:42,960 plates that were in towns for Thanksgiving. Okay, that's included in 629 00:47:39,839 --> 00:47:46,960 Washington DC, Puerto Rico, and Mexico. And you did that on all the family 630 00:47:44,880 --> 00:47:52,480 members for Thanksgiving, singled them out. You took a filter on there, and you 631 00:47:50,079 --> 00:47:54,400 said filtered out all Wyoming plates, right? 632 00:47:53,119 --> 00:47:56,880 » I have no idea what you're talking about. 633 00:47:54,720 --> 00:47:58,880 » It's It's on the records that you guys supplied. 634 00:47:57,520 --> 00:48:00,240 » Records on in front of me. >> Okay. 635 00:47:59,280 --> 00:48:04,079 » I don't know what you're trying >> November 27th at 25. 636 00:48:02,400 --> 00:48:11,720 » Question November 16th. 637 00:48:05,440 --> 00:48:11,720 » November 27th. It was Thanksgiving Day. 638 00:48:13,520 --> 00:48:21,200 » Okay. Maybe it was. It was in that time. All right. Um, 639 00:48:18,880 --> 00:48:26,480 so when you come to one that says gambling or trespass and then says test 640 00:48:24,400 --> 00:48:28,559 afterwards, which one are you doing? Were you looking for gambling or 641 00:48:28,160 --> 00:48:32,240 testing? >> It would be a test 642 00:48:29,839 --> 00:48:34,400 » of gambling. There's nothing to do with gambling. 643 00:48:32,800 --> 00:48:38,240 » So it had an error of gambling or trespassing there. It's just information 644 00:48:36,160 --> 00:48:45,200 that was put in there for the test. >> Huh. Okay. 645 00:48:41,119 --> 00:48:50,079 Why is only five of out of 390 searches come to one case number? You only have 646 00:48:47,280 --> 00:48:52,400 one case number in 390 searches in 2 years. 647 00:48:50,480 --> 00:48:55,839 » As I told you earlier, those numbers were taken out. The case numbers as well 648 00:48:54,400 --> 00:48:59,599 as license plates were supposed to be taken out when that was released. There 649 00:48:57,680 --> 00:49:03,680 was a mistake in that process. >> Always mistakes. When the only 650 00:49:01,920 --> 00:49:07,920 accountability tool that come from promised us is filled with the word 651 00:49:05,359 --> 00:49:12,880 test, the system is not accountable. It is operating with the basic of we don't 652 00:49:10,720 --> 00:49:17,440 know. Uh I call for action. We not asking for 653 00:49:15,839 --> 00:49:21,839 another promise to do better. We're asking the count council to act. Demand 654 00:49:19,599 --> 00:49:27,440 a full independent review of every test search. Require real consequences for 655 00:49:24,720 --> 00:49:30,880 the documented policy violations. release the remaining emails in the 656 00:49:29,040 --> 00:49:35,119 complete order form without further delay and most importantly put the 657 00:49:32,960 --> 00:49:42,000 future of these counties on the ballot where it belongs to the people of Glenn 658 00:49:38,000 --> 00:49:48,000 to vote on it and off the town council. Uh the logs are public are documented. 659 00:49:46,400 --> 00:49:52,240 The only question left is whether this council will finally hold the system 660 00:49:50,000 --> 00:49:58,240 accountable to the community it is supposed to be served. And the last one 661 00:49:55,280 --> 00:50:02,880 is Mr. know you stated that you guys when you did these you permitted them 662 00:50:00,079 --> 00:50:09,760 outside your jurisdiction by getting a permit from white dot is that correct 663 00:50:05,599 --> 00:50:17,200 » okay that was and you did that by white dot right it wasn't extending the city 664 00:50:13,200 --> 00:50:20,160 limits like you quoted in cowboy daily >> cuz they said it got extended 665 00:50:19,200 --> 00:50:22,880 » I don't know the answer to that >> okay do you know the answer to that 666 00:50:21,760 --> 00:50:28,079 » no I do not >> okay cuz on cowboy daily you said that 667 00:50:24,880 --> 00:50:31,200 that we extended the city limits. That's not true. 668 00:50:28,480 --> 00:50:35,359 » City limits was extended to the south up to Deer Creek Road. Yes. I didn't say it 669 00:50:32,960 --> 00:50:39,119 was extended any other direction, Jack. >> Huh. Well, I can't even find any records 670 00:50:37,920 --> 00:50:42,960 of that. >> Wasn't done by this council. It was done 671 00:50:40,880 --> 00:50:50,559 by probably 12 years or long before it was done by 672 00:50:47,440 --> 00:50:54,559 back at that time when that all was in. So why is it the sheriff's department 673 00:50:52,480 --> 00:50:58,960 they hire patrol under these and not you? Cuz it's not even your jurisdiction 674 00:50:56,640 --> 00:51:01,280 where you hold up the data. >> Why is that? 675 00:50:59,760 --> 00:51:05,040 » Jurisdiction doesn't matter with these because these are not things that are 676 00:51:02,559 --> 00:51:07,599 being legally they're not the infractions aren't occurring outside of 677 00:51:06,559 --> 00:51:10,480 the jurisdiction. >> Huh? Who? 678 00:51:08,480 --> 00:51:14,079 » There's no infractions being recorded. And the only reason the jurisdiction 679 00:51:12,319 --> 00:51:16,640 jurisdiction would come into play is if say something were to be actionable on 680 00:51:16,240 --> 00:51:20,240 this. >> Yeah. The infractions. What do you mean 681 00:51:18,240 --> 00:51:23,599 by infractions? Infractions means breaking the law. 682 00:51:21,119 --> 00:51:27,920 » Is there any law you can just decide to run these fire without case numbers in? 683 00:51:26,480 --> 00:51:32,960 Is that what you're saying? >> I'm not sure. 684 00:51:29,040 --> 00:51:38,720 » I'm not either. So, all right. I run 100 miles between Grock and Casper. So, any 685 00:51:36,079 --> 00:51:42,960 given day I'm at I could run two to three times to Grock. That means I pass 686 00:51:40,800 --> 00:51:47,280 these six times a day. Times that by five, that's 30 a week. times that by 687 00:51:45,680 --> 00:51:52,240 52, you're looking for an astronomical 688 00:51:49,119 --> 00:51:56,720 amount. Say 3,000 times. I go to 15 rentals and going up in Casper. 689 00:51:54,880 --> 00:52:01,839 Especially if I have to replace a water heater and go up to Casper. We all 690 00:51:58,720 --> 00:52:06,400 commute. My problem is is we run a power four times a day. In 2 years, we've got 691 00:52:04,319 --> 00:52:11,040 a total of 2,000 times that we ran across those power plays. So, we could 692 00:52:08,400 --> 00:52:16,160 all be in fractions by your means. I mean, what? I mean seriously, we have a 693 00:52:13,839 --> 00:52:20,559 digital footprint this gang us in here and you know we are ranked number one on 694 00:52:18,720 --> 00:52:25,839 the internet for the safest town. Good job by the way. It's safest town in 695 00:52:23,359 --> 00:52:29,040 which in Wyoming right now. Okay. So I don't understand why we have 696 00:52:26,960 --> 00:52:34,160 justification for these systems when it's a foot in the door for what's 697 00:52:31,200 --> 00:52:38,400 coming next with drones with facial recognition. It's a foot in the door for 698 00:52:36,640 --> 00:52:44,319 total surveillance. Do we want to be like China? Come on now. That's where 699 00:52:40,800 --> 00:52:49,520 it's leading to just straight up do it. Might as well just throw it all away. 700 00:52:46,559 --> 00:52:53,359 You know, my grandfathers died in this country to [music] save our freedoms, 701 00:52:51,359 --> 00:52:57,440 our rights, our liberties, and put people like you guys that we can vote in 702 00:52:55,680 --> 00:53:03,599 charge and trustworthy to do the right thing. And man, I ain't giving up my 703 00:52:59,920 --> 00:53:07,599 rights that my family died for, man. I mean, we all have family members that 704 00:53:05,200 --> 00:53:12,319 have fought for this country and our freedoms. and it's a foot in our door to 705 00:53:10,000 --> 00:53:18,000 take our freedoms away. Especially in a town of 2400 people that lives 3 miles 706 00:53:15,680 --> 00:53:22,559 off the road. Who's going to detour of a criminal to come through our town to buy 707 00:53:20,400 --> 00:53:26,800 gas in the middle of the night? They're going to stick to 25. What? I mean, 708 00:53:25,200 --> 00:53:32,000 seriously, we're 72% below average for a crime 709 00:53:30,000 --> 00:53:34,559 rate. It doesn't make sense. 