1 00:00:00,980 --> 00:00:12,220 All right. I'm going to call to order the council work session for Tuesday, September 8th. Moving on to 2 00:00:12,220 --> 00:00:15,920 having two topics of discussion, starting out with you know, the county sheriff's office, 3 00:00:16,140 --> 00:00:22,580 drone assistant response, and automated license plate reader, pilot, project, chief expert. 4 00:00:23,180 --> 00:00:28,020 Tonight we have a special guest with us. Everyone knows, shared, bread wise. Happy to have 5 00:00:28,020 --> 00:00:30,660 I'm here to do this presentation for all of you 6 00:00:31,100 --> 00:00:32,600 and so we can have a good discussion 7 00:00:32,600 --> 00:00:34,340 and talk about it that way. 8 00:00:34,800 --> 00:00:36,200 Also, before I turn it over to him, 9 00:00:36,320 --> 00:00:37,860 I just wanted to acknowledge that 10 00:00:37,860 --> 00:00:39,860 Sheriff Wise has been a mentor to me, 11 00:00:40,260 --> 00:00:41,860 new in my role as chief 12 00:00:41,860 --> 00:00:45,420 and when I call his cell phone the answers 13 00:00:45,420 --> 00:00:46,860 he has helped me through a lot of things 14 00:00:47,420 --> 00:00:48,520 that I haven't experienced before, 15 00:00:48,640 --> 00:00:49,680 so I'm really grateful for that 16 00:00:49,680 --> 00:00:52,000 and really the whole group of 17 00:00:52,500 --> 00:00:54,980 Anoka County chiefs treated me that way when I was new 18 00:00:54,980 --> 00:00:57,120 to do it, you know, at least I've heard of it. 19 00:00:57,400 --> 00:00:59,860 So, informer, please shape with the interhabits. 20 00:01:00,160 --> 00:01:01,220 Yeah, I did. 21 00:01:01,380 --> 00:01:02,080 Disappointed county. 22 00:01:02,360 --> 00:01:05,240 Yeah, 27 and a half years there, including 11 23 00:01:05,240 --> 00:01:06,800 and simply shape with the interhabits. 24 00:01:07,040 --> 00:01:07,220 Awesome. 25 00:01:07,460 --> 00:01:08,020 So I'll do it. 26 00:01:08,200 --> 00:01:09,260 Work sessions with us. 27 00:01:09,400 --> 00:01:09,980 I have another team. 28 00:01:10,920 --> 00:01:14,700 Obviously, we did some introductions, and it's nice 29 00:01:14,700 --> 00:01:16,060 to get a chance to talk about you. 30 00:01:16,720 --> 00:01:18,760 I'll try to keep this relatively tight. 31 00:01:19,160 --> 00:01:21,060 I don't know what your habit is, but I'm assuming 32 00:01:21,060 --> 00:01:22,700 in a work session like this to be a little bit 33 00:01:22,700 --> 00:01:23,440 conversational. 34 00:01:23,440 --> 00:01:30,280 as it relates to this. But I thought I'd give you sort of an overview of the topic really and 35 00:01:32,120 --> 00:01:37,160 have more of a philosophical conversation because I think in many ways people get the technology 36 00:01:37,160 --> 00:01:44,640 while simultaneously it gets mischaracterized for sure in other places. But if you don't mind, 37 00:01:44,700 --> 00:01:50,200 I don't want to talk about a couple things that we all wrestle with. But especially as elected 38 00:01:50,200 --> 00:01:53,820 that officials is putting all of this technology 39 00:01:53,820 --> 00:01:56,780 into context when it comes to people's opinions. 40 00:01:57,700 --> 00:02:00,860 We've all talked about keyboard warriors and so on, 41 00:02:00,960 --> 00:02:03,440 is that obviously I'm not immune to that myself, 42 00:02:03,440 --> 00:02:04,440 I get a fair amount of it. 43 00:02:05,340 --> 00:02:08,300 But I've changed, I shouldn't say a giant, 44 00:02:08,440 --> 00:02:10,100 I've learned some things along the way. 45 00:02:10,600 --> 00:02:13,960 And in that, so I left Cooner Rapids in 2022 46 00:02:13,960 --> 00:02:16,300 and when we did social media posting 47 00:02:16,300 --> 00:02:17,900 when I worked for the city of Cooner Rapids, 48 00:02:18,800 --> 00:02:22,960 If you put something on social media, you expect it to have a positive response, just a 49 00:02:22,960 --> 00:02:24,320 universally positive response. 50 00:02:24,660 --> 00:02:27,720 We're law enforcement, we're for the public, we're against some of the people having good 51 00:02:27,720 --> 00:02:28,480 things to say. 52 00:02:29,940 --> 00:02:33,080 Flash forward to 2026 and the world has turned upside down. 53 00:02:33,980 --> 00:02:39,480 And I had a bit of an epiphany as I was following some political races, not least the which the 54 00:02:39,480 --> 00:02:44,360 Senate race, and I specifically mentioned Michelle's play in Peggy Planning and mostly because 55 00:02:44,360 --> 00:02:48,780 because they have pretty big social media presences as you might imagine on Facebook. 56 00:02:49,660 --> 00:02:52,320 Almost all of the comments are negative for both of them. 57 00:02:53,220 --> 00:02:59,300 That's just rather than me supporting my team, I, in turn, I'll make it my mission to talk 58 00:02:59,300 --> 00:03:03,700 or smack, if you will, or whoever has a view that's different than mine. 59 00:03:04,380 --> 00:03:09,460 And the only reason I bring that up is that it was a eureka moment, you know, do your own 60 00:03:09,460 --> 00:03:13,880 research on this stuff and, you know, again, I don't know what you all personally 61 00:03:13,880 --> 00:03:18,300 experience, but I struggle with trying to put into context people saying 62 00:03:18,300 --> 00:03:21,880 things about this technology or law enforcement technology and what to do 63 00:03:21,880 --> 00:03:25,380 about it in terms of decision making because it affects a lot of people. We're 64 00:03:25,380 --> 00:03:32,400 380,000 people here in the Noca County and at least we all have responsibility to 65 00:03:32,400 --> 00:03:37,320 represent the people that we serve. So that said it's a tricky conversation and I 66 00:03:37,320 --> 00:03:42,720 I talk about this broad topic, public safety use technology, and actually I'm glad you're 67 00:03:42,720 --> 00:03:48,800 talking about data centers because it's an interesting conundrum from cities or for cities. 68 00:03:49,780 --> 00:03:54,460 In that you hear a lot of the negative, whatever is in the media is generally negative about 69 00:03:54,460 --> 00:03:55,240 data centers. 70 00:03:55,560 --> 00:03:59,600 Meanwhile, you know intuitively if every community says no to data centers, they're going 71 00:03:59,600 --> 00:04:00,220 to be in China. 72 00:04:00,960 --> 00:04:05,080 And we're going to have a whole different data privacy conversation of every data center 73 00:04:05,080 --> 00:04:10,360 is in China or some other country and that it just travels at the speed of light there and back. 74 00:04:10,980 --> 00:04:15,680 We got important issues to discuss, so in all of that makes it super hard for you all, for me, 75 00:04:16,240 --> 00:04:23,540 as it relates to this kind of technology, but I thought it would be helpful to talk a little bit about how we got here 76 00:04:23,540 --> 00:04:28,580 and one thing that I say a lot, so I started in law enforcement in 1995. 77 00:04:29,860 --> 00:04:40,240 And when I started in Koon Rapids at that time, a squad car had a radio and a shotgun and an ink pen, and that was it. 78 00:04:41,300 --> 00:04:46,960 And if I had a time machine, I could go back to 1933 when the first radios, two radios, got into squad cars. 79 00:04:46,960 --> 00:04:56,040 I could transport that person to 1995, except for a few laws that could immediately go to work and serve the citizens pretty well. 80 00:04:58,080 --> 00:05:04,340 Conversely, if I took me from 1995 and transported me into 2026, I couldn't start the car. 81 00:05:05,900 --> 00:05:11,420 All along the way is technology has changed, and you as elected officials, you have a 82 00:05:11,420 --> 00:05:15,380 police chief here that I highly regarded, known Chief Wemble here for a long time. 83 00:05:15,540 --> 00:05:16,520 I think you're lucky to have them. 84 00:05:16,540 --> 00:05:17,480 I know I said that before. 85 00:05:18,720 --> 00:05:24,620 But somewhere you have to pick a point, right, between no technology and every imaginable 86 00:05:24,620 --> 00:05:28,000 technology and you've got to find a spot that slips in right there and you're not going 87 00:05:28,000 --> 00:05:33,880 to please everybody for sure in that this technology for sure kind of slips into that space. 88 00:05:34,940 --> 00:05:41,020 Especially it's interesting in that ALPR's first came on the scene in 2009 license plate 89 00:05:41,020 --> 00:05:46,980 readers in 2009 where it was strictly a hot file item and we'll talk about what a hot file 90 00:05:46,980 --> 00:05:52,920 item means it wasn't really an investigative tool and then drones which will be part of this 91 00:05:52,920 --> 00:06:00,120 conversation to first started being used in 2015. So 17 and 11 years, I respect a 92 00:06:00,120 --> 00:06:07,360 week for those two items. And yet here we are now rustling with, you know, like 93 00:06:07,360 --> 00:06:12,100 data privacy and how much of me is public. You know, meanwhile, you all have 94 00:06:12,100 --> 00:06:16,900 conversations with a lot of people about cell phones, you know, the how much 95 00:06:16,900 --> 00:06:20,540 access to information has about you. And I hear it all the time, somebody will say to 96 00:06:20,540 --> 00:06:23,440 But yeah, I consented to that up to my cell phone. 97 00:06:24,920 --> 00:06:30,780 I chose to own it, knowing full of what it does, which in part is true in that Apple commits 98 00:06:30,780 --> 00:06:33,040 to not selling your data, but none of those apps do. 99 00:06:34,100 --> 00:06:40,000 And you know from your own shopping or whatever it is that you do on your cell phone that you'll 100 00:06:40,000 --> 00:06:43,260 be doing one thing on your home computer and then something pops up in your social media 101 00:06:43,260 --> 00:06:47,240 that is totally related and completely out of left field and you're like, man, somebody's 102 00:06:47,240 --> 00:06:47,740 watching me. 103 00:06:47,740 --> 00:06:50,720 But you can't figure it out, nor are you ever going to figure it out. 104 00:06:52,320 --> 00:06:57,560 Meanwhile, and it's kind of related to all of this, is that you have Supreme Court wrestling 105 00:06:57,560 --> 00:07:00,880 with privacy as it relates to all of this, and there was a Supreme Court decision that 106 00:07:00,880 --> 00:07:07,340 also pops up in this conversation as it relates to AOPRs about how much tracking can law enforcement 107 00:07:07,340 --> 00:07:08,680 do of a cell phone. 108 00:07:09,100 --> 00:07:14,620 And the Supreme Court puts some barriers around that in that it required the use of a search 109 00:07:14,620 --> 00:07:20,520 aren't to be able to to find particulars on an individual. That same mindset actually applies 110 00:07:20,520 --> 00:07:26,680 to ALPRs and again we'll kind of circle back to that topic too but the of courts that are 111 00:07:26,680 --> 00:07:31,340 wrestling with some of this stuff too you know and when I'm in public on a road how much privacy 112 00:07:31,340 --> 00:07:38,400 might entitle to what is an ALPR do and so on it's all very tricky. Meanwhile in the context of 113 00:07:38,400 --> 00:07:43,920 people voluntarily giving up their privacy they're sort of these government personal data 114 00:07:43,920 --> 00:07:50,900 points that cross which you all notice we go to the airport now. Yeah they take 115 00:07:50,900 --> 00:07:54,180 your ID and they have you look at a machine right you have no idea what that 116 00:07:54,180 --> 00:07:59,700 machine does I don't as I know is when I look in the machine person gives me a 117 00:07:59,700 --> 00:08:03,160 thumbs up without ever handing them a boarding pass anymore remember you step to 118 00:08:03,160 --> 00:08:08,020 show a passport don't have to do that anymore and you walk you walk through it and 119 00:08:08,020 --> 00:08:12,380 oh thank god if that went faster than I expected and you have people voluntarily 120 00:08:12,380 --> 00:08:20,260 giving a personal data for convenience or personal data for a free french fry or a small coffee 121 00:08:20,260 --> 00:08:27,480 that comes around a little more regularly than my otherwise gift. So how do we wrestle with all of that? 122 00:08:28,120 --> 00:08:34,520 Is that, meanwhile, another thing that comes up too is ring cameras. 123 00:08:34,800 --> 00:08:41,520 I think you're like these comparisons of a ring. I'm out of curiosity. I'm going to do you have a ring or something similar on your house. 124 00:08:41,520 --> 00:08:44,660 I do. Not giving up that personal battle. Yeah. 125 00:08:46,260 --> 00:08:53,360 Well, it's interesting. Again, it falls in the category of in a here for people to is that yeah, I volunteer to have that 126 00:08:53,360 --> 00:08:59,420 I read camera and I do it to protect myself from stuff being stolen or my family or whatever it is. 127 00:09:00,100 --> 00:09:07,960 But meanwhile nobody asked for the consent of their neighbors to record them as they drive by your house or they walk by your house. 128 00:09:07,960 --> 00:09:12,140 In fact, the way my house is oriented, I'm kind of on a corner. 129 00:09:12,840 --> 00:09:16,560 My ring camera looks at probably the front doors of three, several houses all in a row. 130 00:09:16,720 --> 00:09:19,300 I can see you would come out, I can't see them, I actually go into the door. 131 00:09:20,000 --> 00:09:23,580 But I'm not asking for their consent, this time it works out for you. 132 00:09:25,680 --> 00:09:29,880 So, I wanted to show you this company, it's called Imaginario. 133 00:09:29,880 --> 00:09:39,540 So, imagine an area is a software company that takes any visual data and can interpret 134 00:09:39,540 --> 00:09:41,500 the data that it sees in your video. 