710 00:53:33,280 --> 00:53:38,720 » Are you asking me a question? >> No, I'm just talking personal 711 00:53:36,160 --> 00:53:42,119 personally, but I'm done. Thank you. That was good. 712 00:53:43,040 --> 00:53:49,440 » I had uh one other question or perhaps a couple of quick questions. So, I've been 713 00:53:47,119 --> 00:53:53,200 writing software since like the '90s and often times when I'm doing stuff for 714 00:53:51,119 --> 00:53:56,480 like hospitals or lawyers or you know like personal information, bank 715 00:53:54,400 --> 00:54:00,400 accounts, like we create sandbox environments so that way we're not 716 00:53:58,480 --> 00:54:05,040 exposing personal information and we can test all kinds of different things, 717 00:54:01,839 --> 00:54:08,800 train, so on and so forth. Why wasn't testing done through something like 718 00:54:06,720 --> 00:54:13,359 that? as opposed to real citizens information. 719 00:54:10,000 --> 00:54:17,920 » So that's a great question for because I agree with you on that but it 720 00:54:15,839 --> 00:54:21,079 just they just haven't environment. >> Thank you. 721 00:54:24,000 --> 00:54:30,000 » Hi, my name is Tate Wise. I have four questions down. First, are there any 722 00:54:28,400 --> 00:54:33,119 portions of the contract the town has with Flock that any of you council 723 00:54:31,520 --> 00:54:36,960 members would like to see changed in any way if we were to, you know, renew it or 724 00:54:35,520 --> 00:54:41,520 if you could just go back in time and change any stipulations? 725 00:54:39,760 --> 00:54:43,040 » I'll be honest. I've never read the contract. 726 00:54:42,319 --> 00:54:46,359 » Yeah, >> I'll be honest. 727 00:54:46,559 --> 00:54:53,200 » Okay. And uh well, I guess I don't know who direct 728 00:54:51,680 --> 00:54:57,359 this next question. I guess it's a follow-up question, but um do you know 729 00:54:55,520 --> 00:55:01,280 how much flexibility flock provides when 730 00:54:59,280 --> 00:55:04,960 negotiating with the municipality in terms of the details of the contract. Is 731 00:55:03,200 --> 00:55:08,240 it pretty willing to say yes, we're willing to make this concession and that 732 00:55:06,319 --> 00:55:12,160 concession? It sounds like they might be. 733 00:55:09,280 --> 00:55:16,160 » My understanding, but my understanding is that yes, they 734 00:55:13,599 --> 00:55:20,559 will make alterations to the contract. >> Okay. Thank you. Um, regarding 735 00:55:18,800 --> 00:55:23,599 intermunicipal flock searches, could you tell us about how Glenrock works with 736 00:55:21,920 --> 00:55:28,559 other municipalities and what sort of data is shared? be more particular, 737 00:55:26,000 --> 00:55:32,559 would you would you speak to how or if information at all is shared using 738 00:55:30,480 --> 00:55:36,960 information directly from Flock between municipalities? 739 00:55:34,640 --> 00:55:40,880 I guess what I'm asking is, you know, when working with other municipalities, 740 00:55:39,119 --> 00:55:45,280 is it something through Flock where you're able to like, you know, share 741 00:55:42,880 --> 00:55:48,640 footage or give direct access to another municipality for a certain period of 742 00:55:46,559 --> 00:55:51,200 time or does another municipality just call the police department and say, 743 00:55:49,839 --> 00:55:54,240 "Hey, we're wondering if this license plate has come through town." So if 744 00:55:52,880 --> 00:55:57,440 somebody wanted information like that, yes, they would have to call unless 745 00:55:56,000 --> 00:56:00,720 they're a subscriber of the flock system. They're a subscriber of the 746 00:55:58,960 --> 00:56:02,160 flock system and they can search from their end. 747 00:56:01,680 --> 00:56:06,079 » Okay. >> Depended on who they were and whether we 748 00:56:04,640 --> 00:56:10,160 allow would allow them for something like that. But for something like that, 749 00:56:08,079 --> 00:56:17,359 that would require a license. >> Okay. Um, so if we were to have a 30-day 750 00:56:15,040 --> 00:56:21,680 cutoff, but another municipality were to connect to us using what you just 751 00:56:19,520 --> 00:56:26,079 mentioned and they didn't have a 30-day cut off, would the data from our town be 752 00:56:24,240 --> 00:56:28,960 we be deleted from their database after 30 days or would they retain it? 753 00:56:27,760 --> 00:56:32,319 » You mean if they searched it and they retained that like they did a search and 754 00:56:31,040 --> 00:56:36,160 got that data from our system? >> I Yes. 755 00:56:34,160 --> 00:56:39,119 » My understanding would be yes. Okay. >> Unless they were able to download that 756 00:56:38,160 --> 00:56:43,359 as evidence. >> Okay. Thank you. And uh would you be 757 00:56:42,000 --> 00:56:46,559 willing to be more particular when running test searches? For example, by 758 00:56:44,960 --> 00:56:49,920 naming the officer being trained and the exact skill being taught so that there 759 00:56:48,480 --> 00:56:51,920 aren't just things saying tests, but more particular things. 760 00:56:50,880 --> 00:56:55,040 » Yeah, we definitely look into those changes. 761 00:56:52,480 --> 00:56:58,079 » Okay. Thank you. And uh do any council members uh have any thoughts on how to 762 00:56:56,720 --> 00:57:01,599 provide a higher degree of oversight perhaps from outside the police 763 00:56:59,280 --> 00:57:06,799 department? I mean, no shade at all. I I trust you, right? But you know, just 764 00:57:03,119 --> 00:57:11,520 just institutionally, you know. >> Any thoughts, 765 00:57:08,079 --> 00:57:16,079 » sir? I I appreciate hearing the thoughts of the citizens of our community and I 766 00:57:14,240 --> 00:57:21,119 just want to hear what you have to say and what you have to what you feel about 767 00:57:18,319 --> 00:57:24,079 this and to think upon it. Thank you. >> Oh, thank you. All right. Anything else? 768 00:57:23,359 --> 00:57:28,000 We're good. >> I think we're going to take all the 769 00:57:25,359 --> 00:57:31,359 information we got tonight and evaluate. >> Okay. Thank you very much. 770 00:57:28,960 --> 00:57:32,720 » We are we're going to look at this. So, >> all right. I appreciate it, guys. Thank 771 00:57:32,559 --> 00:57:36,799 you. >> We can't make any decisions on this 772 00:57:34,720 --> 00:57:40,640 tonight. This is council. >> No, this is 773 00:57:37,520 --> 00:57:43,760 » it would have to go into an exam session on and during your regular council 774 00:57:42,319 --> 00:57:46,240 meeting. So, it's an official. >> Yeah. 775 00:57:44,400 --> 00:57:50,799 » I just want to make one comment. First and foremost, I think that everybody up 776 00:57:48,319 --> 00:57:54,799 here tries to do their very level best by way of the town. 777 00:57:52,400 --> 00:57:58,880 » And to the extent that we have this many people showing up tonight for this kind 778 00:57:56,400 --> 00:58:02,079 of system issue, I mean, this is powerful. This is what democracy is. 779 00:58:00,799 --> 00:58:06,880 This is what government should look like. So, it's real good that 780 00:58:03,760 --> 00:58:13,520 everybody's here to voice your concerns. And to the extent that there's 781 00:58:10,799 --> 00:58:18,880 information being misappropriated or, you know, mismanaged, 782 00:58:16,000 --> 00:58:23,920 I haven't been a part of any of the discussions related to blockch. But now 783 00:58:20,799 --> 00:58:30,559 that I am, I can assure everybody that I've looked at um this system and what 784 00:58:27,680 --> 00:58:34,240 Chief Selson's been doing that the fact that we're here, we're being transparent 785 00:58:32,480 --> 00:58:38,079 and open and trying to educate everybody in the community, I'm not in a position 786 00:58:36,319 --> 00:58:41,680 to know, you know, how this is beneficial or how it's helpful or what 787 00:58:40,319 --> 00:58:47,040 have you. He'd be in the best position to do that. But to the extent these 788 00:58:43,760 --> 00:58:52,240 folks appear um trying to withhold information or invoke more 789 00:58:50,319 --> 00:58:58,480 » are you legal counsel for them? No. >> Yes. Invoke more government versus less 790 00:58:56,240 --> 00:59:02,640 freedom. That's certainly not their intention. And so if it's the masses 791 00:59:01,040 --> 00:59:07,359 here deciding that this is not something the town or those folks want to do, I 792 00:59:04,480 --> 00:59:11,680 mean it's real powerful for everybody up here to hear from you. So I appreciate 793 00:59:09,520 --> 00:59:15,760 everybody's attendance tonight. my I appreciate, you know, being educated on 794 00:59:13,440 --> 00:59:19,920 this topic. It's not something that comes up in my day-to-day work and 795 00:59:18,079 --> 00:59:25,040 unless it's brought to my attention to review these things, I wouldn't be doing 796 00:59:22,160 --> 00:59:29,280 it. Otherwise, I'd be full-time every single day legal counsel reviewing every 797 00:59:27,200 --> 00:59:33,359 single document these folks do. And so to the extent that you know that 798 00:59:31,520 --> 00:59:36,960 everybody up here didn't review the contract or that they didn't have a good 799 00:59:35,280 --> 00:59:43,440 understanding of what the exact terms are, it's certainly not from that 800 00:59:40,000 --> 00:59:48,160 standpoint in my opinion. Um it's certainly that you guys coming out and 801 00:59:45,920 --> 00:59:52,400 speaking about your objections, your questions, your issues with this is just 802 00:59:50,319 --> 00:59:57,599 helpful in terms of a governmental standpoint for us to understand what the 803 00:59:54,559 --> 00:59:58,880 citizens want to do here. So that's just my two cents. 804 00:59:58,480 --> 01:00:01,359 » Oh, ma'am. >> Thank you. 805 00:59:59,520 --> 01:00:03,599 » You're counsel, but we don't know who you are. 806 01:00:02,240 --> 01:00:05,520 » I'm Amy. >> Okay. Thank you. 807 01:00:04,559 --> 01:00:08,720 » Very nice. Thank you. I >> I had one more question. Um, 808 01:00:07,040 --> 01:00:13,760 » thank you so much for coming in. >> Thank you, by the way. Uh, 809 01:00:11,680 --> 01:00:17,920 » could any of you quickly clarify the constitutionality of of this? I I mean, 810 01:00:16,160 --> 01:00:21,040 I'm sure there's something here about, you know, plain view or something like 811 01:00:19,520 --> 01:00:24,480 that. I mean, could you could you talk about it? So, I don't really want to 812 01:00:22,720 --> 01:00:28,480 give you like a constitutional analysis, but just think of it this way. Okay? So, 813 01:00:27,040 --> 01:00:32,960 the last time I went through the Denver airport and I wanted to sign up for 814 01:00:30,640 --> 01:00:36,720 clear or whatever, I walked up to the machine to sign up for that clear system 815 01:00:35,200 --> 01:00:40,960 so you can go through the airport on the faster track, right? I put my 816 01:00:39,280 --> 01:00:47,200 fingerprint on there and it knew immediately who my mom was as who my 817 01:00:44,319 --> 01:00:50,079 mom's maiden name was. And so, that was one of the test questions. I mean to the 818 01:00:48,880 --> 01:00:53,680 extent that we are >> You volunteered that. 819 01:00:51,520 --> 01:00:57,200 » I volunteered the fingerprint. True. But at the same time, the fact that I just 820 01:00:55,200 --> 01:01:01,599 put my finger on there and they knew who I was by reading my fingerprint or they 821 01:00:59,680 --> 01:01:06,720 can test as good as you think considering the information that's been 822 01:01:03,680 --> 01:01:09,200 gathered used through other situations. >> It's terrifying. 823 01:01:07,359 --> 01:01:13,040 » By you putting a fingerprint on there. Now you throw in the metric of knowing 824 01:01:10,880 --> 01:01:16,960 where everybody goes, who's driving that car by who it's licensed to, their 825 01:01:15,200 --> 01:01:22,720 fingerprints, their background, their everything that's put together through a 826 01:01:19,040 --> 01:01:27,839 mosaic of all of this surveillance >> that is the problem we are all going to 827 01:01:24,640 --> 01:01:32,559 hear that are against >> No, and I hear that. I mean, ultimately 828 01:01:30,160 --> 01:01:36,720 to the extent that you have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the public 829 01:01:34,240 --> 01:01:42,160 view anymore, it just doesn't necessarily exist. And so now with the 830 01:01:40,160 --> 01:01:49,520 implementation of the flock system, I mean I I do a lot of 1983 litigation. So 831 01:01:45,680 --> 01:01:53,520 that's civil right litigation and um you know to identify criminals or the like 832 01:01:51,920 --> 01:01:58,079 that that's one of the tools that officers use but to the extent that 833 01:01:55,760 --> 01:02:04,799 there are invasion of privacy issues it's been a hotly debated topic across 834 01:02:00,240 --> 01:02:09,359 the US right so I mean there is very little expectation of privacy and policy 835 01:02:07,280 --> 01:02:12,799 anymore but there's also a reason that we choose to live in a place like 836 01:02:11,520 --> 01:02:17,520 Wyoming >> yeah we choose gun to have and live in 837 01:02:15,680 --> 01:02:21,599 the big cities where these things happen to get out of the hustle and bustle to 838 01:02:19,200 --> 01:02:26,640 live in town. >> Would you guys like if you want to talk 839 01:02:24,000 --> 01:02:32,799 come to the podium and we're we're about to we're all here 840 01:02:29,760 --> 01:02:36,240 on free gratus time so this is not going to last much longer. 841 01:02:34,480 --> 01:02:41,200 » I really appreciate you guys for having this meeting and for you guys being 842 01:02:37,920 --> 01:02:46,240 here. Obviously, I know it's a touchy subject and um it's not always fun to be 843 01:02:44,480 --> 01:02:49,680 when when you know that you're just trying to do what's right to be 844 01:02:47,839 --> 01:02:55,280 questioned. And excuse me, ma'am. Oh, sorry, Brandy Senson. 845 01:02:52,240 --> 01:03:01,599 Um okay, so I just have a couple questions. Um how did Flock come to you? 846 01:02:58,799 --> 01:03:06,160 Was it like marketed to you or how did that come and how did you decide we 847 01:03:04,000 --> 01:03:11,760 needed it here? So, um, I apologize that was back in 848 01:03:09,280 --> 01:03:15,280 early 2024. I I don't remember if I saw it somewhere. 849 01:03:12,640 --> 01:03:19,520 » Okay. >> Actually, we still get a lot of phone 850 01:03:16,400 --> 01:03:26,880 calls. A lot of emails, but 851 01:03:21,599 --> 01:03:30,799 » Okay, awesome. Um, so the other question that I have is about auditing. And I 852 01:03:28,720 --> 01:03:34,319 just want to say I'm very pro law enforcement as well. I just know that 853 01:03:32,400 --> 01:03:38,880 there's also humans in law enforcement. And so I'm not meaning any of this 854 01:03:36,240 --> 01:03:44,319 personal towards anybody in in this room or on our you know force or anything but 855 01:03:42,240 --> 01:03:48,640 um the audit as far as the audit goes and I do appreciate the question that 856 01:03:46,079 --> 01:03:53,680 Hard has but how does can you explain more about what you do to audit it to 857 01:03:51,039 --> 01:03:58,640 make sure that it's only being used for correct purposes and I assume that's 858 01:03:55,599 --> 01:04:03,760 only for you can only audit your officers not any other people who are 859 01:04:02,079 --> 01:04:09,480 maybe in Tennessee that are on the flock. system surging in Glenrock, 860 01:04:06,480 --> 01:04:09,480 right? 