135 00:09:42,080 --> 00:09:49,120 It's marketed as you can take, like let's say you have VHS tapes, I'm guessing all of 136 00:09:49,120 --> 00:09:54,920 you do of your childhood or whatever, the VHS tapes, if you convert them to digital and 137 00:09:54,920 --> 00:10:01,700 uploaded them to a imaginary of this software company will as according to their marketing 138 00:10:01,700 --> 00:10:07,460 automatically index every scene, face, action, object, and spoken word find any moment 139 00:10:07,460 --> 00:10:08,160 is what it said. 140 00:10:08,840 --> 00:10:11,100 So this is what the public has access to. 141 00:10:11,840 --> 00:10:20,220 Its intent is if you have 50 hours with a VHS tapes or DVD, you can find every time birthday 142 00:10:20,220 --> 00:10:25,020 party was on their use birthday party and a pub's birthday or grandma speaking any 143 00:10:25,020 --> 00:10:27,380 dev grandma speaking things that are precious to you. 144 00:10:28,560 --> 00:10:35,760 Which all again makes it very interesting in that we have people that are saying gosh 145 00:10:35,760 --> 00:10:40,780 I just don't want law enforcement to have access to this private data while simultaneously 146 00:10:41,460 --> 00:10:47,220 public has access to the private they can take their ring camera footage put it into a software 147 00:10:47,220 --> 00:10:53,960 system it can do all the sort of data mining. For whatever purpose that's completely unregulated 148 00:10:55,320 --> 00:11:01,300 which we will get to here in a minute. So for our safe county project it's drone assistive 149 00:11:01,300 --> 00:11:07,060 response and license plate reader expansion and I'm going to talk about drones but super briefly 150 00:11:07,060 --> 00:11:12,780 I'm guessing none of you have heard any critical word of a drone if you did has probably been 151 00:11:12,780 --> 00:11:16,580 been in pass and crap where you know somebody will say I don't want to drone 152 00:11:16,580 --> 00:11:21,160 certainly in my house well that's not how they're designed to work and 153 00:11:23,180 --> 00:11:27,640 I don't actually I guess I reordered my slides but that that's not how the drones 154 00:11:28,340 --> 00:11:32,340 themselves work that the drones that we're talking about are the exact same drones 155 00:11:32,340 --> 00:11:36,680 that we've had since 2015 they might do little upgrades than a technology 156 00:11:37,480 --> 00:11:41,660 but where drones today are launched from a trunk 157 00:11:42,260 --> 00:11:47,540 instead a drone will be launched at the time of college dispatch and actually your 158 00:11:47,540 --> 00:11:51,400 fire from this spring is the incident that I use more often than not to talk 159 00:11:51,400 --> 00:11:56,120 about how important a drone assistive response it is in that you had a 160 00:11:56,120 --> 00:11:59,940 opposite of garage fire that spread to a wet land that then threatened the whole 161 00:11:59,940 --> 00:12:04,160 entire neighborhood that your fire chief would have loved or your police 162 00:12:04,160 --> 00:12:08,240 friend would have loved to have that kind of intel a scene size up which is their 163 00:12:08,240 --> 00:12:12,620 term that a drone would have offered before they every been arrived at the scene. 164 00:12:13,000 --> 00:12:18,140 So, truthfully, drones, primarily the benefit for drone is going to be mostly on the 165 00:12:18,140 --> 00:12:22,700 fire side of things, but on the loss of things when we need a drone, we really do need a drone 166 00:12:22,700 --> 00:12:28,480 for sure. But I also need to keep in mind for this profession. For our profession, as we 167 00:12:28,480 --> 00:12:35,820 talk about this stuff, it is that by necessity, the law enforcement has always needed access 168 00:12:35,820 --> 00:12:38,440 us to private data, intensely personal data. 169 00:12:39,140 --> 00:12:43,180 We all make sure, in fact, we have two cops here, 170 00:12:43,440 --> 00:12:46,300 so that it's an axon camera right here, 171 00:12:46,540 --> 00:12:47,920 two that are wearing an axon cameras. 172 00:12:49,800 --> 00:12:53,540 They go into homes to see whatever incident happens 173 00:12:53,540 --> 00:12:55,580 within a home, and they wear the cameras 174 00:12:55,580 --> 00:12:57,000 because they're expected to wear the cameras. 175 00:12:57,180 --> 00:12:59,240 And in fact, the public demanded that they wear a camera. 176 00:12:59,440 --> 00:13:01,360 I mean, that was the genesis of them. 177 00:13:03,080 --> 00:13:09,560 But here you have the juxtaposition now in 2026 where people worry about the privacy 178 00:13:09,560 --> 00:13:12,540 and like, wait a minute, you know, what do I trust my law enforcement to know? 179 00:13:13,420 --> 00:13:18,300 And I'm sure you're sensing, I'm not meaning for this to be some sort of set up to either 180 00:13:20,020 --> 00:13:25,660 unreasonably defend license plate readers, but it feels important to me just to put that 181 00:13:25,660 --> 00:13:29,940 kind of data into context of what you're asking your law enforcement to do. 182 00:13:31,080 --> 00:13:37,360 because universally with every law enforcement leader that I know of, they'll say they'll tell you that it's a valuable tool. 183 00:13:37,760 --> 00:13:46,400 In fact, somebody who works in law enforcement saying that the invasion of privacy is too great for the benefit. 184 00:13:47,460 --> 00:13:56,280 There are a random couple of law enforcement people that say that, but invariably they're like patrol officers or former patrol officer who I watched. 185 00:13:56,280 --> 00:14:01,280 Tucker Carlson did a show on ALPRs and they had some kid that was bad 186 00:14:01,280 --> 00:14:05,820 male like I've shocked at how much data an ALPR collected and it's outrageous 187 00:14:05,820 --> 00:14:10,860 invasion of privacy and it was a 27-year-old former patrol officer that worked 188 00:14:10,860 --> 00:14:13,740 somewhere in Rhode Island and in my head I'm like man that's the best you 189 00:14:13,740 --> 00:14:17,000 couldn't find a police chief anywhere in the truth of the matter so you can have a 190 00:14:17,000 --> 00:14:21,960 hard time finding any law enforcement leader when they talk about waiting the 191 00:14:21,960 --> 00:14:29,700 value of the tool being used and in what it's capable of doing as opposed to the privacy, 192 00:14:30,180 --> 00:14:35,960 because truthfully when I'll show you what an AOPR actually gathers in terms of data 193 00:14:35,960 --> 00:14:44,720 is really benign data that, well, you'll just see for yourself. 194 00:14:44,720 --> 00:14:58,300 So, point being is that we need access to private data, and we've always respected private data, and there's, yes, there will be road cops, there will always be road cops. 195 00:15:00,000 --> 00:15:29,440 That's just my attention is two things. One, what do agencies do when cops do go rogue? And I don't know if any road cop in Minnesota, that keeps their job. And especially as it relates to abuse in this ALPR system, if there's become something that gets abused by somebody. I'll bet a paycheck. It's going to be over some sort of love gone bad. That would be the same. In fact, if you read any of them nationwide, almost always. It's an X of some variety. 196 00:15:29,440 --> 00:15:33,460 that they quote unquote stock, which we'll talk about some, too. 197 00:15:34,920 --> 00:15:43,360 But you find about it in these agencies provide that information, they take affirmative steps 198 00:15:43,360 --> 00:15:50,600 to deal with it in terms of either terminating somebody and or convicting them of crimes, 199 00:15:50,600 --> 00:15:53,260 which for sure would be the thing that would happen in Minnesota, too. 200 00:15:54,780 --> 00:15:58,600 We don't, except for this one particular tool, ALPR, though, 201 00:15:58,600 --> 00:16:01,760 So we don't talk about throwing the tool in the garbage because it's abused, right? 202 00:16:02,200 --> 00:16:05,300 And it's, you know, a handgun gets abused somewhere. 203 00:16:05,440 --> 00:16:10,580 Nobody says, oh, cops can't have handguns anymore, or, you know, it was, uh, driver's license 204 00:16:10,580 --> 00:16:16,580 data years ago was abused by some cops, and it just was dealt with for forcefully, and then 205 00:16:16,580 --> 00:16:17,420 that has gone away. 206 00:16:17,660 --> 00:16:24,160 And, and truthfully, the driver's license data, DBS, as they call it, that problem went away 207 00:16:24,160 --> 00:16:25,200 because of audits. 208 00:16:25,200 --> 00:16:31,520 it's routine audits, much the same way that DLPRs have a built-in hot and that's a part of it. 209 00:16:32,440 --> 00:16:38,220 I want you to know about the controlling statutes. There's a Minnesota statute related to 210 00:16:38,220 --> 00:16:47,000 license plate readers and there's a statute related to my management or drones. If you do any research 211 00:16:47,000 --> 00:16:52,340 on your own those would be the two places that I would recommend. You do research because Minnesota 212 00:16:52,340 --> 00:16:59,020 sort of wrote some really tight laws in that for both of those things, Minnesota says, 213 00:16:59,400 --> 00:17:02,640 here's what you can use these devices for and nothing else. 214 00:17:03,720 --> 00:17:09,200 They didn't write it in a way that sort of was going to be one thing at a time where something 215 00:17:09,200 --> 00:17:12,580 went rogue or bad or wrong and then suddenly the law needs to get amended. 216 00:17:13,240 --> 00:17:16,740 We got to eliminate that use of it or that abuse of it. 217 00:17:16,740 --> 00:17:25,820 It was written in that only certain things are allowed to be done with use of the license plate readers and with the drones. 218 00:17:26,120 --> 00:17:31,020 And it answers a lot of questions for the public when they have them. 219 00:17:31,200 --> 00:17:43,800 And you can't, if I get, if I bristle at any time, it's somebody saying, you know, that's just a law, as if implying that somehow me or anybody that's in a law enforcement position 220 00:17:43,800 --> 00:17:49,440 with just disregard the law because I felt it was just my personal opinion was 221 00:17:49,440 --> 00:17:53,540 too important so I was going to ignore it a lot. That's not how it works. That's not how it's 222 00:17:53,540 --> 00:18:00,320 ever worked whether it's related to supports or the footage that's on these cameras that go into 223 00:18:00,320 --> 00:18:05,920 people's homes. I mean theoretically somewhere down the road all the images that are caught on an 224 00:18:05,920 --> 00:18:13,740 axon body camera could be downloaded into that imaginary software and say, you'll find 225 00:18:13,740 --> 00:18:19,720 me a legal pill spoon and then suddenly you know what we would call a plain view search 226 00:18:19,720 --> 00:18:26,100 like a bio in your house and I see some contraband. I can see that under plain view doctrine. 227 00:18:26,800 --> 00:18:32,340 But the law doesn't cover for instance what if the body camera you know just does a sweep 228 00:18:32,340 --> 00:18:37,780 your house where the cop was lawfully at and then goes back to the office and then downloads it 229 00:18:37,780 --> 00:18:45,140 and find me anything illegal seen in this image and again it's if that were the case and I'm sure 230 00:18:45,140 --> 00:18:49,940 a software could eventually get to that space that would be capable of doing it is the answer then 231 00:18:49,940 --> 00:18:55,520 to get rid of body cameras which has whole other consequences or is the answer to say we need better 232 00:18:55,520 --> 00:18:58,060 regulations that are tied around that. 233 00:18:58,380 --> 00:19:02,540 And I hope, and I would say to you all, is that I'm a 234 00:19:02,540 --> 00:19:04,720 citizen, I ask you a tough question, this is that. 235 00:19:04,900 --> 00:19:07,840 We're not, we're kidding ourselves if we're thinking 236 00:19:07,840 --> 00:19:10,500 that technology isn't going to keep moving forward. 237 00:19:11,480 --> 00:19:15,180 Like I told you before, I was, I was a radio, a two-way 238 00:19:15,180 --> 00:19:19,100 radio, a shotgun, and pencil and paper 31 years ago. 239 00:19:20,300 --> 00:19:22,980 It would be ridiculous to think that 31 years from now 240 00:19:22,980 --> 00:19:28,600 the technology we're talking about today will be quaint and anticipated by comparison. 241 00:19:29,500 --> 00:19:35,300 So this wrestling match for any elected official is just going to be ongoing for the foreseeable 242 00:19:35,300 --> 00:19:35,620 future. 243 00:19:35,760 --> 00:19:41,160 But let's just talk about drones just for a quick thing so that you can have this too. 244 00:19:42,240 --> 00:19:46,960 Just the way that drone response works is exactly like you would hope it would work. 245 00:19:47,120 --> 00:19:48,700 Dispatch receives a 911 call. 246 00:19:48,700 --> 00:20:10,940 If it's authorized in a Minnesota statute, and there's 11 specific reasons that it launches authorized again, it isn't the case that you can just launch and then guess later, you can only launch under these 11 circumstances, and if you launch outside of those 11 circumstances, you're violating the law. 247 00:20:11,840 --> 00:20:15,460 So once the launch is authorized, the drone takes off. 248 00:20:15,560 --> 00:20:18,320 It flies directly towards going using GPS coordinates, 249 00:20:18,780 --> 00:20:22,940 because it's the difference of this drone's sister response 250 00:20:22,940 --> 00:20:28,700 and a trunk-launched response is that the drone doesn't need 251 00:20:28,700 --> 00:20:32,000 a pilot to keep an eyesight on the drone itself. 252 00:20:32,340 --> 00:20:34,740 The drone can operate with some autonomy, 253 00:20:35,360 --> 00:20:39,300 which can, I don't see a lot of people, 254 00:20:39,300 --> 00:20:40,820 Everybody can a large feeling, oh my God, 255 00:20:40,940 --> 00:20:43,000 or Joan can do whatever it is on its own, 256 00:20:43,180 --> 00:20:44,320 but it's a good thing. 257 00:20:44,880 --> 00:20:47,060 Joan takes off, flies to where it's going, 258 00:20:47,580 --> 00:20:49,380 and looks down and provides a scene assessment 259 00:20:49,380 --> 00:20:51,160 of a 911 call or the circumstance 260 00:20:51,160 --> 00:20:52,460 that's authorized under law. 261 00:20:53,460 --> 00:20:56,220 And it's the benefit to, on the fireside of things 262 00:20:56,220 --> 00:20:57,520 is straight up obvious. 