861 01:04:09,520 --> 01:04:15,440 » So, yes, the audit is an internal audit. Not sure I understand what the rest of 862 01:04:13,920 --> 01:04:19,280 the question as far as me auditing another agency. I don't know. 863 01:04:17,680 --> 01:04:24,160 » Yeah. So, like you can't tell whether the person from I'll say Tennessee, 864 01:04:21,839 --> 01:04:28,559 sorry, no offense to Tennessee. Um but just somebody else. You there's no way 865 01:04:26,480 --> 01:04:32,400 to tell whether that is a legit case. He's not just stalking his ex-girlfriend 866 01:04:30,559 --> 01:04:36,000 or something. So, 867 01:04:33,839 --> 01:04:40,319 » can somebody from Tennessee get on your flock system and run search? 868 01:04:38,160 --> 01:04:44,880 » Nobody can come through our system if that makes sense. However, the [snorts] 869 01:04:42,240 --> 01:04:50,880 idea of the national sharing network, it is possible that other cameras could 870 01:04:48,000 --> 01:04:55,760 utilize I mean search across our system. >> Okay. Can you explain that a little more 871 01:04:52,640 --> 01:05:01,119 cuz it like it sounds like yours to me it was contradictory. 872 01:04:59,039 --> 01:05:06,160 » So, Cter let me let me take a stab at that. So, so say somebody in Tennessee, 873 01:05:03,680 --> 01:05:10,319 law enforcement, Jacksonboro, Tennessee, wants to search Wying license plate 874 01:05:07,839 --> 01:05:15,119 1079. If they search that, I got to find my truck cuz that's my truck. If they do 875 01:05:12,799 --> 01:05:18,079 that, do you get notified that they that they found the truck in Glenrock, 876 01:05:16,720 --> 01:05:21,680 Wyoming that they were searching for on Fox? Is that your question, Rick? 877 01:05:19,839 --> 01:05:25,760 » Uh, yeah. That's the beginning of it. Yeah. So no, it would be not I mean 878 01:05:24,240 --> 01:05:29,119 unless there was something with that system like it was flagged 879 01:05:27,520 --> 01:05:33,359 » then it would notify >> but that's possible for them to do that. 880 01:05:31,760 --> 01:05:36,799 » Yeah. That's the idea of the the national 881 01:05:34,880 --> 01:05:40,000 versus just keeping it internal is that if I enter somebody as a a missing 882 01:05:38,720 --> 01:05:43,839 person right and somebody's kidnapped from here we enter them into the system 883 01:05:41,520 --> 01:05:48,160 and they would go to another area and I be able to search those other cameras 884 01:05:45,440 --> 01:05:54,079 and that to flag or for that to flag in those other areas. Yes. 885 01:05:51,280 --> 01:05:59,039 And yeah, how does that differ from, you know, like NCIC or something like that? 886 01:05:56,640 --> 01:06:04,319 Um, putting in that Amber Alert or, 887 01:06:02,079 --> 01:06:08,559 you know, all points built in or, you know, how how come you can't go? It's 888 01:06:06,960 --> 01:06:11,520 just faster this way if you're using all this technology. 889 01:06:09,760 --> 01:06:14,640 » So, it's faster and that you're you're employing the the number of cameras that 890 01:06:13,359 --> 01:06:18,960 are out there, right, to catch that instead of just relying on one officer 891 01:06:16,640 --> 01:06:24,559 to see that. Does that make sense? >> Sure. Okay. Um, and is there a way to 892 01:06:22,079 --> 01:06:28,880 turn that off so that nobody else could come into our area to search in 893 01:06:26,240 --> 01:06:32,319 Glenrock? No other state, you know. >> So, so yes, you can opt out of that, but 894 01:06:30,799 --> 01:06:37,760 then that removes us from being able to utilize those other ones. Um, and also I 895 01:06:35,680 --> 01:06:41,280 can tell you that I am aware that the company itself is actually putting in 896 01:06:39,359 --> 01:06:46,000 some they're altering the way that works so that you can alter uh my 897 01:06:43,599 --> 01:06:48,160 understanding is they have to have only certain reasons can be searched if that 898 01:06:47,680 --> 01:06:52,319 makes sense. >> Okay. So like we could switch once 899 01:06:50,400 --> 01:06:55,200 that's out. It's not out yet. >> Hypothetically 900 01:06:53,119 --> 01:06:58,559 » once that's out certainly it's as I said going to be given a lot of 901 01:06:57,520 --> 01:07:01,680 » and it sounds like a good thing. But anyway long story short we can actually 902 01:07:00,079 --> 01:07:05,280 select what things they could search across the system. So cannot do those 903 01:07:04,319 --> 01:07:09,920 kind of >> okay like the case kind of. 904 01:07:07,680 --> 01:07:15,119 » Okay. And then um what did you when you said on that toggle the federal was off. 905 01:07:13,359 --> 01:07:18,640 Can you explain that a little bit more? So that would mean that if a federal 906 01:07:16,400 --> 01:07:21,200 agency wanted to share, so um the network sharing like we just talked 907 01:07:19,839 --> 01:07:25,920 about that is actually something that one agency has to agree to with another 908 01:07:23,119 --> 01:07:31,359 agency to allow the reciprocity of that national search or famil. 909 01:07:28,400 --> 01:07:35,760 Um so what that toggle does it doesn't allow any federal agencies to actually 910 01:07:33,359 --> 01:07:40,480 even reach out and ask to share. Oh, >> okay. Okay. Um it's interesting that 911 01:07:38,960 --> 01:07:47,200 it's okay from other states but not federally. And I know that's a whole 912 01:07:42,000 --> 01:07:52,160 other issue. Um, last question is, um, and I guess more just a thought with the 913 01:07:49,680 --> 01:07:58,240 with the testing. I appreciate the council's, um, pointing out, you know, 914 01:07:55,200 --> 01:08:01,920 that our data is everywhere. And again, no offense to anybody, but when it's in 915 01:08:00,160 --> 01:08:06,240 the hands of the government, that's the reason that the United States has the 916 01:08:04,079 --> 01:08:08,960 Constitution and the amendments and everything like that. And I know that 917 01:08:07,520 --> 01:08:13,920 you did talk about some constitutionality, but there was a 918 01:08:11,280 --> 01:08:19,120 recent Supreme Court case um federal Supreme Court case about um Chhatri 919 01:08:16,560 --> 01:08:27,759 versus some state, I don't remember, and it was talking it said that um the 920 01:08:23,520 --> 01:08:32,880 the data to get like a phone dump area to see who were all phones. Um that that 921 01:08:30,400 --> 01:08:38,480 still requires a search warrant. And even though right now it hasn't gone the 922 01:08:36,159 --> 01:08:41,759 right case, we all I we all know how case law like you got to have the right 923 01:08:40,000 --> 01:08:45,920 case. sending just the right facts and d and eventually it you know but anyways 924 01:08:43,759 --> 01:08:53,600 it hasn't been ruled to Supreme Court but why not just in your policy require 925 01:08:50,400 --> 01:08:59,279 maybe a search warrant or something to do more looking not just you know so 926 01:08:55,920 --> 01:09:04,000 that we know as citizens and we have a little more trust because as as a 927 01:09:01,199 --> 01:09:10,400 citizen and in Wyoming even when you ask for a public records the keeper of the 928 01:09:07,279 --> 01:09:14,319 records in my um experience the keeper of the records can say actually it's not 929 01:09:12,640 --> 01:09:19,199 for the public's best interest to see that and that is really hard to tr and 930 01:09:17,440 --> 01:09:25,520 it's like trust me bro and I'm like sorry that like no offense but like 931 01:09:21,359 --> 01:09:31,120 that's that's what England said. So um I'm not trying to be like but it's true 932 01:09:28,319 --> 01:09:36,640 and um it's just really hard to again no offense to anybody but um that's why 933 01:09:34,000 --> 01:09:40,440 people get so so nervous about this and I appreciate YOUR TIME. 934 01:09:43,679 --> 01:09:51,920 UM, MY NAME IS Jackie Harder. I live in Rolling Hills. My question is, 935 01:09:49,600 --> 01:09:57,280 how often do you share the flock information with Casper Police 936 01:09:54,480 --> 01:10:01,920 Department? Um, when you guys are working together for say a car going 937 01:09:59,440 --> 01:10:07,768 through Wyoming, does Casper have flock cameras? 938 01:10:03,760 --> 01:10:10,400 » Oh, but they're bigger than us, right? [snorts] 939 01:10:08,000 --> 01:10:17,679 » Okay. So you can't share the information about Glenrock with our local police 940 01:10:13,520 --> 01:10:22,800 departments like Douglas PD, Casper PD, Gillette PD. So you can't share any of 941 01:10:20,560 --> 01:10:25,920 that locally with any of our police departments. 942 01:10:24,000 --> 01:10:30,800 » None of us in the system or they call that request. 943 01:10:28,000 --> 01:10:37,679 » So the closest city in Wyoming to us that also has 944 01:10:34,560 --> 01:10:40,880 flock cameras is Cheyenne. So, do you guys share the information back and 945 01:10:39,199 --> 01:10:46,000 forth with Cheyenne? Do you guys work a lot with Cheyenne since they're so close 946 01:10:42,960 --> 01:10:48,640 to us? >> So, 947 01:10:47,520 --> 01:10:52,560 I'm not sure what you mean by sharing information back and forth. So, if 948 01:10:50,080 --> 01:10:57,679 Cheyenne has flot cameras and we're the closest place to Cheyenne that has flot 949 01:10:55,920 --> 01:11:03,760 cameras, how what is the point? If there's crime 950 01:11:01,679 --> 01:11:09,360 that's done here and there's crime that's done in Casper, Douglas, all the 951 01:11:06,719 --> 01:11:14,640 places that are close around us, they're all bigger than us, but we have 952 01:11:12,960 --> 01:11:20,800 slot cameras here, but they don't have them going into Casper. So, how 953 01:11:17,600 --> 01:11:25,760 beneficial is an Amber Alert or anything once they leave to the next city closest 954 01:11:24,960 --> 01:11:28,480 to us? >> How beneficial would it be for me to put 955 01:11:26,880 --> 01:11:32,159 in an Amber Alert or >> Right. because they're not going to know 956 01:11:29,840 --> 01:11:33,760 because it's on flock. So, how can they know that it's driving through their 957 01:11:33,280 --> 01:11:36,640 city? >> So, yeah, certainly they would have to 958 01:11:35,120 --> 01:11:40,640 drive past one of those cameras for the alert to go on. However, Amber alerts 959 01:11:38,880 --> 01:11:43,600 are also put out through NCIC, which means every officer is made aware of 960 01:11:42,800 --> 01:11:47,600 that. >> Okay. So every officer, 961 01:11:46,080 --> 01:11:51,679 so pretty much my question is why do we 962 01:11:49,360 --> 01:11:56,080 have the flat kayas? Casper doesn't have them. Douglas doesn't have them. We're 963 01:11:53,920 --> 01:12:02,320 smaller than both of them. Maybe not Douglas, but why do we have so many and 964 01:12:00,080 --> 01:12:05,040 the cities that are closest to us don't have them? 965 01:12:03,520 --> 01:12:08,320 » So would that be a question to ask them? I can tell you that when we went into 966 01:12:06,719 --> 01:12:12,400 this, those cities were all looking at the system as well. whether they went 967 01:12:10,560 --> 01:12:15,360 with another system or just opted out of it completely. I can't really speak to 968 01:12:14,000 --> 01:12:19,199 that. That is on them. >> So, they obviously didn't get them for 969 01:12:17,760 --> 01:12:21,120 some reason or another. >> Yeah. 970 01:12:19,920 --> 01:12:26,000 » Huh. Okay. >> So, the original intention was to try 971 01:12:23,040 --> 01:12:28,880 and partner and get those cameras put in those other places as well. So, they 972 01:12:27,199 --> 01:12:33,040 would be more beneficial in that sense. >> Okay. So, when is our what is the 973 01:12:30,719 --> 01:12:37,679 benefit since you said it would be more beneficial if they had them. What is the 974 01:12:35,520 --> 01:12:41,679 exact benefit for us having them here in Glenrock? 975 01:12:39,199 --> 01:12:46,800 So um I pull back the cases that we talked about earlier. So what it does in 976 01:12:44,080 --> 01:12:50,320 those cases was help us solve those cases faster. 977 01:12:47,679 --> 01:12:54,000 » And those cases were from what year? >> A number of years. I've been here since 978 01:12:51,840 --> 01:12:55,920 2010 and I specifically only use cases that I personally. 979 01:12:55,520 --> 01:12:59,040 » Okay. >> From 2010. 980 01:12:56,880 --> 01:13:01,520 » So but recent cases it didn't help with right. 981 01:12:59,520 --> 01:13:07,760 » Okay. I listed those as well. So okay >> since we got the system like I told uh I 982 01:13:04,000 --> 01:13:11,280 apologize asked earlier u we used the system where the system is utilized and 983 01:13:09,360 --> 01:13:16,080 was specifically helpful in those cases I would say about 984 01:13:13,440 --> 01:13:20,719 » okay but it's not useful in the other cities then I guess that are close that 985 01:13:18,239 --> 01:13:23,920 my whole thing is why do we have them >> and why would you make that decision for 986 01:13:22,719 --> 01:13:28,800 us obviously >> is there a certain size that's required 987 01:13:26,320 --> 01:13:36,000 before we put a safety feature in place >> no not at all but the Point is, what 988 01:13:32,239 --> 01:13:41,920 makes you decide for us, a smaller town, when the PD of Casper, which is a much 989 01:13:39,840 --> 01:13:46,239 larger town, decides that it wasn't a good idea for 990 01:13:44,080 --> 01:13:48,800 whatever reason he came up with, why does it make you be like, "Oh, yep. I'm 991 01:13:47,760 --> 01:13:51,679 going to get them, even though no one else around me has them, except for 992 01:13:50,080 --> 01:13:57,640 Cheyenne." And then you get to Denver and we don't even talk about them. 993 01:13:54,640 --> 01:13:57,640 So, 994 01:13:58,719 --> 01:14:04,080 » the decision to to go with them wasn't necessarily made specific to anyone else 995 01:14:02,719 --> 01:14:08,400 going with them as well, >> but it says that the main person for the 996 01:14:06,480 --> 01:14:13,840 flop camera, it tells you what agency owns it, and it's Glenn Rock PD. So, 997 01:14:11,920 --> 01:14:16,960 that's you, right? >> Yes. 998 01:14:14,560 --> 01:14:21,679 » Okay. So, my question is, what made you decide to get them? Since you're the 999 01:14:20,800 --> 01:14:26,640 owner of it, >> there's a potential use for the consult. 1000 01:14:24,719 --> 01:14:30,480 » Okay. So, the but there's also a potential use just like she was talking 1001 01:14:28,560 --> 01:14:34,719 about the people in Tennessee. It's homicide, kidnapping, Amber Alert. Well, 1002 01:14:32,800 --> 01:14:40,640 my ex-boyfriend decided that he was a cop and he put Amber Alert out on me. 1003 01:14:38,320 --> 01:14:46,159 They found me here. Next thing you know, I have a very dangerous man showing up 1004 01:14:43,760 --> 01:14:49,600 at my doorstep because there was an Amber Alert on me. So, how is that 1005 01:14:48,719 --> 01:14:52,640 helpful? >> We speak hypothetical. 1006 01:14:51,120 --> 01:14:56,880 » Well, it's hypothetical that it's going to help you solve crimes, too, right? 