263 00:20:57,800 --> 00:21:01,120 You all know that over responding 264 00:21:01,120 --> 00:21:03,680 to fire incidents is a occupational hazard 265 00:21:03,680 --> 00:21:06,260 for firefighters because they're afraid of under responding. 266 00:21:08,520 --> 00:21:13,840 So, too many assets get really expensive for cities, there's zero doubt in my mind that 267 00:21:13,840 --> 00:21:18,640 a city can turn that into a math problem and say how much did this drone actually save 268 00:21:18,640 --> 00:21:23,860 us in staff time, especially if you have pay-and-a-call volunteers that are being called in for certain 269 00:21:23,860 --> 00:21:24,540 kinds of incidents. 270 00:21:25,460 --> 00:21:29,640 You know where you had that wetland fire, you would have want every resource possible very 271 00:21:29,640 --> 00:21:34,140 immediately, but the converse is true too when somebody calls and say, oh, there's smoke 272 00:21:34,140 --> 00:21:39,100 at my neighbor's house and then you know ten firefighters showed with three trucks and find out 273 00:21:39,100 --> 00:21:43,480 that it's a campfire that had some green leaves on it and those sorts of things wouldn't happen 274 00:21:43,480 --> 00:21:48,900 anymore. So I think I think it speaks for itself in many ways for the on the law enforcement side 275 00:21:48,900 --> 00:21:53,800 of things it's these you know the tactical advantage of it is second to the line for some really bad 276 00:21:53,800 --> 00:22:00,020 what could be really bad incidents it's I guess it's always worthwhile to tell one story. So why 277 00:22:00,660 --> 00:22:04,980 It was line of lakes earlier this summer before the school year got out. 278 00:22:06,180 --> 00:22:12,840 There was a domestic, a domestic that was called out, and then when the officers got there, 279 00:22:14,140 --> 00:22:18,100 or just before the officers got there, there was a gunshot that was heard from within the 280 00:22:18,100 --> 00:22:21,400 house, that was on part of the 911 call. 281 00:22:21,920 --> 00:22:25,860 When the first officers got there, when they did a sort of survey around the building, 282 00:22:25,860 --> 00:22:32,180 I saw a back window was open to this house and as far as I knew the person who had shot 283 00:22:32,180 --> 00:22:36,360 and hopped up the window and took off on his broad daylight during his life or something 284 00:22:36,360 --> 00:22:36,800 like that. 285 00:22:37,220 --> 00:22:41,220 And there were two small schools or two schools of young people, I guess, that were nearby 286 00:22:41,220 --> 00:22:48,020 both of those schools who were notified of the incident and placed on a lot down, invariably 287 00:22:48,020 --> 00:22:51,980 scaring the crap out of the staff and who were probably working very hard and trying not 288 00:22:51,980 --> 00:22:54,300 to scare the children that were in these schools. 289 00:22:55,600 --> 00:22:58,180 Meanwhile, they later found out that it was, yes, 290 00:22:58,340 --> 00:23:00,820 there wasn't a mistake, but the person ultimately died 291 00:23:00,820 --> 00:23:02,600 by suicide and had hanged on suicide. 292 00:23:03,300 --> 00:23:05,040 And that had drawn been over ahead. 293 00:23:05,180 --> 00:23:06,880 The John would have seen nobody ran out of window 294 00:23:06,880 --> 00:23:08,500 and that whole thing could have been prevented. 295 00:23:09,520 --> 00:23:12,260 Again, it's just an example, yes, that I like to use. 296 00:23:12,380 --> 00:23:13,960 But here's the money one. 297 00:23:14,220 --> 00:23:18,380 Here's the ALPRs, though, the thing that has people. 298 00:23:20,220 --> 00:23:21,020 So concern. 299 00:23:21,020 --> 00:23:23,100 So what data is actually captured? 300 00:23:25,040 --> 00:23:27,000 These are a flat camera. 301 00:23:27,540 --> 00:23:28,280 I don't know how many of you have here. 302 00:23:28,700 --> 00:23:29,500 You have eight. 303 00:23:30,600 --> 00:23:32,080 They have eight in Ramsey. 304 00:23:32,340 --> 00:23:33,320 They're mounted on poles. 305 00:23:33,640 --> 00:23:34,800 They look at the road. 306 00:23:35,440 --> 00:23:36,620 And they take a snapshot. 307 00:23:36,640 --> 00:23:40,320 And that's exactly what you see in those photos is exactly 308 00:23:40,320 --> 00:23:43,620 what happens other than the orange thing covering up the license plate. 309 00:23:44,040 --> 00:23:44,880 It would be the full plate. 310 00:23:46,560 --> 00:23:49,000 So it gives the date, time, the wear. 311 00:23:49,000 --> 00:23:57,400 and then it's an image of the car, and that's the sum, totally love it. The photo is under the way, 312 00:23:57,660 --> 00:24:03,360 I think most of them guessing Ramsey hasn't set this way. It's the photo is automatically deleted after 30 days. 313 00:24:04,140 --> 00:24:08,040 It's just to which to seven, all right. So, because Fox-A-D, 314 00:24:08,920 --> 00:24:13,360 Fox-A-D's recommendation or default setting now is seven days. 315 00:24:14,840 --> 00:24:16,860 And actually, why am I not keeping mine there? 316 00:24:17,220 --> 00:24:21,000 I don't know if it eats major companies that do sell AOPRs. 317 00:24:21,300 --> 00:24:25,480 Flock has become sort of the Linux of the AOPR universe. 318 00:24:25,940 --> 00:24:29,660 Because it makes for pretty cool bumper sticker, D-Flock, and all that stuff. 319 00:24:30,040 --> 00:24:31,940 I bet it might say Flock would have picked a tougher name. 320 00:24:31,960 --> 00:24:33,400 It's hard to come up with a cool one. 321 00:24:33,980 --> 00:24:35,240 That bad mouse, Axon. 322 00:24:36,300 --> 00:24:39,120 But Axon has AOPRs also. 323 00:24:39,340 --> 00:24:42,000 But you never hear Axon's name getting mentioned. 324 00:24:42,000 --> 00:24:46,020 or the one called Blue Line, another one called Leonardo, 325 00:24:46,620 --> 00:24:48,580 you've never even heard of these companies before. 326 00:24:49,340 --> 00:24:53,280 But it's the exact same tool that does the exact same thing. 327 00:24:53,460 --> 00:24:56,540 So it takes a photo of cars going by, 328 00:24:58,080 --> 00:25:00,500 and that is the data that it's capturing. 329 00:25:02,140 --> 00:25:02,960 All right, cop files. 330 00:25:04,620 --> 00:25:07,580 So this falls in the category of an opinion. 331 00:25:07,580 --> 00:25:13,420 And in my opinion, the ability to compare that image 332 00:25:13,420 --> 00:25:17,880 to a hotfile is 90% of what's good about a license plate 333 00:25:17,880 --> 00:25:20,100 reader camera. 334 00:25:20,440 --> 00:25:22,120 And what is a hotfile? 335 00:25:23,480 --> 00:25:27,380 Hotfile is stolen cars, cars that 336 00:25:27,380 --> 00:25:30,320 are wanted that are involved in crimes, cars that 337 00:25:30,320 --> 00:25:33,620 are involved in missing persons, kidnappings, runaways. 338 00:25:34,820 --> 00:25:38,860 any time police are looking for a vehicle, so a police officer takes a police 339 00:25:38,860 --> 00:25:43,420 support and he goes, my gosh, I really need to find that vehicle because of one 340 00:25:43,420 --> 00:25:48,720 of these factors. Officers make a police support, they create what's a hot 341 00:25:48,720 --> 00:25:54,300 file and that hot file gets uploaded into the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal 342 00:25:54,300 --> 00:26:00,840 Ampereensions database. They operate the driver and vehicle services database, so 343 00:26:00,840 --> 00:26:08,240 like in the in the old days where a police officer would run a license plate 344 00:26:08,240 --> 00:26:12,420 so would pull them behind your car and see your plate and they would type in 345 00:26:12,420 --> 00:26:16,820 your plate and enter it would compare it to the hot file and boom if something 346 00:26:16,820 --> 00:26:22,480 showed up on a hot file that's a car that we're looking for and then you know 347 00:26:22,480 --> 00:26:27,160 the officers are expected to do verification and they have the right car in that 348 00:26:27,160 --> 00:26:30,140 they'll initiate a traffic software radio the partners or whatever they'll 349 00:26:30,140 --> 00:26:35,640 somehow figure out how to get that car stopped. But it was used in a crime or 350 00:26:35,640 --> 00:26:41,100 used in a significant incident. And finding those cars is a lot like finding a 351 00:26:41,100 --> 00:26:44,840 needle in a haystack. When I first started in law enforcement in 1995, we still 352 00:26:44,840 --> 00:26:49,400 had hot files, but a hot file was typed on the sheet of paper. It was given to us 353 00:26:49,400 --> 00:26:52,840 that roll call and the only cars that were on the hot file were the ones that 354 00:26:52,840 --> 00:27:00,400 that was stolen in your jurisdiction, or it was involved in a crime, it was just your 355 00:27:00,400 --> 00:27:02,000 own jurisdiction as all you have. 356 00:27:02,980 --> 00:27:09,100 You can imagine that with this network of cameras, wherever it is, it can see any Minnesota 357 00:27:09,100 --> 00:27:13,360 hot file entry, and when the camera does, 358 00:27:15,820 --> 00:27:18,840 the way the data flows is that the camera takes 359 00:27:18,840 --> 00:27:26,260 the photo, the license plate is interpreted via the software and it's compared to the 360 00:27:26,260 --> 00:27:31,200 hot list. It doesn't know anything about what the hot list is, but the camera can say 361 00:27:31,200 --> 00:27:35,780 the car on your hot list exists, and then that information then goes to the cops who then 362 00:27:35,780 --> 00:27:40,960 the data pops up on the screen, right? It's the camera itself isn't where the brains are, 363 00:27:41,120 --> 00:27:47,900 the camera just takes that photo, it compares it to the data, but it's on the data and it's 364 00:27:47,900 --> 00:27:52,380 the BCA end of things, the data that the cops are used to have in that private data 365 00:27:52,380 --> 00:27:57,480 they're used to working with, that's where that comparison takes place, and those hot 366 00:27:57,480 --> 00:28:04,180 files are used in awful lot and are a big deal, and it used to be like when I first started 367 00:28:04,180 --> 00:28:08,920 if your car was stolen, you're not getting it back until it's on smashed up against a tree 368 00:28:09,480 --> 00:28:14,100 or it gets reported as abandoned in a parking lot, whoever owns a parking lot says hey, this 369 00:28:14,100 --> 00:28:18,960 cars been here for two months and then you would find the car and then that's how 370 00:28:18,960 --> 00:28:26,620 you recovered it. So the speed and turning these things over is incredible and just 371 00:28:26,620 --> 00:28:32,680 the the capacity for it to do that is significant and again it's the human 372 00:28:32,680 --> 00:28:38,140 does the work. The hotfile is created by human being, the hotfile was not created 373 00:28:38,140 --> 00:28:47,940 by FLOx safety or FLOx safety camera. The other part is as an investigative tool and there 374 00:28:47,940 --> 00:28:53,240 was just, if you caught in the news, was such a busy news weekend, but there was just a shooting in 375 00:28:53,240 --> 00:28:58,940 Columbia Heights for young people involved in a shooting, some 80 rounds including automatic 376 00:28:58,940 --> 00:29:06,420 weapons fire that happened. I'm not necessarily picking on Columbia Heights, but I guess it'll sound 377 00:29:06,420 --> 00:29:08,880 like I am, but they covered all their flat cameras. 378 00:29:09,960 --> 00:29:13,060 There was a thing, we support Columbia Heights 379 00:29:13,060 --> 00:29:14,400 and an investigation like that, 380 00:29:14,520 --> 00:29:16,240 and they can't handle an investigation like that 381 00:29:16,240 --> 00:29:16,940 on their own. 382 00:29:17,620 --> 00:29:20,480 But where we're at right now is three people, 383 00:29:20,860 --> 00:29:22,780 one of which had an automatic gun, 384 00:29:23,540 --> 00:29:26,180 hopped into a car with a big description and took off. 385 00:29:26,540 --> 00:29:31,240 If an ALPR had been there, as an investigative tool, 386 00:29:32,760 --> 00:29:35,080 you could know the time that the shooting happened, 387 00:29:35,080 --> 00:29:37,060 and you could know the time the car took off 388 00:29:37,060 --> 00:29:40,120 and then you could look at the ALPR data and see 389 00:29:40,120 --> 00:29:42,400 if there was a car that matches the description, 390 00:29:42,680 --> 00:29:43,700 but it wasn't the scene. 391 00:29:44,420 --> 00:29:48,920 And if it was, that ALPR has a good enough camera 392 00:29:48,920 --> 00:29:50,860 to be able to discern the license plate 393 00:29:50,860 --> 00:29:51,980 that was screwed onto it. 394 00:29:52,420 --> 00:29:54,080 Now mind you, the criminals are eating smarter 395 00:29:54,080 --> 00:29:56,120 and they're taking plates off of cars now, 396 00:29:56,260 --> 00:29:58,980 but they're not generally speaking rocket scientists. 397 00:30:00,000 --> 00:30:29,460 And we rely on their dumbness and their slaviness to make arrests. But there are many, many stories of successful arrests for kidnappings, for shootings, for murders, for all kinds of things because of that investigative capability of the tool. Now that said, having a camera in the right place, at the right time looking at the right public road requires a little bit of luck. But, 398 00:30:30,060 --> 00:30:32,740 and we'll call it an occupational hazard of my own. 399 00:30:32,980 --> 00:30:36,280 I have such a bias for just if the tool is anywhere, 400 00:30:37,000 --> 00:30:40,060 at least it gives me a shot, it's all in your crime. 401 00:30:40,360 --> 00:30:43,480 And I wind up, I get over-invested in some of this stuff 402 00:30:43,480 --> 00:30:45,760 because of real-world incidents. 403 00:30:46,380 --> 00:30:48,260 The Manny Collins trial coming up this fall, 404 00:30:48,380 --> 00:30:49,580 the kid who was bombing the landfill, 405 00:30:49,820 --> 00:30:51,640 of Worver Landfill, 16-year-old boy, 406 00:30:52,720 --> 00:30:54,440 allegedly murdered by his father, 407 00:30:56,360 --> 00:30:58,080 allegedly murdered by his father, 408 00:30:58,080 --> 00:31:10,180 and who was dumped in a garbage dumpster, and it happened to be fortunately placed surveillance 409 00:31:10,180 --> 00:31:17,600 camera is why his mother, many calls mother, wasn't the new patty wetterland. 410 00:31:18,200 --> 00:31:19,860 It was dumb luck of a camera. 411 00:31:20,200 --> 00:31:24,660 For the record, don't throw car batteries in your garbage because they record garbage going 412 00:31:24,660 --> 00:31:25,380 into their trucks. 413 00:31:26,000 --> 00:31:29,440 If you didn't know that already, I'm telling you, throw a tighter new garbage. 414 00:31:30,080 --> 00:31:35,740 Don't do it because they can bell-trace all that stuff back and see where that happened, 415 00:31:35,840 --> 00:31:40,320 but it was a key piece of evidence, no grant that it wasn't an AOPR. 416 00:31:41,520 --> 00:31:46,720 But it was, I mean, you could say that your garbage gives up a lot of private data about 417 00:31:46,720 --> 00:31:47,080 you, too. 418 00:31:47,500 --> 00:31:54,820 You discard it and it was your, but you have ordinances that require people to give it to their garbage 419 00:31:54,820 --> 00:32:00,000 an avid, picked up and so on, and that they had a camera that was looking at the right 420 00:32:00,000 --> 00:32:05,000 pilot garbage was why that kid was recovered and why somebody's going to be able to 421 00:32:05,000 --> 00:32:10,000 account and why the mother wasn't paddy wetterling for like 30 years praying to God that he just 422 00:32:10,000 --> 00:32:12,860 disappeared and would come home meanwhile he was deceased. 423 00:32:13,460 --> 00:32:18,320 So I just acknowledge that I know that affects me and it's hard for me to have a heavy man 424 00:32:18,320 --> 00:32:24,740 approach to some of these privacy issues that pop up, which is different than you all 425 00:32:25,540 --> 00:32:29,200 But it's all part of what I want to talk about here. 426 00:32:29,540 --> 00:32:33,680 So as an investigative tool, it is vitally important. 427 00:32:34,040 --> 00:32:40,700 Koon Rapids, about a month ago, had a shooting, much like the one in Columbia Heights, at 428 00:32:40,700 --> 00:32:45,840 a crookedly beach park, where that is in that city, on the north part of the city. 429 00:32:46,900 --> 00:32:53,580 And they had a flat camera, actually it was the park's department's flat camera was in 430 00:32:53,580 --> 00:32:57,280 in the park because parks tend to be managed for the other park. 431 00:32:57,420 --> 00:32:59,020 The end of your parks have a full-fled camera. 432 00:32:59,480 --> 00:33:03,640 No, we're getting some PTZ cameras, but just cameras. 433 00:33:04,060 --> 00:33:07,480 And again, it's frustrating for me to hear somebody say, 434 00:33:07,620 --> 00:33:09,900 I don't trust local law enforcement with a camera. 435 00:33:10,340 --> 00:33:12,520 Me, I don't trust you to have a camera. 436 00:33:13,140 --> 00:33:14,820 Meanwhile, something bad happens at a community 437 00:33:14,820 --> 00:33:16,820 about the first thing that people ask for is cameras. 438 00:33:17,820 --> 00:33:20,140 Whether it's your fourth of July or carnival 439 00:33:20,140 --> 00:33:22,640 or you praise, or whatever people on cameras. 440 00:33:23,520 --> 00:33:26,060 In fact, we're almost to the stage now, 441 00:33:26,240 --> 00:33:28,440 where I think there's some question 442 00:33:28,440 --> 00:33:30,420 when people were questioning whether a crime was committed 443 00:33:30,420 --> 00:33:31,840 if it wasn't captured on a camera, 444 00:33:32,040 --> 00:33:34,340 which is, you know, again, it used to be, 445 00:33:34,760 --> 00:33:36,780 when I first started, if I went to court and testified 446 00:33:36,780 --> 00:33:39,080 and somebody's speed, you could judge my word for it 447 00:33:39,080 --> 00:33:40,160 and that was just all it was. 448 00:33:41,480 --> 00:33:44,560 Now, I think if traffic stopped, 449 00:33:44,800 --> 00:33:46,940 where the violation isn't caught on camera, 450 00:33:47,100 --> 00:33:49,380 I think, so I just won't even accept it 451 00:33:49,380 --> 00:33:51,200 it as a crime actually happening. 452 00:33:51,660 --> 00:33:53,700 It's just how much things have changed over time. 453 00:33:55,840 --> 00:33:57,600 All right, so under Minnesota law, 454 00:33:58,100 --> 00:34:00,160 as it's related to license plate readers, again, 455 00:34:00,860 --> 00:34:02,980 the law is very restrictive, right? 456 00:34:04,000 --> 00:34:05,460 And these two are important. 457 00:34:06,200 --> 00:34:08,640 Cannot be used to monitor or track an individual 458 00:34:08,640 --> 00:34:12,260 as a subject of investigation unless there is a surge warrant 459 00:34:12,640 --> 00:34:13,940 or an exigent circumstance. 460 00:34:13,940 --> 00:34:15,400 And that really means an emergency. 461 00:34:17,360 --> 00:34:19,440 And again, I hear it all the time, people go, 462 00:34:19,440 --> 00:34:22,220 Oh, exigencer, you can make up anything to be an exigen circumstance. 463 00:34:22,340 --> 00:34:23,320 No, you can't. 464 00:34:23,800 --> 00:34:29,840 Exigen circumstance would be like, if any of you are dealing with elderly parents that 465 00:34:29,840 --> 00:34:35,240 have Alzheimer's or something, and my dad got in his car and took off because Alzheimer's 466 00:34:35,240 --> 00:34:40,020 is the only one where he is, routine call happened lots. 467 00:34:40,400 --> 00:34:44,420 Law enforcement had no shot at helping that all 20 years ago. 468 00:34:44,760 --> 00:34:47,200 It was, oh, well, your dad turns up somewhere. 469 00:34:47,200 --> 00:34:52,700 and these people turned up in either bad places or deceased or whatever. 470 00:34:54,760 --> 00:35:02,760 Those in exigent circumstance would be, so if dad took off in his car, you could then create a hot file in that license plate. 471 00:35:03,260 --> 00:35:06,820 Then at the NAOPR side, that hot file license plate boom. 472 00:35:07,600 --> 00:35:13,680 His car was last seen at this time at this location which then provides clues to start tracking somebody down. 473 00:35:13,680 --> 00:35:16,640 So that's what it means. That's what emergency circumstance means. 474 00:35:17,740 --> 00:35:23,700 And then to track an individual, this is that cops can stop me if they want to. 475 00:35:24,740 --> 00:35:27,320 No, you can't. It requires a search warrant. 476 00:35:27,540 --> 00:35:31,480 And it's the exact same criteria that is that for your cell phone. 477 00:35:32,000 --> 00:35:34,380 I can get a search warrant for your cell phone. 478 00:35:34,480 --> 00:35:36,340 If I know that you were involved in a crime, 479 00:35:36,600 --> 00:35:39,580 if I have a probable cause to believe you were involved in a crime, 480 00:35:39,580 --> 00:35:44,400 any one of you. And I know what your cell phone number is. I can get a search warrant written 481 00:35:44,400 --> 00:35:48,860 by a judge that would authorize me to find out where your cell phone pinged off certain 482 00:35:48,860 --> 00:35:55,160 towers, which is far more invasive because your cell phone is always in your pocket. You never 483 00:35:55,160 --> 00:36:01,380 loan your cell phone out to anybody just to take for the day unlike your car. And it's an important 484 00:36:01,380 --> 00:36:06,760 consideration when people talk about privacy is just to remember you're talking about a car and 485 00:36:06,760 --> 00:36:15,160 And like in our universe, just because a car was involved in an incident doesn't mean the owner of the car was involved and that's always a big deal. 486 00:36:15,520 --> 00:36:24,720 Even the routine incident that pops up is like a traffic collision where the driver took off or off the nut because they're drunk. 487 00:36:25,320 --> 00:36:32,920 But just because you're the registered owner doesn't mean that you're the one behind the wheel. We have to prove that you're the one behind the wheel, DNA swabs and all kinds of stuff. 488 00:36:33,820 --> 00:36:39,180 Also, I'm trying to do is to say that there is still a warrant of requirement and there 489 00:36:39,180 --> 00:36:42,980 isn't just random checking people out. 490 00:36:44,520 --> 00:36:52,120 The other piece of that, under Minnesota law, is that other information other than a 491 00:36:52,120 --> 00:36:55,580 vehicle picture with the plate number, date, time, and location is prohibited. 492 00:36:55,900 --> 00:36:59,260 No other data is allowed to be collected under Minnesota statute. 493 00:36:59,260 --> 00:37:07,080 Now that's not true in other states and sometimes you'll hear people say and like I can use 494 00:37:07,080 --> 00:37:15,420 flocking for instances that flocks safety does some traffic management like speed of reading 495 00:37:15,420 --> 00:37:22,480 the word public worst people like average speed data you know when you guys put the tubes out 496 00:37:22,480 --> 00:37:28,520 on the roads to out to test out traffic speed and do these speed studies is 35 the right speeds 497 00:37:28,520 --> 00:37:31,100 of women or whatever it is, I'm sure you've been involved in this thing. 498 00:37:32,900 --> 00:37:38,200 That FOX safety apparently has a tool that does that, but it's not authorized in Minnesota. 499 00:37:38,600 --> 00:37:40,680 We can't even collect that data. 500 00:37:41,580 --> 00:37:42,720 So it's just important. 501 00:37:43,380 --> 00:37:47,160 So people will say, oh, it's going to check your speed and merely your speed and take 502 00:37:47,160 --> 00:37:47,340 it. 503 00:37:47,440 --> 00:37:50,680 You're like, I don't know what happens on other states, but not in Minnesota. 504 00:37:54,020 --> 00:37:54,180 All right. 505 00:37:54,440 --> 00:38:00,220 So AOPRs do gather and store data, however they not do it, or they do it mindlessly. 506 00:38:00,220 --> 00:38:02,000 You know, they just take a photo of the back of the car. 507 00:38:02,140 --> 00:38:02,760 It's no different. 508 00:38:03,000 --> 00:38:04,480 I could stand out there with my cell phone 509 00:38:04,480 --> 00:38:07,140 and just snap the photo of every single car as a cop. 510 00:38:08,480 --> 00:38:12,000 And it's the way I phrase it, it's, um, 511 00:38:12,780 --> 00:38:14,040 they help here, it's our good cameras, 512 00:38:14,180 --> 00:38:16,300 but they aren't magic cameras to hear some people talk. 513 00:38:16,420 --> 00:38:17,740 It's where the camera flies out, 514 00:38:17,740 --> 00:38:20,180 the pole will follow them all the way to their home address, 515 00:38:20,900 --> 00:38:23,420 or, you know, to their, to a church service, 516 00:38:23,500 --> 00:38:26,360 or to an abortion clinic, and then to them voting, 517 00:38:26,360 --> 00:38:29,660 and somehow the camera can piece this all together. 518 00:38:30,640 --> 00:38:33,420 But in reality, when the camera's just on a pole, 519 00:38:33,860 --> 00:38:38,760 all of the camera does is see that a car on by you 520 00:38:38,760 --> 00:38:40,540 was at that place at that time. 521 00:38:42,200 --> 00:38:44,340 And even for the people who do this, 522 00:38:44,860 --> 00:38:47,280 I'm stocking my ex-wife and I'm stocking her. 523 00:38:47,600 --> 00:38:50,700 I'm confounded as to how that could possibly 524 00:38:50,700 --> 00:38:54,480 be useful beyond catching that person and why. 525 00:38:54,480 --> 00:38:59,840 Did you go to blank? No, I didn't. Why saw you were on the road or something like that. 526 00:39:00,920 --> 00:39:06,080 But, like I said, they're good cameras, they're not magic cameras. The data moves only one 527 00:39:06,080 --> 00:39:11,780 way, meaning from the camera to law enforcement. So the power is within the software that the 528 00:39:11,780 --> 00:39:19,000 PD has in order to decipher the data. And it doesn't. And again, to me, it makes no sense 529 00:39:19,000 --> 00:39:24,000 that you would say the private sector can have all sorts of software to decipher data like 530 00:39:24,000 --> 00:39:27,560 I can imagine, but well, we don't want our law enforcement agency to have the ability 531 00:39:27,560 --> 00:39:28,380 to cite for data. 532 00:39:30,480 --> 00:39:36,200 That's an opinion, actually, the way I phrase that this is that, you know, how nice 533 00:39:36,200 --> 00:39:40,420 it must be for somebody to be so confident in you or somebody you love is never going 534 00:39:40,420 --> 00:39:44,580 to be victim of a violent crime to not have that in your concern, because I guarantee you 535 00:39:44,580 --> 00:39:49,620 anybody who's a victim of a violent crime or is a loved one that's a victim of a violent 536 00:39:49,620 --> 00:39:56,240 crime moves heaven and earth. If the world would demand every every avenue would be taken to solve 537 00:39:57,120 --> 00:40:02,060 crimes. There's a lot of pressure placed on these guys here to solve crimes for your citizens 538 00:40:02,060 --> 00:40:07,940 and sometimes even most benign crimes but when it's you know like from our perspective but when 539 00:40:07,940 --> 00:40:12,340 you're personally violated it's a big deal to you like even getting egged if your house gets egged 540 00:40:12,340 --> 00:40:15,660 and man you can get really mad about something like that. It stains your pain or whatever and you're like 541 00:40:15,660 --> 00:40:17,980 Oh, it just shatters your sense of safety where you live. 542 00:40:18,820 --> 00:40:20,840 And you'll call the cops, and you'll expect that something 543 00:40:20,840 --> 00:40:21,680 is done about it. 544 00:40:21,920 --> 00:40:25,500 And I'm not saying LPRs are appropriate tool 545 00:40:25,980 --> 00:40:27,960 for trying to sort something like that out. 546 00:40:28,300 --> 00:40:30,760 But I think it just highlights the pressure 547 00:40:30,760 --> 00:40:32,900 of that law enforcement has placed on it 548 00:40:33,370 --> 00:40:35,880 to solve crimes in the act on behalf of their citizens. 549 00:40:37,340 --> 00:40:41,240 And I hope that agencies don't want to handcuff 550 00:40:41,240 --> 00:40:44,720 their capacity of any police department 551 00:40:44,720 --> 00:40:51,260 Based on information that really isn't accurate, doesn't create a clear picture of what these 552 00:40:51,260 --> 00:40:53,080 tools can do or how they work. 553 00:40:53,980 --> 00:40:59,100 So the data only can be searched by law enforcement for a purpose authorized under this statute. 