1007 01:14:55,120 --> 01:15:00,960 Cuz it's a potential. You just said it was a potential 1008 01:14:58,719 --> 01:15:06,560 » and it has potential to do that. But it also has potential for my ex-husband to 1009 01:15:03,840 --> 01:15:11,600 find me who abused me and show up at my door because he's a cop and I was listed 1010 01:15:09,679 --> 01:15:16,239 as an amber alert today. >> Yes. 1011 01:15:13,120 --> 01:15:21,239 » Okay. Okay. That's that's my question and that's it. 1012 01:15:18,000 --> 01:15:21,239 » Thank you. 1013 01:15:24,800 --> 01:15:32,080 » Hi. Uh my name is Mariah Miller. Uh we live here in Glenrock. Um I just wrote 1014 01:15:30,800 --> 01:15:36,960 these down throughout this meeting. It's mostly just questions for clarity. Um so 1015 01:15:35,040 --> 01:15:44,000 for auditing, you said that you conduct internal audits. Um, is there any third 1016 01:15:40,320 --> 01:15:49,280 party or any objective party that audits outside of that or is it just you? 1017 01:15:47,280 --> 01:15:53,120 » So, the short answer is 1018 01:15:50,800 --> 01:15:58,159 » okay. So, my cause for concern for that would be because there have already been 1019 01:15:54,960 --> 01:16:02,560 so I don't want to say so many but um multiple charges for police officers as 1020 01:16:00,159 --> 01:16:07,120 has been stated already abusing the system. Um, one of them was a police 1021 01:16:04,880 --> 01:16:12,400 chief. Michael Steffman in Georgia was criminally charged for using Flock to 1022 01:16:09,520 --> 01:16:16,560 stalk his ex-girlfriend. So, what accountability is there for you because 1023 01:16:14,719 --> 01:16:23,280 you conduct the audits? Who's making sure that you're that it's not getting 1024 01:16:19,840 --> 01:16:27,360 corrected or incorrectly used essentially? Or are we just trusting 1025 01:16:24,800 --> 01:16:33,199 that not personal to you, but just trusting that on your good merit that 1026 01:16:30,719 --> 01:16:37,040 it's being used appropriately? All right. So certainly that's a good point 1027 01:16:36,159 --> 01:16:42,239 that's been brought up and it's something that we're going to have to 1028 01:16:37,920 --> 01:16:45,040 look into. It's not all >> and it's not personal too just because 1029 01:16:43,600 --> 01:16:49,199 it could be any police chief in the future. 1030 01:16:46,480 --> 01:16:54,239 » Okay. Um and then the next section or question sorry I hate public speaking. 1031 01:16:51,360 --> 01:16:58,320 Um for other on the searches that you were showing would that fall under test 1032 01:16:56,640 --> 01:17:01,040 that was the number one or what falls under that category? 1033 01:16:59,360 --> 01:17:05,760 » So it would be yeah it would be other things. I apologize. I haven't I don't 1034 01:17:03,600 --> 01:17:09,920 know exactly looking at it, but other would be testing 1035 01:17:07,840 --> 01:17:14,800 » testing. Okay. Cuz I just noticed that that was number one. Um and then is 1036 01:17:12,239 --> 01:17:19,440 there any policy in town for downloading our data? I know that the retention is 1037 01:17:16,400 --> 01:17:22,080 30 days. Um you had noted um that other towns like if there's a request for 1038 01:17:20,880 --> 01:17:26,400 evidence or if it's being used for evidence, they can download it. Um, is 1039 01:17:24,320 --> 01:17:29,920 that the actual policy? Like you can only download it if it's for evidence or 1040 01:17:28,080 --> 01:17:32,640 can you guys download that and retain it as long as 1041 01:17:30,719 --> 01:17:36,080 » So my understanding is that if those other 1042 01:17:34,560 --> 01:17:40,320 agencies wanted to download it, they would have to actually request that. As 1043 01:17:37,840 --> 01:17:44,159 far as us downloading it or say it was, you know, used for an investigation or 1044 01:17:42,000 --> 01:17:47,280 under investigation, um, it would become a part of that case. 1045 01:17:45,679 --> 01:17:51,440 » So is that the requirement though? You cannot download it unless it is for an 1046 01:17:49,679 --> 01:17:54,159 investigation or is there any specific policy around that? You mean internally? 1047 01:17:53,760 --> 01:17:57,360 » Yes. >> Yeah. No, you wouldn't download any part 1048 01:17:56,560 --> 01:18:02,480 of the case. >> Okay. Um and then I think just kind of a 1049 01:18:00,080 --> 01:18:07,440 question for everyone. Can you all kind of understand the concern that's coming 1050 01:18:04,159 --> 01:18:11,040 from the community around this? Um just because even for the transparency 1051 01:18:09,600 --> 01:18:16,080 portal, I don't think that was something that was brought up as a resource for us 1052 01:18:13,360 --> 01:18:21,040 in the town hall meet or the last city council meeting. Um, and I just think 1053 01:18:18,719 --> 01:18:25,199 it's just suspicious, not suspicious that kind of that it came up in July 1054 01:18:23,360 --> 01:18:29,840 after the Cowboy State Daily article came out making most of us aware of 1055 01:18:26,640 --> 01:18:32,960 these cameras. Um, when from what you're saying, most of it's automated. It 1056 01:18:31,280 --> 01:18:37,440 probably just took some configuration to get that up and running. So why did it 1057 01:18:34,560 --> 01:18:40,080 take almost 2 years for the transparency portal to be available? 1058 01:18:38,560 --> 01:18:44,400 » Portal wasn't an option that was offered by the company. And so like I said, to 1059 01:18:42,560 --> 01:18:47,280 my knowledge, July. I've been working on it since July to actually go through it 1060 01:18:46,000 --> 01:18:49,840 and stuff. Oh, that was when they gave it as an option. 1061 01:18:48,400 --> 01:18:53,840 » That was when I was aware of that as an option. Okay. It wasn't an option when 1062 01:18:51,520 --> 01:18:57,520 we first got the system. Um I'm not aware of it being an option prior to to 1063 01:18:56,640 --> 01:19:00,320 July. >> Okay. 1064 01:18:58,159 --> 01:19:02,320 » So, when it was in there, um going in and actually trying to look through 1065 01:19:01,199 --> 01:19:05,920 that, what it looked like, setting it up, how that works that started then I 1066 01:19:04,960 --> 01:19:11,120 can tell you that, you know, it's not like 247 1067 01:19:08,080 --> 01:19:14,560 was just specifically trying to do that. So, it did [clears throat] take time to 1068 01:19:13,040 --> 01:19:18,640 get it up and running. Yeah, I agree with you that the timing was not good. 1069 01:19:16,800 --> 01:19:21,800 » Okay, that was all I had. Thank you. >> Thank you. 1070 01:19:22,159 --> 01:19:28,960 » Is there anybody else has any questions? Otherwise, we're going to probably call 1071 01:19:25,280 --> 01:19:32,960 this close this meeting before long. >> Go ahead. If you had a question. Yes, my 1072 01:19:31,280 --> 01:19:38,000 question. I'm Dave Blair. I live here in Glenrock. My question is on the recent 1073 01:19:34,960 --> 01:19:43,920 ruling battery versus the US uh August 13th rule 63 that is unconstitutional to 1074 01:19:41,600 --> 01:19:47,520 do a search without a search warrant. Is the department of the town have any 1075 01:19:46,000 --> 01:19:51,199 plans or intentions of putting something in place that a warrant has to be used 1076 01:19:49,600 --> 01:19:56,320 to do a search? >> So not intentions on the warrant. Um we 1077 01:19:54,239 --> 01:20:00,320 were put in the safeguards. The problem with the warrant is that kind of defeats 1078 01:19:57,840 --> 01:20:03,600 the purpose of the time that you save by being able to do that. Um I certainly 1079 01:20:02,320 --> 01:20:06,320 understand And I can be certainly also watching those those court rulings and 1080 01:20:05,199 --> 01:20:08,960 things like that. If something works a little differently, then absolutely play 1081 01:20:08,480 --> 01:20:12,800 that. >> In response to your response, would you 1082 01:20:10,719 --> 01:20:17,040 be willing to put if it's an amber or something? Um, I don't mean to downplay 1083 01:20:15,600 --> 01:20:23,679 anything, but something more timesensitive that we could agree to 1084 01:20:20,640 --> 01:20:27,920 disagree that something of that would be substantial enough to put and wave the 1085 01:20:26,000 --> 01:20:32,159 warrant that is a child missing or something of that nature. But if it's 1086 01:20:29,520 --> 01:20:36,000 somebody that broke into a home, then the crime's already committed, the 1087 01:20:33,679 --> 01:20:39,920 threat's gone, where you could take the time to get a warrant properly. And the 1088 01:20:38,000 --> 01:20:46,719 reason I asked this is um you had mentioned, well, one gentleman mentioned 1089 01:20:42,640 --> 01:20:52,400 375 searches, 370 uses test. You've twice now mentioned that 10 to 12 times 1090 01:20:49,199 --> 01:20:58,800 due off correction in the last year that that system is utilized to help solve a 1091 01:20:55,920 --> 01:21:03,520 crime. So therefore, we have a discrepancy of a minimum of five if not 1092 01:21:00,719 --> 01:21:08,560 seven times the test was used in breaching the protocols and the asterics 1093 01:21:05,920 --> 01:21:13,440 that you pointed out to get the search results. 