554 00:40:59,560 --> 00:41:01,420 All searches are logged and audited. 555 00:41:03,620 --> 00:41:10,720 Flock safety, the brand, has an automatic audit feature that flags suspicious looking searches 556 00:41:11,920 --> 00:41:18,920 And again, it's just, I haven't seen that aspect of it, but it's just, if you're query 557 00:41:19,510 --> 00:41:22,780 looks funny, it'll flag it for it to be checked out. 558 00:41:23,560 --> 00:41:28,680 And the thing that we are good in law enforcement is self-reporting people that go wrong. 559 00:41:28,920 --> 00:41:29,580 We're good at it. 560 00:41:29,900 --> 00:41:30,920 We don't keep secrets. 561 00:41:31,520 --> 00:41:33,680 And people who say that we do are wrong. 562 00:41:36,280 --> 00:41:42,500 In contrast, you know, we have this powerful cell phone in your pocket and you never once 563 00:41:42,500 --> 00:41:48,880 heard of a Verizon employee abusing Verizon's data to track a lover but do any of us honestly 564 00:41:48,880 --> 00:41:54,400 believe that no Verizon employee has never used their access to data of the cell phones 565 00:41:54,400 --> 00:42:00,100 within their network to track down somebody that, you know, somebody who broke their heart 566 00:42:00,100 --> 00:42:03,960 or stole their records or whatever they're dating myself, stole their, 567 00:42:04,040 --> 00:42:06,520 that's really the only thing I'm interested in. 568 00:42:07,060 --> 00:42:08,160 Yeah, that's really weird. 569 00:42:08,900 --> 00:42:10,800 Yeah, I've got flipped password, that's better. 570 00:42:14,540 --> 00:42:17,680 But of course, you know that that's happening, 571 00:42:17,820 --> 00:42:19,120 you just won't ever hear about it. 572 00:42:20,000 --> 00:42:21,820 And we do that. 573 00:42:22,220 --> 00:42:26,100 And we report that stuff because it matters to us. 574 00:42:26,100 --> 00:42:28,240 You know, we work for the citizens. 575 00:42:28,420 --> 00:42:32,380 Actually, people bring up 1984 to me too all of a sudden. 576 00:42:32,700 --> 00:42:34,740 And so they brought it up to me so much, you know, 577 00:42:34,780 --> 00:42:35,960 the book, or the movie, whatever. 578 00:42:36,180 --> 00:42:38,380 They brought it up to me so much that I bought the book again, 579 00:42:38,580 --> 00:42:41,300 because like, you know, I'm a person of a certain age. 580 00:42:41,440 --> 00:42:43,140 I graduated high school in the 1980s. 581 00:42:43,660 --> 00:42:46,760 And I probably had it as a Simon in 10th grade to read 1984. 582 00:42:47,980 --> 00:42:50,820 But it's not a valid comparison. 583 00:42:52,020 --> 00:42:55,080 The big brother was there to keep the government 584 00:42:55,080 --> 00:43:00,220 and power, we use this ALPR technology law enforcement 585 00:43:00,220 --> 00:43:01,940 that's to serve the citizens, that's it. 586 00:43:02,660 --> 00:43:05,260 And if we do anything beyond serve the citizens 587 00:43:05,260 --> 00:43:06,960 with any of the tools that we have, 588 00:43:07,360 --> 00:43:09,360 we've got a road and any user can be fired 589 00:43:09,360 --> 00:43:13,200 and or incarcerated if the statutes say that. 590 00:43:13,580 --> 00:43:18,060 So what ALPRs do not do, no facial recognition. 591 00:43:19,760 --> 00:43:22,600 It's not to say that facial recognition won't be possible 592 00:43:22,600 --> 00:43:23,520 somewhere down the road. 593 00:43:23,520 --> 00:43:31,280 I guarantee you it will, actually talk about retina scanning here in a second. 594 00:43:31,640 --> 00:43:33,220 That'll be probably the way area goes. 595 00:43:33,360 --> 00:43:36,220 But there's no facial recognition because Minnesota law says you can't. 596 00:43:37,340 --> 00:43:43,260 For sure, there are people working like crazy to figure out facial recognition. 597 00:43:43,520 --> 00:43:46,620 I know you've heard about other news stories about it being used elsewhere, 598 00:43:47,520 --> 00:43:51,880 New York or whatever, and they talk about how good it is or isn't. 599 00:43:51,880 --> 00:43:56,040 kind of the irony because it comes up regarding immigration enforcement, you know, 600 00:43:56,080 --> 00:44:01,220 ice work is that ALPR's being used for ice work again at Paul's in the category. 601 00:44:01,440 --> 00:44:06,140 I don't see the value or how it could have been an important tool. 602 00:44:06,320 --> 00:44:08,000 That said, was it used as a search term? 603 00:44:08,320 --> 00:44:14,200 Yeah, a few hundred times, apparently, I don't know what the number is up to deportations now 604 00:44:14,200 --> 00:44:21,140 in this country, but it's somewhere between half a million and one million and I don't know 605 00:44:21,140 --> 00:44:22,360 who typed in those search terms. 606 00:44:22,660 --> 00:44:24,900 But those search terms are not authorized 607 00:44:24,900 --> 00:44:25,360 in Minnesota. 608 00:44:25,360 --> 00:44:27,660 You can't use immigration as a search term. 609 00:44:27,760 --> 00:44:28,980 We don't allow that. 610 00:44:31,140 --> 00:44:33,300 And then I set, like I just reiterated a collection 611 00:44:33,300 --> 00:44:35,700 of any data that is not authorized 612 00:44:35,700 --> 00:44:36,480 is prohibited. 613 00:44:36,940 --> 00:44:39,060 ALPR do not have access to databases. 614 00:44:40,140 --> 00:44:43,080 So the database, like I talked, the hot file 615 00:44:43,080 --> 00:44:45,300 can be triggered by what the ALPRC is, 616 00:44:45,380 --> 00:44:47,620 meaning it's information goes to the data, 617 00:44:47,620 --> 00:44:54,040 but it doesn't go back to the camera and again you'll see you'll see videos on 618 00:44:54,040 --> 00:44:59,000 YouTube that'll say I hacked a flat camera and then there's like millions of 619 00:44:59,000 --> 00:44:59,920 views for one video 620 00:45:00,180 --> 00:45:29,780 That says, let us show you how we hacked a camera, and it was like three, three, four years ago or whatever. And it would appear to look at it as, yeah, they were able to hack the camera, but it was what the camera saw, which was that still limits, right? It's like, usually your eyes could see that. Or traffic management cameras have access to that. No, that said, we'll use Fox safety, but anyone who's eight, eight, ale PR companies, though, 621 00:45:29,780 --> 00:45:35,880 So clearly they went, oh man, our security needs to be better from our camera to our software 622 00:45:35,880 --> 00:45:37,200 and they upgraded the security. 623 00:45:37,740 --> 00:45:42,900 And again, I would just say to anybody, is that we hear about, we know about data hats. 624 00:45:43,440 --> 00:45:50,320 Your city, you train all your employees ruthlessly to not open phishing emails and all this stuff 625 00:45:50,320 --> 00:45:54,820 because you're terrified of some sort of hack that gets into water systems or whatever 626 00:45:54,820 --> 00:45:55,240 it is. 627 00:45:55,960 --> 00:45:59,760 But you don't say we're going to get rid of all software related to our water systems 628 00:45:59,760 --> 00:46:01,040 because it was hacked once. 629 00:46:01,900 --> 00:46:05,760 What you do is you learn from the hack, you toughen up your systems, you train all your 630 00:46:05,760 --> 00:46:12,260 employees that are not vulnerable to those classes or vulnerable to have incidents happen and 631 00:46:12,260 --> 00:46:13,560 then they don't happen. 632 00:46:14,560 --> 00:46:18,120 And then just for your record, if you haven't looked already, if you want to see who uses 633 00:46:18,120 --> 00:46:24,180 license plate readers, the BCA, maintains a website, you can click on it and see where all 634 00:46:24,180 --> 00:46:30,160 cameras are at. If you want to see specific locations of where cameras are 635 00:46:30,160 --> 00:46:35,600 nationwide, dfloc.org. You can see it. You haven't been there. It's worth. It's 636 00:46:35,600 --> 00:46:40,640 amazing to go there, I guess, and see what it all means. But like you have eight 637 00:46:40,640 --> 00:46:44,100 cameras, I don't think County Sheriff's Office operates eight cameras, and I just 638 00:46:44,100 --> 00:46:49,740 put it, put this as a slide to show you where they are. They're sort of, they're 639 00:46:49,740 --> 00:46:58,040 random. They do catch things that happen. But again, I put it in, I did this in the context 640 00:46:58,040 --> 00:47:03,980 of, like, let's say, and actually the way it phrases, Mary will say, I wanted to, I wanted 641 00:47:03,980 --> 00:47:09,280 to stop. Right. I'm, I'm a staff like he rides so bad, he just got some bones, I'm going to 642 00:47:09,280 --> 00:47:17,640 stalk him. And as soon as I type in his vehicle searcher license plate in the ALPR database 643 00:47:18,160 --> 00:47:28,080 I'm subject to be fired, I am, and under Minnesota law, it's not a recall election, it's my license, my peace officer license will be taken from me on the next cop. 644 00:47:28,600 --> 00:47:44,440 I'm going to be fired, and I'm going to go to jail, and it's possible that I'm so angry, that boy, I'm going to follow through, but even if I did that, and I say to people I'll take, even if I did that, what data am I going to get on you? 645 00:47:45,460 --> 00:47:51,940 that you drove on Bunker Lake Boulevard Westbound last Tuesday at six o'clock in the afternoon. 646 00:47:52,180 --> 00:47:56,860 What does it mean? Again, it's sort of the, I just try to highlight for people just like 647 00:47:56,860 --> 00:48:03,440 it's day to day use. It's an, I apologize for the children's reference, but I kind of refer 648 00:48:03,440 --> 00:48:08,780 to it as, where's Waldo? In that, you know, you're looking for Waldo, the ALP here looks for Waldo, 649 00:48:08,880 --> 00:48:12,660 but in reality, the rest of us are just the background noise. We're the other people that are in the 650 00:48:12,660 --> 00:48:15,800 well, where's Waldo, Cartoon, photo? 651 00:48:17,000 --> 00:48:20,160 And the answer is unless somebody's looking for somebody 652 00:48:20,160 --> 00:48:22,220 in particular, you're not noticed. 653 00:48:24,080 --> 00:48:27,760 And I hope nobody's offended that if you want to be paid 654 00:48:27,760 --> 00:48:29,740 attention to in that regard, but you know what I'm saying. 655 00:48:31,140 --> 00:48:35,260 And even if I were to stock, the audit will catch me. 656 00:48:35,460 --> 00:48:36,620 I'll get fired and I go to jail. 657 00:48:37,520 --> 00:48:39,880 And for all to have, for the sole purpose 658 00:48:39,880 --> 00:48:42,400 of knowing that on this date at this time, 659 00:48:43,520 --> 00:48:46,960 the car owned by Ryan went that certain direction. 660 00:48:47,340 --> 00:48:51,220 And again, it just, again, this feels a lot to me 661 00:48:51,220 --> 00:48:53,120 like the babies he had thrown out with an app 662 00:48:53,120 --> 00:48:54,840 letter for these places that he's choosing 663 00:48:55,460 --> 00:48:56,800 to ditch their cameras. 664 00:48:57,820 --> 00:48:59,880 And I'll just highlight if Minnesota has among the 665 00:48:59,880 --> 00:49:01,660 strilings of privacy laws in the nation. 666 00:49:02,260 --> 00:49:05,220 Our laws are comparable to California and California. 667 00:49:05,500 --> 00:49:07,740 It has, in many ways, embraced the technology. 668 00:49:07,740 --> 00:49:14,960 they're going through some issues too and it was San Francisco the city that two 669 00:49:14,960 --> 00:49:22,800 years ago was a laughing stock for their crime where I for many many many anecdotes 670 00:49:22,800 --> 00:49:26,380 if you want to San Francisco's rented a car they have a sign in there that 671 00:49:26,380 --> 00:49:30,520 tells you when you rent a car don't leave any of your personal possessions in 672 00:49:30,520 --> 00:49:34,620 this car it will get stolen where they're having the organized retail vuffs 673 00:49:34,620 --> 00:49:37,060 where smash and grabs and all this stuff. 674 00:49:37,560 --> 00:49:40,920 San Francisco fully embraced flock safety, the brand, 675 00:49:41,660 --> 00:49:44,480 for joining us as a response, and for ALPRs, 676 00:49:44,560 --> 00:49:46,560 animated dramatic difference you can look at yourself. 677 00:49:47,600 --> 00:49:50,960 Where they ran into trouble was, is that somebody 678 00:49:50,960 --> 00:49:54,620 was able to figure out an immigration search 679 00:49:55,450 --> 00:49:58,700 that came up on their audit, and the term immigration popped 680 00:49:58,700 --> 00:50:00,880 up an audit for ALPR data. 681 00:50:01,280 --> 00:50:03,640 And again, some human being made the mistake. 682 00:50:03,640 --> 00:50:08,700 It wasn't the machine that made the state, but some human made the state. 683 00:50:08,920 --> 00:50:17,560 All right, we're not just finished then here with, again, this privacy debate for people is that, you know, sort of my canary in the coal mine 684 00:50:17,560 --> 00:50:24,340 and you've probably gone into CBS pharmacies or pharmacy where, you know, you're in bad neighborhood when the store is locked up. 685 00:50:24,700 --> 00:50:27,480 But the store itself has every shelf that's locked up. 686 00:50:28,160 --> 00:50:29,400 And products are behind the lock. 687 00:50:29,400 --> 00:50:35,420 thing and you gotta go find an employee to unlock. Unlock a cabinet before you to get an item. 688 00:50:36,380 --> 00:50:42,960 CVS solution to that is their testing is that they're an app so they have 689 00:50:42,960 --> 00:50:48,220 automated locks on their stuff within the store in that you would use the 690 00:50:48,220 --> 00:50:52,640 Bluetooth on your phone. You would go on your CVS app, you would put all your 691 00:50:52,640 --> 00:50:57,480 private data into the app and then you would use your app to open the cabinet 692 00:50:57,480 --> 00:51:02,380 to be able to look at stuff. And again, in the context of privacy, you're like, man, 693 00:51:02,520 --> 00:51:07,220 how much privacy are you giving up for the sake of getting? I think that, I don't even know what it is. 694 00:51:07,260 --> 00:51:13,380 Danny Mosch. Danny Mosch in the back. So again, it's stuff that you're voluntarily giving, 695 00:51:13,380 --> 00:51:20,220 they're giving up. And again, it juxtaposed to what an ALPR does. Or, and these are both real photos. 696 00:51:20,220 --> 00:51:40,700 This is California, where beef now has tags on it, anti-thab tags, and it makes me nuts to go to, I'm not picking up on people necessarily, but we don't have to live in places where the stores themselves are fortresses, like, you know, it's unthinkable that 10 years ago that you'd have to find an employee to get you because you needed a drill. 697 00:51:41,260 --> 00:51:47,400 And yet, you know, somehow we're just accepting that that's the way life isn't, it doesn't have to be like that. 698 00:51:47,780 --> 00:51:55,020 And again, Bradweiser opinion, crime rates are dropping in Costa country because it's hard to commit a crime without getting caught. 699 00:51:55,220 --> 00:51:58,200 These days, much harder, you're much more likely to get caught. 700 00:51:58,680 --> 00:52:07,640 I would hate to see that every recent place where we deny law enforcement, technology that can make a difference 701 00:52:10,000 --> 00:52:14,860 for the sake of some privacy that isn't like, again, in my opinion, real. 702 00:52:15,520 --> 00:52:20,480 You know, so my last sentence is, I'll tell you, when I hang up my spurs, what I'm finally 703 00:52:20,480 --> 00:52:27,760 done with law and place language in four years or so, four and a half years, I guess, when 704 00:52:27,760 --> 00:52:30,100 I'm choosing a place to live, I'm going to live someplace safe. 705 00:52:30,360 --> 00:52:35,160 I swear to you, I'm going to find a lot for whatever town, and it might be my current 706 00:52:35,160 --> 00:52:40,520 talent and overwhelming it. But wherever they embrace technology to have this crap, 707 00:52:40,540 --> 00:52:45,620 not be a part of my existence. I'm not living in a community where I go into a pharmacy 708 00:52:45,620 --> 00:52:50,160 and everything is locked up or I go into home depot and I look like a fortress or I got 709 00:52:50,160 --> 00:52:57,620 to go past the security guard for everything I do. I want to place that embrace this technology 710 00:52:57,620 --> 00:53:04,060 and I say that to people because I trust the cops. These are good people that have given 711 00:53:04,060 --> 00:53:08,960 even a lot of their personal lives to keep a city secure. 712 00:53:10,280 --> 00:53:12,940 And if they tell me they need a tool, I won't even blank. 713 00:53:13,520 --> 00:53:16,860 I know how the hiring happens, I know how they work, 714 00:53:17,000 --> 00:53:19,480 I know their training, I know the laws that back them up. 715 00:53:20,400 --> 00:53:23,920 And without even hesitating, if the police department 716 00:53:23,920 --> 00:53:27,180 I live in says I need a tool, I'll be, yep, you do. 717 00:53:27,620 --> 00:53:29,320 You say you need a proof of the deal. 718 00:53:30,120 --> 00:53:33,560 All right, that's, I'm sorry if I went long here, 719 00:53:33,560 --> 00:53:47,040 but it's important stuff to us questions Michael the cameras are they fixed 720 00:53:47,040 --> 00:53:51,980 directionally yes and then the zoom also or there's only one aspect yeah they 721 00:53:51,980 --> 00:53:57,380 don't they just they get a set up and then they're not touching this and so that 722 00:53:57,380 --> 00:54:01,640 That view that you saw a few back, it was a flush cue on the top. 723 00:54:02,100 --> 00:54:05,320 Yeah, I see some, but you know you just changed it yourself. 724 00:54:06,920 --> 00:54:07,960 Yeah, yeah. 725 00:54:08,860 --> 00:54:13,480 And that being said, we have PTCs that are going in by block in our parks. 726 00:54:14,220 --> 00:54:20,340 We have three go in the new waterfront splash bed park, and then we have I think six or 727 00:54:20,340 --> 00:54:25,180 eight in the budget for 2020, seven for central Elmcrest in Rivers Bend. 728 00:54:25,180 --> 00:54:27,540 And those are different than these. 729 00:54:27,680 --> 00:54:29,280 They do not do license plate reading. 730 00:54:29,760 --> 00:54:34,760 They do Zoom and they do move and they have something called guardian mode where they 731 00:54:34,760 --> 00:54:39,440 can, you can set parameters if you wanted to flag the officers after 10 p.m. 732 00:54:39,560 --> 00:54:41,420 that there's 20 people in the park who can do that. 733 00:54:44,220 --> 00:54:44,860 Follow up my call. 734 00:54:46,220 --> 00:54:46,360 Good. 735 00:54:46,580 --> 00:54:46,780 Thank you. 736 00:54:47,180 --> 00:54:47,640 Other questions? 737 00:54:49,900 --> 00:54:50,200 Crystal. 738 00:54:51,440 --> 00:54:56,540 I recall correctly from your presentation at the local government's meeting, it's a third 739 00:54:56,540 --> 00:55:02,260 party audit? Yes a third party audit is required so that so again we use the 740 00:55:02,260 --> 00:55:08,140 branding block safety has this automated audit rate so like I'm going to use 741 00:55:08,140 --> 00:55:12,080 the wrong term I should have written it down but they have if there's an unusual 742 00:55:12,080 --> 00:55:17,300 search or repeated search it'll flag it and again it's just a I mean you can 743 00:55:17,300 --> 00:55:21,820 imagine for for the ownership of block safety it's like oh that's a no-brainer 744 00:55:21,820 --> 00:55:24,940 of a tool it's a good tool so if it's that see something that's an unusual 745 00:55:24,940 --> 00:55:29,560 pattern it'll say you know dear manager you need to take a look at this because 746 00:55:29,560 --> 00:55:33,120 this doesn't look right it doesn't need to wait for an audit before you 747 00:55:33,120 --> 00:55:37,580 investigate and it's a it's a really good tool but yeah otherwise it's a third 748 00:55:37,580 --> 00:55:40,500 party audit that we're recording out which is the same for our 749 00:55:41,260 --> 00:55:45,720 axon videos. We're going to pair that up with our body cameras we're due for 750 00:55:45,720 --> 00:55:50,940 that I'm in the spring so we're going to will be just under our two years that 751 00:55:50,940 --> 00:55:54,340 that actually requires, but we'll be doing the LPR audit 752 00:55:54,340 --> 00:55:56,320 at the same time, the same company, actually. 753 00:55:57,620 --> 00:56:00,280 Are you comfortable sharing the company does that? 754 00:56:01,300 --> 00:56:04,480 Yes, it's sort of the L care member. 755 00:56:05,040 --> 00:56:06,200 I can get it for you. 756 00:56:06,300 --> 00:56:07,960 There are a lot of those companies. 757 00:56:08,400 --> 00:56:12,060 It's a little bit lemma, can you give it? 758 00:56:13,420 --> 00:56:15,740 So there's an audit required over two years, 759 00:56:17,080 --> 00:56:20,060 but in between that time, if there's something as unusual, 760 00:56:20,060 --> 00:56:21,440 it would notify you. 761 00:56:27,380 --> 00:56:34,000 So, I know that you mentioned that people are maybe concerned that it is tracking speed. 762 00:56:34,600 --> 00:56:36,700 I do think that there's also people more concerned. 763 00:56:38,040 --> 00:56:39,680 And this is more like comment. 764 00:56:39,900 --> 00:56:41,740 I don't know if this is, this is nothing to do with you. 765 00:56:41,860 --> 00:56:43,740 You're not the one that would make this decision. 766 00:56:43,900 --> 00:56:49,320 But I've heard people being concerned about it more being like the infrastructure is there for speeding tickets later. 767 00:56:49,860 --> 00:56:52,160 Or for tracking certain things later on. 768 00:56:52,740 --> 00:56:54,920 which, once again, that wouldn't be you. 769 00:56:55,020 --> 00:56:56,240 That'd be like a legislative move, 770 00:56:56,740 --> 00:56:58,660 but just wanted to make that known 771 00:56:58,660 --> 00:57:00,760 that I've heard that people are concerned about that. 772 00:57:01,140 --> 00:57:02,180 That's no doubt true. 773 00:57:02,540 --> 00:57:04,180 Honestly, I've got, like, said 30 years from now, 774 00:57:04,300 --> 00:57:05,980 what technology will be available to shoot? 775 00:57:07,140 --> 00:57:08,080 I have no idea. 776 00:57:08,860 --> 00:57:09,060 Right. 777 00:57:10,100 --> 00:57:13,400 And it's, again, it's the idea that you can say, 778 00:57:14,680 --> 00:57:16,500 we don't want people with brains to think 779 00:57:16,500 --> 00:57:18,960 of this technology, that's not realistic. 780 00:57:19,240 --> 00:57:21,780 The only thing you can do is regulate how that 781 00:57:21,780 --> 00:57:27,400 how those tools are used, that's the only thing you can do because somebody somewhere 782 00:57:27,400 --> 00:57:32,120 is busy but you know like an air tag, Apple air tag is great you know you can't just 783 00:57:32,120 --> 00:57:36,060 put it, you can't just tape an air tag to your spouse's card, follow them around because 784 00:57:36,060 --> 00:57:41,280 their phone will trigger that air tag. Well as soon as that became true, there's some company 785 00:57:41,280 --> 00:57:45,440 in China that will sell your air tags that won't alert yourself on that air tag as part 786 00:57:45,440 --> 00:57:51,480 of it. If somebody will sell you, if it has value and clearly those, they'll market it for 787 00:57:51,480 --> 00:57:56,380 the right reason. Oh, keep track of your suitcase without alerting them. You know, the air 788 00:57:56,380 --> 00:58:00,400 boiler employee that he can, you know, know that you're tracking, you know, your Louis 789 00:58:00,400 --> 00:58:07,040 de Breton bag or whatever it is. So the law come off as legitimate, but for sure it can 790 00:58:07,040 --> 00:58:12,100 be used for various purposes. We're going to be wrestling with this, get used to this, 791 00:58:12,300 --> 00:58:16,880 I guess, this counsel's on getting used to it. He's in this a lot longer. I'm going to be 792 00:58:16,880 --> 00:58:18,160 is going to get used to it, too. 793 00:58:19,240 --> 00:58:20,660 Because it'll be exactly this. 794 00:58:20,780 --> 00:58:22,720 This technology can prevent this crime 795 00:58:23,180 --> 00:58:24,920 as the trade-off to great, yes or no. 796 00:58:25,040 --> 00:58:26,240 And sometimes the answer might be, yeah, 797 00:58:26,400 --> 00:58:27,660 the trade-off is to great. 798 00:58:28,060 --> 00:58:30,280 In this case, I don't think the trade-off is too great, 799 00:58:30,500 --> 00:58:32,460 knowing what I know about ALPRs. 800 00:58:34,300 --> 00:58:36,840 But people freaked out over, ring cameras 801 00:58:36,840 --> 00:58:38,360 being able to be a network, right? 802 00:58:38,540 --> 00:58:43,260 Like a neighborhood could agree to network their ring cameras 803 00:58:43,260 --> 00:58:45,600 in case their dog got lost, which is a great idea. 804 00:58:45,600 --> 00:58:48,000 But boy, that, you know, talk about creeping people out. 805 00:58:48,140 --> 00:58:50,680 That was a super cool ad if you remember reading them 806 00:58:50,680 --> 00:58:51,360 on that last year. 807 00:58:52,000 --> 00:58:55,340 But it creeped people out, but that capability is there already. 808 00:58:56,540 --> 00:59:00,820 10 years ago, when those ring cameras first became part 809 00:59:00,820 --> 00:59:03,500 of the thing, is that when I was in Food and Rampage, 810 00:59:03,640 --> 00:59:05,940 we were trying to get people to sign up to give us access 811 00:59:05,940 --> 00:59:08,040 to the ring cameras, not thinking 812 00:59:08,040 --> 00:59:10,440 that there was a big brother feel to it, buy to it. 813 00:59:10,800 --> 00:59:13,780 You know, he said these ALPRs have been around since 2009. 814 00:59:14,360 --> 00:59:20,680 nobody ever nobody blinks over them ever that this all came up as a big deal 815 00:59:21,480 --> 00:59:26,880 shocked me. Now I didn't see a comment. It's like what do I mean? We've been using this for 17 years. What's the deal? 816 00:59:31,900 --> 00:59:37,900 I and then like for those photos that they're taking off the cars they only are 817 00:59:37,900 --> 00:59:46,040 or something that someone can see once they've put in information requesting, or if it's 818 00:59:46,040 --> 00:59:48,960 triggering a hot list, I'm sorry, not that they're putting in for it, or they're searching 819 00:59:48,960 --> 00:59:53,320 for it potentially, but it's not like there's just a camera or like a TV screen in your 820 00:59:53,320 --> 00:59:59,840 guys as PD where they're like scrolling through. You can see it. No, you can't. If in order to look, yeah. 821 01:00:00,000 --> 01:00:29,240 I have a reason to look, and that's what the audit is. You can't just look for the heck of it. And there is no capability of looking. So, for instance, our system requires a case summer to be added as part of it, of which case summer. You can't not have a case summer in there, it won't look. So it's, it's just one of the ways to restrict it. But you can't just for fun, these look. You know, that said, you can, you can go right now, look at men dot and look at highway time. 822 01:00:29,240 --> 01:00:33,520 maybe you guys do the guarantee of your traffic wherever it is your engineering is 823 01:00:34,160 --> 01:00:39,480 monitors your min. cam is pretty regularly but that min. footage you know 824 01:00:39,480 --> 01:00:43,160 their cameras are good cameras to not match cameras but what their cameras are 825 01:00:43,160 --> 01:00:47,180 capable of doing should we we all get new iPhones be only because the camera gets 826 01:00:47,180 --> 01:00:50,880 better right your iPhone 12 and your iPhone 17 are probably no different 827 01:00:50,880 --> 01:00:55,300 except for the camera maybe a little more data storage but you what is an 828 01:00:55,300 --> 01:00:57,640 Can I from camera going to be capable of 20 years from now? 829 01:00:58,400 --> 01:00:59,580 Or my ring camera? 830 01:00:59,980 --> 01:01:02,080 Can my ring camera zoom right into my neighbors? 831 01:01:02,420 --> 01:01:04,400 Can I read the newspaper again? 832 01:01:04,600 --> 01:01:05,800 Can I read the book that I was using? 833 01:01:07,280 --> 01:01:08,160 Well, you know what I'm saying. 