1094 01:21:10,320 --> 01:21:18,960 » So I think that you're that is not correct. What Mr. street 1095 01:21:15,360 --> 01:21:22,760 said was that there was 370 searches and correct me if I'm not mist 1096 01:21:26,239 --> 01:21:30,159 » had case numbers or license plates >> case numbers 1097 01:21:28,880 --> 01:21:36,800 » case numbers or license plates >> I wasn't confirmed the case numbers or 1098 01:21:32,640 --> 01:21:41,280 » the direct credit or statement was 370 were listed as test 1099 01:21:40,080 --> 01:21:44,400 » don't think that's correct >> okay 1100 01:21:42,400 --> 01:21:48,400 » case that only two case number 1101 01:21:46,480 --> 01:21:53,120 » they were tied to a case number because only one single case number was not 1102 01:21:50,159 --> 01:21:57,040 redacted >> defiance or something 1103 01:21:55,600 --> 01:22:00,239 » and I apologize I don't have the date that was posted but I do have a 1104 01:21:58,239 --> 01:22:04,719 screenshot of response from the town earlier that you yourself only have 1105 01:22:02,239 --> 01:22:10,000 access to the cameras but earlier in this meeting you stated that the tests 1106 01:22:06,480 --> 01:22:15,040 were performed to instruct and teach oncoming officers why was a statement 1107 01:22:12,560 --> 01:22:20,719 publicly made on Facebook that you yourself have sole 1108 01:22:18,080 --> 01:22:26,080 uh access and granted access to the platform if in fact we're using it to 1109 01:22:23,199 --> 01:22:28,159 teach other officers who should then not have access. 1110 01:22:26,880 --> 01:22:31,280 » I'm not familiar with what statement you're talking about. I can tell you 1111 01:22:29,520 --> 01:22:36,400 that it was stated in there. All sworn officers um and individuals who undergo 1112 01:22:34,480 --> 01:22:41,120 that background check to become a member of our department have access. 1113 01:22:38,719 --> 01:22:45,159 » Okay, that's all I had. Thank you. >> Thank you. Another 1114 01:22:45,600 --> 01:22:52,880 quick question for you. Uh, so sorry it's a technical question, but I 1115 01:22:50,719 --> 01:22:56,639 want to make it nontechnical. Um, there are a lot of ways to hack a computer. 1116 01:22:54,560 --> 01:22:59,920 I've like reverse engineered malware and all kinds of different stuff. So I could 1117 01:22:58,320 --> 01:23:03,600 paint a scenario such as like I looked at the data that was published and some 1118 01:23:02,000 --> 01:23:08,080 of those queries seem to indicate they were coming from mobile devices. And I'm 1119 01:23:06,159 --> 01:23:13,360 not gonna really unpack the security stuff unless you wish me to. But in 1120 01:23:10,320 --> 01:23:17,040 essence, an officer using earbuds with Bluetooth listening to something on his 1121 01:23:14,880 --> 01:23:22,159 phone on an authenticated mobile device into this network could have that 1122 01:23:18,880 --> 01:23:26,560 compromised. You can attack Bluetooth as an example when it's not patched as well 1123 01:23:23,840 --> 01:23:31,120 as like other types of technology. So it terrifies me the idea of hostile actors 1124 01:23:28,560 --> 01:23:34,719 abusing these things. And like one of the slides said, never happened. A more 1125 01:23:33,280 --> 01:23:40,960 accurate statement would be we're not aware of a security incident. 1126 01:23:37,840 --> 01:23:45,040 » And so um are there any kind of formal uh do you know what a I'll just say a 1127 01:23:42,960 --> 01:23:48,719 penetration test is a test done where you basically bring in hackers to try to 1128 01:23:46,880 --> 01:23:52,800 break in so as you can learn from how they did it to prevent actual hostile 1129 01:23:50,400 --> 01:23:56,480 actors from coming in. Have you yet arranged for any kind of like pen 1130 01:23:54,239 --> 01:23:59,280 testing for your systems to secure them as best as possible? 1131 01:23:57,360 --> 01:24:02,560 » So the system is controlled through block. So it's just unfaith from a third 1132 01:24:01,360 --> 01:24:06,560 party like you haven't because you couldn't you just do it yourself as well 1133 01:24:04,560 --> 01:24:11,120 your officer's phones your your devices here and everything 1134 01:24:08,800 --> 01:24:16,800 » have a security audit to ensure that you don't have a compromised system and 1135 01:24:12,719 --> 01:24:20,800 therefore a flop compromised system could see the security 1136 01:24:18,400 --> 01:24:24,960 » I'm sorry let me rephrase my question have you made any effort to have a 1137 01:24:22,639 --> 01:24:27,520 formal computer security evaluation of all your officer systems 1138 01:24:26,719 --> 01:24:31,600 » no >> do you intend to Based on what you're 1139 01:24:30,159 --> 01:24:34,080 telling me, it sounds like you could do anything. 1140 01:24:31,920 --> 01:24:37,239 » I would highly advise you to >> Thank you. 1141 01:24:40,480 --> 01:24:49,440 » I've got one more quick thing. Um so recently Flock itself has announced that 1142 01:24:46,719 --> 01:24:56,320 they will no longer keep data for longer than 7 days unless the department has 1143 01:24:53,920 --> 01:25:02,480 extended for longer because of the shelter verse uh the United States they 1144 01:24:59,600 --> 01:25:10,159 ruled that anything longer than 7 days would need a warrant. So moving forward, 1145 01:25:07,280 --> 01:25:15,840 if flock in this town is continued, would you uphold that? Because I do not 1146 01:25:13,040 --> 01:25:21,760 consent to searches. So longer than 7 days, I do not consent 1147 01:25:18,480 --> 01:25:29,280 to you holding my stuff cuz the Supreme Court ruled anything longer being held 1148 01:25:25,520 --> 01:25:36,239 longer than 7 days requires a search warrant. I I highly suggest that you 1149 01:25:32,480 --> 01:25:41,840 look into it. I also highly suggest that you look into Fox response. They 1150 01:25:39,520 --> 01:25:48,239 actually did that. They said that they are not going to retain the data for 1151 01:25:44,560 --> 01:25:54,639 longer than 7 days unless the department says that they want it. Um they did that 1152 01:25:51,040 --> 01:25:58,960 the day before the rule and I do feel like that they probably knew that whole 1153 01:25:56,320 --> 01:26:02,719 thing was coming. you know, big money, big pockets, people talk. And when 1154 01:26:02,000 --> 01:26:09,440 » was that? >> Uh, I believe it was like two weeks ago. 1155 01:26:06,800 --> 01:26:13,360 It was fairly recent. It might have been a week ago. 1156 01:26:10,719 --> 01:26:23,120 » Um, I've been very much keeping up on the flock and Axon and everything. Uh, 1157 01:26:18,639 --> 01:26:31,040 so I just I would appreciate if you guys do keep the system to go along with 1158 01:26:26,960 --> 01:26:37,840 Fox's new way and not retain the system or retain the data for more than 7 days. 1159 01:26:34,080 --> 01:26:44,480 Although I don't think that this is the right way. maybe a hardwired system 1160 01:26:41,040 --> 01:26:49,440 something because I didn't even know that you guys had a discussion about 1161 01:26:46,400 --> 01:26:55,760 this two years ago and I feel a little [screaming] 1162 01:26:51,600 --> 01:27:01,840 too and I just I I feel like the lack of transparency is there. I don't know 1163 01:26:57,600 --> 01:27:07,360 where the city council agendas posted. I don't and I also am not on Facebook all 1164 01:27:04,800 --> 01:27:11,600 the time, although I am more often right now because I want to stay in I want to 1165 01:27:09,600 --> 01:27:15,840 stay in the know because I feel like I have a voice and I should be using it 1166 01:27:13,600 --> 01:27:20,960 just like everyone else in this room. Um, but people who are not on the 1167 01:27:18,480 --> 01:27:25,679 internet should have a place here in Wilmock, whether it be at the town hall, 1168 01:27:23,520 --> 01:27:30,560 the grocery store, the library, or all of the above with, hey, this is going to 1169 01:27:28,159 --> 01:27:35,360 be on the agenda. I mean, I'm not on city council, so I 1170 01:27:33,440 --> 01:27:38,480 shouldn't have to come to all of them if I'm not 1171 01:27:36,320 --> 01:27:44,639 » All of our all of our meetings are posted and put out on the webs our town 1172 01:27:42,080 --> 01:27:49,199 website. >> Yes. 1173 01:27:46,159 --> 01:27:54,000 » The agendas are are posted on Thursday before before Monday. 1174 01:27:50,960 --> 01:27:56,239 » Why can't people speak on Monday? Why can't they? 1175 01:27:54,560 --> 01:28:00,639 » Yeah, that's a different issue. But the agendas are posted. The entire agenda 1176 01:27:58,400 --> 01:28:05,600 pack is posted on the Thursday before the council meeting on Monday. The 1177 01:28:02,800 --> 01:28:11,040 minutes are posted from I mean I think I think it goes back 2 years and then I 1178 01:28:08,239 --> 01:28:15,360 have the meeting minute books upstairs. What might I request for people who 1179 01:28:13,600 --> 01:28:20,320 don't use the internet, cuz I know there's a lot of older people than me, 1180 01:28:17,920 --> 01:28:24,800 um, posting it physically like the senior center, library, grocery store, 1181 01:28:23,040 --> 01:28:30,560 here in the town hall, even in the police department section because that 1182 01:28:28,000 --> 01:28:34,159 would be more transparent to this community. 1183 01:28:32,639 --> 01:28:39,520 And >> I will save the rest of my questions for 1184 01:28:36,400 --> 01:28:43,360 the 14th. So, thank you. It's almost 7:00, so let's hurry up. We're going to 1185 01:28:42,239 --> 01:28:46,639 close this meeting at 7:00. >> I don't have a question. I just have a 1186 01:28:44,880 --> 01:28:51,040 real quick comment I want to make. Uh, it has to do with the CC cameras and 1187 01:28:48,800 --> 01:28:54,159 that he brought up. Um, so people don't leave leave here and feel like they were 1188 01:28:52,560 --> 01:28:57,840 lied to. Again, I think we need to be transparent that cameras are not the 1189 01:28:55,760 --> 01:28:58,960 only cameras that we have in Glenrock. Very true. 1190 01:28:58,400 --> 01:29:02,880 » Okay. >> Absolutely. 1191 01:29:01,360 --> 01:29:06,800 Do you have you have law enforcement that have onboard cameras that take a 1192 01:29:04,960 --> 01:29:11,360 picture of your c of your license plate and your face and do facial recognition 1193 01:29:09,440 --> 01:29:17,239 and run you through NCIC whether you know it or not. 1194 01:29:12,960 --> 01:29:17,239 » And we also have cameras in South 1195 01:29:18,480 --> 01:29:26,080 » and that keeps from the damage and the uh people defacing our property and 1196 01:29:24,800 --> 01:29:28,639 tearing it up. >> I mean there there's always going to be 1197 01:29:27,280 --> 01:29:33,440 an argument for >> Yes. Hi, I'm Cynthia 1198 01:29:31,840 --> 01:29:38,800 cameras and anybody walks up to your door that you're recording 1199 01:29:35,920 --> 01:29:42,400 me before. Hey, Cynthia Wise. I'm a resident of Glen Rock and I have a I 1200 01:29:41,120 --> 01:29:45,520 have a real >> Shut up, please. 1201 01:29:43,840 --> 01:29:50,159 » Excuse me. >> Well, I will be rude. She's down here. 1202 01:29:47,600 --> 01:29:52,480 You want to talk? Walk up to the deal. Jack, 1203 01:29:50,639 --> 01:29:56,000 » I have been waiting. I have been waiting. Don't go to the deal. She's 1204 01:29:55,199 --> 01:30:01,280 talking. >> Please. 1205 01:29:57,040 --> 01:30:06,080 » Okay. I have a problem with the name the name flock. I think that we're we're um 1206 01:30:04,560 --> 01:30:11,679 the flock. I mean, they're treating us like livestock, treating us like sheep, 1207 01:30:08,639 --> 01:30:17,600 and they're not even hiding it. You know, it I'm called back to uh a 1208 01:30:15,280 --> 01:30:23,040 quote from Thomas Moore in in England and he said, 1209 01:30:21,360 --> 01:30:26,639 so it's his writings. They said, you know, when they started fencing the 1210 01:30:24,800 --> 01:30:32,320 property lines that the peasants, you know, they they took away their their um 1211 01:30:29,440 --> 01:30:35,679 gardens and uh they had no livelihood, but then he said you're taking away 1212 01:30:34,000 --> 01:30:40,320 their livelihood and treating them like criminals and then you lock them up 1213 01:30:37,199 --> 01:30:45,280 because they steal. I mean, I think that the back to the point that Tim McCain 1214 01:30:42,480 --> 01:30:53,440 made, these are rights that we have because we are born human beings and we 1215 01:30:50,000 --> 01:30:58,560 need to stand up for our rights. >> You know, we have God-given rights. 1216 01:30:56,400 --> 01:31:04,159 I understand from the perspective of policing that your training and 1217 01:31:02,159 --> 01:31:09,760 everything makes that you know you take it seriously and it is wonderful that 1218 01:31:07,040 --> 01:31:17,760 you take it seriously but I have heard that the the the contract that Flock has 1219 01:31:14,239 --> 01:31:24,320 it says that they own the the um data in perpetuity what is that the word forever 1220 01:31:21,280 --> 01:31:31,280 they're forever it's in private hands we can't trust who's going to be in 1221 01:31:26,480 --> 01:31:35,360 next. Our constitution outlives the what do they call it? The the 1222 01:31:33,600 --> 01:31:42,080 presidency. It outlives lives the administration. And we can't afford to 1223 01:31:38,400 --> 01:31:48,800 erode those rights. They outlives us and it keeps our country safe. And if 1224 01:31:45,199 --> 01:31:53,440 we cannot stand up for that in our town and make a push back against AI and 1225 01:31:51,600 --> 01:31:58,960 everything else just just because the government has it, we have it, then then 1226 01:31:56,639 --> 01:32:05,360 I I think that we're inviting a slippery slope for erosion of more of our rights 1227 01:32:01,040 --> 01:32:10,800 as human beings. Okay. So please will somebody please read and understand what 1228 01:32:08,080 --> 01:32:13,840 the contract with flock says. >> Thank you. 1229 01:32:11,280 --> 01:32:18,480 » Thank you. We're going to call this meeting closed 1230 01:32:15,920 --> 01:32:25,000 at this time and you can come on board. We've been here for an hour and a half. 1231 01:32:20,639 --> 01:32:25,000 We're we're given our time. Ju 1232 01:32:25,840 --> 01:32:33,920 I told you we're closing at 7. You want to speak? Come on the 14th. 1233 01:32:31,679 --> 01:32:38,480 Please come on. I don't trust any of them. That's the 1234 01:32:36,000 --> 01:32:43,520 bad news. The good news is I just paid taxes here. 1235 01:32:40,880 --> 01:32:48,560 But that being said, you violated the public trust and I think the best way to 1236 01:32:45,840 --> 01:32:57,840 do that is to have the police chief an elected position not under the wind of 1237 01:32:53,600 --> 01:33:02,800 let's see mayor code enforcement DCI involvement or whatever you do with 1238 01:33:00,719 --> 01:33:06,639 this new. Okay. So, what would it take to have the 1239 01:33:04,480 --> 01:33:09,600 police elected? >> It's not an elected position. It's 1240 01:33:08,239 --> 01:33:13,440 appointed by the mayor at the beginning of the C of their 4-year term. And you 1241 01:33:11,520 --> 01:33:20,639 can't change that. I think that's across the United States. That's that's statute 1242 01:33:16,880 --> 01:33:20,639 in in the state.