834 01:01:08,640 --> 01:01:12,260 I don't, it's like the holy grail of some technologies, 835 01:01:12,260 --> 01:01:13,740 how good can the cameras get? 836 01:01:14,940 --> 01:01:17,000 And they, I'm willing to bet that they'll 837 01:01:17,000 --> 01:01:19,000 be shockingly good in a decade from now. 838 01:01:20,220 --> 01:01:23,320 And they'll be able to imagine aerial software, 839 01:01:23,320 --> 01:01:30,960 you could do all kinds of stuff. I don't even know what to say. Like, even now, what's the 840 01:01:30,960 --> 01:01:34,260 one that's going to court? The notification law that's in Minnesota that's in court, 841 01:01:35,000 --> 01:01:39,840 now that AI can just make up stuff. And I'm sure most of you read news stories nowadays. 842 01:01:40,540 --> 01:01:45,220 You probably, I don't know what your percentage is, but you 50% believe what you read. That's 843 01:01:45,220 --> 01:01:49,980 where I'm at more or less. If I read something, I immediately go, all right, what does the other 844 01:01:49,980 --> 01:01:54,880 side think about this, and then I try, I fact-of-fact check everything. I don't trust, I literally 845 01:01:54,880 --> 01:01:55,900 trust almost nothing. 846 01:01:58,960 --> 01:02:02,980 And then when you see something on a hot list, it's still, like, 847 01:02:03,140 --> 01:02:07,540 that's your connecting was that, like, you guys are still the ones that make the decision whether 848 01:02:07,540 --> 01:02:13,580 or not that's actually what the crime is. I'm so glad you said that because, again, because 849 01:02:13,580 --> 01:02:17,140 it was a big deal made of employment incident where there was a quote, a flock of mistakes. 850 01:02:18,540 --> 01:02:23,540 Again, when Brad Weiss started in 1995, if there's a bank robbery and it was a blue Toyota 851 01:02:23,540 --> 01:02:28,280 was involved, you know, like a teller called Screaming, Blue Toyota left the parking lot 852 01:02:28,280 --> 01:02:29,080 with a bank robber. 853 01:02:29,660 --> 01:02:33,720 We in law enforcement stopped every blue car, Toyota or not. 854 01:02:34,220 --> 01:02:39,060 That was anywhere in and around that of which 99.9 for some time it was the wrong car. 855 01:02:40,040 --> 01:02:40,820 That was routine. 856 01:02:41,140 --> 01:02:45,740 The technology that we have available now, the number of mistakes that we make is dramatically 857 01:02:45,740 --> 01:02:50,480 less than what it would have been in the good old days, a pre-technology. 858 01:02:51,440 --> 01:02:56,000 Shoot if it was a Toyota, that was red, and we'd stop that too, just for the sake. 859 01:02:56,260 --> 01:02:58,860 I was not saying this is again to keep all this stuff in contact. 860 01:02:59,040 --> 01:03:02,920 Is it foolproof? No, but the human beings, we train our cops to think. 861 01:03:04,280 --> 01:03:10,280 And we train the cops to believe that the ALPR or the technology isn't foolproof. 862 01:03:10,500 --> 01:03:13,680 You've got eyes and brain we expect you to use it, you know, 863 01:03:13,680 --> 01:03:17,160 discern the information that you're seeing and figure out if that actually merits a traffic 864 01:03:17,160 --> 01:03:18,800 stopper, or is it a suspect of something? 865 01:03:20,420 --> 01:03:24,860 And if you're wrong, you get sued and stuff, and there's accountability all on the 866 01:03:24,860 --> 01:03:25,220 way to this. 867 01:03:28,500 --> 01:03:36,340 The last thing that I had, and this just seemed context that was in Texas this week, and 868 01:03:36,340 --> 01:03:42,360 I talked with a Dallas sport-worth police officer when I was there about plot cameras. 869 01:03:42,360 --> 01:03:49,680 So, any opportunity I can to talk to someone about it, and he mentioned that the governor 870 01:03:49,680 --> 01:03:58,100 of Texas had banned them, but that they weren't going to support them financially, but in 871 01:03:58,100 --> 01:04:03,480 Dallas and Fort Worth, the Councils there had decided to fund themselves, because they found 872 01:04:03,480 --> 01:04:04,080 them valuable. 873 01:04:24,560 --> 01:04:29,300 I don't think anybody sits in their living room and goes, boy, I hope they get more 874 01:04:29,300 --> 01:04:38,380 LPRs in the law enforcement agency, but, again, when I just think about how much privacy 875 01:04:38,380 --> 01:04:45,560 people give up for, like I said, for a free copy, by comparison, and just knowing how 876 01:04:45,560 --> 01:04:51,820 the tool is used, the value of the tool, to me it just makes sense to use the tool. 877 01:04:52,060 --> 01:04:57,660 And, you know, for now we're doing this as a pilot project, I got beat up over, you know, 878 01:04:57,660 --> 01:05:00,160 how dare I do this pilot project thing. 879 01:05:00,600 --> 01:05:03,460 The only reason it got started as a pilot project 880 01:05:03,940 --> 01:05:07,780 or that was signed off by me a year ago, 881 01:05:08,060 --> 01:05:10,160 when we first started having meetings about this, 882 01:05:10,300 --> 01:05:12,720 we all had AOPRs, we all had drones, 883 01:05:13,720 --> 01:05:16,340 and it was G.E. we could coordinate, right? 884 01:05:16,580 --> 01:05:18,440 And because we worked well together 885 01:05:18,440 --> 01:05:20,240 and that's not like that in every place. 886 01:05:20,660 --> 01:05:21,700 We're lucky in that regard. 887 01:05:22,600 --> 01:05:24,220 And it was, oh, we should collaborate. 888 01:05:24,540 --> 01:05:26,460 And again, a year ago, we had never thought 889 01:05:26,460 --> 01:05:30,440 there's any controversy over any of it. I've never even entered my brain to think that there'd be 890 01:05:30,440 --> 01:05:39,980 controversy. Then Metro surge happened and then suddenly these two things got linked and then 891 01:05:40,840 --> 01:05:45,160 county commissioners because originally the pilot was going to be a two-year pilot project for 892 01:05:45,160 --> 01:05:51,500 250,000 and then county commissioners lined up being all over the place. They didn't know what to 893 01:05:51,500 --> 01:05:57,120 think and I am and again it's not it's no disrespect from them and I know you 894 01:05:57,120 --> 01:05:59,400 don't have disrespect for them either because they're trying to read the 895 01:05:59,400 --> 01:06:03,200 tea leaves are like man where's the where the citizens at with this it's hard to 896 01:06:03,200 --> 01:06:07,100 figure out they're yelling you know this group is yelling and then the polar 897 01:06:07,100 --> 01:06:10,920 opposite are yelling maybe both sides are yelling I hit this right I don't know 898 01:06:10,920 --> 01:06:16,380 and it's everybody was just like wondering what to do in any and it was like with 899 01:06:16,380 --> 01:06:21,160 the commission's going back and forth with just this pilot project it was me 900 01:06:21,780 --> 01:06:26,920 saying look I'll take Yuri on a bad political spot there's an election coming up 901 01:06:26,920 --> 01:06:33,100 in the fall. I went to Fox Safety and I knew I had $175,000 spending limit 902 01:06:33,100 --> 01:06:37,880 under statute and policy of the number of county and it literally looks like to 903 01:06:37,880 --> 01:06:42,280 Fox Safety what can we get for $175 and they go you can have you can have a one-year pilot 904 01:06:42,280 --> 01:06:46,720 project and I'm like feel one year and that's what was past the election and then 905 01:06:46,720 --> 01:06:50,180 and people can get out of that space. 906 01:06:50,500 --> 01:06:53,620 And again, it's not, you know, I ran for office two 907 01:06:53,620 --> 01:06:56,420 and there were topics that came up when I ran in 2022 908 01:06:56,420 --> 01:06:58,760 where people are trying to pigeonhole me 909 01:06:58,760 --> 01:07:00,440 and one thing or another, you know, 910 01:07:00,460 --> 01:07:02,100 like asking me about my stance on abortion 911 01:07:02,100 --> 01:07:04,460 or something crazy like that, you know, for my position. 912 01:07:05,360 --> 01:07:07,560 And I'm going, wow, is this cost me those or not? 913 01:07:07,780 --> 01:07:09,620 And I understand the calculus all that. 914 01:07:09,840 --> 01:07:12,380 And it was just, it was no more complicated than saying, 915 01:07:13,000 --> 01:07:14,480 I'll just cut these people right there 916 01:07:14,480 --> 01:07:15,300 and I need to be a part of this. 917 01:07:15,300 --> 01:07:21,240 we just want the pilot to go and in the end, if the pilot project is successful, then the 918 01:07:21,240 --> 01:07:27,480 collaboration will be a county-wide collaboration under something we call a safe county initiative 919 01:07:27,480 --> 01:07:32,840 which would be, it would be a literal thing. There'd be no county I'd rather live in. 920 01:07:34,000 --> 01:07:41,380 Again, we personally, then a safe county county, you'll want that, that embraces DFR and 921 01:07:41,380 --> 01:07:48,080 OPR's and regional assistance organizations, and that's where we land. 922 01:07:49,080 --> 01:07:56,660 But there'll be a lot of conversations between now and then and a lot of agreements that 923 01:07:56,660 --> 01:07:59,840 will need to take place and it won't be for everybody to agree. 924 01:08:00,920 --> 01:08:07,460 But Columbia Heights takes their flat cameras off line and then they have 80 rounds shot 925 01:08:07,460 --> 01:08:09,820 off in a parking lot. It starts scaring their residents. 926 01:08:12,360 --> 01:08:13,800 And then, you know, you're like 927 01:08:13,800 --> 01:08:17,540 the officials, you know, to them. You're like the officials and Columbia Heights. What's 928 01:08:17,540 --> 01:08:21,540 your obligation to your citizens? There's a tool that would really help. In the circumstance, 929 01:08:21,660 --> 01:08:26,920 or he just hoped for the best or what, you know, it puts a lot of pressure, a lot of pressure. 930 01:08:27,120 --> 01:08:32,540 It's not easy being city council members these days. I know it was a lot easier. 2011 when I first 931 01:08:37,940 --> 01:08:42,460 I think I've known this participant for a minute, so there are at least programs, right? 932 01:08:42,540 --> 01:08:43,460 You don't actually buy the camera? 933 01:08:44,300 --> 01:08:49,520 Yeah, it's the upgrades will always be an option somewhere down the road. 934 01:08:51,240 --> 01:08:59,360 But again, it'll be conversational at that take place because it's no individual agency in a share of included. 935 01:08:59,360 --> 01:09:04,420 it can, it's just not possible in Minnesota that sheriff could say, I'm going to give this 936 01:09:04,420 --> 01:09:07,540 new technology, I don't care what the rest of you people think, sure that's not how that 937 01:09:07,540 --> 01:09:12,000 would work for sure, city councils. Well, actually, even the nice part, even for the pilot 938 01:09:12,000 --> 01:09:19,820 project to come to fruition, if that poll, you know, post-Bradwise, and it all goes sideways 939 01:09:19,820 --> 01:09:22,500 in city rams, it can save me one hour, and you get out. 940 01:09:24,900 --> 01:09:30,080 And then the data itself, obviously it's stored in their cloud servers, wherever those are stored 941 01:09:30,080 --> 01:09:31,540 as soon as it's not used in the US. 942 01:09:31,800 --> 01:09:35,380 Yeah, it's all the data, all the data belongs to us. 943 01:09:36,040 --> 01:09:40,580 And again, I'm not a, you know, I don't understand the technology. 944 01:09:41,020 --> 01:09:47,960 But again, I'll also say it is this way, is that we use, like in today for all of our police supports, 945 01:09:47,960 --> 01:09:52,080 our written under central square software, Axon has evidence.com. 946 01:09:52,080 --> 01:09:54,100 I have no idea how any of that works. 947 01:09:54,740 --> 01:09:58,080 We take it on faith that our data doesn't wind up somewhere, 948 01:09:58,080 --> 01:10:00,480 that it's not supposed to be you take it on faith 949 01:10:00,480 --> 01:10:03,200 all the time, you're watered, you know, 950 01:10:03,420 --> 01:10:05,520 it's, you rely on the agreements, 951 01:10:05,960 --> 01:10:08,260 because people want me to have some, they want some, 952 01:10:08,680 --> 01:10:09,920 because there's smart people out there 953 01:10:09,920 --> 01:10:12,220 that ask questions and they want technical guarantees 954 01:10:12,700 --> 01:10:16,220 that, that, that flocks safety or any company 955 01:10:16,220 --> 01:10:17,740 doesn't have access to your data. 956 01:10:17,980 --> 01:10:21,940 And you're like, I, I don't know how to even convince you 957 01:10:21,940 --> 01:10:25,680 of that at some point you have to just take it on. I don't know how you're not. 958 01:10:32,350 --> 01:10:38,610 Just for the county side, do you have, and you've obviously already shared a lot of really 959 01:10:38,610 --> 01:10:42,430 wonderful perspectives of cases individually that have been solved because of this, but 960 01:10:42,850 --> 01:10:49,310 do you have any statistics on how many more crimes have been solved because of the use of 961 01:10:49,870 --> 01:10:58,230 No, and I'll say something that we're bad about is that we're we've all been trained to talk all right when you rest somebody 962 01:10:59,690 --> 01:11:05,490 And somebody goes to jail is that you type up or a detective ultimately types up a criminal complaint 963 01:11:05,490 --> 01:11:09,490 That's headed through the attorney's office and then submit it to a court 964 01:11:10,110 --> 01:11:14,690 We always try to write that stuff as vague as possible because we aren't the bad guys to know how we do stuff 965 01:11:14,690 --> 01:11:17,970 Right and it's just our habit. It's the way we're trained 966 01:11:17,970 --> 01:11:27,830 So using an ALPR or drones has always been downplayed in how crimes were solved as it's related to criminal complaint. 967 01:11:29,010 --> 01:11:31,790 And we're just going to have to change the way we go about doing that. 968 01:11:32,130 --> 01:11:43,330 So I'm sure Chief Plumble will tell you, you probably never even heard a story about how an ALPR made the difference in a crime in Ramsey until all this came to fruition. 969 01:11:43,330 --> 01:11:45,230 and then I'll send you a hearing about it all the time. 970 01:11:47,270 --> 01:11:49,210 But, you know, that technology, like said, 971 01:11:49,250 --> 01:11:50,690 has been used for a long time. 972 01:11:51,430 --> 01:11:54,510 It started the first ALPRs where you find stolen cars. 973 01:11:54,870 --> 01:11:57,150 They looked like mailboxes that were mounted on a squad car 974 01:11:57,150 --> 01:11:58,670 and it just dried through parking lots ago. 975 01:11:58,850 --> 01:12:00,850 That car is stolen and you're finding stolen cars. 976 01:12:01,850 --> 01:12:05,170 And nobody, it would be us and law enforcement would say, 977 01:12:05,250 --> 01:12:09,710 I'll be required to recover 47 stolen vehicles in 2010. 978 01:12:10,190 --> 01:12:12,330 We never said if it was because there was 979 01:12:12,330 --> 01:12:17,690 a foot of snow on it or because the ALPR got it. So we said we'd better 980 01:12:17,690 --> 01:12:22,650 about that because I know people want to know. But yeah, the amygdolls are piling up and really, really 981 01:12:22,650 --> 01:12:29,310 significant. It's like right county to set up a homicide that was, or it was a potential homicide 982 01:12:29,310 --> 01:12:35,110 that was an ALPR stopped. They actually prevented a homicide because of an ALPR hot list. 983 01:12:35,950 --> 01:12:41,510 I've also probably made that too narrow because the salt is, I mean there's different ways that we 984 01:12:41,510 --> 01:12:45,790 think that a crime is solved. It doesn't always have to be like there's like actual answer 985 01:12:45,790 --> 01:12:50,950 or conviction or it's you know. Yeah anyways. So I'm sure there's a transparency portal 986 01:12:50,950 --> 01:12:55,290 right that you're working on in that of you. I'm sure the public needs to know if the 987 01:12:55,290 --> 01:13:01,750 success stories. Yeah. They need to know. We've got a couple more minutes. I guess I'll 988 01:13:01,750 --> 01:13:05,410 just say you've got a secondology who's been around for a long time. I used to manage 989 01:13:05,410 --> 01:13:09,370 had a mechanical security. We got approached by many companies that use license plate 990 01:13:09,370 --> 01:13:16,390 play readers and tow trucks to look for repo vehicles and you'd be surprised how much data tow trucks pull when they go through 991 01:13:16,930 --> 01:13:24,030 Vehicle parking lots and they drive down the road and the opposite direction of you are swinging through our grocery stores using 992 01:13:24,650 --> 01:13:25,490 the private 993 01:13:25,490 --> 01:13:28,070 Data gathered by private businesses 994 01:13:28,930 --> 01:13:34,410 I could put in my own license plate and I could see what roads I drive down where apart what grocery stores I go to 995 01:13:34,410 --> 01:13:41,490 The whole pattern of life analysis and the requirement for that software is that you have a physical building and you have a security officer's license. 996 01:13:42,050 --> 01:13:44,230 So it's been around for a long time. 997 01:13:44,910 --> 01:13:55,630 So I think to have that technology in the handle on enforcement is very reasonable since security officers could run that 10 years ago. 998 01:13:57,070 --> 01:14:03,350 personally very conservative very keep the government out of my life but I 999 01:14:03,350 --> 01:14:07,430 also look at this and I say there's a slippery slope argument and that's a 1000 01:14:07,430 --> 01:14:13,250 valid argument but as as you already stated this listens to the 1001 01:14:13,250 --> 01:14:17,670 conversations I have with my wife before I go to bed this tells the 1002 01:14:17,670 --> 01:14:21,850 governments if they want to if they have the ability to do secret 1003 01:14:21,850 --> 01:14:24,430 It fires a warrants, and I don't get to know about it. 1004 01:14:24,510 --> 01:14:25,570 They're stalking me. 1005 01:14:25,750 --> 01:14:28,510 This will tell them a hundred times more 1006 01:14:28,510 --> 01:14:31,730 than a stationery or even a PTC plot camera will go. 1007 01:14:31,950 --> 01:14:35,790 So, personally, for the council, if you want 1008 01:14:35,790 --> 01:14:38,950 to know where I stand, any citizen that demands 1009 01:14:38,950 --> 01:14:43,530 that we remove ELPRs, I will frequently agree with them 1010 01:14:43,530 --> 01:14:46,150 as soon as we remove every bit of technology 1011 01:14:46,150 --> 01:14:47,950 that does the same thing. 1012 01:14:48,210 --> 01:14:50,390 So, when the person posts on Facebook 1013 01:14:50,390 --> 01:14:55,390 look that the flock cameras need to come down. My first question is, you're okay, carrying 1014 01:14:55,390 --> 01:14:59,610 advice that tracks your location and tells you how fast you're walking that knows what 1015 01:14:59,610 --> 01:14:59,970 room and 1016 01:15:00,000 --> 01:15:29,840 House you're sitting at. And yet, when we have a device that law enforcement can use to find missing children or stolen cars, that's where we put up the fight. I think it's low hanging fruit. I think it's lazy by residents. And this is somebody who will say this to both sides and somebody who would say on one hand, I'm very conservative. I think the government can say on a personal matters. But if I'm going to be completely consistent, if I take that stand strong, I'm the biggest hypocrite of all. 1017 01:15:29,840 --> 01:15:32,500 because I care to acknowledge my pocket every day. 1018 01:15:32,580 --> 01:15:34,300 That takes away my rights and I agree to it. 1019 01:15:35,360 --> 01:15:38,260 You don't have a reasonable right to privacy 1020 01:15:38,260 --> 01:15:40,720 in a public area as well. 1021 01:15:40,980 --> 01:15:42,160 That's why we end the cameras everywhere. 1022 01:15:44,160 --> 01:15:48,220 And I mean, as the sheriff said, technology is so crazy. 1023 01:15:48,520 --> 01:15:50,920 I mean, if you want to look at open source news, 1024 01:15:51,240 --> 01:15:54,080 they found the downpiled in Iran through a heartbeat sensor 1025 01:15:54,700 --> 01:15:55,300 from space. 1026 01:15:56,380 --> 01:16:00,380 you are a router at your house and three to map your entire house and see what we're 1027 01:16:00,380 --> 01:16:06,720 moving into. It's all open source, you can check it out. So for me, I would be a 1028 01:16:06,720 --> 01:16:13,380 million posts of block cameras if we started with the things that mattered most 1029 01:16:13,380 --> 01:16:18,160 and then it's slowing me through for me. So I'll understand that the apprehension to 1030 01:16:18,160 --> 01:16:20,380 and I appreciate where it's coming from for many residents. 1031 01:16:21,980 --> 01:16:30,180 I just, I don't know if I can swallow a missing child getting out of the county while 1032 01:16:30,180 --> 01:16:35,420 carrying a self on my pocket and say he ate from freedom and liberty, but I'm contributing 1033 01:16:35,420 --> 01:16:40,200 to surveillance myself, so that's where I'm at. 1034 01:16:41,400 --> 01:16:47,400 That's more mistaken than a question, but I think you did a great job of presenting, and I 1035 01:16:47,400 --> 01:16:48,660 I think there might be more of these statements 1036 01:16:48,660 --> 01:16:50,920 tonight if there are citizens within the point. 1037 01:16:51,240 --> 01:16:53,480 So just wanted to be some perspective for that. 1038 01:16:53,760 --> 01:16:55,300 And Chief, these are time for me to have a couple things. 1039 01:16:55,740 --> 01:16:55,860 Yeah. 1040 01:16:56,540 --> 01:16:56,740 OK. 1041 01:16:58,040 --> 01:16:58,760 Just from Brown. 1042 01:16:58,880 --> 01:16:59,400 Just locally. 1043 01:16:59,640 --> 01:17:01,020 And he did a great job. 1044 01:17:01,040 --> 01:17:05,960 I just want to touch on trust in that it's not mind trust. 1045 01:17:06,100 --> 01:17:09,620 We take your trust very seriously as you can tell 1046 01:17:10,080 --> 01:17:13,140 by how we try to be seen as humans, given the community. 1047 01:17:13,140 --> 01:17:23,520 But right now, for our whole careers, when we go to an alarm at someone's home, and we find a door open, we walk through the entire house. 1048 01:17:24,080 --> 01:17:25,980 And that was before body cameras. 1049 01:17:26,660 --> 01:17:31,760 And so we really need to trust us and we realize that. 1050 01:17:32,360 --> 01:17:38,500 And the second part is, I think we often talk about big cases, and it is fun to talk about big cases. 1051 01:17:38,500 --> 01:17:41,640 because we just had another successful incident with a 1052 01:17:41,640 --> 01:17:44,060 burglary suspect coming out of a river in the Ramsey 1053 01:17:44,060 --> 01:17:47,660 and they were able to help us, who knows where they're going, 1054 01:17:47,860 --> 01:17:48,900 but they came off highway 10. 1055 01:17:50,280 --> 01:17:52,780 So, they came off the main roads into our city. 1056 01:17:52,980 --> 01:17:55,780 So that's a good win, but I don't think we should overlook 1057 01:17:56,540 --> 01:18:00,640 the single person who has a hit and run happened to them. 1058 01:18:01,460 --> 01:18:03,780 You know, it might not be a cool story to tell, 1059 01:18:03,860 --> 01:18:04,700 but that's still a victim. 1060 01:18:04,700 --> 01:18:13,580 And we have searches where we're able to track that or find that vehicle using health care technology. 1061 01:18:14,160 --> 01:18:16,660 And then also I have to have some local information for you guys. 1062 01:18:16,880 --> 01:18:19,140 City stuff specific. I'm going to go real quick. 1063 01:18:19,880 --> 01:18:27,760 But since January 1st with our license plate readers, the 8 of them, we've searched 1,012 vehicles. 1064 01:18:28,580 --> 01:18:33,220 I might seem like a lot of that goes down to about 28 searches per week. 1065 01:18:34,040 --> 01:18:38,940 So, when you have two-to-large shifts, four-rish off-serves, 1066 01:18:39,040 --> 01:18:43,140 95 per shift, just to not much reason it. 1067 01:18:43,280 --> 01:18:44,380 And a search is not a case. 1068 01:18:45,040 --> 01:18:47,880 For example, we recently had an officer do 13 searches, 1069 01:18:48,400 --> 01:18:50,740 trying to find a hit-run suspect vehicle, 1070 01:18:51,100 --> 01:18:52,780 knew the vehicle description, didn't have a plate. 1071 01:18:53,420 --> 01:18:56,080 And when he come back from his day off, he tried to check again, 1072 01:18:56,180 --> 01:18:58,400 just see if he could help this victim and have a meet. 1073 01:18:58,900 --> 01:19:00,160 So, searches aren't cases. 1074 01:19:00,160 --> 01:19:03,140 is they're just the number of times it's queried. 1075 01:19:04,160 --> 01:19:08,180 And I have a lot more I can go into, but I'll keep it at that 1076 01:19:08,180 --> 01:19:13,100 because you know, anything else until we're 1077 01:19:13,100 --> 01:19:14,760 going to recess for the next two items, 1078 01:19:15,700 --> 01:19:18,780 pretty short, minus the presentation is pretty short. 1079 01:19:19,500 --> 01:19:21,720 Council meeting, so we'll have back here for this. 1080 01:19:22,620 --> 01:19:26,580 There is kind of just more policy guidance. 1081 01:19:26,580 --> 01:19:30,860 Is this something where we're good, supporting, moving forward? 1082 01:19:31,320 --> 01:19:32,620 Cameras are going to stay in town. 1083 01:19:33,420 --> 01:19:35,340 We feel as the county starts to implement them. 1084 01:19:35,360 --> 01:19:38,520 Is that something where we look to add more or move around? 1085 01:19:38,640 --> 01:19:43,300 The ones we have things in that nature, or is this something where we want more discussion 1086 01:19:43,300 --> 01:19:44,040 on it? 1087 01:19:45,560 --> 01:19:50,520 Not necessarily encouraging it, but it is an option to do maybe a standalone open house. 1088 01:19:50,920 --> 01:19:52,700 More questions and answers with the public. 1089 01:19:52,700 --> 01:19:55,760 but generally what I've heard from colleagues 1090 01:19:55,760 --> 01:19:59,860 is it's relatively unproductive, very lengthy, 1091 01:20:00,340 --> 01:20:04,280 but I guess looking for kind of our next step. 1092 01:20:04,540 --> 01:20:05,840 So I think tonight was great for 1093 01:20:05,840 --> 01:20:07,280 talk to me for question and answer 1094 01:20:07,280 --> 01:20:08,860 and understand the program as a whole. 1095 01:20:12,260 --> 01:20:13,660 I would, oh, Christopher. 1096 01:20:15,300 --> 01:20:18,640 I was just gonna say I think the equation to present it, 1097 01:20:18,700 --> 01:20:20,200 I don't mean we're gonna be back as a case 1098 01:20:23,440 --> 01:20:38,300 I don't think we're in a place yet to get the direction one or the other, but I think the information's good, and we have more information now to bring to the table for a future discussion. Chris, I don't think an open house would be productive. 1099 01:20:39,760 --> 01:20:46,160 And I would give chief role in my support that if he supports it, it's important to our city and it's important to me. 1100 01:20:51,660 --> 01:20:57,100 I second would come to my Riley says but I also think it's for transparency state and 1101 01:20:57,100 --> 01:20:59,720 that our citizens are interested in having an open house. 1102 01:21:00,000 --> 01:21:04,400 I think it's important that people can come out and share their feelings and ask questions 1103 01:21:04,980 --> 01:21:09,920 and that can be a part of our decision, but I think we all maybe have, I don't think we 1104 01:21:09,920 --> 01:21:14,480 all but from what I'm gathering, maybe have similar feelings to what come to my Riley 1105 01:21:14,480 --> 01:21:18,700 that's just stated, that's supporting the chief level, I'm sure it's nice. 1106 01:21:18,700 --> 01:21:26,080 All right, well, are we going to put a back on a council session of summarizing how we feel and then everybody can take a couple of weeks to think about it. 1107 01:21:29,500 --> 01:21:35,720 Maybe just if there's a few of you that want to, you know, we can play and move forward unless we hear otherwise. 1108 01:21:36,700 --> 01:21:41,080 We'll monitor public input and if we're hearing stuff we can bring it back to. 1109 01:21:41,660 --> 01:21:45,920 I think there's just no change at this time. We'll discuss whether we want change. 1110 01:21:45,920 --> 01:21:53,980 All right, with that, we'll go ahead and recess until after the City Council meeting, 1111 01:22:00,400 --> 01:22:00,660 the 1112 01:22:00,660 --> 01:22:00,920 Thank you.